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American social science and the psychology of development in India, 1940s-1960s 
Joseph Paul Francombe 
Abstract 
With the arrival of independence in 1947, India’s first generation of post-colonial leaders 
embraced the concept of ‘development’ as a central objective of nation-building and a raison 
d'être of the post-colonial state. The opportunity of freedom, it was argued, would pave the 
way for a dramatic process of economic, social and political transformation that would turn 
India from an impoverished, colonial society into a ‘modern’, prosperous and democratic 
one. Set against this backdrop, this thesis explores intersections and entanglements between 
the post-independence pursuit of development and the forms of knowledge produced by post-
war American social science.  
Foregrounding the concept of ‘psychologized development’, the thesis focuses in particular 
on the ways in which Indian elites – including government officials, intellectuals, 
industrialists and more – drew on American psychological expertise in the hope of realizing 
development dreams. With its claims to understand the complex processes that shaped human 
action (and interaction), I argue, American psychological knowledge promised solutions to 
the most pressing contemporary problems, from the treatment of ‘communal’ tension to the 
engagement of rural communities in uplift programmes. Psychology revealed the foundations 
of effective economic entrepreneurship and the basis of sound industrial leadership. It even 
explained how new ideas and practices could be ‘diffused’ throughout society. For Indians, 
psychologized theories of human nature offered knowledge of great utility in the context of 
plans for rapid societal change. For Americans, they offered tools that would turn India into a 
model of democratic development in the context of a global Cold War.  
Using a case study approach, this thesis explores the diverse settings in which Indians and 
Americans came together to psychologize development. In doing so, it examines both the 
common themes and the recurring challenges that came with attempts to realize development 
through social science expertise. The resulting history offers new perspectives not just on the 
character and complexion of developmentalism in post-colonial India, but also on the forms 
of cross-border connection that shaped India’s post-1947 transition. The thesis makes novel 
contributions to a number of historiographical fields, including the history of American social 
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In 1965, in classrooms at Ranchi University, in the Indian state of Bihar, a team of 
psychologists presided over an experiment. Organizing 120 undergraduate students into forty 
groups of three, the psychologists began by explaining that all groups would be undertaking a 
simple ‘cube construction task’ using small wooden blocks. Meanwhile, unbeknown to the 
participants, the psychologists varied the conditions of the task along two different axes. To 
some, they provided the minimum number of blocks necessary to complete the task, thereby 
reflecting a state of ‘limited resources’. To others, they gave three times the number of blocks 
required. At the same time, groups under each of these two ‘resource conditions’ were 
divided further, into two types of ‘verbally induced need’. Some were motivated to feel a 
‘competing orientation’. Here, psychologists framed the task as a test of ‘individual 
intelligence’, one in which every participant should attempt to place the maximum number of 
correct blocks in the shortest possible time. In other groups, the psychologists sought to 
cultivate a ‘cooperative orientation’. The aim of the exercise, these participants were told, 
was to maximize the task performance of the group as a whole.1  
As students carefully placed block on top of block, the psychologists took notes about the 
impact of different conditions on the groups’ ability to complete the task. To what extent did 
groups under ‘unlimited’ resource conditions perform better than those with ‘limited’ 
resources? How did task performance vary with different ‘need conditions’? What sort of 
needs worked best under ‘limited’ resources? According to the researchers, the results would 
have significance far beyond the confines of the classroom. By highlighting the forms of 
motivation conducive to productive behaviour under different resource environments, the 
experiment would provide the basis for a new ‘strategy for planned change’.2  
Against a backdrop of grand contemporary visions for social, economic and political 
‘development’, the Ranchi experiment represented an attempt to deploy psychological 
knowledge as an applied form of expertise. Psychologized frames of thinking, it suggested, 
provided a serviceable set of tools that could be used to catalyse the process of rapid societal 
transformation that India’s post-independence leaders desired. The experiment would form 
part of a broader wave of efforts to apply psychological thinking to developmental problems 
in India. In this thesis, I explore the efforts of a network of actors – comprising government 
 
1 Jai B.P. Sinha, ‘The n-ach/n-cooperation under limited/unlimited resource conditions’, Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 4:2, 1968, pp. 233-246. 
2 Ibid., pp. 238-239.  
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officials, social scientists, industrialists and foundation officers – to ‘psychologize’ 
development in this way.  
A history of what I call ‘psychologized development’, it will be seen, takes us on a journey 
through a diverse range of development fields, from post-partition communal tension, 
through rural and industrial development, to state-backed programmes of population control. 
What underwrote attempts to apply psychologized thinking in each of these areas, this thesis 
will suggest, was a conviction that development hinged ultimately on changes to attitudes, 
norms and behaviours. By highlighting the forces that gave rise to certain types of behaviour, 
proponents argued, psychological frames of thinking would help to usher in those 
adjustments, thereby fast-tracking development from the ‘bottom-up’. A psychological 
approach made sense, then, because development, like all processes of social change, hinged 
ultimately on questions concerning both the individual and the collective mind.  
In most existing accounts, the efforts of post-independence leaders to ‘develop’ India have 
been characterized in certain ways. Driven by desires for rapid economic and social progress, 
we are told, the Nehruvian state threw its weight behind grand feats of technical engineering, 
from hydroelectric dams to steel cities, together with prescriptive models of scientific 
economic ‘planning’, as the mechanisms through which India would make its transition into 
the modern world.3 The Nehruvian investiture in grand material paradigms of progress can 
hardly be denied. The chapters of this thesis, however, speak of a complementary yet 
different set of ideas. For proponents of psychologized development, I argue, the real key to 
progress lay in a distinct kind of societal reordering. Psychological science, they argued, with 
its claims to comprehend complex processes that shaped human nature, promised to deliver 
development not in the form of steel and concrete but rather through the cultivation of new 
patterns of thought and behaviour. Recounting the efforts of those who sought to 
psychologize development thus foregrounds a powerful yet largely neglected strain of 
thinking within India’s post-colonial development discourse, one that framed progress as a 
process centring on the rearrangement of society itself. 
 
3 This is the narrative presented in synoptic histories of India’s post-independence decades. See for example 
Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London: Penguin, 2003), ch. 2; Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The 
History of the World’s Largest Democracy (London: Macmillan, 2011), ch. 10. On material paradigms of 
development see also Daniel Haines, ‘Concrete ‘progress’: irrigation, development and modernity in mid-
twentieth century Sindh’, Modern Asian Studies, 45:1, 2011, pp. 179-200; Sugata Bose, ‘Instruments and Idioms 
of Colonial and National Development: India’s Historical Experience in Comparative Perspective’ in Frederick 
Cooper and Randall Packard (eds.) International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History 
and Politics of Knowledge (London, 1997), pp. 45-63. 
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Psychologized development, this thesis argues, was an enterprise shaped profoundly by 
American social science. Driven by tumultuous shifts within American society during the 
first half of the twentieth century, not least the mobilization of social scientists by two 
successive world wars, American social scientists would enter the post-Second World War 
decades as leading advocates for the application of ‘psychological’ knowledge to pressing 
social problems, a process encapsulated in the birth of the new interdisciplinary concept of 
‘behavioral science’. With expanding American interest in the state of ‘underdeveloped’ 
countries during that same period, underpinned by a new Cold War logic, American social 
scientists would quickly seize opportunities to promote these psychologized forms of 
thinking beyond US borders. In what follows, I explore how American experts found in India 
a key site in which to demonstrate the power of these approaches to development. In doing 
so, I also trace the motivations and influences that led Indians, in various locales, to embrace 
these forms of expertise. 
For Americans, the drive to apply social scientific expertise in India reflected a belief in the 
key symbolic significance of Indian development in the context of an escalating global Cold 
War. For Indians, American social science offered knowledge of great utility in the context of 
plans for rapid societal change. Psychologized thinking promised seemingly simple solutions 
to the most complex of questions: from the treatment of communal tension, to the 
engagement of rural communities in uplift programmes, to the foundations of effective 
entrepreneurship and industrial management. It even explained how new ideas and practices 
were ‘diffused’ within a population, and how to make them so. To some Indians at least, 
American social science offered forms of expertise capable of marshalling a process of rapid 
societal change. Significantly, it also appeared as a body of knowledge free from attachment 
to colonial rule.   
American social science would come to play a significant role in shaping thinking on 
development in India. At the same time, India would also come to shape American social 
science. The experience of psychologizing Indian development would mould individual 
scientific careers. It would also turn India into a site in which entire fields of social science 
research would be either made or unmade. In India, moreover, American experts would find 
no blank canvas on which to project their own ideas. Instead, they would encounter a 
dynamic intellectual environment, one in which incoming concepts would be moulded and 
re-worked in accordance with local agendas and ideas. The story of psychologized 
development is, then, ultimately a story of transnational – albeit asymmetrical – intellectual 
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exchange. Indians and Americans would take different things from this process. Both, 
however, would be shaped by it in important ways.  
Retelling the story of psychologized development thus does more than just highlight novel 
forms of development thinking. It also sheds new light on the forms of cross-border 
connection that have shaped India’s recent past. Nuancing well-worn narratives of 
‘estrangement’ between Indian and American actors during the post-1947 decades, the 
processes traced in this thesis demonstrate how the exigencies of the Cold War produced not 
just alienation and frustration between Indians and Americans, but also deep processes of 
borrowing, interaction and exchange.4 These exchanges were by no means without tensions 
and misunderstandings of their own. By highlighting extended processes of Indo-US 
interaction across the period, however, they also give reason to re-think India’s experience of, 
and position within, the global Cold War.  
--- 
In tracing the efforts of a broad, transnational collective of actors to psychologize Indian 
development, this thesis proposes five key themes that permeated all attempts to realize 
progress through the science of the mind. The first – what I call ‘psychologism’ – concerns 
the intellectual assumptions underpinning psychologized development. For those seeking to 
apply psychological knowledge to contemporary problems, I argue, behavioural factors 
represented more than just a factor in the development process – they formed the crux of it. 
Here, psychologizers differed from those who stressed the role of large-scale material, 
economic or social changes in development. Instead, they framed development as a process 
that began with psychological change. As will be seen, this take on development did more 
than just reduce the weight attributed to structural (non-psychological) determinants. In some 
cases, it also turned ‘underdevelopment’ into a problem centring on personality itself. 
The psychologizing approach to development brought with it a second underlying 
assumption; namely, that human nature worked to a particular set of rules. For 
psychologizing social scientists, it was precisely the universality of human nature that made 
their contribution possible. A psychologized approach to tension, for instance, made sense 
because the psychological roots of inter-group conflict were the same everywhere. It was this 
 
4 The trope of ‘estrangement’ has been a key feature of histories of Indo-US foreign relations during the early 
Cold War. See for example Dennis Kux Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941-1991 (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993).  
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emphasis on universality that would underpin the confidence of American social scientists in 
espousing their own expertise in India. Under its influence, privileged American concepts 
could be promoted with little concern for the specificities in which they had first emerged. 
Collapsing distinctions between culture and behaviour, the universalizing view stressed the 
possibility of changing all behaviour through the manipulation of narrow social psychological 
variables. It turned behaviorist forms of thought into expertise deeply attuned to India’s most 
pressing needs.  
The twin impulses of psychologism and universalism ran through all attempts to 
psychologize Indian development. It is the third key theme of this thesis, however, that the 
ends to which social scientists mobilized these ideas were not always the same. On the one 
hand, social scientists differed both in the area in which they sought to apply psychological 
knowledge and in their understanding of how psychology really could assist development. In 
some cases, however, psychologizing social scientists also differed in their basic 
understanding of what the aims of development actually were. Here, it is worth highlighting 
one major question over which contemporaries parted ways. For some, it will be seen, the 
role of psychological expertise centred on its capacity to catalyse a linear process of urban-
industrial ‘modernization’ based on the Western example. For others, meanwhile, social 
scientific knowledge served as a tool in the pursuit of a small-scale, ‘communitarian’ vision 
of development that deliberately eschewed this approach. The tension between these two 
variants of post-war development thought has drawn increasing attention from historians in 
recent years, encapsulated, most effectively, in Daniel Immerwahr’s work on the 
communitarian strain.5 In the chapters that follow, I explore how these competing 
developmentalisms permeated attempts to psychologize development in the field.  
The fourth thematic strand of this thesis concerns the way in which psychologized 
development became a reality in India. That American behavioural models became entwined 
with Indian development, I suggest, was rarely, if ever, a product of raw American power. On 
the contrary, in each of the cases explored below, American psychological expertise found 
footing in India owing in large part to the actions of Indians themselves. American social 
scientists, then, served not just as straightforward agents of American largesse but also as 
respondents to Indian leaders’ own desires to make use of their expertise. On one level, of 
 
5 Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). For a review essay on these competing development visions see Peter 
Mandler, ‘Modernization’s Doppelgänger’, Modern Intellectual History, 13:3, 2016, pp. 819-829.  
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course, both the allure and the availability of American knowledge (backed as it was by US 
government agencies, foundations and universities) did speak of certain forms of American 
power. At the same time, the active role of Indians in soliciting American support serves to 
preclude a simple history of one-way imposition. The collaborative underpinnings of 
American expertise in this context sit in broad alignment with David Engerman’s recent 
observations concerning the nature of Cold War economic assistance to India. Such 
assistance, Engerman argues, was made possible only by the desire of Indians to use it in 
order to ‘advance their own interests’ and ‘fight internal battles’.6 
The idea that psychological frames of thinking might help to expedite development gave 
cause for much optimism among contemporaries, both Indian and American. Psychologized 
social science, after all, drew its authority not from abstract theoretical models but from the 
careful observation – whether in the laboratory or the field – of actual human behaviour. It is 
a final theme of this thesis, however, that for those who put their faith in psychologized 
development, outcomes rarely met expectations. The challenges faced by psychologizing 
projects were by no means always the same. At times, for instance, such projects failed due to 
extraneous factors, such as shifts in political agendas. At others, psychologizing approaches 
found themselves outmuscled by other development expertise. In some cases, attempts to 
psychologize development would fail for altogether more troubling reasons.  
One important subtheme here, unpacked at various points in this thesis, concerns the limits of 
group-based approaches to social change. Putting faith in local ‘leaders’ was a common 
feature of attempts to psychologize development, underpinned by a belief that existing group-
leader relations could be used to engineer and accelerate processes of behavioural adjustment. 
The adoption of this groupist lens stressed the ties that bound people together in serviceable 
social units, rather than those that drove them apart. As social scientists and others invested 
their hopes in the transformative capacities of local group leaders, however, many soon found 
that they did so at a significant cost. The yawning gap between the lofty goals of 
psychologized development and its ultimate reality contains clear parallels with studies of 
applied psychological knowledge in other contexts, most notably Erik Linstrum’s account of 
 
6 David C. Engerman, The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2018). See also David C. Engerman, ‘Development Politics and the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 41:1, 
2017, pp. 1-19.  
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psychology in the late British empire.7 It also speaks to a broader body of literature on the 
tendency of expert-led development regimes to ‘fail’.8 
Five intersecting themes then – psychologism; universalism; competing developmentalisms; 
collaboration; and failure – form the central leitmotifs of this study. Together, these themes 
explore not just the intellectual and institutional alignments that made psychologized 
development possible, but also the eventual fate of psychological expertise. In the chapters 
that follow, I trace how these five linked themes pervaded attempts to apply psychological 
knowledge within five key arenas of post-colonial development thought and practice. 
In chapter one, I explore the advent of psychologized development in the context of an 
immediate post-colonial crisis. Centred around the problem of post-partition ‘communal’ 
tension, the chapter explores how the resulting pursuit of national ‘social integration’ led 
Indian elites to embrace novel forms of psychological expertise geared towards the 
achievement of peace. Responding to the global peacebuilding imperative of the post-war 
moment, I argue, leaders within the field of American ‘social psychology’ had forwarded an 
understanding of peace (and war) rooted in prevailing psychological theories. Human 
conflict, these theories suggested, was an eventuality linked inherently to the problem of 
‘aggression’ and its displacement onto others. Situating this approach in its initial US context, 
the chapter traces its appropriation first by Unesco internationalists and subsequently by 
Indian intellectuals and government officials. In India, the claim that all conflict had 
psychological roots would give rise to the enterprise of ‘tensions research’ – a new, Ministry 
of Education-sponsored programme of social scientific enquiry concerned with uncovering 
the psychosocial basis of tensions between agonistic groups. As leaders at the Ministry of 
Education pushed this approach as a salve for India’s internal problems, however, tensions 
research would soon encounter opposition on numerous fronts.  
The second chapter turns to consider the mobilization of psychological knowledge in a new 
setting: that of rural development. Focusing on ‘Community Development’ (CD), a flagship 
rural development programme launched by the Government of India in 1952, the chapter 
 
7 Erik Linstrum, Ruling Minds: Psychology in the British Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
8 This broader literature has highlighted the ways in which the failure of development regimes serves to mask a 
more significant effect; namely, the expansion of state power. See for example, James C. Scott, Seeing Like a 
State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1999); James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in 
Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Timothy Mitchell, ‘Society, Economy and the State 
Effect’, in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (eds.), The Anthropology of the State: A Reader (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 169-186.  
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explores how CD’s emphasis on cultivating patterns of village ‘self-help’ provided a new 
opening for social psychological ideas. Launched during a period of major tumult in global 
geopolitics, the inauguration of CD coincided with new levels of US interest in Indian 
agricultural development. In the subsequent entanglement between the CD programme and 
US actors and institutions, American social scientists would find opportunities to forward 
their own understandings of how CD’s goal of rural self-help might be achieved. At the 
centre of this enterprise, I argue, sat social psychological ideas about the merits of group-
based approaches to rural social change. As American experts and Indian officials embraced 
ideas about group mobilization as the key to rural development, they also settled on a 
Gandhian-inspired notion of the village as a ‘natural’ group unit through which such 
mobilization could occur. As the 1950s wore on, the viability of this groupist understanding 
of the village would soon be called into question. 
The third chapter explores the rise of forms of psychologized development in the field of 
industrial entrepreneurship, this time linked to social scientific ideas about ‘psychological 
modernization’. Rooted in an ascendant ‘modernization theory’ within post-war American 
social science, proponents of psychological modernization framed development as a process 
involving linear transformations in individual outlook and mentality – on the replacement of 
‘traditional’ by ‘modern’ psychological norms. Focusing on the ideas of one particular 
theorist of psychological modernization, the Harvard University psychologist David C. 
McClelland, the chapter explores how McClelland found in India a site to test his unique 
argument that psychological adjustment formed a necessary precondition – rather than merely 
an effect – of economic development. In India, I argue, McClelland’s ideas found fertile 
ground among officials, social scientists and business communities. During the 1960s, these 
groups would come together to explore the potential of induced psychological change to 
spark heightened entrepreneurship and economic growth. At the same time, India was also 
becoming the site in which McClelland’s psychological take on modernization would face its 
most significant opposition. 
In chapter four, I turn to trace how the emerging sphere of ‘management’ (and ‘management 
education’) became similarly entwined with psychological forms of knowledge. During the 
1950s and 60s, I suggest, in response to the Nehruvian enterprise of planned industrialization, 
claims about the need for new forms of professionalized ‘management’ emerged as a matter 
of broad consensual agreement among Indian industrialists and policymakers. Tracing the 
emergence of ideas on ‘management for development’, the chapter focuses on the thought of 
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one exponent of this argument, the scientist and industrialist Vikram Sarabhai. For Sarabhai, I 
argue, development called not just for a general ‘professionalization’ of management tasks, 
but also for a precise vision of the forms of leadership necessary for effective organizations, 
at the centre of which sat the concept of ‘horizontal control’. Sarabhai’s thinking on 
horizontal control would find parallels in the forms of knowledge espoused by American 
management science. Focusing on the Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, I explore 
how the horizontalist agenda soon became entwined with American social psychological 
techniques for ‘democratizing’ and ‘sensitizing’ corporate leadership. While Sarabhai and 
others promoted techniques for cultivating horizontal leadership, however, Nehruvian 
industrial planning embraced management of a different kind.  
My final chapter traces connections between psychological knowledge and Indian population 
control. Here, I explore how population control, an increasingly central feature of national 
development planning during the 1960s, embraced social psychological thinking in the form 
of American communications science. A new interdisciplinary subfield within post-war 
American social science, ‘communication studies’ galvanized psychologists, sociologists, 
political scientists and others in the study of how communication processes shaped human 
behaviour. During the 1950s, leaders within this field were engaged in the development of a 
new, ‘scientific’ understanding of the way in which this process worked, one that gave prime 
importance to the role of ‘interpersonal’ factors in effective ‘mass communication’. In India, 
communications knowledge would come to exert a profound influence over the government’s 
approach to population control. Beginning with the establishment of new institutes of ‘family 
planning communications action research’, Indian planners would soon come to develop 
population programmes based squarely on the insights of communications science. As 
communications theory infiltrated population control, it framed reproduction as a behavioural 
phenomenon open to alteration through social psychological dynamics of communicative 
persuasion. By the late 1960s, the pursuit of fertility reduction through strategic 
communication had also become deeply entwined with more coercive approaches to 
population control. 
This thesis adopts a broad, inclusive definition of what constitutes ‘psychological’ 
knowledge. ‘Psychology’, Nikolas Rose has argued ‘is a “generous” discipline’, one that 
routinely ‘enters into alliances’ with other ‘agents of social authority…colonizing their ways 
of calculating and arguing with psychological vocabularies, reformulating their ways of 
explaining normality and pathology in psychological terms’. The key to this ‘social 
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penetration of psychology’, according to Rose, ‘lies in its capacity to lend itself freely to 
others, who will “borrow” it because of what it offers them in the way of a justification and 
guide to action’. For Rose, the assimilable character of psychological thinking calls for 
conceptual, rather than disciplinary, definition of ‘psychological expertise’.9 In a similar vein, 
this thesis approaches psychological knowledge as more than simply the work that 
psychologists do. In some cases, the protagonists of this story do fit the description of 
professional psychologists within university departments. In others, however, the focus is on 
experts from a different disciplinary domain. At times, I explore how psychologized 
assumptions seeped into the thinking of other ‘agents of social authority’, from government 
officials to corporate leaders.  
What follows, then, is emphatically not a disciplinary history of psychology in India, nor a 
straightforward study of American influence in India. Several of the figures and institutions 
one would expect to find in such histories appear only fleetingly in the pages to come. 
Meanwhile, considerable space has been devoted to projects, sites and actors that would 
appear trivial from a disciplinary or broader international relations perspective. What has 
determined the inclusion of projects and programmes in this thesis has been a concern with 
the ideas, interactions and exchanges surrounding the specific process of expert-led 
intervention that I call psychologized development. It is with this question in mind that the 
chapters should subsequently be approached. 
--- 
The history of psychologized development presented here engages and intersects with the 
work of historians in number of fields, the first of which might be referred to broadly as the 
history of development. The era of ‘development’, historians have shown, began long before 
the advent of Indian independence, and long before the escalation of the global Cold War. As 
an idea with its roots in the ideals of progress and ‘social evolutionism’ produced by the 
European Enlightenment, ‘development’ – conceived broadly as state-centred efforts to effect 
processes of social and economic transformation – gained new meaning during the first half 
of the twentieth century, driven in part by new understandings of ‘the economy’ as an 
abstract domain capable of expert intervention.10 Colonial territories, as targets of an imperial 
 
9 Nikolas Rose, ‘Engineering the Human Soul: The Rise of Psychological Expertise’, Science in Context, 5:2, 
1992, pp. 356.  
10 Timothy Mitchell, Rule by Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2002).  
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‘civilizing mission’, were among those most subjected to development discourses.11 In the 
Indian case, a rich body of literature has traced the emergence of developmentalist logic and 
rhetoric within British policies, showing, in the process, how such ideas served to justify and 
extend colonial rule.12 Development ideas did more than merely serve as an instrument of 
colonial power, however; they also became a platform for challenges to colonial rule. With 
the growth of the nationalist movement from the 1920s, arguments about the 
‘underdevelopment’ of India would become a powerful weapon in the armoury of the 
nationalist leaders. Promises to ‘develop’ India, meanwhile, became part of the raison d'être 
for nationalism itself.13 Post-colonial concerns with progress were thus at their core a 
continuation of a longer tradition. Over the colonial to post-colonial watershed, David 
Ludden has argued, the ‘cognitive terrain’ of development remained ‘remarkably stable’.14  
The strong continuities between colonial and post-colonial development discourse can hardly 
be denied. This thesis, however, draws upon literature that has stressed the distinct features of 
developmentalism in the post-colonial era.15 In India, independence brought with it new 
 
11 On colonial developmentalism see Frederick Cooper, ‘Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the 
Development Concept’, in Fredrick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds.), International Development and the 
Social Sciences: Essays on the History of Politics and Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997), pp. 49-62; Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and 
British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: 
Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2007); Helen Tilly, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific 
Knowledge, 1870-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Gilbert Rist, The History of 
Development: from Western Origins to Global Faith (London: Zed Books, 1997); Michael Adas, Machines as 
the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and the Ideology of Western Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989). 
12 On colonial developmentalism in India see Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to 
National Space (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004); Daniel Haines, Building the Empire, Building the 
Nation: Development, Legitimacy, and Hydro-Politics in Sind, 1919-1969 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
2013); David Ludden, ‘India’s Development Regime’, in Nicholas B. Dirks (ed.), Colonialism and Culture 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 247-287; C. A. Bayly, ‘Indigenous and Colonial Origins 
of Comparative Economic Development: The Case of Colonial India and Africa’, in C. A. Bayly et al. (eds.), 
History, Historians and Development Policy: A Necessary Dialogue (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2011), 39–64; Hodge, Triumph of the Expert.  
13 Benjamin Zachariah, Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, c. 1930-50 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).  
14 Ludden ‘India’s Development Regime’, pp. 251-252. For other studies emphasizing continuities between 
colonial and post-colonial developmentalism see Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial 
World: A Derivative Discourse? (London: Zed Books, 1986), ch. 5; Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its 
Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Haines, Building 
the Empire, Building the Nation. The emphasis on continuities between colonial and post-colonial regimes has 
been extended to other aspects of statehood. For one example see David C. Potter, India’s Political 
Administrators, 1919-1983 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).  
15 Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (London: Duke 
University Press, 1998), p. 43. For other accounts that stresses elements of change, as well as continuity in post-
colonial development discourse, see Bose, ‘Instruments and Idioms of Colonial and National Development’, pp. 
45-63; Sunil S. Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-1965 (Cambridge 
International and Post-Colonial Studies Series) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).   
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popular expectations surrounding development, combined, of course, with universal suffrage. 
Independence also tied the state to the domestic economy (and thereby to its development) in 
ways that had not been the case under the colonial rule. Just as importantly, the post-colonial 
pursuit of development also brought a new cast of actors to the fore. As nationalist leaders 
replaced colonial administrators, new Cold War geopolitical imperatives turned development 
into the site of new transnational interactions and exchanges. None of this changed the 
fundamental assumptions underpinning development itself. What it did do was open up new 
contestations over its meaning and form.16 
In particular, this thesis draws on what is now a rich body of literature concerning the 
entanglements between Indian post-colonial developmentalism and American actors, 
institutions and ideas. Encounters between Americans and Indians on questions of social and 
economic progress were not unique to the post-1947 period, as the recent work of Harald 
Fischer-Tiné and others has shown.17 At the same time, a number of historical accounts have 
also traced the way in which the immediate post-independence decades, converging as they 
did with the onset of the ‘global Cold War’, gave rise to an array of new cross-border 
connections within this space.18 As decolonization and Cold War geopolitics conspired to 
 
16 On the role of the Cold War in shaping development ideas and practices see Odd Arne Westad, The Global 
Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). See also Amy L.S. Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture 
Organization and World Health Organization Changed the World (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 
2006).  
17 For earlier entanglements between Indian development pursuits and American actors see Harald Fischer-Tiné, 
‘The YMCA and Low-Modernist Rural Development in South Asia, c. 1922-1957’, Past and Present, 240, 
2018, pp. 193-234; Harald Fischer-Tiné, ‘Fitness for Modernity? The YMCA and physical-education schemes 
in late-colonial South Asia (circa 1900–40)’, Modern Asian Studies, 53:2, 2019, pp. 512-599; Subir Sinha, 
‘Lineages of the Developmentalist State: Transnationality and Village India, 1900–1965’, Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, l: 1, 2008, pp. 57-90; Raghavan, Fierce Enigmas, ch. 3.  
18 David Engerman, The Price of Aid; Immerwahr, Thinking Small; Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: 
America’s Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Srinath 
Raghavan, Fierce Enigmas: A History of the United States in South Asia (New York: Basic Books, 2019); Akhil 
Gupta, Postcolonial Developments; ‘Nicole Sackley, ‘The Village as Cold War Site: Experts, Development, and 
the History of Rural Reconstruction’, Journal of Global History, 6:3, 2011, pp. 481-504; Nicole Sackley, 
‘Village Models: Etawah, India, and the Making and Remaking of Development in the Early Cold War’, 
Diplomatic History, 37:4, 2013, pp. 749-778; Nicole Sackley, ‘Foundation in the Field: The Ford Foundation 
New Delhi Office and the Construction of Development Knowledge, 1951-1970’, in Johm Krige and Helke 
Rausch (eds.), American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), pp. 232-260; Jack Loveridge, ‘Between Hunger and Growth: 
Pursuing Rural Development in Partition’s Aftermath, 1947–1957’, Contemporary South Asia, 25:1, 2017, pp. 
56-69; David C. Engerman, ‘West Meets East: The Center for International Studies and Indian Economic 
Development’ in David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele and Michael E. Latham (eds.) Staging 
Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
2003), pp. 199-233; Dennis Merrill, The Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India’s Economic 
Development, 1947-1963 (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Matthew Connelly, Fatal 
Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
For an earlier account see George Rosen, Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents of Change in South 
Asia 1950-1970 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). 
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produce new levels of American interest in the affairs of so-called ‘underdeveloped’ regions, 
this has demonstrated, India – a newly-independent nation committed to both democracy and 
development – soon became a key symbolic site for American developmental ambitions.19 In 
retracing the connections produced by this Cold War project, historians have also looked to 
uncover the reasons why Indians themselves chose to embrace (or to reject) American forms 
of support.20 In much of this work, the focus has been on either material, technological or 
economic forms of assistance. Nicole Sackley has studied approaches to Indian development 
forwarded by select groups of American social scientists.21 Thus far, however, there has been 
no attempt to understand the ways in which psychological expertise became a key theatre of 
interaction between American and Indian actors during this period. 
In exploring the ways in which Indians and Americans successfully promoted psychological 
knowledge for development, this thesis builds upon the work of those who have studied the 
twentieth century rise of psychologized expertise. The work of Nikolas Rose, Ellen Herman, 
Rebecca Lemov and James L. Nolan Jr. is notable in this regard.22 Such scholarship has 
offered a convincing portrait of the ways in which psychological frames of thinking have 
come to exert influence within Western societies, especially the United States. At the same 
time, there has been no attempt to explore the ways this embrace of psychologized thinking 
found parallels in other contexts. As this thesis demonstrates, in the midst of contemporary 
dreams of rapid social and economic progress, Indian post-colonial elites would also turn a 
 
19 For a series of essays exploring the relationship between decolonization and the Cold War see Leslie James 
and Elisabeth Leake (eds.), Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence (London: Bloomsbury, 
2015).  
20 For an especially good example of this see Engerman, The Price of Aid.  
21 Nicole Sackley, ‘Passage to Modernity: American Social Scientists, India, and the Pursuit of Development, 
1945-1961’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Princeton, 2004. 
22 Nikolas Rose, The Psychological Complex: Psychology, Politics and Society in England 1869-1939 (London: 
Routledge, 1985); Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (London: Free 
Association Books, 1999); and Rose ‘Engineering the Human Soul’ pp. 351-369; Ellen Herman, The Romance 
of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995); Rebecca M. Lemov, World as Laboratory: Experiments with Mice, Mazes, and Men (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2005); James L. Nolan Jr., The Therapeutic State: Justifying Government at Century’s End (New York: 
New York University Press, 1998). Many studies have traced the rise of psychological expertise within 
particular domains of society. See for example: Ron Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and 
Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); James H. Capshew, 
Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice and Professional Identity in America, 1929-1969 (Cambridge, 
1999). For examples of psychology in corporate culture see Richard Gillespie, Manufacturing Knowledge: A 
History of the Hawthorne Experiments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Jenna Feltey Alden, 
‘Bottom-Up Management: Participative Philosophy and Humanistic Psychology in American Corporate 
Culture, 1930-1970’, unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2012; ‘Personality, Incorporated: 
Psychological Capital in American Management, 1960-1995’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of 
Toronto, 2019.  
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psychological lens on society. By charting the ways in which they did so, my thesis extends 
the literature on the rise of the ‘therapeutic’ to new and unexpected locales. 
My study of how psychology became wedded to post-colonial development agendas also 
builds upon existing accounts of the ways in which, both within India and beyond, 
psychology and other forms of social science have been shaped by prevailing political, 
cultural and ideological milieus. During the colonial period, historians have shown, 
‘psychology’ served at times as a powerful handmaid to colonial rule. By reifying perceived 
psychic differences between colonized and colonizing populations, psychological experts – 
from psychiatrists, to psychoanalysts, to mental testers – both legitimized prevailing ideas 
about racial hierarchy and helped to undermine subjects’ own claims to self-determination.23 
Recent studies have sought to nuance the idea of psychological knowledge as an instrument 
of colonial power. While some produced knowledge that explicitly vindicated imperial 
ideologies, Erik Linstrum has argued, others wielded psychology in ways that did more to 
refute than they did to uphold the basic assumptions underpinning colonial rule.24 Studies of 
psychology under colonialism have thus produced a lively debate concerning the relationship 
between psychological knowledge and colonial power. Meanwhile, the morphing of 
psychology into a tool of post-colonial development has received far less attention.25 
This thesis has also benefited from the scholarship of historians in a number of other fields. 
Histories of Indo-US diplomatic relations, including the work of Robert J. McMahon, 
 
23 Sloane Mahone and Meghan Vaughan (eds.), Psychiatry and Empire (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); 
Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
1991); Warwick Anderson, Deborah Jenson and Richard C. Keller (eds.), Unconscious Dominions: 
Psychoanalysis, Colonial Trauma, and Global Sovereignties (London: Duke University Press, 2011); Shruti 
Kapila, ‘Masculinity and Madness: Princely Personhood and the Colonial Sciences of the Mind in Western 
India, 1870-1940, Past and Present, 187, 1, 2005, pp. 121-156; Christine Hartnack, ‘British psychoanalysts in 
colonial India’, in M. Ash and W. Woodward (eds.), Psychology in twentieth century thought and society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 233-252; Christine Hartnack, Psychoanalysis in Colonial 
India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Ashis Nandy, ‘The Savage Freud: The First Non-Western 
Psychoanalyst in Colonial India’ in Nandy, The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable 
Selves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 81-144; Sunil Bhatia, ‘Orientalism in Euro-American and 
Indian Psychology: Historical Representations of “Natives” in Colonial and Postcolonial Contexts’, History of 
Psychology, 5:4, 2002, pp. 376-398; Jock McCulloch, Colonial Psychiatry and ‘The African Mind’ (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Saul Dubow, Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Graham Richards, ‘Race’, Racism and Psychology: Towards a Reflexive 
History (London: Routledge, 1997). 
24 Linstrum, Ruling Minds. Perhaps the most blatant way in which psychology was used to challenge 
colonialism was through accounts of the destructive psychological consequences of colonialism, the most 
notable being Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto Press, 1986). For a secondary account of 
Fanon see McCulloch, Colonial Psychiatry and ‘The African Mind’, ch. 9. 
25 For an exemplary account of how psychological knowledge, and in particular psychiatry, was re-shaped by 
the colonial to post-colonial transition see Matthew M. Heaton, Black Skin, White Coats: Nigerian Psychiatrists, 
Decolonization and the Globalization of Psychiatry (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013).   
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Andrew J. Rotter, Anita Inder Singh, Paul M. McGarr and Srinath Raghavan have provided 
invaluable background material on the rise of American Cold War interest in South Asia (as 
well as the obstacles faced by American actors in the region).26 Owing to the fact that many 
of the experts studied in this thesis arrived in India through non-official channels, the 
expanding literature on the history of American corporate philanthropy (in India and beyond) 
has also proved instructive.27 Broader transnational histories of the United States have 
encouraged me to think about the two-way processes involved in the circulation of American 
ideas.28 Intellectual and cultural histories of American psychology and social science have 
provided essential background on the various forms of knowledge propagated by American 
social science.29 Moreover, the thesis has also benefitted from the lively historical debate on 
the impacts of Cold War politics on American social science.30 Finally, synoptic accounts of 
 
26 Robert J. McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996); Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-
1964 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia 
and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947-1956 (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993); Paul M. McGarr, The 
Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Dennis Merrill, The Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India’s 
Economic Development, 1947-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Kux Estranged 
Democracies; Srinivas Madumbai, United States Foreign Policy Towards India, 1947-1954 (New Delhi: 
Manohar Publications, 1980); Shivaji Ganguly, U.S. Policy Toward South Asia (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990); 
William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972). 
27 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in 
the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); John Krige and Helke Rausch 
(eds.), American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2012); Soma Hewa and Darwin H. Stapleton, Globalization, Philanthropy, and 
Civil Society: Toward a New Political Culture in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Springer, 2005); Robert 
Arnove and Nadine Pinede, ‘Revisiting the ‘‘Big Three’’ Foundations’, Critical Sociology, 33:3, 2007, pp. 389-
425; Corinna Unger, ‘Towards a global equilibrium: American foundations and Indian modernization, 1950s to 
1970s’, Journal of Global History, 6:1, 2011, pp. 121-142; Sackley, ‘Foundation in the Field’, pp. pp. 232-260. 
28 In particular the various contributions to Andrew Preston and Doug Rossinow (eds.), Outside In: The 
Transnational Circuitry of US History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
29 For key texts on psychology see Kurt Danziger, Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological 
Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John M. O’Donnell, The Origins of Behaviorism: 
American Psychology, 1870–1920 (New York: New York University Press, 1985); Rebecca Lemov, World as 
Laboratory; Katherine Pandora, Rebels within the Ranks: Psychologists' Critique of Scientific Authority and 
Democratic Realities in New Deal America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Herman, Romance 
of American Psychology; Mitchell G. Ash, ‘Psychology’ in Dorothy Ross and Theodore Porter (eds.), The 
Modern Social Science (The Cambridge History of Science, Vol. 7) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), pp. 251-274. For social science more broadly see Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Mark C. Smith, Social Science in the Crucible: The American 
Debate Over Objectivity and Purpose, 1918-1941 (London: Duke University Press, 1994).  
30 Mark Salovey and Hamilton Cravens (eds.), Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal 
Democracy and Human Nature (London: Palgrave, 2012); Joel Isaac, ‘The Human Sciences in Cold War 
America’, The Historical Journal, 50:3, 2007, pp. 725-746; Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: 
Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Michael E. 
Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Peter Mandler, Return from the Natives: How 
Margaret Mead Won the Second World War and Lost the Cold War (London: Yale University Press 2013); 
Noam Chomsky et al (eds.)., The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Post-war 
Years (New York: The New Press, 1997).  
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India’s post-independence history have helped to frame the political, cultural and intellectual 
milieu of the 1950s and 60s. In doing so, they have provided valuable information on the 
context within which the enterprise of psychologized development unfolded.31 
--- 
This thesis is the first to systematically examine the place of psychological expertise within 
post-war development thought and practice, not just in India but in any context. What 
follows, however, is more than simply an act of historical gap-filling. Woven into the fabric 
of this history are questions and debates worth studying for other reasons. To what extent 
have expert forms of development knowledge actually delivered on their promise? What have 
been the challenges faced by such forms of intervention? What has caused some forms of 
expert knowledge to rise, and others to wane? The chapters that follow offer few concrete 
answers to these questions. What they do provide, however, is a number of illuminating and 
cautionary tales. In this sense, the story of post-war actors’ attempts to psychologize 
development is a story with stakes above and beyond the enterprise of academic history 
writing. It is also a story of relevance to our own expert-driven times. 
 
31 The most notable examples being Khilnani, The Idea of India; Guha, India After Gandhi; Bipin Chandra, 




Psychologizing tension: the social psychological approach to peace in wartime 
America and post-partition India 
On 15 August 1947, as Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed the commencement of India’s long-
awaited ‘tryst with destiny’, Mahatma Gandhi, the ‘father’ of the Indian nation, observed 
prayer and fasting in a deserted Muslim house in the city of Calcutta, over 900 miles away. In 
the days leading up to the independence celebrations, Gandhi had taken up residence in the 
abandoned dwelling, located within the Belliaghat district of the city, in an attempt to end the 
viscous upsurge of ‘communal’ violence and bloodshed that had engulfed the city throughout 
the previous year. Using the house to hold prayer meetings, debates and confessionals with 
leaders of both the Hindu and Muslim communities, the Mahatma pleaded desperately to 
members on both sides to prevent a further outbreak of internecine slaughter in the period 
during the formal transfer of power.1 
Famously, Gandhi’s efforts would pay dividends. For almost three weeks after Independence 
Day, the city of Calcutta would bear witness not only to a complete suspension of large-scale 
violence, but also to ‘unprecedented’ scenes of ‘communal fraternisation’.2 Nevertheless, the 
juxtaposed positions of Nehru and Gandhi at the moment of independence highlighted a 
crucial point about the circumstances in which Indian freedom had arrived. Intertwined with 
high-level debates about the division of the subcontinent into two nations – a Hindu-majority 
India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan – independence had arrived amidst a bitter cycle of 
retributive violence between Hindu and Muslim communities, especially in major centres like 
Calcutta. The formal partition of the subcontinent on 15 August, which forced millions to 
move between the new territories, would further escalate this violence, leading to mass 
communal killings of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs across the four corners of the new nation. 
As Gandhi’s fast at Belliaghat encapsulated, the restoration of harmonious relations between 
constituent communities represented a matter of urgent importance for India’s new leaders at 
the moment of independence. Indian freedom, it made clear, arrived in the context of an 
urgent search for peace. 
 
1 For first-hand accounts of Gandhi’s time in Belliaghat see Manubehn Gandhi, The Miracle of Calcutta, trans. 
Gopalrao Kulkarni (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1959); Horace Alexander, ‘A Miracle in 
Calcutta’, Prospect Magazine, 137 (2007). 
2 Sumitra Gupta and Mahendra Pratap, ‘Mahatma Gandhi: and the Calcutta Satyagraha 1947’, Proceedings of 
the Indian History Congress, 62 (2001), p. 513.  
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As a defining feature of post-colonial nationalist discourse, the concern for peace found a 
natural adjunct in the international arena. With the shockwaves of the Second World War still 
reverberating, a concern for the establishment of peace represented a defining feature of the 
broader international political and intellectual milieu with which Indian independence 
coincided. Reflected in the emergence of a new, reinvigorated internationalism at the United 
Nations, the urgent pursuit of post-war peace drew upon a prevailing belief that renewed 
international conflict, in an atomic age, would bring with it an end to the human race. ‘If we 
do not want to die together in war’, remarked US President Harry S. Truman in 1945, ‘we 
must learn to live together in peace’.3 
In this chapter, I explore how the mid-century pursuit of peace, as an animating feature of 
both Indian post-colonial and broader post-war international discourse, created spaces for the 
production and exchange of knowledge geared towards its achievement. Though the mid-
century moment would give rise to wide-ranging intellectual engagement with the problem of 
war and human conflict, it was the dynamic field of ‘social psychology’, I suggest, that 
emerged at the forefront of attempts to apply knowledge to peace. Blurring the boundary 
between the academy and public life, social psychology would present itself as the architect 
of a new scientific understanding of the causes of war, one that turned peacebuilding – in all 
its variations – from a lofty ideal into a matter fit for expert intervention.  
At the heart of this intellectual manoeuvre sat the elusive, yet alluring, concept of ‘tension’. 
According to psychologists, all instances of human conflict – and ultimately of war – could 
be understood as a product of tension between the groups involved. Far from inevitable, or 
even rational, such tension represented a contingent social psychological state, produced by 
the interaction between individuals and the ‘pressure’ applied by external forces. More 
specifically, tensions were the result of a complex psychosocial chain in which individual 
‘aggression’, caused by frustration, was displaced onto others in ways that made for ‘warlike’ 
behaviours. According to psychologists, the collective group tensions that underpinned war 
thus had their roots in tensions within the individual mind. By understanding the links 
between these processes, they suggested, the seeds of a truly lasting peace could finally be 
sown.  
 
3 Harry S. Truman, ‘Address to the United Nations in San Francisco, April 25, 1945’, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, Volume I: 1945 (Washington, D.C: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 23.  
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The social psychological approach to peace was forged in the context of mid-century 
American social science. But it soon found itself transported beyond these intellectual 
moorings. From its position at the forefront of post-war internationalism, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) quickly embraced the 
psychological approach as the basis for its first flagship programme – the project on 
‘Tensions Affecting International Understanding’.4 As a central feature of Unesco’s bid to 
build ‘world community’, the ‘Tensions Project’ would set out to both diagnose and treat the 
social psychological underpinnings of tensions pervading the international arena. But the lure 
of a social psychological approach was also a more global story. As Indian leaders sought to 
broker peace and integration within the new nation, they too would embrace expert 
psychological knowledge in pursuit of the task. In 1948, the Indian Ministry of Education 
would embark on its own Unesco-backed programme to study the psychological roots of 
tension between social groups.  
Tracing this intellectual lineage, the chapter pays particular attention to the role of Gardner 
Murphy. As a leading figure within mid-century American social psychology, Murphy sat at 
the forefront of the movement to apply psychological principles to the problem of post-war 
peace. With the uptake of these ideas at Unesco and in India, the New York psychologist 
soon found himself transported to the new Republic as a Unesco consultant, recruited by 
Ministry leaders to coordinate the unfolding national programme of tensions research. 
Linking these diverse sites and spaces, Murphy’s experience would encapsulate not only the 
utopian hopes of post-war social psychology, but also the challenges involved in propagating 
American social science across borders at this juncture.   
In India, I argue, the enterprise of the tensions research represented an attempt to leverage 
methods and means designed to build peace in the international arena for the post-colonial 
national cause. Demonstrating a firm conviction in the potential of expert knowledge to steer 
national progress, leaders at the Ministry, including Humayun Kabir, embraced the 
application of ‘objective’ social scientific methods in the hope of probing the underlying 
causes of divisions that plagued India’s internal body politic. As an attempt to harness the 
study of international tension for the nation, however, India’s tensions project soon ran into 
criticism that reversed this logic. Critics accused the Unesco/Ministry project of hypocrisy, of 
broadcasting India’s internal problems at the expense of more urgent tensions pervading the 
 
4 Throughout this chapter, I have used the acronym Unesco (and not UNESCO), following the practice of the 
organization at that time. 
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international arena. What right did Unesco, whose European and American founders had 
dragged the world into two unprecedented world wars, have to study the problem of tension 
in India? What right did an American, whose own society remained plagued by internal racial 
tensions, have to coordinate such studies? During the early 1950s, such critiques would 
significantly curtail the ambitions of the tensions research, turning what had been a bold 
agenda of action-oriented study into a more modest programme of academic research. As 
Unesco’s own Tensions Project also began to falter, the psychological approach to tension, 
rooted as it had been in the post-war, post-partition search for peace, soon found that its 
moment had come and passed.  
American psychologists and the social psychological basis of war and peace 
As atomic bombs descended upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, signalling an imminent end to 
the Second World War, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI), the 
organizational mouthpiece of American social psychology, published its third annual 
Yearbook. Edited and introduced by Gardner Murphy, a professor at the City College of New 
York, the Yearbook, entitled Human Nature and Enduring Peace, set out to mobilize the 
insights of contemporary social psychological research for the impending task of post-war 
peacebuilding. ‘Governments, practical administrators, men of affairs’, its introduction 
explained: 
…have a right to be told in clear and direct language useful things which psychologists can 
formulate for their guidance, exactly as a chemist explains to a farmer the effects of crop 
rotation, or as a geologist explains to a civil engineer the difficulties which will arise in 
building a highway through the Tennessee Valley. The engineer of national and international 
affairs should have at his disposal the most definite facts available about the changing pattern 
of human nature from which war has stemmed, but from which, with proper engineering, 
peace may be made to spring.5 
Published at the end of a war in which psychological expertise had found unprecedented real-
world applications – from the clinical treatment of soldier mental health to the study of 
enemy ‘national character’ – Human Nature reflected a profound sense of confidence in the 
capacity of psychological knowledge to act as a guiding hand to official policy. ‘Proud 
declarations that psychology had been the key to winning the war were commonplace’, notes 
the historian Ellen Herman. And running alongside them came a keen sense of anticipation 
 
5 Gardner Murphy, ed., Human Nature and Enduring Peace: Third Yearbook of the Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1945), p. 10.  
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that ‘psychology would be at the heart of future efforts to prevent war’.6 Together with other 
statements issued by American psychologists at the time, including a ‘Psychologists’ Peace 
Manifesto’ signed by two thousand psychological professionals, the SPSSI Yearbook formed 
part of a clear strategy to turn the making of peace, just as the making of war had been, into a 
question fit for psychological expertise.7  
Set within this broad context, the SPSSI formed the nucleus for a particular branch of 
American psychological thought. ‘Social psychology’, as contemporaries referred to it, was a 
‘cannibalistic discipline best understood broadly’.8 Drawing insights from survey research, 
community studies, culture and personality theory, opinion polling, and political science, 
social psychology was nevertheless characterized by certain defining traits that distinguished 
it from other strands of contemporary psychological research.9 Most notable, in this regard, 
was its emphasis on the study of human behaviour in its social and cultural context. Rebelling 
against a dominant ‘behaviourist’ paradigm of the interwar years, with its desire to reduce 
psychology to a nomothetic, laboratory-bound, experimental science, social psychologists 
drew inspiration from German Gestalt theory and Boasian cultural anthropology in stressing 
the need to understand psychological phenomena in the full complexity of their individual 
instances.10 While retaining an interest in the normative processes that underwrote all human 
behaviour, social psychologists thus rejected the use of rigorous experimentation to ‘reduce 
the natural and social worlds to the lowest possible terms’.11 Instead, they preferred to 
explore human behaviour as the outcome of the interaction between individual psychological 
 
6 Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), p. 77.  
7 Originally issued as an SPSSI press release in April 1945, the psychologists’ manifesto was reprinted in the 
pages of the Third Yearbook. See Murphy, ed., Human Nature, pp. 454-460. For a quantitative appraisal of 
psychologists’ views on the role psychological expertise in peace planning, see Ross Stagner, ‘Opinions of 
Psychologists on Peace Planning’, Journal of Psychology, 19:1, 1945, pp. 3-16. 
8 See Perrin Selcer, ‘Patterns of Science: Developing Knowledge for a World Community at Unesco’, 
unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2011, p. 30. 
9 For historical introductions to social psychology in this period, written by practitioners in the field, see Gordon 
Allport, ‘The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology’, in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, 
eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968), pp. 1-80 and William H. 
Sewell, ‘Some Reflections on the Golden Age of Social Psychology’, Annual Review of Sociology 15:1 (1989): 
1-16.  
10 For historical accounts of the behaviorist paradigm see Rebecca Lemov, World as Laboratory: Experiments 
with Mice, Mazes and Men (New York: Hill & Wang, 2005); John M. O’Donnell, The Origins of Behaviorism: 
American Psychology, 1870–1920 (New York: New York University Press, 1985).  
11 Katherine Pandora, Rebels within the Ranks: Psychologists’ Critique of Scientific Authority and Democratic 
Realities in New Deal America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 3 
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processes and lived social environments – to ‘reconstruct the relations between phenomena, 
rather than to isolate single variables’.12   
Social psychologists’ concern for the dynamic relationship between the individual and the 
social environment – what contemporaries called ‘the field’ – led them to focus on the role of 
‘social stimulus situations’ in shaping behaviour.13 Here, the role of interpersonal 
relationships, group interactions, as well as prevailing social norms, values and institutions 
took centre-stage. At the same time, refusing to see the individual as a ‘passive mechanism 
merely registering the imprints of the outside stimulus field’, social psychologists also probed 
the role of the individual – as an ‘organism with certain needs to be satisfied’ – in 
determining ‘receptivity’ in relation to a given external stimulus.14 As a ‘founder’ of social 
psychology during the interwar period, Gardner Murphy embodied the ideas and convictions 
of those working within this field.15 During the 1920s and 30s, at Columbia University, 
Murphy published several works that helped to define the parameters of the new 
subdiscipline, including a major theoretical treatise on Personality: A Biosocial Approach 
and two extensive compendium-style introductions to Experimental Social Psychology.16 At 
Columbia, Murphy would also nurture a number of doctoral candidates in social psychology, 
including Theodore Newcomb, Rensis Likert, Muzafer Sherif, and Kenneth B. Clark, all of 
whom would later become leaders in the field.17 
 
12 Ibid., p. 106. For the connections between this vision and the psychocultural turn in American social science 
see Edward J. Gitre, ‘The Great Escape: World War II, Neo-Freudianism, and the Origins of U.S. 
Psychocultural Analysis’, Journal of the History of Behavioural Science, 47: 1, 2011, pp. 26-36.  
13 On the Lewinian concept of the ‘field’ within mid-century social psychology see Kurt Lewin, Field theory in 
Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers (edited by Dorothy Cartwright), (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1951); James A. Schellenberg, Masters of Social Psychology: Freud, Mead, Lewin and Skinner (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), pp. 68-86.   
14 Muzafer Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 1.  
15 For a first-hand account of Murphy’s role as a ‘founder’ of social psychology during the 1920s, recounted by 
a close colleague, see ‘Reminisces of Otto Klineberg: Oral History, 1984’, Columbia Center for Oral History, 
Columbia University, New York, p. 18. For more on Murphy’s own understanding of ‘social psychology’ and 
its divergences from the behaviourist paradigm see There is More Beyond: Selected Papers of Gardner Murphy, 
edited by Lois Barclay Murphy (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 1989), pp. 7-10.  
16 Gardner Murphy, Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1947); Gardner Murphy and Lois Barclay Murphy, Experimental Social Psychology (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1931); Gardner Murphy, Lois Barclay Murphy and Theodore W. Newcomb, Experimental 
Social Psychology: Revised Edition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937).  
17 According to Katherine Pandora, Murphy, together with his wife Lois Barclay Murphy and the Harvard 
University psychologist, Gordon Allport, was a key figure in the emergence of social psychology during the 
interwar years, and, as such, a leading ‘rebel’ against the dominant behaviourist paradigm of the period. 
Pandora, Rebels within the Ranks, p. 96-110.  
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Established in 1936, in response to the social and economic crises of the Depression era, the 
SPSSI articulated social psychologists’ desire to apply their science to real-world problems.18 
Here, in a further divergence from the behaviorist emphasis on psychology as a removed, 
‘objectivist’ science, Murphy and other founder members stressed the need for psychologists 
to act purposively to ‘get scientific knowledge into the bloodstream of applied social 
action…building as many bridges as possible between theory and practice in group, 
community, national, and international living’.19 The crux of this activist enterprise, as 
Katherine Pandora has argued, was the study of ‘social attitudes’. According to social 
psychologists, attitudes (like human behaviour more broadly) formed at the intersection 
between individual organisms and social environments. As such, they were not fixed, 
interminable features of human nature, but malleable formations, contingent, in part, on the 
‘stimulus situations’ that gave them their character.20 Uncovering how certain attitudes were 
shaped by certain conditions offered an opportunity to change them. By highlighting the 
conditions that gave rise to racism and inter-group antagonism, for example, social 
psychology sought to highlight ways in which changes to a given social environment might 
enable the replacement of these attitudes with more cooperative forms of social existence. 
Between 1936 and 1945, SPSSI publications would apply these general principles to a wide 
range of contemporary issues, from industrial labour disputes to wartime civilian morale.21 
In Human Nature and Enduring Peace, SPSSI psychologists set out to extend this line of 
thinking to the problem of war itself.22 Contesting the ‘widely-held belief’ that ‘war cannot 
really be eliminated because of the hate and aggression in the heart of man’, psychologists 
offered an interpretation of war as only ever the product of a contingent set of social 
psychological conditions that made people ‘war-ready’. ‘Society’, explained Murphy:  
 
18 On the early history of the SPSSI see Lorenz J. Finison, ‘The Psychological Insurgency: 1936-1945’, Journal 
of Social Issues, 42:1, 1986, pp. 21-33; Finison, ‘The Early History of the Society for the Psychological Study 
of Social Issues: Psychologists and Labor, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 15, 1979, pp. 29-
37; and B. Harris and I.A.M. Nicholson, ‘Experts in the Service of Social Reform: SPSSI, Psychology, and 
Society, 1936-1996 [Special Issue]’, Journal of Social Issues, 54:1, 1998, pp. 53–77. 
19 ‘The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues: Statement of Purpose’, Journal of Social Issues, 2, 
1, 1946. On the distinction between ‘objectivist’ and ‘purposive’ visions of social science in this period see 
Mark C. Smith, Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose, 1918-1941 
(Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1994).  
20 Pandora, Rebels within the Ranks, pp. 113-118.   
21 For an overview of the Society’s early work on these subjects see Finison, ‘The Psychological Insurgency’, 
pp. 21-33.  
22 In actual fact, the SPSSI’s attempts to apply this sort of thinking to post-war peacebuilding had begun earlier 
in the 1940s. See Lorenz J. Finison, ‘The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Peace Action, 
and Theories of Conflict: 1936-1950’, American Psychologist, 38:11, 1983, pp. 1250-1252. 
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…is made warlike or passive…excitable or placid, in accordance with the tempo of life as 
geography, the soil, and commerce with other peoples affect it…it is the cultural categories 
rather than the biological which make men ready or unready to fight, eager or reluctant to 
respond to the appeal of conquest or aggrandizement.23 
According to the psychologists, understanding the social psychological basis for war began 
with the recognition that ‘aggression’ was not an intrinsic human trait. Distinguishing 
between ‘inborn’ tendencies – such as the desire to fulfil hunger, or to breathe – and those 
shaped by externalities, Human Nature placed aggression firmly within the latter category. 
The individual, explained Murphy, had ‘no intrinsic tendency to aggression’. On the contrary, 
feelings of aggression represented a state produced ‘only when specific outside pressures’ 
were ‘brought to bear’.24  
Specifically, the Yearbook framed aggression as a product of ‘frustration’. ‘Frustration’, it 
explained, occurred when an individual or group’s capacity to pursue their own wants was 
‘thwarted’ or ‘blocked’ by external arrangements, resulting in a ‘failure to achieve goals’. All 
instances of aggression, the psychologists argued, were the result of some kind of frustration. 
War, broadly speaking, was thus causally linked to the experience of frustration within the 
populations that perpetrated it. ‘Satisfied people or satisfied nations are not likely to seek 
war’, explained Murphy. ‘Dissatisfied ones constitute a perennial danger.’25 
Here, in connecting aggression with the experience of frustration, SPSSI psychologists drew 
on the findings of one particular set of psychological experiments. Undertaken by the Yale 
University psychologist John Dollard and his associates during the 1930s, the experiment had 
employed empirical, laboratory-based methods to investigate the hypothesis that aggression 
was ‘always a consequence of frustration’.26 The aims of the experiment were largely 
theoretical in persuasion; by demonstrating the production of aggression in a stimulus-
response mode, Dollard hoped to reconcile elements of psychoanalytic theory with the then 
dominant practices of behavorist experimental psychology. At the same time, however, the 
experiment’s finding that aggression and frustration were causally linked appeared as 
knowledge with wide-ranging practical implications. Frustration, it suggested, was the key to 
understanding all manner of social problems, from the roots of criminality to the causes of 
 
23 Murphy ed., Human Nature and Enduring Peace, p. 13. 
24 Ibid., p. 19. 
25 Ibid., p. 21. 
26 John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal E. Miller and O.H, Mowrer and Robert R. Sears, Frustration and 
Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), p. 1.  
25 
 
conflict.27 The Yale psychologists would also link this hypothesis to a peculiar set of claims 
regarding the roots of frustration. Failure to conform to prevailing social norms, they argued, 
was a key cause of frustration. Conformity and adherence, by contrast, were the most 
effective ways to eradicate aggression within society.28  
To the general claim that war had its roots in frustration, the SPSSI psychologists added a 
further set of claims about the conditions that actually led to war. At the heart of this sat the 
concept of what Murphy would call the ‘loaded world-view’. ‘Without any contradiction’, he 
argued, ‘war may properly be thought of as arising also from points of view’.29 The 
tendencies to identify with one’s own group, to see other groups as different to one’s own 
(ethnocentrism) and to ‘stereotype’, for example, played an important role in fostering the 
conditions for war. ‘The hope of peace’, explained Murphy, was threatened: 
… by the fact that instead of thinking of the individual wellsprings of goodwill and 
understanding which develop when human beings have a chance to know one another face-
to-face, we think of abstract, generalized stereotypes.30 
According to psychologists, the loaded world-view enabled the irrational displacement of 
frustration and aggression onto others. The individual facing frustration had no inherent need 
to vent their aggression towards other groups. Prevailing social norms, however, such as 
ethnocentrism and stereotyping, made the process of animistic scapegoating infinitely more 
likely to occur.31 There was also a symbiotic dimension at work in all of this. On the one 
hand, the inability to understand others allowed for the displacement of frustrations on them. 
At the same time, the existence of frustration also worked to reinforce loaded world-views. 
Prejudice allowed for the channelling of frustration; but frustration perpetuated prejudice too.  
Here again, the understanding forwarded by Human Nature drew on prevailing ideas within 
American social science. Driven by rising concerns about the effects of ‘inter-group conflict’ 
for wartime national morale, the study of ‘prejudice’ had become a staple feature of 
American social psychological research by the 1940s. In the process, notes Ellen Herman, a 
‘broad and explicit consensus’ had emerged that prejudice represented a major cause of racial 
 
27 See for example Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression, pp. 26, 39-40, 151-153, 160.  
28 Dollard et al., Frustration And Aggression, pp. 110-138. See also Lemov, World as Laboratory, p. 140. For an 
interesting take on the connections between the Yale psychologists’ conformist argument and their own personal 
experiences see Corbin Page, ‘Preserving Guilt in the “Age of Psychology”: The Curious Career of O. Hobart 
Mowrer’, History of Psychology, 20:1, 2017, pp. 1-27.    
29 Murphy ed., Human Nature and Enduring Peace, p. 39.  
30 Ibid., pp. 43-44.  
31 Ibid., pp. 39-44.  
26 
 
and other antagonisms.32 This new interest in prejudice was such that it even sparked the 
development of instruments geared towards measurement. In 1926, for example, the 
University of Southern California sociologist, Emory S. Bogardus, developed a new 
empirical tool for measuring prejudice, the ‘Social Distance Scale’.33 Inspired by Robert E. 
Park’s definition of prejudice as ‘the more or less instinctive disposition to maintain social 
distance from other groups’, the scale worked by asking participants about their willingness 
to accept and interact with members of other communities.34 In highlighting prejudice as a 
cause of inter-group hostility, American social scientists forwarded numerous hypotheses 
about the factors that underpinned it. Some stressed ‘intrapsychic’ factors, including 
frustration and aggression. Others, meanwhile, stressed sociological factors, most notably, a 
lack of social contact and communication between groups.35 This new concern for prejudice 
was ironic, Franz Samuelson has argued, because it conveniently forgot the earlier role of 
psychological science in certifying the inferiority of minority groups.36 
By placing the interaction between frustration and prejudice at the crux of their understanding 
of war, the SPSSI psychologists rejected the notion that human conflict represented a result 
of ‘real’ competition for resources, wealth and power between groups. War, they argued, had 
far less to do with actual material factors than it did with deeply ‘irrational’ processes of 
displacement.37 The tendency to read conflict through the lens of irrationality would, it will 
be seen, remain an important feature of the psychologizing approach as it moved across 
borders. The corollary to this would be a consistent disavowal of the idea that hostile attitudes 
might constitute a rational stance. 
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37 Murphy ed., Human Nature and Enduring Peace, pp. 28, 71, 152, 205, 219, 315. 
27 
 
By itself, of course, the scapegoating of frustrations onto others was not enough to precipitate 
war. Such an eventuality hinged, rather, on the complex interplay between ‘popular’ 
processes of scapegoating and the actions of national leaders. On the one hand, it required 
‘loaded’ populations ready and willing to view other national groups as the cause of their 
frustrations. At the same time, it also required a feeling among ‘dominant personalities or 
classes’: 
…that their aspirations were being blocked, that diplomacy and economic pressure were 
insufficient to achieve their goals, and that there was a good chance that military methods 
would succeed better.38 
Determined leadership could perpetuate the idea that the blame for economic distress lay with 
‘outside powers’ (as well as internal ones) and ‘fan the feeling of frustration to a white heat’. 
More importantly, it was also national leaders who possessed the ultimate means to make 
war. Leaders could not act in isolation from society. ‘Unless the psychological structure of a 
national group is right for the purpose’, explained Murphy, ‘the frustration of leaders will not 
in itself produce war’.39 By the same token, however, it was only with the emergence of a 
frustrated national leadership that war would materialize. The crux of war, then, was a 
process in which both leaders and populations at large accepted the idea that conflict against 
others held the potential of relief for their own frustrations.  
In his introduction to the Yearbook, Murphy applied this psychologized understanding to the 
processes that had led Nazi Germany to wage war in 1939. Sketching out the widespread 
frustrations of Germany’s industrial, labour and agricultural classes during interwar years, he 
charted the emergence of the National Socialist Party as an attempt by ‘frustrated and 
restless’ leaders, driven by ‘nationalistic revenge fantasies’ to blame these woes on ‘internal 
minorities’ and ‘outside powers’. As the party grew in strength through economic support, 
‘shrewd political manoeuvring’ and propaganda techniques, gradually acquiring the means 
with which to make war, it drew on the support of a German population itself willing to 
blame others for its manifold frustrations. ‘Frustrated German masses’, explained Murphy, 
‘were easily led to blame, or to attack, helpless minorities’. ‘It was only because this nexus of 
economic, political and psychological conditions obtained in Germany that a National 
Socialist Party was possible’.40 Murphy’s reading of Nazism (and thereby of war) as the 
product of a ‘system of psychological relationships’ formed part of a broader post-war trend 
 
38 Ibid., p. 22. Emphasis in original. 
39 Ibid., p. 27.  
40 Ibid., p. 29.  
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in which liberal Western intellectuals sought explanations of fascism through psychological 

















The social psychological understanding of war brought with it two major insights concerning 
the basis for peace. The first was that war could ultimately be prevented by a greater 
commitment to the removal of the sources of frustration within society. ‘If man can live in a 
society which does not block or thwart him’, explained Murphy: 
...he does not tend to be aggressive…If a society of men can live in a world order in which 
the members of the society are not blocked or thwarted by the world arrangement as a whole, 
they have no intrinsic tendency to be aggressive.42  
An effective strategy for peace, by extension, required: 
…the release of the individual from the frustrations of his daily life in such a fashion as to 
reduce the types of tension and aggression which are likely to lead, through one channel or 
another, to organized group conflict.43  
 
41 For an historical study of these efforts see Daniel Pick, The Pursuit of the Nazi Mind: Hitler, Hess and the 
Analysts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
42 Murphy ed., Human Nature and Enduring Peace, p. 20.  
43 Ibid., p. 28. 
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The second observation concerned the ‘moulding of human attitudes’. While the reduction of 
frustration promised to tackle the root cause of war, post-war peace also called for a ‘vast re-
educational project’ aimed at combatting prejudice and the loaded world-view. Such a 
project, noted Murphy, would comprise ‘not only a bettering of our understanding of our 
fellows, but a redirection of our attitudes toward them’. For world peace to be achieved, he 
argued, ‘world-wide educational steps toward intercultural understanding’ were 
‘imperative’.44  
Unesco and the psychological study of international ‘tension’ 
Psychologists’ claims regarding the avoidable nature of war ran consonant with efforts to 
build peace in the post-war international arena. But the new internationalist architectures of 
the late 1940s would also create new spaces in which the social psychological approach to 
peace would find concrete expression. At Unesco, an organization at the forefront of these 
efforts, ideas about the psychological underpinnings of war would soon become the basis of 
new initiatives geared towards fostering international peace. Under the auspices of its 
flagship project on ‘Tensions Affecting International Understanding’, Unesco would embrace 
social scientific research designed specifically to diagnose (and treat) the social psychological 
conditions that led to war. 
Founded in November 1945, before the framework of the United Nations had itself been 
clearly defined, Unesco occupied a central place in post-war hopes for international peace 
and reconstruction.45 Assigned the elusive task of using education, science and culture to 
build ‘the defences of peace’ in the ‘minds of men’, Unesco’s leaders, including its first 
Director-General, the British biologist and philosopher Julian Huxley, would approach this 
task as one that centred on the creation of ‘world community’ – a new post-national, post-
racial sense of global consciousness that would provide the foundations for international 
peace.46 World community, contemporaries argued, required more than just heightened 
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political and economic integration; it required a radical reorientation of popular attitudes 
towards this new cosmopolitan end. As Glenda Sluga has argued, this was an ambition that 
wedded new hopes with old, reflecting not only the bold ambitions of the post-war moment 
but also the legacy of late nineteenth-century conceptions of evolution and empire.47 Like the 
United Nations system more generally, world community was a vessel into which a diverse 
range of hopes, including those of a revived liberal imperialism, were generously poured.48   
Forged under the rubric of world community, the ‘Tensions Project’ had its origins in a 
resolution presented to the 1947 Unesco General Conference by Louise Wright, a member of 
the American delegation and Director of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Drawing 
inspiration from a symposium on ‘World Community’ held at the University of Chicago 
earlier that year, attended by leading figures from across the American social sciences, the 
resolution implored Unesco to conduct enquiries into matters including:  
1) the distinctive character of the various national cultures, ideals and legal systems; 2) the 
ideas which people of one nation entertain of their own and of other nations; 3) modern 
methods developed in education, political science, philosophy and psychology for changing 
mental attitudes and for the social and political circumstances that favour the employment of 
particular techniques; 4) the influences which make for international understanding or for 
aggressive nationalism.49 
The proposed research agenda contained clear parallels to SPSSI psychologists’ ideas about 
the basis of war in aggression and prejudiced worldviews. Its adoption by Unesco, thereby 
marking the birth of the Tensions Project, would turn these ideas into a central feature of the 
organization’s own thinking on post-war peace. Encapsulating this process, two psychologists 
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with deep connections to the SPSSI, Hadley Cantril and Otto Klineberg, would serve as the 
first two directors of the Unesco Project.50 
As its title suggested, the Unesco Project introduced a new concept into the vocabulary 
surrounding the social psychological understanding of war – that of ‘tension’. Alongside 
‘frustration’, ‘aggression’, ‘prejudice’ and other such terms, it was references to the ‘tensions 
that cause wars’ that littered Unesco press releases and memoranda during the late 1940s. 
Here, it is important to recognize, the term ‘tension’ served as a polyvalent signifier, 
capturing the idea that war had its roots both in the strained relations between nations and in 
the internal states of ‘tension’ caused by frustration. To speak of ‘world tension’ meant to 
speak of both of these things.51 ‘Tension’, then, served to underline the perceived connection 
between the tenor of international relations and individual ‘psycho-physical’ states.52 Its 
adoption as the guiding principle of the Unesco Project reflected its capacity to express 
cutting-edge social scientific thinking in language that all could understand. At the same 
time, it also reflected prevailing hopes that peace could be achieved through technical fixes, 
centred upon an understanding of the human mind.  
In practice, the Tensions Project sought to probe these interlinked forms of individual and 
international ‘tension’ through novel forms of field research. Launched in 1948, the Project’s 
‘Community Studies’ programme was exemplary in this regard. Here, through the holistic 
study of communities in situ, social scientists sought to analyse both ‘the problem of 
aggression and its relation to various social and psychological factors’ and the ‘social patterns 
[that] lead to tensions between groups’.53 The aim, as one report put it, was to study the 
‘actual appearance’ of tension ‘in the life of peoples’.54 
Community Studies proceeded as a set of coordinated field researches in four different 
countries – Australia, France, India and Sweden – with social scientists studying one rural 
and one urban community in each setting. A methodology for the studies, developed through 
 
50 Cantril, a Princeton University psychology professor, served as President of the SPSSI from 1947 to 1948 
Klineberg, a Columbia University social psychologist, had also served as SPSSI President from 1942 to 1943. 
51 ‘We are interested’, stated Otto Klineberg capaciously, ‘in tensions as states of strain, leading to action, 
frequently of an aggressive or hostile character’. Otto Klineberg, ‘The Unesco Project on International Tensions: 
A Challenge to the Sciences of Man’, 30 May 1949, UNESCO/SS/TAUI/15, Unesco Archives (hereafter UA), 
p. 2. 
52 For more on this dual understanding of ‘tension’ see Robert C. Angell, ‘Unesco and Social Science Research’, 
American Sociological Review, 15:2, 1950, pp. 282-287; and Robert C. Angell, ‘Sociology and the World 
Crisis’, American Sociological Review, 16:6, 1951, pp. 749-757.   
53 Otto Klineberg, ‘The Unesco Project on International Tensions’, p. 3 
54 ‘Statement Concerning the Unesco Tensions Project (1949-1953)’, WS/083.71, UA, p. 3. 
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a series of Paris-based conferences comprising experts from psychology, psychiatry, 
sociology and other social sciences, recommended an eclectic mix of sociological and 
psychological instruments – including interviews, life histories, survey questionnaires, social 
distance scales, and projective tests – for use by the study teams.55 The aim was to use these 
techniques to construct two pictures – one a sociology of the life of the community as a 
whole; the other of a series of psychological portraits of individuals within it. By illuminating 
the ‘goodness of fit’ between the former and the latter, the studies would highlight those areas 
in which an absence of fit gave rise to frustration and aggression.56 From this point, the aim 
was to pinpoint the conditions that allowed this aggression to be steered ‘towards 
foreigners’.57 
While Community Studies undertook to build a holistic understanding of how international 
tensions were made, other aspects of the Tensions Project focused more explicitly on the 
prejudices that allowed aggression to be steered towards other national groups. Here, it was 
the study of mutual stereotyping that loomed largest. ‘Stereotypes’, explained Otto 
Klineberg: 
…usually take the form of generalizations concerning the members of a particular national 
group. They are regarded as applying rather widely; they take the form of opinions or 
judgments concerning the character of the Germans, the French, the Russians, the Americans, 
etc. Unlike certain other generalizations, however, stereotypes are based not on an inductive 
collection of data, but on hearsay, rumour, anecdotes—in short, on evidence which is 
insufficient to justify the generalization. They are not grounded on objective facts, and as a 
consequence they represent a sort of "autistic thinking" which is relatively unresponsive to 
external reality.…It is not only possible, but even highly probably that unfavourable 
stereotypes concerning a particular nation constitute a fertile soil in which hostility may be 
more easily developed, although the specific outbreaks may be precipitated by other factors. 
Hostility can obviously be generated more easily between two nations which hold 
unfavourable stereotypes regarding each other.58 
Between 1947 and 1951, Unesco commissioned studies of national stereotyping covering 
twelve countries. Conducted using the latest opinion polling and survey research methods, the 
studies sought to provide ‘snapshots’ of the assumptions held by members of each nationality 
towards other national groups. In all cases, the results highlighted not only a general tendency 
 
55 Otto Klineberg, ‘The Unesco Project on International Tensions’, p. 3.  
56 It might highlight, for example, highlight how a high value attached to education by individuals failed to fit 
with that society’s inability to make such education available to all, thereby leading to frustration. See 
‘Conference on the Methodology of Social Studies, Royamont, France, 1951’, WS/051.62, UA, pp. 5-6.  
57 ‘Statement Concerning the Unesco Tensions Project’, p. 3. 
58 Otto Klineberg, ‘The Scientific Study of National Stereotypes’, International Social Science Bulletin: 
National Stereotypes and International Understanding, 3:3, 1951, p. 505.  
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to ascribe certain characteristics to certain sets of people but also an apparent correlation 
between negative stereotyping and a lack of first-hand ‘contact’ with members of other 
groups.59   
According to Unesco social scientists, the study and exposition of mutual stereotypes had 
remedial qualities in its own right. ‘When one group is able to see what it thinks of others, 
and what others think of it’, explained one official, ‘the absurdities and errors will become 
apparent’.60 A second strand of the work on stereotypes, however, focused more concertedly 
on the development of methods for their eradication. The Tensions Project’s ‘Way of Life’ 
initiative, for example, focused on the production of a series of monographs providing a 
‘general description’ of different national cultures in fifteen countries. Styled as a popular 
iteration of the ‘national character’ studies performed by social scientists during the war, the 
monographs explained the different traits of national groups while highlighting the 
‘underlying values and attitudes in which all people meet as human beings’.61 Designed for 
use in adult education and teacher training, these ‘international textbooks’ sought to promote 
mutual understanding between national groups, thereby undercutting the oversimplified, 
erroneous stereotypes that allowed international tensions to flourish. Meanwhile, under the 
research heading, ‘Enquiries into modern methods which have been developed in education, 
political science, philosophy and psychology for changing mental attitudes and into the social 
and political circumstances which favour the employment of particular techniques’, Unesco 
officials also compiled research findings on the best available methods – from mass 
communication to inter-group therapy – for combatting stereotypes and promoting 
international understanding.62  
Tension in the nation: psychologizing tension in post-partition India 
In October 1948, a little over one year after independence from British rule, the Indian 
Ministry of Education issued a memorandum to Indian universities. Accompanied by a letter 
 
59 The studies were published in a special edition of Unesco’s International Social Science Bulletin in 1951. See 
Ibid. For an example of the argument on first hand contact see H.E.O. James and C. Tenen, ‘Attitudes Towards 
Other Peoples’, in Ibid., pp. 560-561.  
60 The quote was from Sripati Chandrashekar, an Indian economist, sociologist and demographer and head of 
Unesco’s Demographic Research Section. Cited in ‘Psychiatry to aid of mankind: UNESCO Plan for Peace’, 
Times of India, 9 November 1948. 
61 Hadley Cantril. ‘The Human Sciences and World Peace: A Report on the Unesco Project ‘Tensions Affecting 
International Understanding’, SS/TAIU/1, UA, p. 238,  
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signed by Humayun Kabir, a Bengali intellectual, educationalist and special adviser to the 
Minister, Maulana Azad, the memorandum read as follows:  
The Government of India feels that an objective, comprehensive and critical enquiry into the 
conditions and consequences of the various tensions that poison the relations between the 
different communities and groups in the country would be of the greatest possible value at the 
present juncture. Such a study, while discovering the causes of tensions, may also suggest 
methods for overcoming them, so that it may be possible to establish a better social order.63 
Calling upon all universities to establish ‘bodies of experts’ consisting of ‘specialists in 
Economics, Political Science, History, Anthropology, Sociology, Philosophy and 
Psychology’, the memorandum explained that enquiries into tension were vital ‘in order to 
promote better understanding between different communities and groups and facilitate the 
peaceful and orderly evolution of a secular State’.64   
Drafted following consultation with Unesco officials, the Ministry memorandum drew 
squarely on the template of the Tensions Project.65 Among the areas it recommended for 
investigation were:   
(ii) Psychological and sociological survey of the distinctive character, type, customs and 
manners, traditions and history of different communities and culture groups…(iv) Enquiry 
into the conception which any one community or cultural group holds of its own members 
and of other communities or groups…(vii) Use of modern techniques developed in education, 
political science, philosophy and psychology for the study of processes and forces involved in 
conflicts between individuals, communities or groups (viii) Enquiries into techniques that 
have been developed to change mental attitudes of individuals and groups in order to create 
an understanding of one another’s special problems and stimulate sympathy and respect for 
each other’s ideals.66 
Its circulation by the Ministry – then the official liaison between the Government of India and 
Unesco – initiated an attempt to borrow methods then being used to treat international 
tensions to address tensions within India’s own body politic.  
In fact, Indians were among the most prominent supporters of Unesco’s attempts to foster 
‘world community’. Citing a Gandhian commitment to non-violence, many Indian post-
colonial elites entered enthusiastically into Unesco’s efforts to foster peace and international 
 
63 ‘Memorandum’, Folder 6: India, 1949-50, Box 1262, Gardner and Lois Murphy Papers (hereafter GLMP), 
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64 Ibid., p. 3.  
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cooperation during the post-war years.67 Kabir, a former Oxford University graduate with a 
dense network of international connections, was exemplary in this regard. During the late 
1940s, Kabir would become an active figure on the Unesco scene, participating in both a 
1948 symposium on ‘Democracy in a World of Tensions’, chaired by the American 
philosopher Richard McKeon, and also as a member of the committee that drafted the first of 
Unesco’s influential Statements on Race.68 As part of this broader participation in post-war 
peacebuilding, leaders at the Ministry of Education had also engaged proactively with the 
Tensions Project. Following the announcement of the Project’s Community Studies initiative, 
in 1948, Kabir had quickly approved arrangements for India to serve (alongside Australia, 
France and Sweden) as a field site for the experimental research. In collaboration with B.S. 
Guha, an anthropologist and head of the Government of India’s new Department of 
Anthropology, the Ministry arranged for a group of the Department’s social scientists to 
travel to Paris to receive training in the newly devised methods for Community Studies. 
Returning to India, Guha’s group set about applying these methods to explore the making of 
international tension among rural and urban communities in West Bengal.69  
Indians, then, sat at the forefront of Unesco’s efforts to mobilize social science in the name of 
international peace. The Ministry’s 1948 memorandum, however, pointed to the fact that 
Indians entered these pursuits as a two-way enterprise. While committed to alleviating the 
tensions between nations, it demonstrated, Indian leaders were not above turning methods 
devised to foster world community into tools of post-colonial nation-building as well. The 
key context for this manoeuvre, as the memorandum would itself make clear, was communal 
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violence. Building on existing outbursts of fighting between Hindu and Muslim groups in the 
lead up to independence, the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent, a process that forced 
millions to move between the new nations of India and Pakistan, had sparked an 
unprecedented escalation of violence between India’s Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities, 
leading to the death of over a million people by the time the mass migration drew to a close.70 
Kabir, like many other Indian leaders, would recall the ‘total anguish’ he had suffered as 
result of this bloodshed, of feeling ‘completely shaken and bewildered’ by the realisation that 
Hindus and Muslims, ‘many of them with almost identical backgrounds’, could ‘become 
mortal enemies overnight’.71  
Concerns about the state of relations between India’s internal social groups, Srirupa Roy has 
argued, held an implicit utility for post-colonial leaders. By normalizing ideas about the 
‘diversity’ of the population, they helped to present the state itself as the only ‘legitimate 
institutional authority under whose helpful guidance individuals could enjoy security, groups 
could enjoy freedoms and recognition, and the nation as a whole could enjoy unity and 
stability’.72 In the case of post-partition communal tension, however, such concern also called 
for urgent action to address these problems. ‘The displacement of large groups of men and 
women and tensions created by it’, the Ministry memorandum declared, ‘have created special 
problems which demand immediate study and treatment’. Alongside other internal tensions, 
including those between caste, linguistic and regional groups, communal tensions in 
particular called for urgent action in order to preserve ‘internal security’, ‘stability’ and 
conditions conducive to ‘prosperity’, ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.73 
Against this backdrop of internal communal strife, combined with concerns about other latent 
social tensions, the Ministry memorandum thus spoke of an attempt to turn the psychological 
study of tensions inward. But the decision to embark on domestic tensions research spoke of 
more than just a concern for national (as well as international) peace. In Kabir’s words, the 
initiation of the tensions studies spoke also of a ‘new awareness of the value of the study of 
 
70 The literature on partition and communal violence is extensive. Some of the important examples include 
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37 
 
the social sciences for…dealing with some of the most difficult and intricate social problems 
of the day’.74 What led Ministry officials to turn the study of tension inwards, in other words, 
was not just a concern with alleviating forms of internal social conflict, but a positivist faith – 
shared with Unesco internationalists – in the power of ‘scientific’ intervention to deliver 
social change. In passing the question of tension to ‘bodies of experts’ armed with ‘objective’ 
tools of social enquiry, Kabir and his Ministry colleagues exemplified a broader tendency 
among Indian post-colonial elites – a tendency to frame ‘science’ as both the driver of 
national progress and the elixir for all manner of social ills.75 This Comtean faith in the 
amenability of society to scientific intervention, one which we will see repeated throughout 
this thesis, was accompanied by a belief in the capacity of the state itself, acting on scientific 
principles, to rise above particularistic interests and act in the name of the social whole.76 The 
Ministry memorandum, then, encapsulated a faith in scientism and technocracy that defined 
the Nehruvian moment. But what could experts really say about peace? 
Following a period of inactivity, the Ministry’s tensions programme began in earnest on 9 
August 1950 with a three-day Planning Conference in New Delhi. Attended by social 
scientists from across the nation, as well as Ministry officials and members of other 
government departments, the Conference agreed to organize the enquiries into tension around 
six independent ‘study teams’, located within distinct research institutions, each of which 
would study social tensions within its own local environment. Though agreeing that Hindu-
Muslim relations would be of ‘central and fundamental’ importance, the Conference followed 
the Ministry memorandum in specifying that the study teams should also conduct studies of 
other forms of tension, ‘including caste, language, economic and regional hostilities’.77 
Three days earlier, senior Ministry officials including Kabir, P.N Kirpal, and the Ministry 
Secretary Tara Chand had welcomed Gardner Murphy to India. Travelling with his wife, the 
eminent child psychologist Lois Barclay Murphy, Murphy arrived with the title of ‘Unesco 
consultant’, tasked with providing ‘expert’ advice to the enquiries into tension undertaken by 
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the Ministry.78 The appointment followed a formal request for technical assistance from the 
Unesco Tensions Project, submitted by the Ministry in March 1949. Murphy, a leading figure 
in the movement to apply psychological principles to peace, had been recommended for the 
job by Otto Klineberg, his former colleague, close friend, and at that time acting Director of 
the Unesco Social Science Department.79 As a Unesco consultant, Murphy would chair the 
proceedings of the New Delhi Planning Conference, supervise the research, and provide each 
study team with technical guidance on ‘modern’ methods of social scientific research.   
The study teams drew upon existing and emerging sites of psychological and anthropological 
research. Three of the selected sites – the universities of Lucknow, Patna and Aligarh – had 
strong traditions in experimental psychological research running back to the 1920s.80 Here, 
renowned analysts such as Kali Prasad, H.P. Maiti and Pars Ram would head teams focused 
on the new, more sociologically-inclined questions of tensions research. A fourth study team, 
headed by the anthropologist B.S. Guha, comprised social scientists from the Government of 
India’s Department of Anthropology (known also as the Anthropological Survey of India 
(ASI)), established in 1946 to conduct ‘physical, biological and cultural’ investigations of 
tribal groups. ASI, we have seen, had already been participating in Unesco’s own 
‘Community Studies’ programme since 1948.81 The project’s final two study teams were 
located in Bombay and Ahmedabad respectively. At the University of Bombay, a group 
formed under the direction of the economist C.N. Vakil was tasked with studying the ‘three-
cornered hostility pattern’ between ‘Hindu residents, the Hindu refugees, and the Muslims’ in 
the city. In Ahmedabad, a group of researchers at the newly established Ahmedabad Textile 
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Industry’s Research Association (ATIRA), led by the social psychologist Kamla Chowdhry 
would explore tensions pertaining to the industrial environment.82 
Many of these appointments articulated the clearly shifting potentialities of social science in 
the post-colonial moment. Take B.S. Guha for example. A physical anthropologist by 
training, educated at the University of Calcutta and Harvard University, Guha had spent the 
1920s and 30s building a reputation as a leading authority on the classification of Indian 
racial groups. As evidenced by the titles of his major works The Racial Affinities of the 
People of India (1935) and Racial Elements in the Population (1944), it had been the 
colonialist quest to categorize difference – not to the desire to overcome it – that had formed 
the backdrop for the science through which he made his name.83 Guha’s transmogrification 
from race scientist into a leader of tensions research spoke of the new integrationist 
imperatives attached to social science in the post-colonial milieu – a shift that mirrored the 
transition from interwar ‘race psychology’ to ‘studies of prejudice’ within wartime American 
social science. 
Psychologizing tension: communalism 
As already noted, research projects initiated by the six study teams probed wide-ranging 
forms of ‘social tension’, from those between ‘settled’ and ‘Adivasi’ communities, to 
linguistic and caste tensions, to tensions between workers and their supervisors. Two 
categories of tension, however, formed the core of the researchers’ enquiries. The first of 
these was the study of communal tensions, forming part of the investigations conducted by 
five of the six study teams. Here, Indian social scientists followed squarely the example set 
by their Unesco counterparts. Far from a consequence of inherent differences between the 
two groups, they argued, Hindu-Muslim tensions were deeply enmeshed in the pre-existing 
prejudices, biases and misunderstandings between different social groups, prejudices which 
allowed for the displacement of frustrations onto each other. Communal antagonisms, the 
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Aligarh-based researcher Pars Ram explained, were ‘due to one’s inability to look at others as 
they look upon themselves’.84  
This argument drew on comparisons between areas of ‘high’ and ‘low’ communal tension, as 
defined by recent outbreaks of communal violence. Performing interviews, social surveys and 
Bogardus-style social distance tests in both contexts, social scientists argued that the results 
pointed to significant differences. On the one hand, areas of low tension were marked by a 
considerable degree of social contact and interaction between Hindus and Muslims. In 
Lucknow, for example, where relations between the city’s Hindu and Muslim communities 
were relatively peaceful, social distance surveys revealed tendencies for ‘greater social 
contacts between Hindus and Muslims’, ‘common observances of religious festivals’, 
‘common dress’, ‘common culture’ and ‘greater understanding and tolerance’.85 High tension 
areas, by contrast, such as Bombay and Aligarh, showed the opposite trend. Here, surveys 
pointed at a pervasive ‘provincialism’ involving less communication and interaction, and 
greater feelings of social distance between groups.86 In such areas, explained Murphy, 
‘despite much childhood association’, the city’s Hindus and Muslims eventually ‘drew apart’, 
entering ‘different ideological and cultural worlds’.87 
Comparisons of high and low tension areas thus revealed greater tendencies towards 
segregation and integration respectively. Communal tensions, by extension, appeared to be 
linked to the prejudices and feelings of social distance that already existed between particular 
social groups. In his studies of Muslim ‘minority group psychology’ in the city of Aligarh, 
the psychologist Pars Ram would adhere firmly to these assumptions. Chronic feelings of 
religious persecution and discrimination felt by Aligarh’s Muslims, he argued, were not so 
much a reflection of actual experience than they were evidence of the scapegoating of 
‘common frustrations’ made possible by the social gulf between Hindus and Muslims. ‘Both 
Hindus and Muslims are exposed to frustration on the score of inadequate employment and 
non-availability of needed goods’, he explained. In the context of their social isolation from 
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Hindus, however, Muslims had ‘channelled’ this frustration ‘into a specific kind of 
stereotype; Hindus persecuting Muslims’.88 
Ram would take these arguments further in an analysis of rumour. Drawing on the work of 
the Harvard University psychologist Gordon Allport, Ram seized upon rumours as ‘clues to 
the problems and perplexities of the rumour-affected sections of the community’.89 Studying 
a period from February to March 1951, during which the Muslim community of Aligarh had 
been engulfed by vicious rumours concerning an imminent attack by the city’s Hindus, he 
made two observations. The first was that the perpetuation of the rumour served an important 
‘social function’ within the Muslim population. Spread by vulnerable sections of the 
community, the rumour ‘made active’ those powerful members of the community capable of 
taking steps to address the threat. In turn, these power-brokers themselves believed the 
rumour because it reinforced their own value to the community at large. Rumour thus 
‘conserved the prestige and dependence relations operating in a community’.90 The second 
observation, however, concerned the relationship between the spread of rumour and the social 
dislocation between Muslims and their Hindu counterparts. Rumours about the impending 
annihilation of the Muslims by Hindus gained credence, Ram argued, due to Muslims’ lack of 
exposure to anything other than internal channels of communication. The Urdu press tended 
‘to delight in dilating upon grievances’. ‘Informal groups’ meanwhile, ‘usually cut off from 
the rest of the population’, perpetuated ‘an atmosphere of defeatism…through exchange of 
notes about the treatment of the Muslims’.91 The Hindus of the city, entrenched as they were 
in their own channels of communication, were ‘blind’ to the incidents of discrimination that 
concerned Muslims. ‘One kind of communication’, according to Ram, was ‘completely shut 
off from one set of people’ yet had a ‘tremendous emotional significance for the other’.92 The 
key point was that a lack of communication between Hindus and Muslim groups was a major 
factor in the perpetuation of tensions between them.   
By framing Hindu-Muslim tension as a product of prejudices rooted in deficient 
communication, tensions researchers mirrored closely the understanding of war put forward 
in Human Nature. Here, communal conflict was characterized not so much as a function of 
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the ‘actual hostilities’, ‘the competitive relationships’, nor the mutual ‘damage and threats’ 
posed between groups, but rather as a result of the ‘irrational’ displacement of internal 
frustrations onto others aided, in turn, by the prejudices that lack of communication made 
possible. In stressing the ‘irrationality’ of communal tensions, Indian social scientists, like 
American psychologists, sought to downplay the idea that conflict was inevitable. For all its 
good intentions, there was also something in this reading that verged on disingenuous; 
namely, a tendency to divorce the problem of tension from actual lived experience. The scale 
of retributive communal violence witnessed during the 1940s had, after all, been so severe 
that many Hindus and Muslims had indeed suffered deep tragedy and loss at the hands of 
members of the other community. In such cases, the reason for antagonism towards the 
communal ‘other’ was based firmly in reality. The framing of tensed attitudes as a product of 
irrational displacement, however, glossed over the role of these personal and community 
traumas in the process of attitude formation. In doing so, it denied its subject matter the status 
of a rational response to experienced wrongs. 
According to psychologists, the discernible links between communalism, prejudice and social 
distance suggested at least one major antidote to the problem of communal strife: increased 
opportunities for communication and understanding between Hindu and Muslim groups. In 
the context of their investigations, psychologists outlined a number of strategies through 
which this objective might be pursued. Proposed solutions included a ‘broad educational 
programme based on the replacement of provincialism by a sense of a common destiny 
shared with all other citizens’ and the development of shared communication channels – from 
newspapers to textbooks – that would provide ‘factual material of a sort which will encourage 
genuine understanding’.93 At the same time, there was also a need to promote improved 
interpersonal relations between Hindu and Muslim groups. The most important point in 
combating communal tension, Murphy explained, was ‘personal contact on terms of equal 
status’.94 
Psychologizing tension: refugees 
The study of ‘refugee tensions’ was a second key focus of the tensions research, ultimately 
becoming part of the work carried out by four of the study teams. This field of study reflected 
the emergence of a ‘refugee problem’ as a serious concern for India’s provincial and national 
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governments during the early post-independence years. Following the mass influx of Hindus 
and Sikhs into India between 1947 and 1948, and continued waves of migration in the years 
that followed, vast numbers of migrants found themselves without access to jobs, 
accommodation, and basic services. With violent demonstrations and forcible occupations of 
property an increasingly common occurrence, the plight of refugees had quickly become not 
only an urgent humanitarian concern but also a source of national insecurity and instability by 
the time the tensions research got underway.95 
Against this backdrop, the study of ‘refugee tensions’ represented, first and foremost, an 
attempt to understand the psychological condition of refugees. Starting from the assumption 
that refugees had, almost by definition, experienced ‘terrible frustration’, the aim of social 
scientists was to explore the extent to which this experience had given rise to both internal 
(psychological) and external (social) patterns of tension. Unlike the study of communalism, 
then, which aimed to explore the social psychological underpinnings of manifest social 
tensions, enquiries into refugee tension sought to pre-emptively trace the direction of tension 
that would, it was argued, necessarily flow from the experience of frustration.  
The most notable example, in this regard, were the studies of refugee tension conducted by 
the anthropologist B.S. Guha and his colleagues. Seeking a comparative element to his 
analysis of East Pakistani refugees, Guha had opted to study refugees in two distinct settings. 
The first was a government-administered refugee colony located 40 miles to the west of 
Calcutta, in the village of Jirat. The second was a ‘self-help’ community established in the 
suburbs of Calcutta. Named Azadgarh, the community was established on land seized by the 
refugees themselves. Selecting a random sample of 100 individuals within each location, split 
along caste, gender and age lines, Guha and his colleagues set about examining the social 
psychological status of the refugees using a battery of sociological and psychological 
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techniques, from interviews, to attitude scales, to projective tests. The findings, they argued, 
pointed to different patterns of ‘tension’ among the refugees of the two settlements. 
In the Jirat colony, Guha argued, the frustration experienced by the refugees had given rise to 
discernible patterns of outward ‘social tension’, of which ‘Muslims’, ‘local people’ and ‘the 
Government’ were the prime recipients. Such tensions, he suggested, while in part a response 
to actual experiences, such as the government’s inadequate assistance, were also to be 
understood as tensions of ‘a displaced or transferred type’, caused by the ‘blocking of the 
group’s retaliatory attitude’ towards the ‘real offender’; that is, the communities of East 
Pakistan whose persecuting actions, Guha claimed, had been the principal cause of their 
frustration.96 More interesting than Guha’s pronouncements on social tension, however, were 
his observations on the internal psychological state of Jirat’s refugees. Drawing on his 
extensive interview evidence, Guha postulated that the colony’s inhabitants had responded to 
their extensive frustrations not simply with outward aggression, but in many cases with 
regression to an almost infantile state of dependency: 
[A] kind of primitivation [sic] of the behaviour of the subject seemed to be operative. His 
actions become less mature, more childish; the sensitivity of his discriminations and 
judgements diminished, his feelings and emotions became more poorly differentiated and 
controlled like those of a child. In general, his psychological field tended spontaneously in 
the direction of a lower level of simplification, which is a reversal of the normal trend 
towards higher level complexity characteristic of the growth and maturation of the individual. 
Thus we find from the life histories that they were childishly dependent on the Government 
support. They found nothing to be done by themselves, seemed to have lost all initiative and 
organised efforts befitting adult persons and in its place expected that everything would be 
done for them by the Government. As a proof of the diminution of the sensitivity of their 
discrimination and judgement some subjects when asked to state their idea of rehabilitation or 
what Government should do for them, replied that they have lost all their power of judgement 
and thought, and could not answer the question and asked the interviewers to suggest these 
for them.97 
By arguing that dislocation had reduced refugees to a state of listless apathy, Guha mirrored 
the arguments of social scientists studying refugees across the post-war world. In a 
contemporaneous report on the status of refugees worldwide, submitted to the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, the French anthropologist Jacques Vernant suggested that 
‘the refugee has no longer the elasticity which enables a man when fortune has dealt him a 
 
96 B.S. Guha, Studies in Social Tensions Among the Refugees from Eastern Pakistan (Delhi: Manager of 
Publications, Department of Anthropology, Government of India, 1959), p. 9-10.  
97 B.S. Guha, Memoir No. 1, 1954. Studies in Social Tensions Among the Refugees from Eastern Pakistan, 
(Calcutta: Department of Anthropology, Government of India, 1959), p. 32. 
45 
 
hard blow to recover his poise and carry on’. Compared to the energetic labour migrant, 
Vernant argued, the refugee showed a ‘typical lack of drive’.98 
In the case of Jirat, Guha contended that this process of psychological deterioration had 
played a role in many of the issues then being experienced by the colony, including the 
failure of most refugees to secure gainful employment. As Joya Chatterji has argued, 
however, such an analysis wilfully neglected more obvious reasons for the colony’s 
problems, including the lack of employment opportunities, the geographical isolation, the 
malarial conditions, and the poor quality of the agricultural land.99 In due course, 
anthropologists’ claims about the ‘childlike dependency’ of Jirat’s refugees would be woven 
into an official explanation of the colony’s failure, sweeping aside the planners’ own 
culpability in the process. Here, Chatterji argues, notwithstanding clear failures like Jirat, the 
concept of refugee psychological degeneration provided justification for the Government of 
West Bengal to continue with its flawed policy of ‘dispersal’, based on the resettlement of 
refugees in often remote, poorly administered, government-controlled camps.100 
The study of Azadgarh’s refugees revealed a different psychological portrait. A key factor 
here, according to Guha, was the different circumstances under which the settlement’s 
refugees had left Pakistan. Unlike the inhabitants of Jirat, most of whom had remained in 
their homeland until fear and insecurity made this untenable, the majority of Azadgarh 
refugees had left earlier, under more peaceful conditions. Some had left before partition, 
others shortly after. Virtually all, however, had departed East Bengal before the largescale 
outbreak of communal violence that took place there in February 1950. Coupled with this, the 
self-help nature of the Azadgarh settlement had also proved far more successful than Jirat 
when it came to the provision of livelihoods for its refugees. Established on land seized in the 
southern suburb of Tollygunje, Azadgarh sat in the vicinity of mills, offices and factories 
wherein the settlement’s population of mostly literate, upper-caste refugees could find work. 
For Azadgarh’s inhabitants, then, both the circumstances of departure and the process of 
‘settlement’ appeared to have involved considerably less ‘frustration’ than they had for those 
residing in Jirat. 
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According to the researchers, however, notwithstanding these rather more favourable 
conditions, Azadgarh refugees were experiencing no less ‘tension’ than their counterparts. 
The reason for this lay in the inhabitants’ deep anxiety concerning the government’s 
approach towards them. Following police supported efforts to reclaim the land from the 
settlers, as well as the passing of a 1951 provincial Bill outlining the government’s intention 
to ‘evict’ squatters from ‘unauthorised’ property, the refugees had come to harbour the 
distinct impression, the researchers argued, that their settlement was under threat: 
While…they obtained satisfaction of ego-participation and ego-enhancement through the 
activities connected with the establishment and maintenance of the colony, as against the 
refugees of Jirat, who have had no part of control in their own affairs and virtually subsisted 
as an ‘outgroup’ on charity from the Government, fear of insecurity was immeasurably 
greater among the Azadgarh settlers, as the very existence of the settlement in which they had 
sunk their capital and brought to a state of sufficiency, was at stake.101 
The result, according to Guha, was a pronounced ‘tensional attitude’ towards ‘the 
Government’, combined with reduced (albeit not absent) hostility towards Muslims.102  
It was a tension, Guha explained, that the researchers experienced first-hand. Early attempts 
to gain access to Azadgarh’s refugees, he reported, were thwarted by the group’s suspicion 
that the researchers were ‘agents of the government…who under the guise of scientific 
workers went there to collect information which might be utilized against them when deemed 
necessary’.103 Faced with such opposition, the researchers chose to distance themselves from 
the state. For example, during meetings with Azadgarh’s camp leaders, facilitated by local 
notables including the Congress politician and renowned ‘champion of refugee causes’ 
Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, Guha requested that the leaders: 
… ponder over the matter that the investigators went there as scientists and men…not as 
Government officials, for in that case they would be able to establish their camp and to go on 
with their work with the help of the police but that was not the method of a systematic pursuit 
of a scientific investigation…and that their obstruction would mean the under estimation of 
[the] Indian in the eye of the world.104 
Here, the act of distancing from the government agendas severed as a tool to generate the 
trust of refugees as study subjects. Notably, such a distancing stood in marked contrast to 
statements made in other settings, wherein Guha stressed the great utility of social science – 
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and of tensions research in particular – as a tool in the service of the state’s nation-building 
efforts.105  
According to the researchers, the Azadgarh refugees’ ‘persistent state of insecurity about 
their continued existence’ was such that it had largely undermined their otherwise good 
‘group morale’.106 While not then demonstrating the same forms of regression seen in Jirat, 
the ‘tension’ caused by this uncertainty threatened to bring about a similar process of 
psychological deterioration in the longer term. Here, the analysis ran consonant with other 
studies of refugee tensions, such as those in Bombay and Ahmedabad, wherein social 
scientists had also suggested the possibility of links between prolonged uncertainty, 
frustration and the eventual ‘deterioration of personality’.107 Notwithstanding this 
observation, however, Guha’s study also offered a clear sense that the Azadgarh self-help 
settlement offered, on the whole, a superior model of refugee rehabilitation. By allowing 
refugees to ‘participate in the organization and management of the camp’, Guha explained, 
Azadgarh had created opportunities for ‘ego-participation and ego-enhancement’ not offered 
by approaches that treated refugees as an ‘out-group to be pitied and succoured’. While the 
government’s failure to provide Azadgarh’s refugees with security had undermined this 
effect, an approach that combined these ego-enhancing elements with greater security 
guarantees would help to both prevent the relapse to ‘infantilism’ and to reduce the problem 
of tension against external targets.108  
Guha’s emphasis on the psychological and social merits of refugee ‘self-help’ found support 
from his fellow tensions researchers.109 But it also chimed with a broader set of discourses 
surrounding refugee resettlement in post-partition India. As several historians have 
demonstrated, the concept of ‘self-rehabilitation’ – that is, the ability of refugees to turn 
themselves into effective national citizens without state intervention – had become the core 
principle of the Government of India’s resettlement policy by the early 1950s. This emphasis 
on self-rehabilitation, Ravinder Kaur has argued, was a ‘governmental technology’. On the 
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one hand, it allowed effective rehabilitation to be claimed as the ‘success’ of state policies. 
On the other, it framed rehabilitative failure as an outcome for which ‘the state was not 
responsible’.110 At the same time, the emphasis on self-rehabilitation also downplayed the 
factors that determined the ability of a refugee to successfully self-rehabilitate, from financial 
resources to the strength of one’s social and cultural ‘capital’. In doing so, it inadvertently 
rewarded those who could manage on their own while failing to support those ‘who really 
needed state help’.111 
Projecting tensions 
Alongside other instruments, such as interviews, surveys and social distance scales, 
projective testing formed a key technique used during the tensions research. A state-of-the-art 
concept within mid-century American psychology, projective instruments sought to discern 
features of a subject’s psychological profile by assessing that subject’s responses to a series 
of prompts. The key to this enterprise was the indeterminacy of the prompt itself, the effect of 
which, proponents argued, was to provoke test subjects to ‘project’ their innermost thoughts, 
feelings and motivational drives. Projective techniques drew upon psychoanalytic 
understandings of the mind, specifically their claim that the driving force of human action lay 
below the threshold of everyday human consciousness only to be revealed through ‘free 
association’. By the 1950s, the projective techniques deployed by American social scientists 
had grown to include a wide range of instruments, from Rorschach inkblot tests, to ‘Draw-a-
Man’ tests, to tests of visual, auditory and sensory ‘apperception’. Projective techniques, the 
historian Rebecca Lemov has argued, operated on the basis of a curious contradiction. On the 
one hand, the overriding concern of these methods was to listen to and understand the needs 
and desires of the people they tested. At the same time, however, projective tests were also 
structured in a way that avoided ‘freely giving voice’ to the test subject. The projective 
instrument ‘provided a kind of instamatic psychic X-ray that, by its very workings, allocated 
to the expert the task of discerning the true meaning of what was being said’. In doing so, it 
denied that right to individuals themselves.112 
 
110 Ravinder Kaur, ‘Distinctive Citizenship: Refugees, Subjects and Post-Colonial State in India’s Partition’, 
Cultural and Social History¸ 6:4, 2009, p. 430. 
111 Ibid., p. 444. For more on the tendency of discourses of self-rehabilitation to ride roughshod over the needs 
of more vulnerable groups, for example untouchables and women, see Chatterji, Spoils of Partition, ch. 3; Uditi 
Sen, Citizen Refugee: Forging the Nation after Partition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), ch. 5.  
112 Rebecca Lemov, ‘X-Rays of Inner Worlds: The Mid-Twentieth Century American Projective Test 
Movement’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 47:3, 2011, p. 274.  
49 
 
Two projective instruments featured prominently in India’s tensions research, the first of 
which was the ‘sentence completion test’. Here, instead of seeking responses to ‘yes-no 
questions’ or asking individuals to indicate their feelings on a five-point scale, psychologists 
presented interviewees with an opportunity to complete sentences about others in any fashion 
they liked. The test, explained Murphy, performed a function not served by other methods of 
research, enabling the scientist to venture:  
…momentarily beneath the surface, getting a spontaneous form of expression, and 
discovering the relative importance of factors contributing to an attitude, not merely an 
indication of the intensity of the attitude.113  
In his study of refugee tensions in the city of Ahmedabad, the psychologist N.L. Dosajh 
employed sentence completion tests to examine the directionality of the tensions held by 
refugee communities. Used alongside other instruments like attitude scales, the tests asked 
refugees to complete a series of sentences designed to uncover the true nature of their 
feelings towards other groups or entities. Sentences used included: ‘the kind of people I like 
is…’; ‘Muslims as a whole are…’; ‘The Gujaratis in general are…’; ‘ ‘The other 
communities in this country are…’ and ‘The present government is…’.114 
Another who made use of sentence completion tests was B.S. Guha. In examining the 
attitudes of Bengal’s predominantly Hindu refugee communities, Guha employed sentence 
completion to probe deeper into the nature of refugee tensions towards Muslims in particular. 
Five linked sentences formed the basis of this investigation, each of which provided an 
opportunity to express potential causes for hostility towards Muslims.115 According to Guha, 
the completion exercises highlighted three consistent themes underpinning refugee feelings of 
tension towards the Muslim community: ‘(1) manners and conduct; (2) cow slaughter (and 
beef eating); and (3) torture’. References to torture highlighted the role of ‘specific horrors 
which live in the memory’ as a potential cause of antagonism between Hindu refugees and 
Muslims. At the same time, however, the first two suggested the importance of more 
systemic processes, including social distance and stereotyping, in the making of inter-group 
tension.116 
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A second projective instrument used by tensions researchers was the Thematic Apperception 
Test (TAT). Developed by the Harvard psychologist Henry A. Murray and his partner 
Christiana Morgan during the 1930s, the TAT operated, first and foremost, through visual 
stimulation. Presenting subjects with a series of ambiguous images, testers then used open-
ended questioning to encourage the subject to create a ‘narrative’ based upon the thoughts, 
feelings and emotions provoked by each image. In designing the TAT, Murray and Morgan’s 
principal interest had been in its capacity to reveal hidden motivational drives.117 In the 
context of the tensions research, however, the TAT would, like the sentence completion test, 
be employed as a technique for probing the real nature of a subject’s feelings towards others.  
As part of his investigations into communal tensions in the city of Lucknow, the psychologist 
Kali Prasad deployed a bespoke version of TAT geared towards probing both the existence 
and nature of feelings of tension between Hindus and Muslims. As with Murray’s original 
TAT, Prasad showed subjects a series of images and asked that respondents ‘make up a story 
about the scene shown in the picture’. Rather than Murray and Morgan’s original frames, 
however, he prepared a new series of images designed specifically to represent ‘communal 
conflict situations’. In 1950, Prasad informed Murphy of his plans to apply this method to 
‘1,200 persons – Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and refugees’. A projective approach, he suggested, 
would act as ‘a check’ on the results of more subjective research methods such as 
questionnaires and interviews.118  
In employing American projective tests to the study of tension, Indian social scientists 
tailored these techniques towards a new set of questions. At the same time, they also adapted 
projective instruments to fit a new cultural environment. The TAT in particular, with its 
images drawn from American magazines and popular culture, was deemed unsuited to easy 
cross-cultural application. In using the test on communities in Bengal, for instance, Uma 
Chowdhry, a psychologist working under B.S. Guha’s Calcutta-based study team, observed 
that the original TAT had caused confusion among participants owing to the fact that ‘in 
certain respects…Indian social situations do not have counterparts in Euro-American society 
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as portrayed in the original Murray cards’.119 The lack of resonance between the images and 
Indian social and cultural realities, Chowdhry argued, presented a barrier to ‘empathy’ and 
‘identification’ with the figures featured, the result of which was an absence of subject 
projection in response to the cards. Noting especially the absence of reference to the ‘joint 
family system’ and ‘religious phantasy’ within Murray’s original images, Chowdhry worked 
















Tensions researchers’ attempts to ‘Indianize’ the TAT ran alongside a broader wave of efforts 
to adapt Western projective instruments to new cultural environments. In India, Chowdhry’s 
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An ‘Indian TAT’  
Figure 2. Slides from Uma Chowdhry’s ‘Indian’ modification of the 
Thematic Apperception Test 
(Source: Uma Chowdhury, ‘An Indian Modification of the Thematic 
Apperception Test’, Journal of Social Psychology, 51:2, 1960) 
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work on an ‘Indian TAT’ intersected with the attempts of other social scientists, working 
under the auspices of a Columbia University research project, to produce their own 
culturally-appropriate versions of the test.121 Such efforts, Lemov has argued, formed part of 
a concerted contemporary movement to use projective instruments in order to ‘amass data-
rich psychological portraits of a worldwide sample comprising all types of people known to 
humanity’.122 From the 1940s onwards, this ‘projective test movement’ would spur the 
creation of extensive ‘adaptations and target-specific’ versions of projective instruments 
intended to ensure their widest possible application. Subsequent adaptations would target not 
just ‘national cultures’ but also specific cultural subcategories such as children and the 
elderly.123 As Erik Linstrum has demonstrated, attempts to adapt projective instruments to 
different cultures had also formed part of a global wave of psychometric testing during the 
first half of the twentieth century, one in which projective techniques, including the TAT, had 
become one of the tools used to conduct ‘mental measurement’ of populations across the 
British empire.124 
Projective techniques, it will be seen, would also feature prominently in other attempts to 
psychologize development. During the 1960s, for example, the Harvard University 
psychologist, David C. McClelland, would turn projection, and the TAT in particular, into a 
key instrument in the service of another set of contemporary problems; namely, those 
concerning economic development. Here, animated by ascendant discourses on the need to 
‘modernize’ Indian society, psychologists would turn the TAT into a device for measuring 
(and ultimately producing) the psychological characteristics associated with modernization. 
Attempts to use the TAT in this way would diverge significantly from the use of projection to 
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probe the causes of inter-group tensions. In both cases, however, scientists would suggest that 
a key route to development lay in the capacity of projective instruments to uncover the 
patterns of thought and feeling that lay buried within the subconscious mind.    
The fate of India’s tensions research 
As social scientists collated their findings regarding the social psychological basis of 
tensions, their arguments chimed neatly with the broader agenda of the Ministry of Education 
during the post-independence years. By the early 1950s, the notion that communal and other 
tensions had their roots in inter-group misunderstanding and stereotyping, exacerbated by 
social and cultural separation, had become a key element of thinking among Ministry leaders. 
Pronouncing the need for education to address the ‘social and psychological conditions that 
give rise to fear and prejudices’, the Ministry would consistently emphasize the need for 
‘courses and curricula’ to be organized ‘in such a manner that they focus the attention of the 
younger generation to subjects dealing with inter-group relations and lead to better 
understanding among people’.125 Beyond the Ministry, however, the tensions research would 
prove more controversial.  
Significantly, the principal controversy here proved to be not so much the technical merits of 
the research, but rather the various sensitivities surrounding national self-image, hypocrisy 
and the motives of international organizations that it provoked. When addressing the subject 
of tensions research during a speech to the Indian National Commission to Unesco, in 1951, 
for example, India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, remarked upon the project’s tendency 
to conflate India’s internal tensions with the more serious tensions pervading the international 
arena. ‘UNESCO’, he explained:  
…has here in India been carrying on investigations into what is called, the problem of 
tensions. They study tensions, tensions between capital and labour, tensions between this 
community and that; between this religious group and that; and so many other tensions 
because our world is full of tensions and, what is worse, each one of us, even as individuals, 
is full of tensions…I wonder if it would not be a worthy exercise in a study of tensions for 
UNESCO to study them at Lake Success. Why go far afield in studying them? Why not study 
them at the headquarters?126 
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Similarly, when the tensions programme surfaced during discussions in the Rajya Sabha, 
parliamentarians asked not just for clarification on the findings of the studies, but also 
‘whether it is advisable that a foreigner should come and sit in judgement on such a 
question’. ‘When America is causing tension all over the world’, asked Shri Bhupesh Gupta, 
a Member of Parliament for the Communist Party of India, ‘what is the big idea of our 
Government getting an American over here?’127 
According to Gardner Murphy, the tensions research soon became the subject of a palpable 
sense of suspicion regarding the work of international actors in India. ‘There is’, he 
suggested:  
…a very natural feeling after the 200 years of British control that those of white skin may 
remain in India to dominate Indian institutions, and there is today a fairly widespread feeling 
that the United Nations, UNESCO, the World Health Organization, and other 
instrumentalities are to a considerable extent Western agencies which are in India to do 
something…When now one visualizes the present writer as a designate of UNESCO, sent as 
an American from the Paris office of that organization to study social tensions in India, 
nothing can be more natural than the Indians’ assumption that they were on the spot, that 
there was something wrong with them, that their country’s institutions were in some way in 
need of correction, that social tensions were a bad thing which the Western world would like 
to eradicate, and that there was no real escape from the surgery destined to be carried out.128 
Other tensions researchers, including the Aligarh psychologist Pars Ram, would also note the 
pervasive sense of distrust that surrounded the Unesco-assisted project. ‘The notion is 
unfortunately prevailing in many quarters and persists even after the best efforts of Dr. 
Murphy to dispel it’, wrote Ram to Humayun Kabir, that ‘the purpose of the research [is]…to 
get a survey conducted for the [UN] to find out how minorities are treated in India’.129 
Critiques of the tensions research reflected more than just suspicion towards the motives of 
international organizations, however. As Murphy again noted, they also reflected a prevailing 
sense of contradiction in the idea of an American studying social tension beyond America’s 
own borders. During ‘public addresses’, Murphy recalled, audiences frequently posed the 
question ‘in pointblank form’: 
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Why with your social tensions in the United States, your maltreatment of minority groups, 
and so on, do you come to India to tell us what to do about the problem of our minorities 
here?130  
Such responses bore the imprint of a deep sense of awareness regarding racial discrimination 
in the United States, one that, as several historians have demonstrated, formed a persistent 
dilemma for American actors operating in India, and Asia more broadly, during the post-war 
years.131 In India, in fact, popular resentment towards American racial prejudice was such 
that dispelling such discourses became a key theme within American cultural diplomacy in 
the newly-independent nation. In 1951, for example, a meeting of American diplomats 
working in South Asia suggested that: 
…anti-Westernism springing from color and race prejudice should be combatted by 
maintaining the present volume of counter-propaganda through an information and cultural 
approach which admits the existence of a color problem in the United States but points out 
that we are doing something about it.132 
The meeting’s recommendations included an increase in the number of ‘negroes’ working in 
American establishments, together with a ‘carefully formulated public relations program’ in 
the region.133 During the 1950s, efforts to combat discourses of American racial chauvinism, 
both within India and beyond, would grow to incorporate a wide range of tactics, from 
speaking tours by black civil rights leaders to the promotion of jazz music – and African-
American jazz musicians – as a means of highlighting the openness and tolerance of 
American society.134 As Nico Slate has argued, however, such efforts typically did less to 
convince Indian audiences than they did to impress upon American policymakers the need to 
address racial oppression at home.135  
Tensions research, then, provoked both sensitivity and suspicion regarding the motivations of 
international actors studying tension in India. At the same time, however, it also encountered 
claims that the research served to exaggerate the extent of India’s internal tensions. In 1952, a 
Steering Committee convened to discuss the future of the research programme adopted 
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precisely this view. Citing the ‘delicate political implications’ of the research, in particular its 
tendency to accentuate the problem of communal tension, the committee called for increased 
‘care’ to be taken to ‘place the study of communal tensions in their proper perspective by 
viewing them in the wider context of attitudes of different classes, communities and political 
and other groups’. At the same time, it also called for a ‘reorientation’ in the emphasis of the 
programme. Moving forward, it suggested, the principal focus of the study teams should be 
less the state of relations between social groups than ‘the impact of policies and measures of 
Government and other agencies on different groups and communities’.136  
Together with a Cabinet Directive calling for similar adjustments, the Steering Committee’s 
decision dealt a significant blow to the enterprise of tensions research. By 1952, however, the 
various concerns raised had also produced a shift in the Ministry of Education’s own stance 
towards the tensions programme. Having initially expressed great hopes for the research, 
Ministry officials now manoeuvred carefully around it, eager to assuage potential sensitivities 
it might provoke. When Murphy and his Indian colleagues made plans to publish the 
research, for instance, the Ministry persistently dragged its heels on the question of an official 
government publication. Fearing that the material was ‘growing cold’, Murphy would 
ultimately be forced to arrange for private publication of the research, calling upon contacts 
at the New York-based outfit Basic Books. The study, entitled In the Minds of Men: The 
Study of Human Behaviour and Social Tensions in India would eventually be published in 
1953. The Ministry’s comments on the draft publication, written by Humayun Kabir, 
encapsulated its now altered position towards the research. 
We would…like you to include somewhere in the foreword of the text a reference to the fact 
that 1950, when you came out to India, was a rather bad year. On account of the exodus from 
East Pakistan in February to April of the year communal feelings in the country had been 
greatly accentuated. Also from the very nature of your visit, you had to concentrate on areas 
like Aligarh and Kalyan, where such feelings were more in evidence than in the vast 
hinterland where the communities have established a relationship of accommodation with one 
another.137 
As the Ministry turned increasingly cold towards the tensions research, it also took measures 
intended to redress some of the criticisms levelled against that project. At the heart of this 
was a shift in the nature of its engagement with Unesco. Wary of claims that the tensions 
research risked stigmatizing India in the eyes of the international community, Ministry 
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officials now began to focus on opportunities that reversed the direction of learning on peace 
and the alleviation of tensions. The key initiative here was a concerted Ministry campaign to 
promote the merits of Gandhian principles and philosophies for the prevention of war. In 
leading a movement of non-violent resistance against British rule, this campaign argued, 
Gandhi and his followers had provided the world with a set of ideas and practices of great 
significance when it came to the construction of a peaceful world order. In 1953, in New 
Delhi, the Ministry hosted a high-profile Unesco Seminar on the ‘Contribution of Gandhian 
Outlook and Techniques to the Solution of Tensions Between and Within Nations’. Featuring 
an illustrious cast of Indian speakers, including Jawaharlal Nehru and the Minister of 
Education, Maulana Azad, the Seminar invited leading Unesco internationalists and 
peacebuilders from around the world to:  
…pay special attention to the ideas of Gandhi, who devoted all his life to the perfection of 
techniques for improving understanding between and within nations and to find out a moral 
substitute for war.138 
Held against the backdrop of the widely discredited tensions research, the Seminar 
encapsulated a significant volte-face in the Ministry’s thinking on tension. Now, rather than 
focusing on what India might draw from internationalist approaches to peace, officials 
prioritized the question of what India itself might teach the world on this question. 
In actual fact, the tensions research did not disappear altogether. Under the new terms of the 
Steering Committee and Cabinet directives, the Ministry of Education would continue to fund 
social scientific studies of tension throughout the 1950s, thereby supporting studies at the 
University of Bombay, the University of Lucknow, the University of Mysore, and the 
University of Poona, led by many of the same social scientists who had participated in the 
project’s initial phase. As they continued, moreover, these research projects played a 
formative role in the gradual evolution of ‘social psychology’ as a discipline taught and 
researched within Indian universities.139 Increasingly, however, the subject of tensions 
research was not so much the analysis of tensions between hostile social groups, but the 
study, as instructed by government policymakers, of popular responses to government 
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policies. At the same time, in the period after 1952, the ambitions attached to tensions 
research would subside greatly. From a bold programme of action-orientated research, the 
study programme would soon become little more than an academic pursuit conducted by 
university researchers independent of the government supervision or interest. ‘Though the 
Social Tensions Project itself went on year after year, and a great deal of work was done’, 
reflected Gardner Murphy in 1967, there was ‘never a recapitulation of the behavioural 
science studies that were launched in 1950’.140 While the project launched by the Ministry’s 
1948 memorandum limped on, creating its own legacies in the process, the notion that the 
psychological study of tension held the key to national peace had soon found that its moment 
had come and gone.  
Conclusion 
As it happened, the fall from grace experienced by India’s tensions research was mirrored by 
the fate of its international progenitor. At Unesco, where the psychological approach to 
tension had so captured the imagination of post-war internationalists, tensions research would 
also find itself marginalized, and gradually forgotten, during the course of the 1950s. The 
crucial factor here was not so much the symbolic sensitivities and that had embroiled the 
Indian project, but the shifting tenor of international relations. With the escalating 
geopolitical rivalry of the Cold War, Unesco’s ambitious bid for ‘world community’ soon 
found itself out of sync with a new set of international priorities focused on combatting 
communist influence. Increasingly, Unesco programmes would begin to focus less on the 
development of mechanisms for fostering world unity than on initiatives that, bearing the 
imprint of global Cold War, placed the imperative of economic and social ‘development’ at 
centre-stage.141 As ‘world community’ recoiled from centre-stage at Unesco, so too did the 
study of the tensions that stood in its way.  
And yet, despite its restricted lifespan, the enterprise of tensions research had established a 
pattern of interaction that would be repeated many times over in the decades to come. In the 
context of the tensions research, Indian leaders had come to view social scientific thinking as 
a potent means with which to address contemporary problems. In doing so, they had also 
drawn freely on the ideas from American psychological science. As the global peacebuilding 
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imperative that had facilitated this process soon gave way, the years that followed would 
witness the emergence of new sites and spaces within which contemporaries would look to do 
the same. These psychologizing enterprises would bear the hallmarks of a new set of 
imperatives, most notably those attached to the development agenda of the 1950s and 60s. 





























Between the American neighbourhood and the Indian village: ‘Community 
Development’, rural sociology and primary group dynamics 
On 2 October 1952, at an inauguration ceremony in the district of Alipur, near Delhi, 
Jawaharlal Nehru launched the programme of rural ‘Community Development’ (CD). Timed 
to coincide with the birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, the ceremony marked the 
initiation of a new government-backed enterprise of uplift targeted at India’s rural population. 
‘The work that we are starting today not only in Alipur but also in many parts of India’, 
remarked Nehru, ‘is of supreme importance’. Beginning with 55 experimental ‘Community 
Projects’ covering 27,388 villages, he explained, CD would seek to transform the conditions 
of India’s rural populace through the generation of new patterns of community ‘self-help’.1 
The launch of CD spoke of a quite different set of circumstances to that which had 
underpinned the enterprise of ‘tensions research’. More specifically, it signalled the arrival of 
a new set of priorities associated with the birth of Nehruvian development ‘planning’. In 
1951, the Government of India had formally adopted its First Five-Year Plan. Drafted by a 
Planning Commission comprising senior government policymakers, and chaired by Nehru 
himself, the Plan brought with it a new concern for policies geared towards the economic, 
social and political development of the new nation. In doing so, it positioned CD as the 
principal ‘method’ through which the state would seek ‘to initiate a process of transformation 
of the social and economic life of the villages’.2 CD set out with a particular vision of how 
this process of transformation would occur. Fusing Gandhian constructive work with a 
Nehruvian modernization agenda, it held that the key to the development of rural areas lay in 
the active participation of the people themselves. Through a holistic programme, covering 
agriculture, health, sanitation and education, CD sought ‘to build up the community and the 
individual and to make the latter a builder of his own village centre and of India in the larger 
sense’.3 During the 1950s, CD would come to occupy centre-stage in the government’s plans 
for the development rural areas, in the process acquiring its own dedicated government 
 
1 Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘This Sacred Work’, Jawaharlal Nehru on Community Development (New Delhi: 
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958), p. 22. For a first-
hand account of Nehru’s inaugurating speech, written by an unnamed observer, see ‘The Journey Begins’, 
Kurukshetra: A Symposium on Community Development in India (1952-1955), (New Delhi: Publications 
Division, for the Community Projects Administration, 1955), pp. 54-55. 
2 The First Five-Year Plan (New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India. 1952), p. 223. 
3 Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Community Projects’ (Speech at Community Projects Conference, New Delhi, 7 May, 
1952), in Jawaharlal Nehru Selected Speeches, Volume 2: 1949-1953 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1957), p. 69.  
62 
 
agency – the Community Projects Administration. By the end of the decade, the programme 
would extend to encompass almost every village in the nation.  
In this chapter, I trace how the bold new enterprise of CD, marking as it did a departure from 
the post-partition concern with ‘tension’, created new opportunities for the transference of 
American social psychological ideas to the Indian scene. Established during a period of 
tumultuous geopolitical change, the CD programme dovetailed not only with shifting 
domestic priorities, but also with transformations in the nature of American engagement with 
the Asian arena. Amidst a growing American concern with ‘development’ as an antidote to 
communist insurgency, India’s CD programme quickly became more than just a national 
endeavour; it became a key site of American ambition too. American support for CD came in 
the form of funds and resources, but it also came in the form of expertise. Funded by US 
Government, Ford Foundation and UN agency funds, American experts arrived in India keen 
to demonstrate how their own American models of rural development could help the CD 
programme to achieve its aims.  
Set against this backdrop, the chapter explores the trials and travails of a body of US rural 
social scientists, reared on the agricultural programmes of the American New Deal, who later 
became advisers to the Indian CD programme. The social scientists in question – men like 
Carl C. Taylor, Douglas Ensminger, Oscar Lewis and Milburn L. Wilson – were not 
psychologists per se. Nevertheless, they shared an understanding of rural development shot 
through by prevailing social psychological ideas. As part of a broader belief in the need for 
development efforts to be sensitive to local cultural contexts, they espoused the need to work 
with local structures of rural group-leader organization – with rural ‘primary group dynamics’ 
– as the key to ensuring popular participation in agricultural development programmes. In the 
context of the New Deal, social scientists had used these ideas to forward a specific set of 
arguments about the need to engage (and mobilize) ‘natural neighbourhood groups’.  
In seeking to apply this same approach to Indian CD, American social scientists would face a 
new set of questions. What was the ‘natural’ group unit of Indian rural society? And how 
could it be used for purposes of the CD programme? In search of an equivalent to the 
‘neighbourhood’ group, I argue, American sociologists would soon encounter a powerful set 
of discourses on the structure and ontology of the Indian rural society. Reflecting the 
influence of both colonialist and nationalist strains of thought, this discourse held the Indian 
countryside to be a land of once autonomous, self-sufficient ‘village communities’, whose 
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essential character, though weakened by the colonial experience, remained intact. The 
discourse on the village community formed a key underpinning of the Indian CD programme. 
Developing new patterns of rural self-help, according to community developers, was a task of 
‘restoring’ village communities to their former autarkic state.  
The idea of the village community had its detractors, including those who stressed the deeply 
divided features of rural social life. Rural sociologists, however, chose to go with rather than 
against the consensus. As advocates of rural development based on the mobilization of local 
groups, they settled on an understanding that the participation of rural people in self-help 
programmes hinged on working with the social psychological fabric of existing ‘village 
communities’. Charting these intersections between the neighbourhood and the village, this 
chapter argues that social psychological claims about rural group dynamics helped to justify 
an approach that worked through the influence of local ‘village leaders’. As embedded 
members of the local village group, social scientists argued, such leaders could be relied upon 
to mobilize their fellow group members for participation in CD. During the 1950s, the 
practice of working with village leaders would become a core strategy of the CD programme. 
As it did so, however, experiences on the ground would also begin to highlight the limits and 
dangers that came attached to such approaches.  
Self-help rural uplift: situating ‘Community Development’ in post-independence India 
The programme launched at Alipur, in 1952, formed part of a broader international flowering 
of ‘community development’ programmes during the post-war years. Shaped by diverse 
influences, including colonial ‘fundamental education’ campaigns and American agricultural 
‘extension’ techniques, community development offered an alluring, transnational vision for 
how problems of poverty, ‘underdevelopment’ and post-war reconstruction might be 
addressed. Focused on rural areas, community development stressed the need for local 
communities to come together to address their own problems, through their own initiative, as 
a means of building self-reliance. Its foundational principle, explained one UN brochure, was 
the recognition that people ‘had in their own hands and tools, and in their own ideas, the 
means of greatly raising their standard of living’.4 
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Community development, Daniel Immerwahr has argued, was anti-modernizing in its 
orientation. In prizing the efforts of rural communities to address their own local problems, 
community development rejected the notion that large-scale societal transformations, such as 
urban-industrial modernization, represented the only effective route towards social and 
economic progress.5 In the brave new world of post-war welfarism and developmentalism, 
this ‘low-modernist’, self-help approach to development had soon come to occupy a central 
place. In 1940s Africa, as British colonial regimes embraced a new ‘development-minded 
colonialism’, community development programmes became a key feature of those efforts.6 In 
post-war Greece, meanwhile, UN-assisted reconstruction programmes embraced community 
development as an organizing principle for the regeneration of rural areas.7 By the mid-
1950s, according to Immerwahr, community development had become ‘easily the primary 
rural development strategy at the United Nations’.8 
While part of this broader contemporary movement, in India, CD drew its inspiration 
primarily from more local thought and experience. Perhaps the most important influence, in 
this regard, was the legacy of Mohandas K. Gandhi. As part of a broader vision of 
decentralized, low-technology, village-based development known as ‘villagism’, Gandhi had 
argued that meaningful development called for the ‘reconstruction’ of Indian villages into 
self-contained and self-reliant social, political and economic units. In the context of his own 
constructive programme, he had emphasized the need to work with villagers in order to instil 
both a desire and a capacity for ‘self-sufficiency’ across all domains of rural life – from 
agriculture, to handicrafts, to sanitation and hygiene.9 For Gandhi, cultivating rural self-
reliance across these areas represented a vital step towards a broader goal of individual, as 
well as national, self-rule. By freeing villagers from inherently violent processes of economic 
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and administrative ‘centralisation’ he argued, increased self-reliance would also pave the way 
for a non-violent economic, social and political order.10 
With its aim of helping villages to become individual self-help communities, India’s CD 
programme articulated the strong hold of Gandhian villagist philosophy over the post-
colonial imagination. At the same time, the Indian CD programme reflected other lineages 
too. One was the rural uplift work of Gandhi’s fellow nationalist figurehead Rabindranath 
Tagore. From the 1920s onwards, at his Sriniketan institute in rural Bengal, Tagore had 
overseen a rural reconstruction experiment that fused his own moral and philosophical 
concerns with an emphasis on educating villagers in habits of ‘self-reliance’.11 Another key 
influence was the rural experiments of Francis L. Brayne, a British colonial official and the 
leader of an ambitious programme of self-help-based village development in the district of 
Gurgaon, near Delhi, between 1920 to 1927.12 Still another was the ‘low-modernist’, self-
help model of rural reconstruction pioneered by the Young Men’s Christian Association 
(YMCA) and in particular its leading agronomist, Duane Spencer Hatch, during the interwar 
years.13 Each of these nationalist, colonialist and missionary-led experiments had their own 
distinct points of emphasis.14 At the same time, however, each helped to propagate an 
assumption that it was the development of new patterns of community self-help that formed 
the key to effective rural development. 
If shaped by these various lineages, however, the Indian CD programme owed both its 
existence and its distinct character to one particular rural uplift experiment: that of the 
American architect, Albert Mayer. Arriving in India in 1943, Mayer seemed an unlikely 
figure to become a pioneer in the field of rural development. A town planner with interests in 
urban planning and communitarian design, Mayer had come to India on a wartime 
assignment, sent by the US Government to build airstrips in Bengal. Soon, however, he had 
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developed a deep interest in the problems of India’s rural areas. Following an invitation to 
meet Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1945, Mayer soon forged a close relationship with the Prime 
Minister in waiting, the two engaging in ‘intimate talks until far into the night’ on the topic of 
rural development and model villages.15 Nehru, one contemporary recalled, was in search of a 
‘symbolic way of showing concern for the needs of the mass of the people in the Indian 
countryside’.16 Prepared to let the architect try, in 1946, the Prime Minister in waiting had 
given Mayer permission to establish his own pilot rural development project in the district of 
Etawah, in Uttar Pradesh.17  
Drawing eclectically upon earlier rural experiments, Mayer’s project would inherit prevailing 
assumptions about both the problems facing rural society, and the potential solutions to them. 
Much like Gandhi, Tagore, Brayne and Hatch, Mayer’s principal aim would be to find ways 
of tackling rural problems by harnessing villagers’ energies towards a new pattern of ‘self-
help’. At Etawah, Mayer would suggest that the key to cultivating this pattern lay in a 
bottom-up, grassroots approach. Rather than imposing plans for improvement upon villagers, 
then asking them to partake in them, he argued, development workers needed to work with 
rural people in order to help them understand and address their own ‘felt needs’. It was only 
when people saw it was possible to address their own needs, according to Mayer, that a new 
‘spirit of change’ would be instilled within them.18 
The grassroots approach also shared much with what had gone before. At Etawah, however, 
Mayer would add his own slant to it in the form of a new development agent: the village level 
worker (VLW). A multi-purpose development agent, the VLW had two principal functions. 
On the one hand, he would act as a skilled elicitor and interpreter of local felt needs. On the 
other, using knowledge acquired through training in health, sanitation, education and 
agriculture, he would demonstrate to villagers how they might develop plans to address those 
needs. VLWs would seek opportunities to introduce villagers to ‘new’ techniques – from 
commercial crop rotation methods, to smallpox vaccinations, to DDT spraying. At the same 
 
15 Albert Mayer et al., Pilot Project, India: The Story of Rural Development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh 
(Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 6.  
16 Alice Thorner cited in F. Tomasson Jannuzi, India’s Persistent Dilemma: The Political Economy of Agrarian 
Reform (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 90. 
17 For more detailed accounts of Mayer’s relationship with Nehru, and the foundations of the Etawah pilot 
project see: Alice Thorner, ‘Nehru, Albert Mayer and Origins of Community Projects’, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 16:4, 1981, pp. 117-120; Nicole Sackley, ‘Village Models: Etawah, India, and the Making and 
Remaking of Development in the Early Cold War, Diplomatic History, 37:4, 2013, pp. 749-778; Nick Cullather, 
The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010), pp. 77-93; Immerwahr, Thinking Small, pp. 71-76.  
18 Sackley, ‘Village Models’, p. 756.  
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time, they would also seek opportunities to enmesh these innovations within existing cultural 
frameworks and value systems, ‘disguising new ideas in old practices’ in a way that 
smoothed the process of adoption by the villager.19 
Etawah offered a model of rural development well-suited to Nehruvian sensibilities. Nehru, 
though broadly sympathetic to Gandhi’s ideas about village reconstruction, maintained a deep 
scepticism towards Gandhian attempts to orient villages towards subsistence cultivation and 
handicraft production. Village development, according to Nehru, was an enterprise deeply 
entwined with a larger vision of industrial modernization, one that called for villages to be 
turned not into pockets of subsistence, but into productive agricultural units capable of 
feeding growing urban populations. When it came to agricultural production, he argued, 
villagers did not need encouragement to use ‘outdated methods’, with little concern for what 
they produced; they needed education in modern techniques that would enable them to 
produce ‘twice or thrice as much’ as they did currently.20 In this regard, Etawah’s fusion of 
Gandhian-style rural reconstruction with an emphasis on exposure to new ‘scientific’ 
innovations held great appeal. What was compelling about the pilot, Nehru explained to 
Mayer, was its promise to fit the ‘modern technique’ to ‘Indian resources and Indian 
conditions’, without ‘breaking up the old foundations’.21   
If it struck prevailing intellectual chords, however, Etawah also produced striking results. In 
the years after the project’s inauguration, in 1948, the villagers of Etawah soon set about 
building everything from roads, to culverts, schools, libraries, sanitary wells and hand pumps 
using their own materials and labour. Most notable of all, however, were the observed 
increases in agricultural yield. By 1950, the villages of Etawah witnessed, on average, nearly 
three-fold increases in agricultural output.22 Occurring at a time of pressing national food 
shortage, amplified by the failure of the 1951 monsoon, these increases soon captured the 
attention of Nehru and the Planning Commission, spurring hopes that an expansion of the 
Etawah model might produce the more general increases in agricultural production that India 
desperately needed.23  
 
19 Ibid., pp. 759-761.  
20 Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Self-sufficiency in food’, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru: Vol. 20 (19 October 1952 
– 31 December 1952) (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1997), p. 86. 
21 Cited in Sackley ‘Village Models’, p. 754.  
22 As Nehru told one press conference, at Etawah ‘the food situation has improved so much that the average of 
nine maunds per acre has become an average of twenty-three maunds per acre’. Cited in Ibid., p. 767. 
23 Here, Etawah’s productive promise also persuaded Nehruvian planners that a holistic, participative approach 
to rural development and the redressal of India’s food situation were compatible, rather than oppositional, 
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It was on this basis that, in 1951, the Government of India initiated efforts to expand the 
Etawah model. Establishing 15 experimental ‘Pilot Blocks’ (each comprising 100 villages) in 
areas chosen for their high potential agricultural yields, the government assigned ten VLWs 
to each Block (one for every ten villages). In each case, Block-level ‘technical advisers’ – 
covering agriculture, health, sanitation and education – were also appointed to assist VLWs 
in their work. From here, the effort to create more ‘Etawahs’ gathered pace swiftly. Already 
by 1952, 55 new ‘Community Projects’ had been created, each of which comprised three 
Pilot Blocks, thereby bringing a further 16,500 villages into the fold. The official 
inauguration ceremony, on 2 October 1952, turned this sprawling enterprise into an official 
programme of ‘Community Development’, with its own coordinating body – the Community 
Projects Administration (CPA) – located under the purview of the Planning Commission. By 
1953, with the creation of a National Extension Service (a subdivision of the CPA) the 
government had signalled its intention to extend CD to every village in the nation.24 
To head the CPA, Nehru appointed Surendra Kumar Dey. An engineer by training, Dey had 
spent the late 1940s coordinating his own pioneering rural development experiment. On a 
patch of deserted swampland near the village of Nilokheri, in eastern Punjab, the former 
General Electric employee had led the construction of a new rehabilitation project for 
partition-displaced refugees. At Nilokheri, Dey combined training in basic skills such as 
masonry, carpentry and blacksmithing with constant invocations to practice discipline, self-
reliance and a commitment to ‘work’. By 1952, the project had morphed from a series of 
scattered tenements into a flourishing township of approximately 6,000 people.25 What had 
happened at Nilokheri, according to Nehru, had captured ‘the main ideas of Etawah’.26 Dey, 
meanwhile, as an advocate for fusing Gandhian constructive work to an ‘agro-industrial’ 
 
pursuits, thereby silencing those that had pushed for a programme focused exclusively on agricultural 
production: ‘It is now increasingly recognised’ explained Planning Commission Secretary Tarlok Singh in 1952, 
‘that while increase of agricultural production must remain the central objective, agricultural development has to 
be conceived as part of the wider process of rural development. The problems of rural community development 
have to be attacked simultaneously from several directions and there has to be the fullest cooperation among the 
various agencies set up by the Government as also between those agencies and the people’. Tarlok Singh to All 
State Governments, 12 January 1952’ File No. 5-13/50-T: 1, Records of the Ministry of External Affairs, NAI. 
24 For an overview of the expansion of the Etawah project between 1951 and 1953, see ‘The Ford Foundation in 
India 1951-1959’, Report No. 003415, Box 51, Catalogued Reports 3255-6261 (FA739B), Ford Foundation 
Archives (hereafter FFA), pp. 40-53.  
25 For an historical account of the Nilokheri project see Jack Loveridge, ‘Between hunger and growth: pursuing 
rural development in Partition’s aftermath’, Contemporary South Asia, 25:1, 2017, pp. 56-69.  
26 ‘To Tarlok Singh, December 28, 1951’, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 17 (1 November 1951 – 31 
March 1952) (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of 
India, 1995), p. 269. 
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model, spoke a language of development deeply in tune with the Prime Minister’s own 
ideas.27 
In India, then, CD came into being on the basis of an Etawah-brokered compromise between 
the dual impulses of Gandhian villagism, on the one hand, and Nehruvian developmentalism, 
on the other. While shaped by the Gandhian-inspired commitment to village self-sufficiency, 
CD nevertheless eschewed the emphasis on subsistence agriculture and handicraft production 
so central to Gandhian constructive work, opting instead to tether rural self-reliance to a more 
modernizing project of development. Here, new collective patterns of self-help would be 
combined with scientific approaches to agriculture, health and sanitation, thereby 
transforming villages into ‘productive’ economic units capable of supporting the parallel 
project of national industrial development. As will be seen, this compromise would have 
important implications for the way in which the CD programme developed during the 1950s, 
including for the way in which social scientists applied their expertise.  
An American opportunity 
Etawah galvanized Nehruvian planners. But it would also capture the attention of another 
audience. Arriving in India in 1951, Chester Bowles, the new US Ambassador, had been 
among those most enraptured by the results of Mayer’s pilot project. The appeal of this ‘very 
remarkable program’, he argued, lay in both its ‘integrated’ nature and its emphasis on ‘a 
maximum of self-help’.28 Meanwhile, in its capacity to demonstrate to a ‘hungry’, ‘cheated’ 
and ‘exploited’ peasantry that their government actually ‘cared’, a government-backed 
programme of CD had, according to Bowles, ‘enormous political implications’.29 
A liberal New Dealer and former Governor of Connecticut, Bowles’ interest in CD spoke of a 
new set of priorities driving American foreign policy by the time of the Etawah pilot. 
Dovetailing with transformative geopolitical developments, including the 1949 communist 
victory in China and the onset of the Korean War, this set of priorities had begun to place 
new emphasis on the necessity of ‘Third World development’ as a bulwark against 
communist ‘radicalization’ and the foundation for a peaceful, politically stable world order. 
Encapsulated in President Harry S. Truman’s ‘Point Four’ programme of overseas technical 
 
27 Anumpama Arya, ‘S.K. Dey’s contribution to Indian political thought’, International Journal of Academic 
Research and Development, 3:2, 2018, pp. 1736-1738.  
28 ‘Reminisces of Chester Bowles, Oral History, 1963’, Columbia Center for Oral History, Columbia University, 
pp. 522. 
29 Ibid., p. 521.  
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assistance, this growing American concern with development was global in its scope.30 For 
Bowles, however, India represented its key crucible. Getting development right in India, he 
had advised Truman, formed nothing less than ‘the key to Asia’.31  
By the time of his assignment to India, Bowles had already been a prominent advocate of 
American support for Indian development. Between 1950 and 1951, for instance, he had 
championed an American wheat loan intended to help India through its period of monsoon 
failure.32 In Etawah, he saw a model of development eminently worthy of American support. 
He and Nehru, he later recalled, spent long periods discussing ‘endlessly’ the ‘whole field of 
rural development’ and the ‘great question of how you involve the people and bring them in 
as participants in the whole approach to growth’.33 Meanwhile, Bowles also set about pulling 
American purse strings too. In January 1952, he successfully secured US Congress approval 
for a new Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) promising $54 million of US 
support, the majority of it earmarked for the expansion of CD. Administered under the Point 
Four programme, the TCF funds would help to underwrite the establishment of both the CPA 
and the 55 ‘Community Projects’ announced by Nehru later that year.34 
American assistance came from other sources too. In August 1951, hot on Bowles’ heels, 
Paul Hoffman, the new President of the Ford Foundation, had also arrived in India. A former 
corporate executive and lead administrator of the Marshall Plan, Hoffman sat at the head of a 
foundation which, following a large endowment of funds in 1947, sat eager to provide 
assistance to US-backed development programmes around the world.35 Hoffman, a close 
associate of Bowles, had travelled to India to learn more about Etawah and the developments 
 
30 On Truman’s ‘Point Four’ programme see Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins 
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name, dwarfing those of its nearest rival, the Rockefeller Foundation. See Eugene S. Staples, Forty Years, a 
Learning Curve: The Ford Foundation Program, 1952-1992 (New Delhi: Ford Foundation, 1992), pp. 4-9. 
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unfolding there. Impressed by what he observed, he saw ‘no reason why all 500,000 of 
India’s villages could not make a similar advance’.36 Returning to New York, Hoffman 
quickly set about coordinating a package of foundation support for the expansion of CD. By 
1952, Ford had approved initial grants of $3.75 million for the Indian programme.37 
Nehru, of course, had his own reasons for accepting these funds. While the TCF provided 
much needed financial backing to support the government’s own plans, Ford’s assistance also 
provided a way of generating funds quickly, circumventing the lengthy and time-consuming 
process of securing Ministry of Finance approval.38 Reflecting stipulations of the broader 
Point Four programme, most TCF assistance came in the form of equipment – from 
agricultural tools, to jeeps, to bicycles – shipped to India from the United States.39 The initial 
focus of Ford funds, meanwhile, was the training of VLWs. By 1953, Foundation dollars had 
helped to establish 34 regional VLW training centres across the nation.40 
It was not just American funds and equipment that flowed into CD, however. As new patterns 
of Point Four and Ford assistance came into being, they soon brought opportunities for US 
experts too. Social scientists would come to occupy a central place in this process, soon 
becoming one of the major forms of technical assistance that Americans sought to provide the 
CD programme. In this process, American social scientists would seize new opportunities to 
promote psychologized ideas as development expertise. To understand how they did so, it is 
first necessary to go back to the foundation of these ideas, in the context of the American 
New Deal.   
New Deal rural sociology and ‘neighbourhood’ group dynamics 
Since its foundation in the early years of the twentieth century, the discipline of American 
rural sociology had always been animated by a belief that the study of rural society should be 
 
36 Cited in Cullather, The Hungry World, p. 89.  
37 Between 1951 and 1959, one third of Ford’s expenditure in India went on Community Development-related 
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geared towards problems of ‘concrete reality’, as one contemporary put it, rather than 
‘abstract concepts’.41 Influenced by John Dewey’s conception of democracy as a cultural 
system that maximized individual and group participation, rural sociologists viewed the 
scientific study of rural life as a means to advance the participation of rural people in 
administrative processes – to ‘stimulate [the] democratic process in the local community’.42 
Prior to the 1930s, however, rural sociologists had found few opportunities to put this 
principle into practice. Sociologists had, in fact, been employed at the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) since 1919, when the formation of the Division of Farm Population and 
Rural Life first brought the study of rural social structure under the Department’s remit. The 
Division, however, remained peripheral to the USDA’s overall operations, with little 
influence on broader departmental policies and programmes.43  
The New Deal had changed all this. With its raft of measures to improve the conditions of 
post-Depression American society, the New Deal brought wide-ranging programmes of 
reform upon rural communities. New USDA programmes such as ‘Agricultural Adjustment’, 
‘Soil Conservation’, ‘Farm Credit’ and ‘Rural Rehabilitation’ had greatly increased the 
contact between the USDA and rural people.44 In doing so, they had given new significance 
to the question of how to best engage rural communities in government programmes. Against 
this backdrop, rural sociologists had emerged as champions of a particular approach to 
enhancing rural participation, one that had quickly come to shape thinking in the upper 
reaches of the USDA.  
For the rural sociologists in question, a loose-knit body of agrarian intellectuals including 
Milburn L. Wilson, Carl C. Taylor, Douglas Ensminger and Arthur F. Raper, the best way to 
ensure popular participation in USDA reform programmes lay in moulding those 
programmes to fit the existing social and cultural lifeways of rural people. This meant 
ensuring that programmes addressed the actual needs of rural communities, rather than 
problems policymakers felt to be important. It meant framing programmes in a language rural 
 
41 Carl C. Taylor, ‘Sociology on the Spot’, Rural Sociology, 2:4, 1937, pp. 373-374.  
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people could easily understand. Most importantly, however, it meant connecting the 
administrative architecture of new USDA programmes to the prevailing structures of rural 
social life.45  
Here, rural sociologists forwarded a particular set of social psychological ideas. Following a 
tradition running back to the origins of the discipline, and its founding father Charles Horton 
Cooley, the sociologists framed rural society as a domain of ‘primary group’ relations.46 
Unlike urban settings, in which forms of group association were loose, transient and often 
based on short-term interest, they argued, in rural settings, people tended to live out their 
lives within ‘cohesive human groups’ based on locality, regular face-to-face interaction, and 
‘sympathetic, familistic’ bonds.47 The concept of rural primary group relations drew on the 
theory of Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft forwarded by the German sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnies. Translating these concepts as ‘community’ and ‘society’ respectively, American 
sociologists followed Tönnies in arguing that these contrasting forms of social relations found 
their clearest expression in the differences between the urban and the rural. Europe’s historic 
peasant villages exemplified the forms of communal solidarity and cultural integration 
associated with the gemeinschaft. But the contrast between ‘society’ and ‘community’ could 
also be found in the distinction between America’s cities and its rural areas.48 The steady 
‘stream of change’ brought by urbanization and industrialization had forced rural people ‘by 
necessity and by choice’ to begin making ‘new orientations to functions and processes which 
led far beyond local areas’. According to the sociologists, however, ‘primary group attitudes 
and ideals’ remained ‘more dominant’ in the rural setting than they did in the ‘urbanite’.49 
The rural neighbourhood community, explained Carl C. Taylor, had ‘never lost its locality 
orientation’.50 
According to rural sociologists, the ‘natural’ neighbourhood groups to which most rural 
people belonged were quite different to the ‘artificial’ groups that existed in urban 
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environments. ‘Informally or unconsciously organized in a way which served to develop 
human cooperation in attaining certain needs’, rural groups had emerged slowly over time, 
‘out of the common needs of people’.51 In the rural setting, group ties governed not only day-
to-day patterns of social interaction and contact, but also attitudes, habits, and patterns of 
work. In neighbourhood groups, explained one contemporary, the activities of ‘people 
working together’ took on a certain ‘naturalness, approaching almost instinctive action’.52 
The key to enhancing rural participation in USDA programmes, the sociologists claimed, was 
to reform the administrative structure of those programmes to reflect these natural patterns of 
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Neighbourhood groups and their natural leaders 
Figure 3. Slides from a USDA presentation on neighbourhood group 
dynamics 
(Source: ‘Morris presentation slides’, Nancy Nutting to Carl C. Taylor, 9 
June 1952, Box 7, Carl C. Taylor papers) 
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As things stood, the sociologists argued, the administrative structure of new USDA 
programmes rode roughshod over these group structures. ‘New and powerful Federal 
agencies’ were ‘barging into almost every local community, administering action programs 
that strongly affected local affairs’.53 Local planning committees developed to oversee the 
implementation of New Deal programmes, for instance, bore little relation to actual patterns 
of group organization and leadership on the ground. The result had been low participation 
and, in some cases, active ‘opposition’ to USDA programmes.54 An approach that worked 
with local neighbourhood group dynamics, rather than violating them from above, however, 
would help to ensure the participation of people in the government’s reform programmes.55  
In making this argument, sociologists drew on the findings of contemporary industrial 
psychology regarding the relationship between ‘primary group relations’ and worker 
productivity. Arguing that the close-knit relations established between factory workers 
demonstrated many of the same characteristics of rural ‘primary groups’, the Harvard 
University psychologist Elton Mayo had proposed that recognition of employee ‘primary 
group’ relations played a pivotal role in effective management. Where such groups were 
recognized and respected, he argued, productivity increased. Where they were ignored, 
disrupted or discouraged, alienation and low-morale prevailed.56 Mayo’s ‘human relations’ 
approach to management had thus framed attention to primary group dynamics as a key 
factor in the harnessing of productive human energies. Drawing explicitly on these 
arguments, rural sociologists argued that rural dwellers would participate more actively in 
USDA programmes if encouraged to work together in the local groups to which they ‘already 
felt attached’.57  
 
53 Milton Eisenhower and Roy I. Kimmel, ‘Old and New in Agricultural Organizations’, USDA Yearbook of 
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Sociologists made these arguments not from the margins, but from the epicentre of USDA 
political power. Indeed, by the late 1930s, rural sociologists had themselves come to occupy 
some of the most important roles within the USDA planning and administration. Milburn L. 
Wilson, a sociologist and agricultural economist trained at the universities of Iowa and 
Wisconsin, led this charge. Recruited to the USDA in 1933, by 1937 Wilson had risen to the 
position of Undersecretary of Agriculture, the second highest office in the Department. 
Together with a fellow economist and USDA administrator, H.R. Tolley, Wilson had taken 
concerted steps to extend the influence of rural sociology at the USDA. Under his influence, 
the Division of Farm Population and Rural Life (now the Division of Farm Population and 
Rural Welfare and placed under the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE)), was assigned 
a key role in the planning and organization of USDA programmes. From 1936 onwards, the 
Division would be headed by Carl C. Taylor, a leading rural sociologist recruited from the 
University of North Carolina.58  
In 1937, Taylor’s Division began a process of reforming the structure of local USDA 
planning committees to reflect the structure of local neighbourhood groups. At the centre of 
this process sat the enterprise of ‘community delineation’. Described as the ‘systematic 
analysis of rural locality groups’, community delineation used sociological research methods, 
including surveys, interviews and questionnaires, to identify the patterns of neighbourhood 
group association as they existed on the ground.59 Conducted by BAE social scientists, 
assigned in teams to local areas, the delineations probed residents on the intricacies of their 
social ties with other people in the area. ‘Each family’, explained one report:  
…was requested to indicate the three families with which it visited most frequently. 
Frequency of visitation and degrees of consanguinity were also ascertained. All visiting 
relationships and kinship patterns were then mapped by means of lines drawn between the 
dwellings of the families.60 
Typically comprising between twenty and thirty families, the ‘neighbourhoods’ identified 
through these delineations were defined not by geographical proximity, but by the intensity of 
interaction and ‘group feeling’ between residents. Once delineated, these natural 
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neighbourhood units were turned into the basis for a new structure of USDA planning 















The identification of ‘natural neighbourhood leaders’ was a central part of community 
delineation. For neighbourhood groups to function as the basis of popular participation, the 
sociologists argued, it was essential that the representatives to the reformed local planning 
committees were ‘natural leaders’ of the neighbourhood group.62 Such leaders were those 
who had ‘won the confidence of their neighbors and to whom their neighbours turn for advice 
 
61 Rising from the neighborhood, social scientists also delineated a second layer of committee representation –
confusingly termed ‘the community’ – each of which comprised between 10 and 15 individual neighbourhood 
groups. For more on structure of reformed USDA planning committees see Gilbert, Planning Democracy, pp. 
187-211.  
62 Here, they drew again on insights from contemporary industrial psychology, specifically the arguments of 
Chester Barnard’s The Functions of the Executive with its claim that effective ‘formal’ leadership had its 
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Mapping the neighbourhood group 
Figure 4. Sociogram of neighbourhood ties in Charles County, Maryland 
(Source: Charles P. Loomis and Douglas Ensminger, ‘Governmental Administration and Informal 
Local Groups’, Applied Anthropology, 1:2, 1942) 
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with respect to both their individual and mutual interests’.63 In the process of community 
delineation, social scientists probed residents with questions intended to pinpoint these 
leaders. ‘Natural leaders’, they argued, were those who, while not necessarily having titular 
authority, acted intuitively as ‘advisers’, ‘examples’, ‘spokesmen’, ‘informants’, 
‘harmonizers’ and ‘planners’ for the neighbourhood.64 Some consciously avoided use of the 
term ‘leader’ in their efforts to discern who the real ‘natural leaders’ were. The best way to 
identify natural leaders, explained one delineator, was to ask who residents considered, above 
all else, to be a ‘good neighbor’.65  
According to sociologists, the appointment of ‘natural neighbourhood leaders’ as 
representatives to planning committees would ensure that USDA programmes were tailored 
to fit local needs and priorities. At the same time, as trusted and respected members of the 
community, natural leaders would also spur the engagement of local people in the planning 
process – they would ‘mobilise the community for the improvement of rural life’.66 By 1942, 
roughly two-thirds of all US counties had seen their USDA planning committees reformed on 
the basis of community delineations.67 Those engaged in this process included Douglas 
Ensminger, a sociologist trained at Cornell University under the preeminent theorist of ‘rural 
social organization’, Ezra Dwight Sanderson.68 Ensminger, as Taylor’s right-hand man within 
the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare, would oversee several major county-
wide delineation projects during the late 1930s and early 1940s.69 Other figures engaged in  
community delineation included Oscar Lewis, a cultural anthropologist trained at Columbia 
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University; Rensis Likert, a social psychologist and also a Columbia graduate; and Arthur F. 
Raper, a sociologist from the University of North Carolina.70  
By 1942, however, the project of the rural sociologists had begun to unravel. Concerned 
about the impact of the delineation programme on its own political organizations, the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, an organization comprised largely of wealthy landowning 
farmers had, by 1942, turned firmly against Taylor’s Division. In that same year, under heavy 
pressure from the Bureau, an anti-New Deal US Congress had taken the decision to cut 
funding for the process of local planning altogether. Thus, by the early 1940s, the 
sociologists’ group-based approach to rural participation had quickly found itself 
marginalized from its former seat of power.71 Marginalized at home, however, American 
rural sociologists would soon find solace in new locales. Following the new channels of post-
war technical assistance, many would soon turn the transnational enterprise of rural 
development, rather than the project of domestic agricultural reform, into the principal object 
of their expertise.72 In doing so, they would carry with them the ideas honed in the context of 
the New Deal. It was in India, and its US-backed programme of CD, that these opportunities 
would loom largest of all.  
Between the American neighbourhood and the Indian village 
In November 1951, a few months after the visit of Paul Hoffman’s delegation to India, the 
former BAE rural sociologist Douglas Ensminger, arrived in New Delhi. Once a leading 
figure in BAE’s neighbourhood community delineations, Ensminger had come to India on a 
particular mission. Just weeks before his arrival, the sociologist-turned-administrator had 
been recruited to serve as the Ford Foundation’s new India Representative. Convinced of the 
need for long-term Ford support for Indian rural development, Hoffman had set about looking 
for an individual to permanently lead the organization’s activities in the country. Turning, in 
the first instance, to his contacts at the USDA, he had reached out to M.L. Wilson, now 
USDA Director of Extension Work, and H.R. Tolley, now serving as an adviser to the United 
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Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, both of whom had recommended their former 
colleague for the job.73 Reluctant at first, Ensminger had, with Hoffman’s encouragement, 
soon come to see the posting as a unique opportunity to ‘make a contribution to world 
peace’.74 Establishing temporary offices in rooms at New Delhi’s Ambassador Hotel, 
Ensminger quickly set about working with Nehru and other members of the Planning 
Commission to coordinate Ford support for the fledgling CD programme.75 
Ensminger’s appointment reflected a broader conviction on the part of US aid organizations 
and philanthropies like Ford that American agricultural experts had something to offer Indian 
CD. The crux of this was a belief that American experts, both at the USDA and beyond, had 
mastered and refined the techniques of what contemporaries called agricultural ‘extension’. 
Extension comprised the development of methods for effectively demonstrating new 
agricultural techniques to farming communities. As a result of the New Deal, however, it had 
also come to signify a broader set of ideas about the use of applied expertise to foster civic 
engagement, including the approaches to community mobilization championed by Ensminger 
and his colleagues. From 1952 onwards, the transfer of American ‘extension specialists’ 
would become a key form of US Point Four and Ford Foundation assistance to Indian CD. As 
part of this process, many of the figures previously associated with the New Deal BAE would 
find themselves following Ensminger's path. Carl C. Taylor, the former head of the BAE 
Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare, would make no fewer than six trips to India 
during the 1950s, serving as both a Point Four and Ford Foundation consultant on CD. M.L. 
Wilson, Oscar Lewis and Arthur F. Raper, all of whom had also worked with Ensminger and 
Taylor at the Division, would also spend time advising the Indian CD programme.  
As self-styled ‘sociological middlemen’, American social scientists approached the pursuit of 
Indian CD through the lens of their experiences at home.76 Much like the participation of 
American rural communities in New Deal programmes, they argued, the engagement of 
Indian villages in their own self-help required an approach that worked with, not against, 
local group dynamics. Effective CD, wrote Carl C. Taylor, required an approach that ensured 
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‘the potentialities of local groups’ were ‘energized, mobilized and harnessed for [the] 
economic and social improvement of themselves’.77 It was ‘the purpose of countries which 
are promoting community development programs’: 
…not only to utilize…locally organized groups as channels for reaching the masses for their 
own technical assistance programs…but to develop the manpower, ingenuity and enthusiasm 
of the common people in their economic and social programs of national development.78 
 
The emphasis on mobilizing local group energies reflected rural sociologists’ deeply-held 
belief in the merits of development realized through the existing socio-cultural frameworks of 
rural people, as well as their belief in the universality of rural primary group dynamics. But 
the framing of CD in this way would also generate its own pressing questions. After all, what 
was the ‘natural’ group unit of India’s rural society? In India, American sociologists would 
find no blank canvas when it came to this question. Indeed, when it came to the structure and 
ontology of Indian rural society, many Indian elites already subscribed to a particular set of 
ideas. Rural India, they held, was a social landscape marked by one particular institution: that 
of the ‘village community’.  
The idea of the historic village community was, in fact, a colonial creation. Its origins ran 
back to the nineteenth century, to the accounts of colonial administrators and scholars such as 
Charles Metcalfe and Henry Maine. Both Metcalfe and Maine had described India as a land 
of ancient, autarkic ‘village communities’, each representing a cohesive and self-contained 
unit of social, economic and political organization. Notwithstanding the many upheavals of 
Indian history, they argued, including the onset of British colonial rule, the basic character of 
these village communities had remained stable and unchanged.79 In reality, the ‘village 
republics’ described in such accounts represented less an objective reality than a product – 
both physical and ideological – of the colonial experience. Physically, the appearance of 
India as a ‘village society’ owed much to economic and politico-legal developments of the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. During that period, shifting commodity markets, 
extractive colonial revenue policies and the disruption of India’s erstwhile centres of 
economic activity had set in motion processes of ‘de-industrialization’ and ‘de-urbanization’ 
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that forced large swathes of a previously urbanized, mobile population back onto the land.80 
Against this backdrop, colonial officials, eager to find ways to fix stable assets that could be 
seized in lieu of unpaid revenue, had enshrined ‘traditional’ forms of property right over 
market ones, thereby creating a layer of landed village elites that would serve as a direct line 
of control between the colonial administration and the locality.81 By the mid-nineteenth 
century, then, driven in part by the colonial state’s desire to create standardized, manageable 
sites for the maintenance of fiscal and political order, Indian society had undergone a process 
of ‘sedentarization’ and ‘village-ification’ that gave it the appearance of a patchwork of 
discrete village units.82  
As colonial economic and political developments conspired to organize a previously fluid 
society around the economic and administrative unit of the village, Metcalfe, Maine and 
others proceeded to imagine the Indian village as hierarchical yet harmonious ‘community’ 
that had always been there. Such an imagining was, of course, not simply a misreading; but 
an interpretation tied deeply to colonial ideological imperatives. By portraying India as a land 
of timeless village communities, colonialists implicitly ‘displaced’ the subcontinent’s 
complex pre-colonial polity with a vision of India as ‘ancient’ civilization, awaiting the 
‘modernity’ of British rule.83 The representation of India as a society of self-sufficient 
villages served to justify imperial rule in other ways. Since villages had always been 
autonomous social, economic and political units, the rulers of India in turn had always been, 
to some extent at least, outsiders presiding over a foreign terrain.84 
Notwithstanding its deep colonial ties, the idea of the village community stuck firmly in the 
Indian imagination. Gandhi, above all, took the autarkic village communities of Maine’s 
description to be the core of India’s ‘traditional’ civilization – the essence of the ‘real’ India 
as it had existed before the disruptive impact of colonialism. ‘Indian society’, he observed, 
‘was at one time unknowingly constituted on a non-violent basis. The home life, i.e. the 
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village, was undisturbed by the periodical visitations from barbarous hordes’.85 Contrasting 
Maine’s village communities to the subcontinent’s urban centres, Gandhi would frame the 
latter as an expression, both material and symbolic, of British rule over India. Gandhi, was 
not alone, however. A broader coterie of nationalist leaders embraced the idea of the historic 
village community as well. Nehru too subscribed to the view of a precolonial ‘agrarian 
system’, based on the ‘cooperative or collective village’. Prior to the arrival of the British, he 
explained, throughout ‘foreign conquests…war and destruction, revolts and their ruthless 
suppression’, the ‘self-governing community’ of the village had, nevertheless, ‘continued’.86 
According to both Gandhi and Nehru, colonialism had brought destruction and ruin upon the 
village community. For Gandhi, this problem centred on the corrupting influence of modern 
urban civilization on the village, a process that had reduced rural communities to a state of 
‘miserable dependence and idleness’. For Nehru, however, the blame resided in more specific 
quarters; namely, the colonial practice of ‘landlordism’. By supporting landowner control 
over local land in order to bolster its own political power, he argued, the colonial state had 
created a system of exploitative agrarian relations that had immiserated the peasant classes, 
thereby undermining the delicate socio-economic equilibrium on which the village 
community had once been based.87 
In India, however, American sociologists encountered more than just a belief in the existence 
of the historic village community. They also encountered a conviction that the semblances of 
those village communities, at least in some shape or form, remained in-tact. According to 
Gandhi, notwithstanding the deleterious material and psychological impacts of cities on the 
village, the essential spirit of the age-old village community could still be found. ‘Go 30 
miles from the railway line’, he implored, ‘and you will see that the people show a kind of 
culture which you miss in the west...you will find culture which is unmistakable’.88 Animated 
by this belief, Gandhi had turned the restoration of India’s village communities to their 
former autarkic state into the core principle of his constructive programme. Claims about the 
endurance of the village community were not the sole preserve of Gandhi, however. Such 
thinking found adherents in other post-colonial nationalists too. Nehru would reject Gandhi’s 
wholesale romanticization of village life. He would also, as we have seen, reject Gandhian 
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attempts to orient village ‘reconstruction’ towards subsistence agriculture and handicraft 
production. Nevertheless, the idea that certain features of the erstwhile village community 
survived, and might be revived for the new purposes, formed a prominent feature of Nehru’s 
own thought. ‘The village’, he explained:  
…which used to be an organic and vital unit, became progressively a derelict area, just a 
collection of mud huts and odd individuals. But still the village holds together by some 
invisible link, and old memories revive. It should be easily possible to take advantage of 
these age-long traditions and to build up communal and cooperative concerns in the land and 
in the small industry. The village can no longer be self-contained economic unit...but it can 
very well be a governmental and electoral unit, each such unit functioning as a self-governing 
community within the larger political framework and looking after the essential needs of the 
village.89 
The idea that the remnants of the village community both survived and could be utilized for 
the purposes of post-colonial development planning received vindication in the work of 
Indian social scientists too. ‘There are aspects and characteristics of the life of a village’, 
explained Rudra Dutt Singh, a sociologist working with Albert Mayer at Etawah, ‘which 
clearly give it a distinct individuality’. ‘Underlying its varied divisive features and 
encompassing all of them’, Dutt argued, the village remained bound by ‘strong sentiments 
and deeply entrenched habits of thought’ Villages had not only been autonomous, autarkic 
communities, they also remained coherent sociological units that could galvanize people to 
‘act in the interest of the group’.90 
The desire to rebuild the spirit of the village community suffused the way in which 
Nehruvian planners and officials approached CD. ‘A community project’, explained Tarlok 
Singh, the Secretary to the Planning Commission: 
...[is] best thought of as a programme for the development in a co-ordinated and planned way 
of all the individual village communities comprised in it…The old village order has broken 
down…But, if we know our goal, through community development and planning at the 
village level, organized as a base for planning on a larger scale, the achievement of a new 
synthesis in rural life is a task that can be accomplished’.91  
‘The aim of Community Development’, explained another official:  
…is to create opportunities for village communities to reconstitute themselves on the 
fundamental basis of co-operation, so that human beings come together in order to shoulder 
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the burdens of life. In this consciousness of togetherness there is strength and common efforts 
of such groups will achieve great results.92  
In India, then, American rural sociologists encountered a robust set of discourses concerning 
the centrality of the village as an historic, still surviving and serviceable unit of social 
structure. In turn, these discourses would exert a profound influence over the sociologists’ 
own ideas about the natural group unit of Indian rural society. ‘A few hundred years ago’, 
explained Ensminger and Taylor, each village constituted an ‘integral village community’ 
bound by the ‘universal caste honoured core of village integrity’.93 And while colonial rule 
had ‘degenerated’ the ‘heart and mind’ of the villages, sapping the spirit of ‘community 
action’ that had once suffused them, every village remained, nonetheless, ‘a highly-structured 
social entity’: 
Each recognized that notwithstanding its inter-village kinship and caste responsibilities, it did 
have local village responsibilities. Even though it had for generations not been permitted 
completely to govern itself, it had always been dealt with as a unity by overhead government, 
even by feudal owners and administrators…In spite of all its weaknesses, the result of long 
periods of decay, village settlement was and is sure to be for a long time to come one of the 
most basic social structures of Indian society.94 
Indian villages were no longer ‘pristine folk communities’, the sociologists argued, but they 
continued to be ‘self-contained and cohesive groups’. They were, as such, ‘ready-made 
candidates for community development’.95 The task of CD, explained Taylor, was to 
reawaken the latent collective spirit of these ‘local village groups’ – to ‘convert thousands of 
“stagnant” village groups into dynamic social action cells of a great democratic society’.96 
Ensminger and Taylor would develop an analogy to describe this approach. As an attempt to 
re-energize extant village groups, they argued, CD could be likened to a process of ‘pouring 
new wine into old bottles’.97  
--- 
While Taylor and Ensminger cosied-up to prevailing ideas about the village as a ‘social 
entity’, others took a different view. Oscar Lewis, an anthropologist and former BAE staffer, 
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brought to India as a Ford Foundation consultant, was one. Arriving in 1952, Lewis’ 
assignment was to help develop methods through which the CD programme could be 
evaluated. Confessing that his real interests lay ‘fundamentally in research rather than 
administration’, Lewis had suggested that the most valuable contribution he could make to 
the programme was an in-depth anthropological study of a ‘typical’ Indian village, thereby 
creating ‘a baseline’ from which change could be measured.98 Following approval from 
officials at the Planning Commission’s Programme Evaluation Organisation (PEO), the 
research had been undertaken in the village of ‘Rampur’ near Delhi. Working closely with 
two Indian assistants, Lewis employed participant observation, interviews and survey 
methods to produce a detailed account of the village’s political, social, economic and cultural 
life.99 
Published in 1954 under the title Group Dynamics in a North Indian Village, Lewis’ study 
offered a rather different take on the structure of India’s rural society than that proposed by 
his American colleagues. The Indian village, it argued, far from a cohesive community, was a 
social space replete with divisions that ‘cut across’ any coherent sense of internal unity. At 
Rampur, Lewis identified a complex network of social sub-groupings, including caste, the 
extended family, and ‘the faction’ as basic features of ‘traditional village social organisation’. 
Factions, he argued, as groupings based primarily on kinship and caste, operated as 
particularly ‘cohesive units’, playing a key role in social functions such as ceremonial 
occasions; court litigations; the operation of the village panchayats; and increasingly in 
district board, state, and national elections. These factional alignments served not only to 
divide villages into discrete, identifiable subgroups; they also ‘reached out’ beyond the 
village, connecting each factional group to an extensive network of others. Viewed from this 
perspective, the Indian countryside appeared not as a patchwork of discrete villages but as a 
vast interconnected web of factions: ‘The village community’, argued Lewis, ‘in the 
American sense of a neighbourhood, hardly exists’.100 
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For Lewis, it was the faction, not the village, that represented the ‘natural’ group unit of the 
Indian countryside. It was ‘the small groups which we have called factions’, he explained, 
(not village communities) that provided ‘ready-made co-operative groups for community 
projects’. Moreover, because they constituted networks of intersecting alliances, as well as 
Mapping the Indian faction 
Figure 5. Sociograms and maps from the village of ‘Rampur’ 
(Source: Oscar Lewis, Group Dynamics in a North Indian Village (New Delhi: Planning 
Commission Programme Evaluation Organisation, Government of India, 1954) 
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coherent social units, factions held peculiar potential as ‘channels’ for the dissemination of 
information and ideas to rural people. 101  
Lewis was not alone in his willingness to question ideas about the enduring unity of Indian 
villages. Indeed, running in parallel to the Rampur study, a broader community of 
anthropologists had also begun to voice doubts about the coherence of ‘the village’ as a 
functioning social unit. This became clear during a series of seminars conducted at the 
University of Chicago in 1954. Organized by Robert Redfield, a University of Chicago 
anthropologist with a keen interest in India, the seminars brought together American, Indian 
and British anthropologists to discuss key ontological and methodological questions related 
to the study of the Indian village. During the seminar, participants voiced a full spectrum of 
opinions on the question of whether villages could be considered ‘isolable’ units of study. 
Some, such as the University of Baroda anthropologist M.N. Srinivas, answered in the 
affirmative, describing the village as ‘a community which commands loyalty from all who 
live in it, irrespective of caste affiliation’.102 Others, however, painted a different picture. The 
Indian village, argued McKim Marriott, Kathleen Gough and Gitel Steed, had long been 
enmeshed in dense ‘regional networks of kinship, caste, and trade which divided village 
groups from one another and tempered much sense of village loyalty and cohesion’.103 Had 
cohesive village communities ever existed, suggested others, the gradual incursion of 
railroads, cash crops, colonial revenue policies and other urbanizing influences had wrought 
changes that had long since destabilized those earlier patterns of social organization.104 
Nor was it just anthropologists that challenged the idea of the cohesive village community. In 
B.R. Ambedkar, an economist, politician, jurist and social reformer, and a renowned 
campaigner for the rights of India’s Dalit (untouchable) community, the concept of village 
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unity found its fiercest critic by far. Raised a Dalit in a rural area of India’s Central 
Provinces, Ambedkar approached the village from a wholly different perspective to that of 
other nationalist leaders.105 Far from an enduring social unit, he argued, the Indian village 
was little more than a symptom of the profound division that pervaded Indian society. 
According to Ambedkar, the village was segregated into two groups. On the one hand stood 
the ‘major community’ made up of all touchable castes. On the other, the ‘minor community’ 
comprising those born into untouchable groups. Far from equal members of a harmonious 
‘village community’, the minor community held dependent status in every possible sense. 
Economically subservient, the untouchables also occupied separate quarters and were 
segregated from ceremonial occasions. ‘I hold that these village republics have been the 
ruination of India’, Ambedkar remarked famously. ‘What is the village but a sink of localism, 
a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism?’106 Ambedkar’s emphasis on the 
village as a site of caste oppression made him deeply sceptical of Gandhian and Nehruvian 
attempts to reconstitute the village community as a basic unit of administration, 
representation and collective action. From the perspective of the Dalits, the enshrinement of 
the village community represented nothing less than a ‘great calamity’.107 
Neither Nehruvian planners nor American sociologists wholly denied the divisions, tensions 
and conflicts that Lewis, Ambedkar and others had highlighted. Nehru, for one, possessed a 
keen awareness of the potential caste and economic inequalities of contemporary village life. 
For community developers, however, the incongruent, oppressive features of the village 
coexisted alongside a deeper, underlying pattern of cohesion – as Nehru put it, an ‘invisible 
link’ – that bound members of the same village together. There remained, explained Rudra 
Dutt Singh: 
 …symbols, ideas, and values which in certain circumstances and situations force people to 
forget their internal bickering and external ties, and which impel them to stand united in the 
face of danger of absorption from outside or of disruption from within. Looked at from the 
viewpoint of the integral aspect of the village community most of its internal conflicts and 
external relations then fall in place as features of normal processes of community living.108 
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While political measures, such as reforms to the zamindari landholding system, would help to 
root out the oppressive features of agrarian relations, the underlying group ties of the village 
provided a raw social material that could be used to spur people towards collective action. 
The major ‘sociological problem’, explained Taylor, was:  
…what the village has inherited from the past by way of social organization which can assist 
development, and what is required of the village if it is to play the roles expected of it in the 
development programme.109  
Though recognizing the potential for discord and domination, then, both Nehruvian officials 
and American social scientists embraced the idea that ‘the village’ could still act as a conduit 
for the mobilization of people. In doing so, both would embrace the idea that villages – much 
like neighbourhoods – could be spurred to action through their own ‘natural leaders’. 
Natural leaders of the village community 
With its assumption that villages retained the remnants of a core social unity, the Indian CD 
programme proceeded on the basis that villages could be mobilized through ‘village leaders’. 
‘One of the important ways village level workers can create an interest in all the people in 
wanting to learn how to farm and live better’, explained the CPA’s Manual for Village Level 
Workers, ‘is to place trust and responsibility on local village leaders’.110 ‘One of the chief 
objectives of the rural community development program’, explained one Indian official, ‘is to 
arouse the self-confidence of the village people through their local leaders’.111 
American sociologists provided support for this practice, based on their experiences of the 
neighbourhood group. ‘Rural extension in the United States’, explained M.L. Wilson, ‘lays 
great emphasis on the place of local leaders in the development of the rural community’: 
…the “development of the community”, headed by local leaders, has been a tremendous 
factor in creating understanding and in demonstrating and teaching better ways of farming 
and living. It has demonstrated that such leaders can quickly develop in the village, if given 
the opportunity, and assisted by training and education.112 
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According to Carl C. Taylor, the VLW could only be ‘effective in his role as a consultant and 
as a bridge between the group and others only if he knows who the natural group leaders are 
and works with groups through them’:  
It should be taken for granted that there are hundreds of thousands of local group leaders in 
Indian villages. Nothing is more important in the community development programme than 
to locate, use, and develop them.113 
For Ensminger, meanwhile, ‘the essential step in creating the new village outlook’ was to 
‘locate the village leaders’: 
…every village will have its leader-follower patterns…every person in the village is a 
functional part of some informal leader-follower pattern…Through close attention with these 
village leaders and by following appropriate and carefully applied extension methods the 
[VLW] should hope to develop in the minds of these village leaders new attitudes about their 
present patterns of living and methods of making a living….Since these village leaders will 
have a following one can expect that ideas well developed in the leaders’ minds will be later 
interpreted and discussed in meaningful village terms within the informal leader-follower 
group. When this happens the seeds for change toward a new village outlook can said to have 
been sown.114  
The search for village leaders underscored the need to work with existing forms of authority 
in the village. Those already prominent within the village councils (panchayats) and other 
village level institutions, for instance, were identified as key candidates for village leadership. 
‘As far as possible’, described one account:   
…[t]he Community Development Project sought the co-operation of existing village 
institutions…Persons holding offices in these bodies or otherwise prominent in their activities 
were regarded as ‘village leaders’, and the development officials made a special effort to 
work closely with them.115  
‘In almost all villages’, the Manual for Village Level Workers explained:  
…there are headmen…they are natural, sometimes hereditary leaders of the community…A 
village worker should keep this in mind and while approaching the village problems would 
do well to keep this village leader on to his side. If he is with him, more than half the village 
is with him…village Panchayats still wield enormous power. [The VLW] can make an 
approach through the members of these Council of Elders.116 
Existing leaders had to prove their worth. In cases where such leaders failed to embrace the 
role of proactive change agents, for example, programme officials advocated the emergence 
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of ‘new leadership’ and the removal of traditional leaders’ power. One Ford Foundation 
pamphlet, for instance, published in 1956, described how a ruling Brahmin family of one 
village had ‘bitterly opposed’ the development programme, only to be faced by opposition 
from new leaders. As villagers rallied round the new leaders to initiate new cooperative 
action programmes, the Ford report described, these programmes ‘symbolised the final 
destruction of the traditional leader’s power’.117 The CD programme, explained one official, 
was a ‘testing ground for traditional leaders’, some of whom were ‘losing their positions 
because of opposition to these calls for action when the majority have wished to rally to 
them’.118 Nevertheless, while encouraging the downfall of those who ‘resisted change’, 
community developers also championed examples of those ‘traditional leaders’ who ‘under 
the stimulus of the development programme’ had emerged as ‘real and vigorous’ leaders, 
capable of enlisting the ‘enthusiasm’ and ‘support’ of village people.119 Traditional leaders 
were to be given an opportunity to demonstrate that they possessed the desired qualities for 
leadership. The role of development officials, explained one guidance document, was to 
‘recognise healthy leadership where it already exists’.120 
The vision of ‘traditional leaders’ as agents for village mobilization was one tied deeply to 
prevailing assumptions about the unity of the Indian village. Traditional elites, according to 
both CD officials and American social scientists, acted as guardians and trustees of the 
broader village community, whose role it had always been to coordinate village ceremonial 
undertakings, mediate between the interests of villagers, and represent the village to external 
parties.121 In the eyes of community developers, the leadership of the panchayat and landed 
classes formed a sort of ‘natural leadership’, one that ran in confluence with, not 
contradiction of, the basic aims of CD. Here, community developers harked back, once again, 
to historical understandings of the village community. According to the accounts of Metcalfe, 
Maine, Gandhi and Nehru, the panchayat had always been an institution welded to the 
broader corporate body of the village. Its leaders acted, first and foremost, in the interests of 
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the community as a whole. American sociologists provided support for the idea that 
traditional leaders would work in the interests of the village. As ‘guardians of the traditional 
ways of thinking and behaving’, explained Ensminger, those leaders ‘more than any others 
can also be counted upon to be the interpreters of the new’.122 
The practice of working with existing elites thus reflected key intellectual assumptions 
underpinning the CD programme. As Subir Sinha has argued, however, it also meshed well 
with more practical dimensions of programme implementation. Many of the regional-level 
bureaucrats and development officials employed by CD were, after all, themselves members 
of a provincial rural middle-class whose own ‘gender, class, and caste positions identified 
them closely with dominant rural groups’. Owing to ‘family and caste networks, marriage, 
and their own stakes in rural landed property’, these low-level officials harboured a ‘natural 
affinity’ towards existing village elites.123 
In 1957, the government placed renewed emphasis on the role of leaders with the 
introduction of a new ‘Gram Sahayak’ (village leaders) programme. Framed as a response to 
concerns about the failure of CD to ‘evoke popular initiative’, this programme provided 
village leaders with new, structured forms of training that would improve both their 
understanding of CD and their ability to engage their fellow villagers. Combined with 
instruction on technical skills, such as agricultural techniques, the training was typically 
carried out through a ‘series of special 3-day sessions in village camps’, each attended by 
‘about 50 leaders’.124 ‘Anyone who has seen these camps’, explained one Ford Foundation 
report: 
…is strongly impressed with the initiative and the growing sense of responsibility the camps 
awaken among the village leaders…In block after block today, the dynamic and aggressive 
force for development is coming from these newly-found and newly-trained village 
leaders.125 
A continued emphasis on the role of village leaders found further articulation with the 
implementation, from 1959 onwards, of a series of administrative reforms to the CD 
programme centred around the concept of ‘Panchayati Raj’. Based on the recommendations 
of a Study Team convened under by Congress politician Balwantray Mehta, Panchayati Raj 
proposed the transfer of increased decision making authority, including decisions relating to 
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CD projects and resources, out of local government agencies and into the hands of village-
level panchayats.126 In 1959, India’s parliament passed new legislation enabling this system 
to be adopted by states. The adoption of Panchayati Raj reflected a broader agenda of 
‘democratic decentralization’ pursued by the Nehruvian state. At the same time, however, it 
also reconfirmed the government’s convictions concerning the role of village leaders in CD. 
In handing more power to the panchayat, Panchayati Raj sought to increase the role of village 
leaders in the planning, organization and implementation of local CD projects. Like the Gram 
Sahayak programme, then, it spoke of an enduring belief that local leaders, free from the 
interference of local government agencies, would act to engage their fellow villagers in 
bottom-up programmes of community self-help. 
It was not long, however, before questions would be raised about the consequences of 
working with village leaders. From the mid-1950s, observers, both official and non-official, 
would begin to highlight a number of important points about the workings of the CD 
programme on the ground. The first concerned the nature of the programmes initiated under 
CD. In many areas, it seemed, programmes of so-called ‘cooperative village action’ launched 
under the auspices of CD had been projects of a particular kind. Often centred around modest 
physical undertakings, including wells, roads, irrigation and community buildings, these 
projects had in most cases offered benefits ‘skewed toward the wealthy’, ignoring alternative 
areas of action – such as land rights, education and caste reform – that might have a more 
significant impact on the lower orders of the village.127  
At the same time, contemporaries also raised concerns about the nature of popular 
participation in CD. In cases where villagers provided support for CD-backed projects, one 
observer remarked:  
Public participation…has mostly been in the form of participation in shramadan (people’s 
voluntary unpaid labour). These devices often lasting a week, were organized under the 
direction of leader politicians of the village. They could manage to collect a reasonable 
number of people for this work but a great majority of participants had very little 
understanding of its purpose. There was not much overt resistance to it, but a very 
considerable proportion of the participants viewed it as a form of coercion and submitted to it 
in a spirit of obedience…it is difficult to see how this approach could generate in them a habit 
of democratic cooperative action.128 
 
126 Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service (New Delhi: 
Committee on Plan Projects, Government of India, 1957).  
127 Immerwahr, Thinking Small, pp. 92-93.  
128 S.C. Dube, ‘Some Problems of Communication in Rural Community Development’, Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 5:2, 1957, p. 144.  
95 
 
Popular participation, described another account, took the form of ‘extorted labour’: ‘It was 
toil, pure labour contribution without the people themselves understanding why they were 
doing so and without being involved in decision making.’129  
Village leaders were supposed to engage villagers in programmes of genuine cooperative 
action. What was actually happening, critics argued, was quite different altogether. 
Approached as ‘natural leaders’ of village groups, rural elites had used their privileged 
positions to instigate projects that served their own interests, not those of the community 
more broadly. Perhaps worse, they had used their social and economic influence to conscript 
villagers’ labour for those projects as well. ‘Village solidarity’, one observer remarked:  
…would be strengthened if the lower castes were recognized by the higher-born as having 
equal rights; if they really shared in the fruits of cooperative action, they would not grudge 
their share of the labour. Yet almost everywhere the attempts of the lower castes to raise their 
status are strenuously resisted. The civic sense of the villagers would be strengthened if the 
rich would accept the obligation to utilise part of their wealth for the good of the community. 
…Today, the ancient tradition of charity and selflessness has become faded.130 
Working through village leaders, it seemed, created other problems too. ‘In some villages’ 
argued Adrian C. Mayer, an anthropologist studying CD in Madhya Bharat state, ‘the 
individual leaders were at the head of distinct factions’. At times, such as when factional 
leadership was ‘recognised by all’ in the village, or when factions ‘competed to outdo each 
other’, the results could be positive, so far as the progress of CD was concerned. At the same 
time, however, the prevalence of factional alignments could also prove injurious for the CD 
programme. Factional leaders might seek improvements that benefited only their own group, 
and even seek to block the progress of other factions. There was also the possibility that 
‘development work itself may be taken as the main issue of opposition’ between factions, 
thereby causing the programme as a whole to ‘fall into disrepute’.131 
Measures such as the Gram Sahayak programme and Panchayati Raj were supposed to 
address these emerging issues. Training sought to educate village leaders on the meaning of 
CD. Panchayati Raj, meanwhile, by introducing formal elections to the village panchayats, 
sought to widen the base of leadership, thereby loosening the grip of existing elites over areas 
such as CD. According to critics, however, such measures only deepened the problems facing 
the programme. The well-established social and economic positions of existing leaders, they 
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argued, enabled them to control the behaviour of their fellow villagers in council elections. In 
most areas, therefore, panchayats remained firmly in the hands of existing rural elites. ‘It 
seems clear’, explained one Ford Foundation report, ‘that the more favoured class – more 
education, more land, more status and more caste – are chosen as the [panchayat] leaders’:  
One samiti president (a well-to-do land-owner) frankly said, “They vote as we tell them to” 
and admitted that the agricultural labourers (dependent for work, credit and goodwill on the 
landed farmers) were in effect threatened not even cajoled into “voting right”.132 
From this perspective, the passing of new powers down to these local bodies had merely 
provided existing elites with yet further means to steer CD projects in their own interests, 
thereby either ignoring or exploiting the ‘weaker sections’ of the village.133 
In some places, it seemed, the passing of power to the panchayat had also further exacerbated 
the factional dimension of rural social relations. ‘It is generally felt’ concluded one meeting 
of Indian officials, ‘that elections to the Panchayati Raj bodies have increased the number and 
intensity of the factions in the villages’:  
In fact, one can discern a vertical relationship between political factions at the state and even 
at the central level and the electoral factions at the samiti and panchayat levels. There is also 
no denying the fact that in quite a few cases office bearers of the panchayati raj institutions 
are devoting themselves more to political factions than to the development functions.134 
As CD became subject to claims that it did little more than intensify the hierarchies and 
divisions within villages, the programme showed signs of lapsing from its original intentions 
in other ways. The focus on village leaders, it seemed, in addition to alienating and exploiting 
large segments of the rural population, had also paved the way for a programme that looked 
increasingly top-down, rather than bottom-up, in its orientation. Faced with declining popular 
participation in CD, for example, some development officials had begun to look to local 
leaders not as channels for the elicitation of local ‘felt needs’ but rather as conduits through 
which to push externally-mandated projects upon the people. In his history of the Indian CD 
programme, Daniel Immerwahr has described how this process of what he calls ‘backhanded 
authoritarianism’ became a progressively more significant part of the way CD operated on 
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the ground during the 1960s. Increasingly, he argues, ‘encouraging the “participation” of the 
community did not mean encouraging poor people to craft their own plans but rather eliciting 
their consent to the government’s programs’.135 Community developers were themselves 
acutely aware of these problems. Rather than acting as ‘beholden’ leaders ‘to local groups’, 
feared Carl C. Taylor, some local leaders were becoming ‘the mere tools or lackeys of the 
agencies whose services are now flowing into the villages’.136 
As a programme aimed at mobilizing community self-help through natural village leaders, 
then, CD had soon become subject to criticism that it did nothing of the sort. By embracing a 
model of rural development tied to the idea of cohesive village communities, critics argued, 
community developers had not only overlooked the potential for divisions (both vertical and 
horizontal) within the village, they had also overlooked the ways in which a development 
programme built around the former assumption could have profoundly contradictory effects. 
The framing of villages as communities had opened the door to an understanding of village 
leaders, including existing leaders, as conduits for group mobilization. In doing so, it had 
allowed for the deferral of influence, resources and power to leaders whose actions, in some 
cases at least, spoke little of enduring ‘close-knit bonds’ or ‘invisible links’. Those 
approached as natural group leaders not only failed to engage the lower social orders of the 
village, they had also used CD to entrench the deep structures of social, economic and 
political power that divided villages. By assuming villages formed cohesive units, then, CD 
had done more than just downplay the possibility of alternative social arrangements. In many 
cases, it had divided villages more than they had ever been divided before.  
Conclusion 
As the problems pervading CD gradually became clearer, the programme itself soon began to 
unravel. Growing concerns about the programme’s failure to reach those sections of rural 
society that needed it most were an important factor here. It was, however, renewed concerns 
about agricultural production that played the decisive role. In expanding CD throughout the 
1950s, the Nehruvian state had hoped that it would enable India to meet national grain 
production targets by 1958. Between 1956 and 1958, however, failed monsoon rains across 
northern India had led to a ten percent fall in national agricultural production, leaving the 
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government with no choice but to import, at great cost, millions of tons of grain.137 In the 
early 1950s, we have seen, concern about food supply, when combined with Etawah’s 
striking results, had created an opportunity for CD to claim the centre-stage. Now, however, 
it brought with it a gradual shift away from CD’s broad self-help agenda and towards 
programmes targeted more explicitly at increased agricultural production as the central goal 
of rural development strategy. In 1960, the Government of India signalled the beginning of 
this shift with the establishment of a new Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme (IADP). 
Coordinated by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MFA), the IADP reoriented the 
administrative apparatus of CD towards the new goal of increasing use of fertilizers, farming 
equipment and credit within rural areas chosen for their high potential agricultural yield.138 
The shift towards agriculture would be pushed further by the decision, in 1966, to relegate the 
CPA (and by extension CD) to a subsidiary arm of the MFA. In this capacity, CD would 
linger on for several more years. From 1965, however, under its new Minister C. 
Subramaniam, the MFA’s focus would shift towards increases in national wheat and rice 
production through investments in ‘hard’ agricultural science. As the promotion of pesticides, 
fertilizers and new strains of hybrid seed moved to the forefront, the foundations for India’s 
‘Green Revolution’ were in turn being laid.139  
As the focus of Indian policymakers moved towards ‘hard’ agricultural science, the thrust of 
American assistance took a similar turn. During the 1960s, following a decade of support for 
the CD programme, the Ford Foundation also began to channel the majority of its funding for 
Indian rural development towards agricultural programmes, beginning, in 1961, with a new 
$11 million grant for the IADP.140 The US Government, meanwhile, would also shift its 
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focus in this direction. The most significant aspect of this was a new, concerted effort to build 
India’s capacity in the field of scientific agricultural research. Increasingly, US Government 
assistance would target not sociological expertise for the CD programme, but faculty 
exchanges between Indian agricultural colleges and US land-grant universities.141 The 
Rockefeller Foundation, another American philanthropy, would also come to play a key role 
here. In addition to funding for new Indian PhD programmes in agricultural science, 
Rockefeller would underwrite the expansion of new research institutions such as the Indian 
Agricultural Research Institute, focused, above all, on the development of new high-yielding 
varieties of seed.142 
As parties on all sides drifted gradually away from CD, questions concerning rural 
sociological knowledge found themselves, in turn, pushed gradually from the centre-ground. 
The exchange of experts in agronomy and other agricultural sciences became increasingly 
more common during the 1960s; the transfer of experts in rural sociology and community 
group dynamics, increasingly less so. And yet, even as the CD programme ended in ‘failure’, 
the pursuit itself had set in motion processes that would leave a lasting imprint on both India 
and the United States. Through CD, American organizations, both governmental and non-
governmental, had become invested in Indian development in new and unprecedented ways. 
Through CD, the notion that American expertise might have something to contribute to 
Indian development had gained a new sense of legitimacy and appeal. One of the most 
important legacies of CD, however, so far as this thesis is concerned, was the new 
relationship it had galvanized between Indian development and the Ford Foundation 
specifically. Out of its experience assisting the Indian CD programme, Ford would go on to 
establish not only a permanent residence in the country (at the head of which Ensminger 
would remain for over two decades), but also a broader commitment to support India’s social 
and economic development in the longer term. As will be seen, Ford would go on to facilitate 
further attempts to apply American social scientific knowledge to Indian development. Here, 
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Postcolonial Developments, pp. 56-61; Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution, pp. 140-186; Cullather, 
The Hungry World, pp. 180-204; Cullather, ‘Miracles of Modernization’, pp. 227-254; John H. Perkins, ‘The 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution, 1941-1956’, Agriculture and Human Values, 7:3-4, 1990, pp. 
1-13; Deborah Fitzgerald, ‘Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-53’, 
Social Studies of Science, 16:3, 1986, pp. 457-483.  
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then, CD had brought into being a connection that would prove seminal to the enterprise of 
psychologized development moving forward.  
If it brokered new institutional alignments, CD would also prove formative for psychologized 
development in other ways. More specifically, the fall from grace of CD’s low-modernist, 
group-centric approach would create space for new ideas about the sociological and 
psychological underpinnings of development to come to the fore. In the next chapter, I turn to 
explore the emergence of new forms of psychologized development positioned in direct 
opposition to community developers’ earlier claims. Tethered to a broader social scientific 
paradigm of ‘modernization’, these approaches would locate the basis of development not in 
‘group mobilization’, but rather in a process of individual psychological adjustment. The 






Modernizing the mind: modernization theory, motivation and Indian economic 
development 
On 13 December 1957, in the secluded setting of Endicott House, a stately home some 20 
miles southwest of Boston, leading American social scientists gathered together for a 
conference on ‘Community Development and National Change’. Held against the backdrop 
of increasing American involvement in ‘community development’ programmes around the 
world, as well as increasing concerns about such programmes’ shortcomings, the conference, 
convened by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Center for International 
Studies (CENIS), brought together social scientists, along with aid officials, donors and 
practitioners, in an attempt to clarify the aims of community development and to discuss the 
nature of the American contribution moving forward. During the final session of the 
conference, following three days of intense and, at times hostile, debate between participants, 
David C. McClelland, a young psychologist from the Harvard University Department for 
Social Relations, rose to speak.1  
A little-known face among the eminent cast gathered at Endicott (among which included the 
renowned rural sociologist-turned-community developer Carl C. Taylor), McClelland 
nevertheless used the conference to outline a bold new understanding of what community 
development might mean. Addressing the apparent ‘failure’ of such programmes around the 
world, he argued that the problem lay in the fact that the concept of community development 
had itself been labouring under a misapprehension. Community developers, he argued, 
appeared to have ‘agreed that group problem solving is not only the right method of 
achieving the objectives of community development but perhaps even a definition of 
community development itself’. In doing so, they had based their efforts around the idea that 
‘if people meet together [and] decide what their needs are’, they ‘will work out plans for 
meeting their needs’, plans ‘that individuals will then successfully and energetically execute’. 
There was ‘no reason at all’, McClelland explained, ‘for accepting this as self-evident’.2  
 
1 For a summary of the conference proceedings, see Irwin T. Sanders (ed.), Community Development and 
National Change: Summary of Conference, Endicott House, December 13-15, 1957 (Washington DC: 
International Cooperation Administration, 1958). 
2 David C. McClelland, ‘Community Development and the Nature of Human Motivation: Some Implications of 
Recent Research [1957]’, Box 20, David C. McClelland Papers (hereafter DCMP), Harvard University 
Archives, Harvard University, pp. 23-45. 
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A preoccupation with techniques for group mobilization, McClelland went on, had caused 
community developers to overlook what cutting-edge psychological research had shown was 
the real driver of human action. For it was ‘individual motivation’, not ‘group dynamics’, 
that formed the true catalyst of change. People were moved to action not by the behaviour of 
their fellow group members, but as a result of their own ‘intrinsic motive and value 
orientations’. It was ‘in the end…always the individual who acts’.3 During the course of the 
lecture, and throughout the next decade, McClelland would go on to suggest that the key to 
development lay in one particular form of motivation – what he called the ‘need to achieve’. 
An observable, quantifiable psychological trait, the need to achieve represented the vital 
‘inner force’ that underwrote an individual’s capacity to behave in economically productive 
ways. Its widespread proliferation, McClelland argued, formed the touchstone of social and 
economic development.4 
McClelland’s critique of community development concerned more than simply the respective 
merits of individual versus group-based models of behavioural change. It also spoke of a 
more profound shift taking place within the American social sciences by the time of the MIT 
conference. More specifically, the argument reflected the emergence of a new way of 
thinking about development, one that stressed the need not for adaptation to local socio-
cultural conditions and ‘felt needs’, but rather for the initiation of a prescriptive process of 
societal change centred around the concept of ‘modernization’. Development, this new 
paradigm argued, was a process in which societies moved linearly from a state of ‘tradition’ 
towards a common endpoint of ‘modernity’. In the process, they adopted not only new 
technologies and institutional forms but also a specific set of ‘modern’ social, cultural and 
psychological norms. McClelland’s claim that development required a certain type of 
individual motivation thus formed part of a burgeoning consensus that conflated development 
– increasingly referred to as ‘modernization’ – with the emergence of a particular way of 
being.  
Discourses on modernization framed development as a process requiring linear, predictable 
social and psychological change. According to most theorists of modernization, such changes 
represented the inevitable effect of more structural and institutional aspects of the 
modernization process. For McClelland, however, the opposite was true. Development, he 
 
3 Ibid., p. 24. 
4 For a journalistic report on McClelland’s lecture see Malvina Lindsay, ‘Foreign Aid Test – ‘N’ Achievement’, 
Washington Post, 26 May, 1958. 
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argued, was a process that hinged ultimately on ‘changing people first’. During the course of 
the 1960s, McClelland would embark on a quest to prove that economic development in 
particular could be realized through the pre-emptive installation of the right ‘motivational’ 
conditions. In doing so, he would find his central proving ground in India. 
This chapter explores the entanglements between McClelland’s psychological approach to 
‘modernization’ and development thinking and practice in the Indian arena. In India, it 
suggests, McClelland’s claims about the need for pre-emptive psychological modernization 
found fertile ground among groups of officials, social scientists and business communities 
who saw in them a unique opportunity to realize Indian economic development from the 
‘bottom-up’. During the 1960s, these groups would come together to explore the potential of 
heightened ‘motivation’ to produce modernizing changes in economic life. At the same time, 
it was also in India that McClelland’s psychological approach would ultimately face its most 
significant opposition.  
I begin by situating McClelland’s enterprise within different contexts of late 1950s American 
social science. Starting with emerging concepts of ‘psychological modernization’, I show 
how McClelland intervened in this discourse with a theory that stressed the role of 
psychological change as a cause, rather than an effect, of modernization. Tracing this theory 
from its origins in needs-based understandings of personality, I then place McClelland in 
dialogue with other contemporary theorists of economic modernization, exploring 
commonalities and differences in their understanding of the relationship between 
psychological variables and economic change. In the chapter’s middle sections, I explore how 
McClelland’s efforts to prove his theory led to the conduct of action research experiments in 
India. In doing so, I argue that the application of achievement motivation theory to Indian 
economic development was an enterprise driven not so much by Americans, but by the 
efforts of Indians themselves. Moreover, as McClelland conducted his own experiments, the 
motivational paradigm soon morphed into a broader feature of development thinking and 
practice in India.  
The final sections of the chapter turn to explore forms of competition and contestation waged 
against McClelland’s motivational approach. Here, I situate the motivational enterprise 
within a contemporary debate about Indian culture and economic development. While 
McClelland’s ideas about the need for new psychological norms converged with a broader 
body of thought concerning the hindrance posed to economic development by Indian (and 
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more specifically Hindu) culture, others vigorously opposed the idea that the country’s 
existing socio-cultural norms were somehow unsuited to economic development. Faced down 
by relativists on one side, McClelland’s motivational approach would also find itself subject 
to other forms of rivalry. One came from Indian psychologists who, while embracing the 
motivational approach, nevertheless sought to re-work it to suit ‘Indian’ conditions. Another, 
however, came in the form of the increasing predominance of the particular model of 
development that McClelland had initially sought to refute. Indeed, while McClelland found 
in India a site to prove his own vision of economic development through psychological 
change, the country was simultaneously becoming an arena in which proponents of more 
economistic theories of development sought to prove theirs.   
McClelland, modernization and motivation 
McClelland’s claim that development required a particular type of individual motivation sat 
comfortably within a broader set of ideas rising to prominence within the American social 
sciences of the late 1950s, at the centre of which sat the totemic concept of ‘modernization’. 
Downplaying ideas about the dialectical relationship between tradition and modernity – and 
the subsequent need to fuse development efforts to local social and cultural traditions – new 
discourses on ‘modernization’ framed development as a process that hinged on a linear 
transformation of societies from a state of ‘tradition’ to a fixed endpoint of ‘modernity’. 
Forged in new interdisciplinary research centres such as the Harvard Department for Social 
Relations, the MIT CENIS and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Committee on 
Comparative Politics, modernization theory replaced nineteenth century ideas about racial 
and civilizational hierarchy with a new set of heuristic distinctions between traditional and 
modern. Now, however, the differences between societies were not fixed and static, but rather 
fluid and mutable; comprising changes which all societies would go through in the natural 
course of their evolution and growth.5 
 
5 The rise of modernization theory within American social science – as well as its far-reaching implications – is 
now the subject of a vast literature. The most important works include Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: 
Modernization Theory in Cold War America (London: Johns Hopkins, 2007); David Ekbladh, The Great 
American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010); Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development and 
U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Michael E. 
Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); various contributions to David C. Engerman et al 




Proponents of modernization stressed the totalizing nature of the modernization process. In 
the transition to modernity, they argued, societies not only adopted new institutions and 
technologies, they also replaced ‘traditional outlooks’ with ‘modern’ social and psychological 
norms. The strength of the belief that modernization would bring with it predictable 
psychological changes was such that some social scientists dedicated themselves to the study 
of this process in action. Two notable exemplars, in this regard, were the Yale psychologist 
Leonard Doob and the Harvard sociologist Alex Inkeles. Doob, a behavioral psychologist by 
training and former contributor to John Dollard’s Frustration and Aggression experiments, 
spent much of the post-war decades exploring the process of what he called psychological 
‘civilization’ within African and Caribbean societies. Using the term ‘civilization’ to refer to 
the ‘culture or the way of life possessed by modern literate and industrial nations in Europe 
and America’, Doob suggested that civilized societies were marked by a particular set of 
psychological propensities, including tolerance, reason, self-reflection, objective problem 
solving, and abstraction, that contrasted markedly to the attributes of ‘less civilized people’. 
Through interviews, surveys and projective tests, Doob looked not only for ‘objective’ 
evidence of what these psychological differences were, but also for signs that test subjects 
were themselves in the process of ‘becoming more civilized’.6  
Inkeles, meanwhile, a former wartime expert on Soviet ‘national character’ and a key figure 
within Harvard’s Russian Studies Centre, would spend the 1960s conducting his own 
research on the psychological dimensions of ‘modernization’.7 Like Doob, Inkeles framed 
modernization as a process that necessarily entailed a psychological transition, one in which 
‘traditional’ mindsets gave way to new ‘modern’ ones. Terming this endpoint ‘Overall 
Modernity (OM)’, Inkeles defined it by a series of character traits including ‘an openness to 
new experience’, ‘the assertion of increasing independence from ‘traditional’ authority 
figures’, ‘high occupational and professional ambition’, and even ‘a preference for people to 
be on time’. Through study teams in six ‘modernizing’ countries (including one in India), 
coordinated under the umbrella of the Harvard Project on Social and Cultural Aspects of 
 
6 Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Exploration (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1960). See also the later Leonard W. Doob, ‘Scales for Assaying Psychological Modernization in Africa’, 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 31:3, 1967, pp. 414-421. 
7 For the connections between Inkeles’ work on Soviet society and his later interest in psychological 
modernization, see David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 54-57; and Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, pp. 95-96.  
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Modernization’, Inkeles set out to measure and compare levels of OM among different social 
groups within the resident populations.8 
For both Inkeles and Doob, the question was not just the categorization of differences 
between ‘psychological modernity’ and its opposite, nor simply whether test subjects showed 
signs of becoming more psychologically ‘modern’, but also the factors that gave rise to 
‘modern men’. Connecting to his earlier work, Doob would link the process of psychological 
civilization with the emergence of a combination of factors such as frustration, aggression, 
and a greater toleration for deferred gratification caused by increased contact between 
civilized and less civilized societies, a process expedited by the introduction of civilizing 
forces like education and mass communication.9 Inkeles’s research, meanwhile, coalesced 
around his conviction that the key factor in the making of individual modernity was ‘the 
factory experience’. While forces like urbanization, education and exposure to mass media 
were themselves important in shaping thought and behaviour, he argued, it was the 
experience of industrial work, with its capacity to inculcate values of ‘efficacy’, ‘readiness 
for innovation’, and ‘planning’, that served as a uniquely effective ‘school’ in the making of 
modern minds.10 Notwithstanding these different points of emphasis, both Doob and Inkeles 
shared a common view of psychological modernization as a process that would occur through 
the life experiences of individuals within a modernizing society. As ‘modern’ institutions, 
technologies and cultures were established, this view held, such changes would work to 
produce new mindsets within the people that experienced them. Psychological change, then, 
was an effect of modernity. In Inkeles’s words, it was ‘the great ends of the development 
process’.11  
 
8 For write-ups of the research see Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in 
Six Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). See also Alex Inkeles, ‘Making Men 
Modern: On the Causes and Consequences of Individual Change in Six Developing Countries’, in American 
Journal of Sociology, 75, 2, 1969, pp. 208-225; and Alex Inkeles et al., Exploring Individual Modernity (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1983). For India-specific insights see Alex Inkeles and A.K. Singh, ‘A Cross-
Cultural Measure of Modernity and Some Popular Indian Images’, Journal of General and Applied Psychology, 
1, 1968, pp. 33-43. 
9 Doob, Becoming More Civilized, p. 71-101. 
10 Inkeles and Smith, Becoming Modern, pp. 158-164. ‘There were people’, explained Inkeles, ‘like myself, who 
believed that one major element in their failure was a kind of socio-psychological factor of some kind, or 
something cultural, and in part that represented having a certain set of attitudes or values or orientations towards 
the world…I thought you could organize the work process in such a way that you’ll get that effect. These people 
will then move out into the society and spread this influence’. Oral History with Alex Inkeles, Spencer 
Foundation Project, Columbia Center for Oral History, Columbia University.  
11 Inkeles and Smith, Ibid., p. 291. While I have singled out Doob and Inkeles here, there were others who held 
this consequentialist view of psychological modernization. The sociologist, Daniel Lerner, for example, became 
a proponent of the role of mass media in inducing psychological change in traditional societies. See Daniel 
Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 1958). For a 
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The theory of achievement motivation fed into this emerging discourse on the psychological 
dimensions of modernization. In doing so, however, it represented a specific take on the 
process. Distinct from the arguments of Doob and Inkeles, McClelland’s theory would 
suggest that psychological change represented not so much an effect of the modernization 
process, but a necessary precondition of it. Modernization, according to McClelland, required 











The theory had its origins in the laboratory, in theorization and experimentation in the 
psychology of human needs. Attempts to understand human personality and behaviour 
through the lens of human needs had become increasingly common within American 
psychology by the middle decades of the twentieth century. In 1938, the Harvard 
psychologist Henry A. Murray had published Explorations in Personality, a major new 
treatise in this field. According to Murray’s thesis, all individuals possessed the same set of 
basic needs – some ‘primary’ (biological), some ‘secondary’ (psychogenic) – which together 
shaped human nature. While these needs were common to all, their distribution varied 
between individuals. The extent to which a person possessed particular needs, according to 
Murray, especially ‘secondary’ needs, determined their individual personality and 
behaviour.13 In 1943, meanwhile, in an article entitled ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’, 
 
recent historical biography of Lerner see Hemant Shah, The Production of Modernization: Daniel Lerner, Mass 
Media, and the Passing of Traditional Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012). 
12 David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (New York: D. Van Nostrand 1961), p. 337. 
13 Henry A. Murray, Explorations in Personality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938). 
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Figure 6. Alex Inkeles, Leonard W. Doob and David C. McClelland (from left to 
right) 
 




Abraham Maslow, a psychologist at Brooklyn College New York, published the first iteration 
of his own theory of personality based on human needs. Describing ‘man’ as ‘a perpetually 
wanting animal’, Maslow explained how individual personality and behaviour was 
determined, above all, by an individual’s position within a hierarchical structure of needs. 
Beginning with basic ‘physiological’ needs, these needs rose through ‘safety’, ‘love’ and 
‘esteem’ needs, eventually arriving at the need for ‘self-actualization’. As needs at one level 
were fulfilled, Maslow argued, new needs emerged which in turn came to ‘dominate the 
organism’.14  
Upon receipt of a PhD in experimental psychology from Yale University in 1941, 
McClelland had entered enthusiastically into this emerging field of needs-based 
psychology.15 Influenced by Henry Murray’s work, McClelland developed an interest in the 
practice (already pioneered by Murray) of using projective techniques to measure and 
compare the need drives of individuals. Together with his colleague Christiana Morgan, 
Murray had developed the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) explicitly for this purpose. 
Presenting subjects with a series of indeterminate images, the test asked participants to use 
these to construct a ‘fantasy’ story, careful analysis of which, according to Murray, could 
reveal the unconscious need patterns that drove the individual.16 Interested in Murray’s use of 
the TAT as a ‘technique for measuring motivation’, McClelland brought a ‘systematic 
approach’ to its use.17 Using the TAT to test thousands of individual subjects, most of them 
his students at Wesleyan University, his post-doctoral institutional home, McClelland 
meticulously analysed and coded the outputs to measure ‘need patterns’ within the imagery 
produced.18 The results, he argued, pointed to the existence of three forms of motivational 
need – ‘the need for power’, ‘the need for affiliation’, and ‘the need for achievement’. It was 
 
14 Abraham Maslow, ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’, Psychological Review, 50:4, pp. 370-396. The 
argument would later be expanded in Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper, 1954).   
15 On McClelland’s early interest in motivation, see ‘David McClelland’ in Richard Evans (ed.), The Making of 
a Social Psychology: Discussions with Creative Contributors (New York: Gardner Press, 1980), p. 85.  
16 For a brief but instructive history of the Thematic Apperception Test, see Rebecca Lemov, Database of 
Dreams: The Lost Quest to Catalog Humanity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 27-43 
17 ‘David McClelland’, pp. 87-88.  
18 One technique used here was that of ‘motive arousal’. Here, the psychologists undertook to induce subjects 
into a particular motive state – e.g. a need for achievement – prior to taking the test, thereby allowing them to 
analyse what TAT output looked like when produced by an individual with a high need to achieve. The presence 
of similar themes within TATs produced in a ‘normal’ state were then claimed to be evidence of a high intrinsic 
need to achieve. See David C. McClelland, ‘Methods of Measuring Human Motivation’, in John W. Atkinson 
(ed.) Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society: A Method of Assessment and Study (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 
1958), pp. 7-42; David G. Winter, ‘The Science of the TAT: Development of Empirically-Derived TAT-Motive 
Measures’, Series: Correspondence, Box 87, DCMP. For the TAT images used by McClelland and his 
Wesleyan colleagues during this period see Atkinson (ed.), Motives in Fantasy, Action and Society, pp. 819-830. 
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differences in the distribution of these needs, McClelland argued, that underpinned 
differences in individual personality.19 
As he delved further into the relationship between need orientations and personality, 
McClelland came to focus on one need in particular: the need for achievement. In his 
Explorations, Murray had also identified the ‘need for achievement’ as a basic human need, 
equating it with a desire to ‘accomplish something difficult…to overcome obstacles and 
attain a high standard; to excel oneself; to rival and surpass others’.20 Following this broad 
definition, McClelland argued that the results of TATs showed considerable variations in the 
proclivity of this need, as manifested in the level of ‘achievement imagery’ in the stories 
people told. Using situational tests, McClelland argued that those with a higher need for 
achievement also demonstrated consistent behavioural traits, among which included 
‘moderate risk-taking’, ‘personal responsibility’, ‘feedback’, and ‘realistic goal-setting’.21 
According to McClelland, the need for achievement (or ‘n Achievement’) was a ‘socially 
acquired’ motive.22 All children had an inborn ability to feel satisfaction with the growth of 
their own skills and ‘mastery’ over their environment, he argued. It was those who had 
experienced this type of satisfaction more regularly, however, that would be more driven to 
seek it again in the future. A high need to achieve was thus the product of the systematic 
experience of the satisfaction that came from achievement. In most cases, it was related to a 
childhood in which realistic opportunities for self-improvement and achievement had been a 
regular occurrence. According to McClelland, subjects with a higher need to achieve tended 
to have been raised by parents who encouraged ‘excellence’ and expressed a healthy degree 
 
19 For a summary of a later summary of these three different forms of motivation see David C. McClelland, 
Human Motivation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp 223-267 (achievement); pp. 268-332 
(power); pp. 333-372 (affiliation).  
20 Murray, Explorations in Personality, p. 164.  
21 For an account of McClelland’s early experimentation on the need to achieve see David C. McClelland, John 
W. Atkinson, Russell A. Clark, Edgar L. Lowell, The Achievement Motive (New York: Appleton Century-
Crofts, 1953). On the behavioural traits associated with the need to achieve see McClelland, The Achieving 
Society, pp. 36-46 and 205-239.  
22 For motives as ‘acquired needs’ see David C. McClelland, ‘Toward a theory of motive acquisition’, American 
Psychologist, 20:5, 1965, 321-333. By framing the need for achievement as an ‘acquired’ motive, McClelland 
diverged substantially from ‘psychobiological’ approaches to drive orientation prevailing elsewhere. For the 
psychobiological approach see Hans Eysenck, The biological basis of personality (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas 
Publications, 1967) and H. J. Eysenck (ed.), Experiments in Motivation (London: Pergamon Press, 1964). For a 
revealing intellectual biography of Eysenck see Roderick D. Buchanan, Playing With Fire: The Controversial 
Career of Hans J. Eysenck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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of ‘emotional pleasure’ in their achievements. By contrast, those with a lower need to achieve 















Initially, McClelland’s work on the need for achievement remained theoretical. A 1953 
publication entitled The Achievement Motive, co-authored by McClelland and several 
colleagues, consisted of little more than a detailed summary of the lab-based experiments 
conducted at Wesleyan and other locations during the intervening years.24 During the course 
 
23 On the sources of achievement motivation see McClelland, The Achieving Society, pp. 336-390. As Alice O’ 
Connor has argued, McClelland’s identification of child-rearing as a key factor in the production of achievement 
and (thereby productive economic behaviour) also reflected a tendency among post-war social scientists to 
stress the role of the family, and child-rearing patterns in particular, in the making of poverty. By framing 
poverty as a product of personality traits linked to cultural dynamics within the family, this approach reversed 
the assumptions of more ‘sympathetic’ anthropological approaches, including those which emphasized the role 
of impoverished circumstances in the production of certain behaviours. See Alice O’Connor, Poverty 
Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy and the Poor in Twentieth-Century US History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011), pp. 107-109. 
24 The other major site for achievement motivation research being Michigan University. McClelland et al, The 
Achievement Motive, pp. 319-334.  
Theorists of human needs 
 
Figure 7. David C. McClelland with Abraham Maslow (left) 
 
(Source: University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Records of the Nebraska 
Symposium on Motivation, 1955) 
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of the 1950s, however, McClelland would begin to turn the need for achievement into a 
causal explanation for the process of economic development writ large. This shift was 
complex but hinged ultimately on two key intellectual manoeuvres. The first was a claim that 
the personality traits associated with a high need for achievement – moderate risk-taking for 
example – were also the key features of successful economic entrepreneurship. Then, 
drawing on theories regarding the role of entrepreneurialism in economic growth – from Max 
Weber to Joseph Schumpeter – he began to ponder the possibility of an underlying causal 
connection between entrepreneurialism, economic development and the level of achievement 
motivation within a society.25 
This burgeoning argument would find clear expression in his 1961 work, The Achieving 
Society (TAS). Styled as a counter-thesis to John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent Society, 
TAS employed an elaborate repertoire of techniques to make the case that the need for 
achievement and the process of economic development were inherently linked.26 Among the 
methods employed was historical analysis. Combining detailed economic statistics with 
wildly creative methods for measuring societal motivational patterns, TAS argued that 
throughout history – from ancient Rome to pre-Inca Peru to eighteenth century Britain – 
major periods of economic growth had been preceded by surges in the need to achieve within 
 
25 According to McClelland’s colleague, David Winter, the move to apply achievement motivation theory to a 
problem like economic development reflected his ‘Methodist background’ and ‘Quaker consciousness’, which 
instilled within him a ‘desire and energy to apply psychology to solving real-world problems’. David G. Winter, 
‘David C. McClelland (1917-1988): Obituary’, American Psychologist, 55:5, 2000, p. 541. If this was the case, 
it is also true that McClelland’s shift to ‘real-world problems’ dovetailed with changes in his personal 
circumstances. In 1952, he had taken up a position as Deputy Director of the Ford Foundation’s Behavioral 
Sciences Division (BSD), the body responsible for administering the Foundation’s sizeable endowment for 
social science research. Here, McClelland would later recall, he had ‘absorbed’ a new ‘spirit of hope and 
enthusiasm for the role that knowledge of human behaviour might play in helping man control his destiny’, with 
important consequences for his own research ambitions. McClelland, The Achieving Society, p. x. In 1956, 
meanwhile, McClelland had also joined the Harvard Department for Social Relations, an emerging centre of 
modernization theory under the leadership of the sociologist, Talcott Parsons.  At the DSR, McClelland would 
encounter not only an emerging scholarly concern with the differences between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ 
societies, but also, encapsulated in Parsons’ own work, an intellectual atmosphere thick with assumptions about 
the sociological and psychological underpinnings of ‘rational’ economic behaviour. On the Harvard DSR during 
this period see Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, p. 78; Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: Making the 
Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), ch. 5. For more on the 
Ford Foundation’s Behavioural Sciences Division and its role in shaping American social science, see Roger L. 
Geiger, ‘American Foundations and Academic Social Science, 1945-1960’, Minerva, 26, 3, 1988, pp. 315-341; 
Emily Hauptmann, ‘The Ford Foundation and the rise of behaviourism in political science’, Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences, 48, 2, 2012, pp. 154-173; Peter J. Seybold, ‘The Ford Foundation and the 
triumph of behavioralism in American political science’, in R. F. Arnove (ed.), Philanthropy and Cultural 
Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1980), pp. 269-303. 
26 The choice of the title The Achieving Society, explained McClelland, was ‘partly to reflect the association of n 
Achievement with this kind of social expansion, and partly to contrast such societies with the “affluent society”, 
popularized by Galbraith (1958) in which the emphasis is on the revere of what it is in the achieving society – 
namely on slowing down production rather than speeding it up’. McClelland, The Achieving Society, p. 63. 
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the respective population.27 Analysing national economic performance between 1925 and 
1950, McClelland then claimed that countries which experienced significant growth had also 
demonstrated higher levels of achievement motivation at the outset.28 TAS combined these 
attempts to demonstrate the historical role of achievement motivation with a qualitative 
reformulation of the Weberian thesis. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
Weber had famously linked the rise of industrial capitalism in Europe and North America to 
the existence of a vigorous ‘capitalistic spirit’, one with its roots in Protestantism’s ‘this-
worldly ascetism’.29 In TAS, McClelland advanced Weber’s claim by suggesting that the real 
impact of Protestantism had been its impact on the need for achievement. By encouraging 
‘independence and mastery’ among followers, he argued, the Protestant Reformation had 
created ‘a revolution in the family, leading to more sons with strong internalized achievement 
drives’. Protestantism had thus led to ‘greater n Achievement, which in turn led to the rise of 
modern capitalism’.30 
To McClelland, the finding that the historic rise and fall of economic fortunes could be linked 
to the presence of achievement motivation left little doubt that the key to economic 
development lay in the proliferation of the need to achieve. ‘Civilization’, he explained, ‘at 
least in its economic aspect…is a positive creation by a people made dynamic by a high level 
of n-achievement’.31 The argument had an obvious implication. For if the need to achieve 
formed the basis of economic development, then it necessarily followed that economic 
underdevelopment, where it persisted, was connected to a shortage of the ‘right’ motivational 
conditions. Weaving this into the ascendant discourse on modernization, McClelland 
suggested that a key difference between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ societies might well be the 
existence and absence, respectively, of the need for achievement. ‘The precise problem of 
underdeveloped countries’, he explained, ‘is that they do not have the character structure, 
especially the motivational structure, which would lead them to act in the ways required’.32 
Linking back to themes in his earlier work, McClelland, located the cause of this disparity in 
 
27 Among the techniques McClelland used to take readings of the motive forces in existence within societies, 
both present and historical, was the analysis of folk stories and children’s literature. These and other 
‘imaginative products’, he argued, could be used as a form of societal projective test – a means of probing the 
subconscious motivational patterns of entire populations. Ibid., ch. 3. 
28 Ibid., ch. 4. 
29 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1930).  
30 McClelland, The Achieving Society, p. 47. 
31 David C. McClelland, ‘The Achievement Motive in Economic Growth’ Bert Hoselitz & Wilbert E. Moore 
(eds.), Industrialization and Society (Paris: UNESCO-Mouton, 1963), p. 84.  
32 McClelland, The Achieving Society, p. 429.  
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differences between the normative child-rearing practices in ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
societies. While ‘modern’ cultures (especially Protestant ones) had developed child-rearing 
practices conducive to a high need for achievement, ‘traditional’ patterns of socialization 
typically stifled this need.33 Here, then, was an alternative theory of psychological 
modernization, one that framed it as a process caused not by the transformative effects of 
modern economic institutions, but by changes to cultural systems that preceded, and then 
gave rise to, modernizing economic development. 
--- 
McClelland’s argument regarding the psychological preconditions for economic development 
came with an unsavoury twist. Forwarded with the benevolent intention of identifying the 
roots of economic problems, it nevertheless suggested that the root cause of impoverishment 
lay in the psychological incapacities of those that suffered it. Applied to nations, achievement 
motivation theory offered a reading of Third World ‘underdevelopment’ that downplayed 
broader structural considerations – from investment to trade to histories of colonial 
exploitation – and stressed instead the innate cultural and psychological shortcomings of 
‘traditional’ societies. This, it will be seen, was a reading that McClelland would carry with 
him in his later Indian experiments, including the belief that India’s economic problems bore 
linkages to the retardational effects of ‘Hindu’ cultural norms.  
Strange though it may seem, McClelland’s framing of poverty as a consequence of the 
cultural and psychological defects of traditional societies found support in the work of other 
contemporary economic theorists. In 1962, for example, Everett E. Hagen, an MIT economist 
and former economic adviser to the Government of Burma, published his own treatise 
entitled On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins. Setting out to 
explore ‘the factors which cause a traditional society to become one in which economic 
growth is occurring’, Hagen turned to ‘theories of personality’, rather than straight economic 
considerations, arguing that the real causes of economic growth lay there. 34 Economic and 
technological progress, he argued, required the proliferation of ‘innovational’, ‘creative’ 
personalities ‘unconsciously alert to new aspects of phenomena’. Such a personality, he 
 
33 Ibid., ch. 9. For an account of McClelland’s enterprise as part of a broader effort by post-war American actors 
and institutions to intervene in and shape patterns of child development around the world see Sara Fieldston, 
Raising the World: Child Welfare in the American Century (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 
ch. 6.  
34 Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Illinois: 
Dorsey Press, 1962), p. 1. 
114 
 
contended, assumed ‘that the phenomena of the area of experience of interest to him form a 
system that he can understand and manage, and that therefore encountering unexpected 
aspects will lead him to new understanding, not to frustration’.35 Like McClelland’s high n 
Achievement individual, he also had a strong ‘sense of duty to achieve’.36 The problem, 
according to Hagen, was that such personalities represented an anomaly in ‘traditional’ 
societies governed by hierarchy, custom and restrictive social norms: 
The member of a traditional society is uncreative for several reasons. He perceives the world 
as an arbitrary place rather than an orderly one amenable to analysis and responsive to his 
initiative. His unconscious processes are both inaccessible and uncreative. He resolves his 
relationships with his fellows primarily on the basis of ascriptive authority. He avoids the 
anxiety caused by facing unresolved situations in the physical world by reliance on the 
judgement of authority.37 
‘Traditional societies’, according to Hagen, were characterized not by ‘innovational’, but by 
‘authoritarian personalities’.38 
For economic growth to begin, then, traditional societies needed to experience a fundamental 
rupture in their dominant character structure. According to Hagen, the most likely source for 
such a rupture was among marginal groups. Connecting the discrimination and ‘withdrawal 
of status respect’ experienced by such groups with increased feelings of insecurity and 
‘frustration’, Hagen argued that such factors made for a greater likelihood of ‘breakdown’ in 
the ‘traditional’ authoritarian family structure, thereby undermining one of the principal 
bastions of personality formation. By virtue of their marginalization and discrimination, 
minorities were more likely to develop innovational personalities, a process borne out, Hagen 
argued, by the successful entrepreneurialism of minority groups around the world.39  
Another contemporary economist who found pure economic theories of development lacking 
was the University of Chicago scholar Bert F. Hoselitz. A graduate of the University of 
Vienna, drawn to economics through the work of Joseph Schumpeter among others, Hoselitz 
was a ‘decided oddity among Chicago’s economists of business cycles and market models’.40 
 
35 Ibid., p. 96. 
36 Ibid., p. 97.  
37 Ibid., p. 98. 
38 On antipathy towards the authoritarian personality in Cold War America, and the construction of the 
‘creative’, ‘open-minded’ self as its idealized antidote, see Jamie Cohen Cole, The Open Mind: Cold War 
Politics and the Sciences of Human Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). See also Cohen-Cole, 
‘The Creative American: Cold War Salons, Social Science, and the Cure for Modern Society’, Isis, 100, 2, 2009, 
pp. 219-262. 
39 Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, chs. 9 and 10.  
40 Nicole Sackley, ‘Passage to Modernity: American Social Scientists, India, and the Pursuit of Development, 
1945-1961’, unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2004, pp. 162.  
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A prominent exponent of what he called the ‘non-economic barriers to economic 
development’, in 1952 Hoselitz established a new journal, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, dedicated to the examination of these barriers in more detail. ‘Economic 
development’, his introduction to the journal’s inaugural issue explained:  
…consists not merely in a change of production techniques, but also, in the last resort, in a 
reorientation of social norms and values…If the observation is made that among the 
prerequisites of economic development is the growth of a middle class, or the evolution of a 
spirit of ventursomeness [sic]…we are confronted with changes in the social organization and 
culture of a people rather than its economy.41 
During later years, Hoselitz would further develop his ideas regarding the role of non-
economic factors in economic development, in the process forwarding his own version of the 
argument that ‘culturally marginal groups’ played a vital role in entrepreneurship and 
economic development.42 At the same time, however, Hoselitz would also expound important 
differences between his own thought and the McClelland-Hagen approach. Though stressing 
that psychological factors played an important role in the development of entrepreneurialism, 
and thereby in economic development, Hoselitz would come to suggest that the process of 
development could not be understood in purely psychological terms. ‘Entrepreneurship’, he 
explained: 
…depends partly upon the appearance of persons with a psychological make-up for 
entrepreneurial activity, and partly on the social and economic environment that would make 
it an attractive venture to such individuals.43  
Personality factors and economic inducements thus existed in a ‘reciprocal’ relationship, one 
which could not ‘be arranged in any neat hierarchy of cause and effect’.44 Interestingly, while 
McClelland and Hagen’s psychological focus led them to assume that the requisite 
psychological conditions for development were fundamentally lacking, and requiring 
inducement, Hoselitz’s belief in the interdependence of psychological and economic 
processes created space for the conviction that the requisite psychological potential might 
already be there, just awaiting the right conditions:  
 
41 Bert F. Hoselitz, ‘Noneconomic Barriers to Economic Development’, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 1:1, 1952, pp. 8-10. 
42 See Bert F. Hoselitz, ‘A Sociological Approach to Economic Development’ in Sociological 
Aspects of Economic Growth (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960), pp. 61-62; and Bert Hoselitz, ‘Entrepreneurship 
and Economic Growth’, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 12:1, 1952, pp. 97-111. 
43 Bert F. Hoselitz, ‘The Entrepreneurial Element in Economic Development, 1962-1963 (UN Conference 
Paper’), in Box 2, Bert F. Hoselitz Papers (hereafter BFHP), Special Collections Research Center, University of 
Chicago, p. 4.  
44 Bert F. Hoselitz, ‘The Social Conditioning of Entrepreneurship’ in Box 4, BFHP, p. 1.  
116 
 
…from the great number of traders scattered about the urban and rural areas of almost all 
developing countries, we may deduce that individuals who exhibit achievement-oriented 
personalities are available in developing societies. What is required is not so much the 
creation of new personality types, but rather the opening up of opportunities in the social, 
economic and political environment, in the scale and impact of government services, and in 
the intellectual equipment and training of the persons concerned.45 
Though sharing a basic concern with the role of psychological factors in economic 
development, then, Hoselitz nuanced McClelland and Hagen’s psychological determinism by 
stressing the potential of the right economic conditions to unleash existent entrepreneurial 
drives.   
While it encountered subtle pushback in the form of Hoselitz’s reciprocal thesis, 
McClelland’s psychological approach encountered an altogether more substantial 
confrontation at the hands of other contemporary theorists of economic development. Most 
notable, in this regard, was the theorizing of the MIT economist Walt Whitman Rostow. The 
author of a landmark 1960 treatise on The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto, Rostow would propose a model of economic development that, on one level, 
shared many of the assumptions of McClelland, Hagen, Hoselitz regarding the cultural 
underpinnings of economic development. In The Stages, an archetypal work of modernization 
theory, Rostow set out five key economic phases through which all societies would pass on 
the road to modernity. Beginning with ‘traditional society’, this staged trajectory ran through 
a pivotal ‘take-off’ phase, during which an economy made the transition into mature, self-
sustained growth, culminating eventually in what Rostow called the ‘age of high mass 
consumption’. Framing societies as ‘interacting organisms’ in which ‘the worlds of politics, 
social organization, and culture’ converged, Rostow explained how progression through each 
of these various ‘stages’ involved fundamental shifts in the prevailing values, attitudes and 
behaviours of society.46 
 
45 ‘The very fact that a substantial number of entrepreneurs [have] appeared in societies in which a short time 
ago little or no such talent seemed to be available’, Hoseltiz went on ‘makes one suspect that individuals with 
the required ambitious drive exist in all human societies, though they may not always make their impact felt 
with the same intensity. If economic development and industrialization are planned as goals of a society as a 
whole, would-be entrepreneurs will step into a very different environment from that which prevailed in the 
historical epochs which McClelland and his students, Hagen, and even Schumpeter have investigated’. Hoselitz, 
‘The Entrepreneurial Element’, pp. 6-7.  
46 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960), p. 2. ‘[T]he ultimate reasons why the approach to growth via mainstream economics is 
misleading’, Rostow went on, ‘are that cultural, social and political factors are all at work as well as economic 
factors; and that the process of growth is inherently interactive, yielding not only changes in the parameters but 
even in the rules of behavior’. Ibid., p. 247.   
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Though sharing in ideas about the necessity of ‘cultural’ factors in economic change, 
however, Rostow’s stagist theory would ultimately forward a fundamentally different set of 
claims about the conditions that drove economic development. More specifically, Rostow 
would suggest that the key to economic modernization – and the ‘take-off’ stage in particular 
– lay in structural economic transformation brought about through targeted capital 
investment. Investment in an economy’s productive sectors, he argued, to a tune of at least 
ten percent of national income, formed the key intervention that would catalyse the ‘take-off’ 
of an economy into a repetitive cycle of growth, profit and reinvestment, thereby ushering in 
the transition towards ‘mature’, ‘self-sustaining’ economic growth. Once initiated, Rostow 
argued, this self-sustaining cycle would not only continue but also grow cumulatively. In due 
course, the full trappings of modern economic life – from modern institutions to modern 
attitudes – would follow.47 Rostow’s theory, it will be seen, would lead him to stress the 
transformative potential of American economic aid, with profound implications for American 
foreign policy. McClelland, meanwhile, would espouse alternative methods for turning 
theory into practice.  
From theory to practice: aid with ideology, India, and the ‘Kakinada Experiment’ 
For Rostow, then, certain economic conditions – in particular those relating to productive 
investment – formed the key drivers of economic ‘take-off’. During the 1950s, together with 
his MIT colleague Max Millikan, Rostow would use this argument to promote large-scale 
increases in American overseas aid. Targeted injections of American capital, he argued, made 
available at the critical ‘take off’ stage, would help to create the investment levels needed to 
‘push’ underdeveloped countries towards self-sustained economic growth. In making this 
argument, Rostow and Millikan would present the case for American aid squarely in the 
terms of the global Cold War. By setting undeveloped nations on the path to economic 
development, they claimed, American capital would do more than just help decolonizing 
nations stand on their own two feet. In the process, it would also steer those nations’ ‘newly 
aroused human energies in constructive rather than destructive directions’, thereby eschewing 
 
47 For second-hand accounts of Rostow’s stagist thesis see David Milne, America’s Rasputin: Walt Rostow and 
the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), pp. 59-68; Ekbladh, The Great American Mission, pp. 183-
189; Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution, pp. 51-58; Nicole Sackley, ‘Passage to Modernity’, pp. 294-301; 
Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2001), pp. 29-48, 75-86. For Rostow’s views on agricultural development in particular see 
Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), pp. 149-155. 
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them away from radicalism, and ultimately communism.48 Increasing the amount of US 
economic assistance to underdeveloped countries thus represented far more than a 
humanitarian endeavour. According to Rostow and Millikan, it was an act firmly in the 
American interest. 
This argument would have a profound impact in American policy circles. Having begun his 
first presidential term with a foreign policy based on a conscious disavowal of large-scale 
economic aid – encapsulated in the famous dictum ‘trade not aid’ – President Dwight 
Eisenhower would be the first to embrace its logic. From 1956 onwards, influenced in no 
small part by Rostow’s ideas, Eisenhower would oversee a gradual expansion of American 
aid programmes to underdeveloped countries in key strategic areas, including India. It was 
under the presidency of John F. Kennedy, however, that the influence of Rostow’s theory 
would reach its apogee. Assuming the Presidency in 1961, Kennedy would make the MIT 
economist’s ideas a central tenet of his foreign policy agenda. Under Kennedy, Rostow was 
appointed first deputy National Security Adviser and later head of the State Department’s 
Policy Planning Council. Within a year of assuming office, Kennedy had announced a new 
international ‘Decade of Development’ underpinned by dramatic expansions in US overseas 
aid.49 In November 1961, his administration established a new Agency for International 
Development (USAID) tasked with administering these funds.50 
Published at this precise historical juncture, TAS offered an open critique of the notion that 
large increases in Rostovian economic aid would produce the rapid economic development 
that economists and policymakers sought. Engaging head-on with Rostow’s and Millikan’s 
argument that ‘the more capital aid is poured into a country, the more rapidly it will be 
 
48 Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: 1957), p. 
8.  
49 For Kennedy’s famous speech to the UN General Assembly, during which he called for the inauguration of a 
‘Decade of Development’, see John F. Kennedy, ‘Address to the UN General Assembly’, New York City, 25 
September 1961. Retrieved from: https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207241.htm (accessed on 24 
October 2019).  
50 According to Kimber Charles Pearce, the influence of Rostow’s ideas on US policymaking had much to do 
with Rostow’s adept skill in the use of ‘rhetoric’ and economic storytelling. See Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy and 
the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid, pp. 1-10, 49-74. For details on the influence of Rostovian ideas on the Eisenhower 
and Kennedy administrations see Milne, America’s Rasputin, pp. 59-68; Ekbladh, The Great American Mission, 
pp. 183-189; Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution, pp. 51-58; Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, pp. 174-202; 
Cullather, The Hungry World, pp. 149-155; Sackley, ‘Passage to Modernity’, pp. 302-314; Srinath Raghavan, 
Fierce Enigmas: A History of the United States in South Asia (New York: Basic Books, 2018), pp. 211-215; 
Amanda Kay McVety, ‘JFK and Modernization Theory’ in Andrew Hoberek (ed.) The Cambridge Companion 
to John F. Kennedy (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 103-117. For Rostow’s own first-hand account of economic aid 
programmes under both Eisenhower and Kennedy see Walt W. Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Foreign Aid 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985). 
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developed’, McClelland suggested that this line of reasoning, though appealing, neglected 
‘the human factor’.51 ‘Capital output ratios’, he argued, showed wide variations in the level of 
investment needed to get the same output across different countries, variations which, in turn, 
were ‘fairly closely associated with national n Achievement levels’. Approaches that focused 
solely on capital aid thus failed to account for the fact that such aid only worked effectively 
when the appropriate psychological conditions were in place. ‘Human resources’, argued 
McClelland, made ‘a large difference in the capital needed to speed up economic 
development’.52 
McClelland did more than just critique existing aid practices for their neglect of ‘human 
factors’. He also offered his own proposals for how diagnostic theory might be turned into 
remedial action. As an ‘acquired’ motive, the need to achieve was not conceived as fixed or 
immutable. It was, rather, a character trait that could be developed within individuals, 
including in later life.53 Stressing the potential of various forms of ‘psychological education’ 
to induce changes in popular need orientation, McClelland argued that plans for accelerating 
economic growth needed to focus on elevating the presently scarce n Achievement resources 
in underdeveloped countries.54 His views about the possibility of cultivating rapid, 
widespread changes in motivational disposition contrasted with the ideas of many 
contemporaries, including the like-minded Hagen, regarding the difficulty of changing adult 
character structures. While not the only one to suggest psychological change was necessary 
for economic development, McClelland was unique in his belief that the required mental 
adjustment could be accomplished with relative ease.  
According to McClelland, one way in which the required psychological change might be 
brought about was through a process of ‘aid with ideology’. Rather than plying 
underdeveloped countries with ‘material aid’, he argued, ‘we must try to develop what is 
called the “achievement mystique”’. This required ‘selling people on the future of their own 
country’ through ‘the use of speeches, radio, newspapers and all the techniques of Madison 
Avenue’.55 Saturating impoverished nations with ideas of achievement would create an 
 
51 McClelland, The Achieving Society, p. 422.  
52 Ibid., pp. 422-423.  
53 For McClelland’s views on the possibility of inducing personality change in adults see McClelland, ‘Child 
Rearing versus Ideology and Social Structure as Factors in Personality Development [1975]’, Series: Writings 
and Speeches, Box 95.   
54 Ibid., pp. 403-418. 
55 David C. McClelland, ‘Foreign Aid is Only Effective When Men Seek Their Own Betterment’, Town Hall, 
1965, Box 25, DCMP, p. 2.  
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ideological environment conducive to a heightened motivation to achieve. It would instil the 
‘spirit which makes men seek their own betterment’.56  
As an example of how this approach could work, he pointed to communism. Communist 
governments, he argued, had ‘always stressed the importance of ideology, of propaganda, of 
whipping up enthusiasm for a new regime’.57 Communist literature, for example, was 
saturated with ‘achievement’ themes. In both Russia and China, McClelland argued, this 
‘achievement concern’ had worked to produce a spike in the need for achievement within 
society, thereby fuelling economic growth that outstripped that of the West and the nations it 
supported with economic aid. ‘The communists are ideologically materialists’, he explained 
‘they believe that economic and materialistic forces shape the course of history. Yet in actual 
fact much of their effort goes into changing people’s [sic] ideas. They act as if they have 
realized unconsciously that it is really ideas that shape the course of history’.58 Citing 
superior rates of Chinese over Indian economic growth, McClelland contended that this could 
be understood as a product, first and foremost, of the ‘ideological fervour which the Russians 
exported to China’.59 
While promoting ‘aid with ideology’, McClelland also proposed other ways in which the 
need for achievement might be propagated. Indeed, by the time TAS was published, his 
attention had turned decisively towards one question: to what extent was it possible to ‘train’ 
people in n Achievement? From 1961 onwards, McClelland and his Harvard colleagues 
would begin to promote the concept of ‘achievement motivation training’, a 
 
56 Ibid., p. 1. On several occasions, McClelland would make the case for a new approach to aid in front of 
Congressional committees. See ‘David McClelland’s appearances in Washington’, Box 25, DCMP. See also 
Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), pp. 141-142. 
57 David C. McClelland, ‘Motivational Patterns in Southeast Asia with Special Reference to the Chinese Case’, 
The Journal of Social Issues, 19:1, 1963, p. 17. 
58 Here, McClelland argued, was a strange paradox: ‘The Communists are ideologically materialists: they 
believe that economic or materialistic forces shape the course of history. Yet in actual fact much of their effort 
goes into shaping people’s ideas…Western democracies on the other hand, particularly the United States, are 
philosophical idealists yet practical materialists. The aid they have given is largely in the form of “guns and 
butter”’. Ibid., p. 17. This concern that, for all their faults, the communists might be doing ‘development’ better 
than the United States reflected a sense of anxiety (and arguably appreciation) towards the achievements of the 
Soviet Union not uncommon in American intellectual circles during the post-Sputnik years. See Engerman, 
Know Your Enemy, ch. 3. See also Zouyue Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow: The President’s Science Advisory 
Committee and Cold War America (London: Rutgers University Press, 2009).  
59 This fervour, McClelland explained, had ‘been more influential in modernizing the country than all the 
material aid that the Western democracies have exported so far either to China-Taiwan or to countries like India. 
In short this is just one more piece of evidence to support the growing conviction among social scientists that it 
is values, motives, or psychological forces that determine ultimately the rate of economic and social 
development.’ Ibid., p. 18. McClelland frequently made the China-India comparison in other speeches and 
articles. See for example David C. McClelland, ‘Business Drive and National Achievement’, Harvard Business 
Review, 40:4, 1962, pp. 110-111. 
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psychotherapeutic model of behaviour change geared towards the inducement of the need to 
achieve. At the heart of achievement motivation training was a purposive reimagining of the 
instrument used to measure n Achievement: the TAT. The TAT was now turned into a 
learning technique for teaching subjects ‘how to think like’ someone with a high need to 
achieve. By repeatedly undertaking the test to ‘improve’ their n Ach ‘score’, McClelland 
argued, trainees would gradually build an ‘associative network’ centred around the need to 
achieve, thereby ‘elevating’ it within their internal motivational structure. Telling stories 
about achievement would turn the idea into a ‘syndrome’.60 ‘Daydreaming aggressively’, 
McClelland explained, was a first step towards fostering new psychological norms.61  
McClelland and his colleagues set out to test this new model of psychological training in a 
number of locales. It was in India, however, that the Harvard psychologists would find their 
most important test site. To understand how, it is necessary to trace the particular set of 
institutional forces that pulled the enterprise of achievement motivation training in the 
country’s direction. The influential actors in this process, it will be seen, were not just 
Americans but Indians themselves.  
The key movers in this process were a group of officials, businessmen and social scientists 
associated with the Small Industries Extension Training (SIET) Institute, an agency of the 
Indian Ministry of Industry and Commerce located in Hyderabad. SIET sat at the confluence 
of a new set of priorities ascendant within Indian development planning by the latter half of 
the 1950s; namely those associated with the pursuit of planned industrial development on the 
‘small-scale’. Running parallel to the contemporary push for large-scale industrial 
development focused on capital goods (to be explored in more detail below), the push for 
small-scale industrialization followed the recommendations of an International Study Team 
on Village and Small Industries convened by the Ministry in 1954. Highlighting the key role 
that small industries could play in meeting the growing demand for consumer goods, 
providing essential agricultural equipment, and reducing population pressure on urban 
centres, the Study Team had presented the growth and ‘rationalization’ of such industries as 
the essential feature of any ‘realistic program for India’s industrial development’.62 In doing 
so, it recommended the establishment of a ‘nation-wide network’ of ‘extension service 
 
60 David C. McClelland and David G. Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement (New York: Free Press, 
1969), p. 25.  
61 Patricia McBroom, ‘How to Succeed: Dream Aggressively’, Inquirer¸ 9 April 1969, Box 25, DCMP.  
62 ‘Ford Foundation Program Letter, report no. 40: The Planning Team on Small Industry Makes Its Report’, 
Report 001448, Catalogued Reports 1-3254 (FA739A), Box 56, Ford Foundation Archives (hereafter FFA). 
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institutes’ (combined with additional extension ‘sub-units’) geared towards teaching new 
production methods and tools to small-scale entrepreneurs and businesses.63 During the late 
1950s, under the auspices of a newly-appointed Development Commissioner for Small 
Industries, the Ministry had launched concerted efforts to build this network on the ground.64  
Established in 1962, with support from the Ford Foundation, SIET was something of an 
anomaly among the Ministry’s expanding network of extension institutes and service 
centres.65 Most institutes adopted a narrow remit of technical activities, focusing on the 
provision of essential equipment and operational advice to trades within their locality. Owing 
in part to its connection with Ford, however, SIET, under the stewardship of its first Director 
R.N. Jai, quickly embraced an alternative role as a node for international (in most cases Ford-
sponsored) ‘experts’ on small-scale industrialization. Within its first year of operation, the 
Institute had already appointed Joseph E. Stepanek, a Yale-educated chemical engineer-
turned-economist to advise on its nascent programme of extension services.66 Stepanek would 
use his time as a SIET consultant both to help build SIET’s programme and to publish his 
own take on the importance of what he called Industrialization Beyond the Metropolis.67  
It was through Stepanek that SIET officials would become aware of McClelland’s work on 
achievement motivation. An admirer of TAS, Stepanek would recommend using 
‘McClelland-type training’ to ‘accelerate growth more rapidly than using economic 
inducements alone’.68 For their part, Jai and SIET Institute leaders would quickly embrace 
the idea of achievement motivation training. Beginning in early 1963, they initiated efforts to 
bring the Harvard psychologists to Hyderabad. The key connection here was the knowledge 
that, in January 1963, McClelland and his colleagues had secured USAID funding to conduct 
achievement motivation training courses overseas.69 Knowing this, SIET arranged for one of 
 
63 Ibid., pp. 2-4.  
64 ‘Ford Foundation Program Letter, No. 98: The Development of India’s Small Industries: A Nation-wide 
Industry Extension Service Taking Shape’, Report 001798, Catalogued Reports 1-3254 (FA739A), FFA. 
65 For a summary of Ford’s involvement in the establishment of the SIET see ‘Some suggestions on the future of 
SIET Institute’ File No. 000394, Box 22, Catalogued Reports 1-3254 (FA739A), FFA.  
66 For a contemporary interview with Stepanek covering, among other things, his views on the importance of 
small-scale industrialisation and the role of Western experts see ‘Unusual Rotarians’, The Rotarian, November 
1966, pp. 32-35.  
67 J.E. Stepanek, Industrialization Beyond the Metropolis: A New Look at India (Hyderabad: SIET, 1963).  
68 JE Stepanek to Gustav Raina, Dec 27, 1966, Box 113, DCMP, p. 1.  
69 As McClelland recalled, USAID officials were particularly interested in the more efficient use of ‘what 
seemed to be a diminishing supply of money’, and to this end were actively seeking out ‘new methods’ that 
could supplement the approaches of ‘economic theorists and planners’. USAID was interested in the question of 
‘whether n Ach training might be a relatively effective and inexpensive way of accelerating economic growth’. 
McClelland and Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement, pp. 95-96.  
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its officials, Aziz Pabaney, to attend a summer planning meeting at Harvard Business School 
during which potential sites for the USAID-sponsored courses were discussed. At the 
meeting, Pabaney would make the case for SIET as an institutional collaborator. Meanwhile, 










                                                                                       
 
 
Initially, McClelland and USAID had planned a comprehensive training experiment covering 
three continents.71 In September 1963, however, USAID administrators informed the Harvard 
psychologists that the anticipated funding had been unexpectedly withdrawn.72 While this 
sudden reversal led to the ‘abandonment’ of the proposed transnational study, the eagerness 
of SIET officials ensured that the prospect of overseas achievement motivation training did 
 
70 Ibid., p. 101-104.  
71 Following the 1963 Planning Conference, the proposed study sites were India, Tunisia, and southern Italy. 
Ibid., pp. 97-98. 
72 The key factor in USAID’s reversal was the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance, J.K. Mansfield. 
Mansfield had written to USAID Administrator, David Bell, advising that ‘we find it very difficult to see how 
the large cost of this proposed project can be justified in terms of its contribution to the Agency’s work’. He 
‘strongly recommend that AID not enter into [the] contract’. Ibid., p. 96. Interestingly, McClelland would later 
learn that Mansfield, a close ally of the late anti-communist campaigner Joseph McCarthy, had objected to the 
proposed project due to a perception that McClelland’s earlier research, by virtue of its arguments regarding the 
connections between achievement motivation and Protestantism, was ‘anti-Catholic’. [BurtonBlattInstitute], 23 
May 2017, ‘Master’s Series on Field Research - Interview with Professor David McClelland, Harvard 
University [Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=taECrn9KUCU (accessed on 17 
August 2019). 
Industrialization through entrepreneurship 
Figure 8. P.C. Alexander, Development Commissioner (Small Scale Industries), 
inaugurates the SIET with R.N. Jai (right) 
(Source: National Institute for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, Government of India) 
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not collapse altogether. ‘There was’, McClelland recalled, ‘some eagerness at SIET Institute 
to see whether achievement motivation training would help meet India’s need by creating 
entrepreneurial spirit’, thereby ‘leaving ‘one opportunity alive – the possibility of 
collaborating with the Small Industries Extension Training Institute in Hyderabad’.73 Already 
in India when the USAID reversal was announced, McClelland met with SIET leaders to 
push ahead plans for achievement motivation training at the Institute. When a last-minute 
application to the Ford Foundation’s New Delhi Office also fell through, SIET’s Governing 
Council again made the decision to push ahead with the experiments backed by its own 
limited resources.74 As Americans prevaricated on various fronts, it was SIET officials that 
helped to ensure the achievement motivation training experiment became a reality.75 
Commencing in February 1964, the Harvard/SIET experiment set out to test whether 
intensive courses of achievement motivation training, designed by McClelland and his 
colleagues, could produce changes in the economic life of a community. Targeted at 
entrepreneurs and businessmen from the town of Kakinada, in Andhra Pradesh – a site 
chosen for its particular size, location, and economic characteristics – the training combined 
McClelland’s bespoke methods of TAT-based motivational therapy with elements of ‘self-
study’, ‘goal-setting’ and ‘interpersonal support’. Self-study encouraged the subjects to 
‘perceive the newly conceptualized motive as consistent with the ideal self-image’. Goal-
setting asked subjects to define long-term goals to ‘keep the newly acquired associative 
pattern salient’. Interpersonal support focused on the cultivation of a social environment 
conducive to psychological transformation. Here, drawing upon the practices of self-help 
organizations like Alcoholics Anonymous, the training emphasized the importance of the 
‘retreat setting’ and the ‘new reference group’ as factors that would facilitate the process of 
personality change.76 It was, McClelland noted, ‘a matter of ethical propriety to state 
 
73 McClelland and Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement, p. 98.  
74 Ford would, in fact, provide a small grant to support follow-up surveys later in the project. Nevertheless, 
underpinned by personal differences and the perception that McClelland was driven more by his own ‘curiosity’ 
than the ‘interests of Indian institutions’, Foundation officials would adopt a stand-off approach towards the 
Harvard/SIET achievement motivation project. See various correspondence between McClelland and Ford 
Foundation officials in ‘Winter, David, [1965-1985]’, Folder 2, Series: Correspondence, Box 18, DCMP. 
75 Resource constraints on the SIET forced considerable revisions in the scope of the project, compared to the 
initial USAID proposal. What had been initially intended as a project covering seven Indian cities, for instance, 
was ultimately scaled-down to a single-site programme in the city of Kakinada, Andhra Pradesh. Moreover, 
owing to shortfalls in funding, some parts of the achievement motivation courses were run not by Harvard 
personnel, but by SIET staff and social scientists themselves. McClelland and Winter, Motivating Economic 
Achievement, pp. 99-105.  
76 Ibid. For ‘self-study’ inputs, see pp. 57-65; for ‘goal-setting’ inputs, see pp. 65-74; for ‘interpersonal 
supports’ pp. 74-78. 
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emphatically that the course does not manipulate or brainwash anybody…we want to 
demonstrate how a person can change his thinking and why he might want to do so’. In fact, 
when it came to motivation, McClelland argued, the desired psychological change could not 













Drawn from the local Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club and entrepreneurs’ associations, 
the Kakinada entrepreneurs entered enthusiastically into the experiment, viewing it as a ‘god 
sent’ opportunity to ‘break through the spirit of stagnation and helplessness that had gripped 
the community’.78 At a meeting of the Kakinada Chamber of Commerce held to inaugurate 
 
77 Ibid., p. 67. For a later attempt by McClelland to distinguish motivational psychology from coercion and 
manipulation, see David C. McClelland, ‘Managing motivation to expand human freedom’, American 
Psychologist, 33:3, pp. 201-210. On the rise of debates about brainwashing in American society see Matthew W. 
Dunne, A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Post-war American Society (Boston: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2013); see Ron Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the 
Military-Intellectual Complex (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 162-182; Rebecca Lemov, World 
as Laboratory: Experiments with Mice, Mazes and Men (New York: Hill & Wang, 2005); pp. 189-220.  
78 David C. McClelland, A.B. Pabaney, Elliot Danzig, M.S. Nadkarni, Udai Pareek, ‘Developing the 
entrepreneurial spirit in an Indian community’, Box 106, DCMP, pp. 9-10.   
Modernizing the mind 
 
Figure 9. David C. McClelland and his wife Mary with Kakinada entrepreneurs, 1965 
 




the experiment, reported Aziz Pabaney, members of the association came forward to 
‘publicly “own” the project as having been adopted by the city’.79 As such, ‘it did not prove 
difficult to get men who were eager to go to the course given at the SIET Institute’. In fact, 
‘the difficulty soon became one of deciding which ones should be chosen for the training’. In 
response, psychologists opted for a number of selection criteria. Alongside English language 
requirements and position within the local business community, the criteria included a 
‘serious interest in change and self-development’.80 
Through guidance on ‘the process of management’, ‘the kinds of help to small industries 
available from the Government of India’, and ‘opportunities for enterprise in the local 
community’, achievement motivation training also helped participants to think about how 
their newly-acquired motivational drives could be put into practice in their professional life.81 
Courses ended with ‘strong motivational reminders that the real test lay in the future after 
they returned home’.82 
In the years that followed, McClelland, his Harvard colleagues, and SIET staff, would 
conduct regular follow-up studies on the Kakinada entrepreneurs. Through revised life-
histories, TATs, and periodical business audits, they sought to measure both the 
psychological and the economic impacts of achievement motivation training on participants. 
The findings, they explained, provided new evidence regarding the ‘peculiar relevance’ of 
achievement motivation ‘to improved economic performance’.83 Following completion of the 
courses, they argued, many of the Kakinada entrepreneurs increased profit margins, 
developed new product lines, started new enterprises, and built new factories. Within only 
two years, the Kakinada entrepreneurs had ‘invested twice as much in expanding their 
businesses and created twice as many jobs as a comparable group of businessmen who had 
not received this special type of psychological education’.84 Many of the participants also 
showed clear signs of psychological alteration. A round of TATs conducted three years after 
the motivational courses, for instance, demonstrated significantly higher n Ach scores on 
average compared to those performed at the outset.85 According to one follow-up report, 
 
79 McClelland and Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement, p. 121 
80 McClelland et al., ‘Developing the entrepreneurial spirit in an Indian community’, p. 12 
81 Ibid., p. 29. 
82 Ibid., p. 32.  
83 McClelland and Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement, p. 339.  
84 David C. McClelland, ‘Trip around the world: A psychological path to rapid economic development’, Box 94, 
DCMP, p. 7. For a full write-up of the economic effects of the training courses see McClelland and Winter, 
Motivating Economic Achievement, chs. 7, 8, 9 and 10.   
85 Ibid., pp. 324-325.  
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‘many of the men’ demonstrated not only ‘a changed perception of risk’ but a greater 
harmonization between entrepreneurial, profit-seeking activities and an ideal self-image.86 
To McClelland’s evident frustration, the results emerging from Kakinada eluded a neat 
correlation between these processes of economic and psychological change. Those men who 
became most economically ‘active’ after the course, for instance, were not necessarily those 
who had retained the best command of the n Ach ‘associative network’. Equally, the 
economic impacts of the training appeared to be most pronounced among those who 
possessed stronger n Ach beforehand, indicating the possibility that achievement training 
might work best as a tool for better mobilizing existing psychological capacities, rather than 
for cultivating new forms of motivation. Perhaps most importantly, in a finding that seemed 
to lend weight to Hoselitz’s (rather than McClelland’s) model of development, differences in 
economic ‘opportunity’ also appeared to play a ‘major role’. While heightened n 
Achievement tended to have a significant bearing on the economic behaviour of those who 
were in charge of their business, its impact on those not in positions of control was relatively 
small. Indeed, where few economic opportunities existed at all, increases in achievement 
motivation could ‘actually lead to less activity’.87  
If such observations gave cause for certain qualifications concerning the conditions under 
which heightened achievement motivation might contribute to economic development, to 
McClelland, the Kakinada Experiment had also done a great deal to validate his claims. At 
Kakinada, he concluded:  
...change in people resulted in concrete increases in investment and employment…the 
business expansion was not in response to changes in the opportunity structure or to specific 
economic incentives or disincentives introduced by the government or the market…[the 
trainers] had to go about their task completely empty-handed, so far as material aids were 
concerned…All they had to offer is what are usually considered to be “soft” educational 
inputs, yet these inputs had a greater effect on “hard” economic outcomes than many aid 
programs that have made available large material resources and incentives.88   
 
 
86 ‘Before the course they had often had an idea for a new venture, but they felt that they could not undertake it, 
that somebody else would have to do it or help them do it’. Later, however, ‘the men were more willing to make 
investment decisions than they had been previously. The change seemed to be a result of the training they 
received in moderate risk-taking during the course. They had learned to minimize the real risks by studying the 
situation thoroughly before deciding, and then to act on their own initiative rather than waiting for someone else 
to take responsibility’. Ibid., p. 193.  
87 For a summary of these various problems and their negation of a simple correlation between n Achievement 
and entrepreneurial activity see Ibid., pp. 334-335.  
88 Ibid., pp. 337-8.  
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Motivating Indian development 
As the Kakinada Experiment unfolded, the notion that heightened motivation held the key to 
development acquired a broader Indian following. Here again, the take-up of motivational 
thinking would have less to do with McClelland’s own conscious efforts to promote the 
paradigm than with the soft-landing achievement motivation theory experienced amidst 
contemporary Indian strains of thought. Beyond Kakinada, McClelland’s motivational 
approach tapped into a broader climate of elite opinion regarding the need for psychological 
transformation as an aspect of social and economic development, a view made explicit in 
statements such as the following, taken from Jawaharlal Nehru’s Discovery of India. When it 
came to the process of industrial development, Nehru explained:     
The real question is not one of quantitative adjustment and balancing of incongruous 
elements and methods of production, but qualitative consequences flow. The economic and 
political aspects of this qualitative change are important, but equally important are the social 
and psychological aspects. In India especially, where we have been wedded too long to past 
forms and modes of thought and action, new experiences, new processes, leading to new 
ideas and new horizons, are necessary. Thus we will change the static character of our living 
and make it dynamic and vital, and our minds will become active and adventurous.89 
Nehru’s emphasis on the ‘psychological aspects’ of modernization harboured a 
consequentialist tilt. The required psychological adjustment, he went on to clarify, would 
come about through ‘new situations’– especially those associated with industrial work – that 
compelled the mind to ‘adapt itself to a changing environment’.90 Such a reading sat closer to 
Inkeles’s and Doob’s concepts of psychological modernization than it did to McClelland’s 
pre-emptive formulation. Nevertheless, the motivational paradigm would find its own 
adherents in the Indian context. Moreover, in Indian hands, the motivational idea would soon 
be put to uses that even McClelland himself had not contemplated.  
One such figure was Prayag Mehta, an educational psychologist at the National Council for 
Educational Research and Training (NCERT) in New Delhi. Mehta, a psychologist trained at 
Delhi University, had been aware of achievement motivation theory since 1953, having read 
McClelland’s first publication, The Achievement Motive. In 1962, he had joined NCERT, a 
new research institute created by the Government of India to advise on central and state 
education policies and programmes. Leading a team of social scientists in the Council’s 
 
89 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 415. Emphasis 
mine.  
90 Ibid., p. 415.  
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Department of Psychological Foundations, Mehta soon began a process of applying 
McClelland’s work on motivation to the school environment. Citing concerns about the high 
rate of failure in India’s secondary schools, he suggested that the problem might be treatable 
through the creation of heightened motivational drives.  
Under-achieving pupils, Mehta wrote to McClelland, tended to exhibit ‘low norms of 
achievement’, ‘dependency’ and ‘lack of responsibility’ linked in part to ‘traditional values in 
the home’.91 The existing school system, however, focused as it was on rote learning and 
examinations, did little to instil a concern for achievement. What was needed was an 
approach that turned schools into platforms for the propagation of achievement ideas. To test 
the hypothesis, Mehta and his colleagues developed an experiment that monitored ‘the effects 
of classroom programmes designed to enhance concern for achievement and to boost 
aspirations’.92 According to NCERT psychologists, the results provided general:  
…support to the hypothesis that the teaching of characteristics of persons with high n 
Achievement can produce improvement in the academic performance of underachieving high 
school boys…[and] that this can be done by means of a regular classroom programme given 
by teachers trained in achievement motivation.93  
Mehta claimed that achievement-oriented pupils were not only academically superior, they 
also developed a stronger sense of ‘personal responsibility’ and ‘self-confidence’, attributes 
which they would carry into their adult working life. Linking economic productivity and 
entrepreneurship, Mehta argued that reorienting curricula around ‘achievement’ would help 
to ensure that education served as ‘an instrument for national economic development’.94 
Together with his NCERT colleagues, Mehta would spend the 1960s encouraging recognition 
of the role of motivational factors by provincial education authorities across the country. 
While educationalists saw increased achievement drives as the key to success in Indian 
classrooms and beyond, others employed the motivational approach in different ways. For 
Durganand Sinha, chair of the Department of Psychology at the University of Allahabad, the 
findings of motivational psychology called above all for a new approach to the enterprise of 
 
91 Prayag Mehta to David McClelland, 11 December 1964, Box 105, DCMP.  
92 Rather than conduct these programmes themselves, the NCERT psychologists opted for a model that turned 
teachers themselves into achievement motivation trainers. First, Mehta’s group ran courses in achievement 
motivation training for teachers in five Delhi schools. The teachers then ran four-month courses in 
‘Achievement Motivation’ with select groups of ‘Class IX’ boys. The courses also included bespoke elements 
designed by Mehta, such as ‘Aspiration Boosting Training’. Prayag Mehta, The Achievement Motive in High 
School Boys (New Delhi: National Council of Educational Research and Training, 1968), pp. 159-169.   
93 Ibid., p. 195. 
94 Prayag Mehta, Managing Motivation in Education (Ahmedabad: Sahitya Mudranalaya, 1976), p. 160. 
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rural development in India. In a series of works published throughout the 1960s, Sinha 
stressed that the existing programme of rural ‘Community Development’, though 
contributing in important ways to the improvement of the villages, had failed to bring about 
‘the psychological mobilization of urges that would ensure all-round rural development at an 
accelerated pace’.95   
Effective rural development, according to Sinha, required certain social and psychological 
changes. It required a general ‘change of attitude from contentment to that of striving and 
aspiring for one’s betterment’ and ‘a proper channelization of motives among the rural 
population’. Such a proper channelization occurred only when the expression of human urges 
took ‘concrete and specific form’. ‘Instead of wanting everything’, Sinha explained, ‘there 
should be its expression in concrete terms, for example, want for more land, more production, 
better livestock, better health facilities, improved seeds, better food, and other material and 
social realities’. Concrete aspirations were more ‘capable of being translated into concrete 
action’. They were also more likely to produce ‘risk-taking’ behaviour.96  
Psychologically surveying the Indian countryside, Sinha found limited evidence that the 
necessary inclinations existed. Even in those villages where participation in Community 
Development had been strong, villagers’ need tendencies typically remained ‘general and 
vague in nature’. Moreover, attitudes of ‘extreme caution and reluctance to take risk’ created 
a ‘general resistance with innovations and new techniques’. There was, according to Sinha: 
…not much evidence that the masses in the village had begun to shake off their ‘placid, 
pathetic contentment’, nor was there much sign that new aspirations and urges for 
development had begun to pulsate in the rural population. Villagers by and large were still 
lethargic and indifferent to material progress.97  
Sinha’s was a critique launched from outside the Community Development programme. It 
therefore offered little concrete advice – save the general recommendation that aspirations 
needed to be raised – regarding how the necessary forms of motivation might be instilled 
within the rural population. Other social scientists, however, operating within the Community 
Development establishment, were working to re-shape that programme in light of 
 
95 Durganand Sinha, Motivation of Rural Population in a Developing Country (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 
1969), p. 49.  
96 Ibid., pp. 1-49. 
97 Ibid., p. 44. Sinha would also espouse the motivational approach to rural development in other articles and 
speeches. See Durganand Sinha, Indian Villages in Transition: A Motivational Analysis (New Delhi: Associated 
Publishing, 1969) and Sinha, ‘A study of level of aspiration and motivation of the rural population in a 
developing country’, XVIII International Congress of Psychology, Moscow, 1966. 
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motivational theory. Curiously, however, these efforts focused not on initiatives that would 
raise the general level of aspiration within the rural population, but on a reconceptualization 
of the nature of effective rural leadership. Challenging prevailing ideas about ‘traditional 
leaders’ as vectors for the mobilization of villagers to action, during the 1960s social 
scientists at the National Institute of Community Development began to stress the need to 
work with leaders who possessed the right psychological characteristics. Individual adoption 
behaviour, they argued, was linked less to group dynamics than it was to individual 
psychological variables such as the ‘aspiration’, ‘risk-taking’ and ‘change-proneness’.98 The 
success of Community Development thus hinged on its ability to mobilize these particular 
individuals to act as ‘agents of change’.99 As well as McClelland’s ideas, these arguments 
drew on an ascendant theory on the ‘diffusion of innovations’ espoused by the University of 
Iowa sociologist, Everett Rogers. Based on studies of technology adoption in the American 
Midwest during the 1950s, Rogers had purported a universal pattern to the way in which 
innovations diffused within society, an important feature of which was the role of ‘early 
adopters’ – individuals whose unique psychological makeup made them more likely to take-
up new innovations.100 The claim that Indian rural development should focus on such 
individuals was one that, like Rogers’ own theory, stressed the potential for differences in the 
psychological makeup of rural populations – for ‘pluralities of persons in a cumulative 
cultural pattern’.101 This, in turn, produced its own debate about the extent to which certain 
social groups possessed stronger motivational characteristics than others.102 
 
98 S.N. Chattopadhyay, ‘Psychological Correlates and Adaption of Innovations’ in T.P.S. Chawdhari (ed.), 
Selected Readings on Community Development (National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad, 
1967), p. 37.  
99 W.B. Rahudkar, ‘Communication Pattern in the Acceptance of Agricultural Practices’, in Chawdhari (ed.), 
Selected Readings on Community Development, p. 34. By contrast, the leadership of those without the 
appropriate psychological characteristics was deemed to be ‘retardatory, as far as the adoption of the maximum 
number of practices is concerned’, p. 34.  
100 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press, 1962). For more on the Rogers and the 
‘diffusion of innovations’ theory see chapter five of this thesis.  
101 Chattopadhyay, ‘Psychological Correlates and Adaptation of Innovations’, p. 37. 
102 Here, the principal axis of debate was the question of whether high or lower socio-economic groups 
possessed higher achievement motivation. While some, like Durganand Sinha, found motivation to be higher 
among higher socio-economic groups, others, like Prayag Mehta, tended to argue lower socio-economic groups 
possessed higher motives (albeit with far fewer opportunities to realize them). Indeed, in a curious inversion of 
McClelland’s own theory, Mehta would argue that it was precisely the lack of economic opportunity that 
underpinned deprived groups’ higher sense of motivation. To understand how why it is necessary to 
comprehend his parallel concept of ‘social achievement motivation’, a point further developed in a later section 
of this chapter. For examples of Sinha’s and Mehta’s contrasting views on the distribution of motivation see 
Sinha, Motivation of Rural Population in a Developing Country (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1969), pp. 9-34; 
and Prayag Mehta (ed), Social Achievement Motivation: Needs, Values and Work Organization (New Delhi: 
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It was, however, in the realm of industrial entrepreneurship that the motivational approach 
found its firmest foothold. In the shadow of Kakinada, the 1960s and 70s witnessed the birth 
of a host of new entrepreneurial development programmes (so-called ‘EDPs’) that drew 
explicitly on McClelland’s model of achievement motivation training. SIET, for its part, 
continued to run EDPs well into the next decade.103 By the early 1970s, however, Kakinada-
style EDPs had also been established at, among other locations, the National Institute of 
Motivational and Institutional Development in Mumbai, the Gujarat Industrial Development 
Corporation, the Assam Entrepreneurial Motivation Training Centre and the Maharashtra 
Small Scale Industrial Development Corporation.104 In 1988, a report prepared for USAID on 
entrepreneurship training in India would find 686 Indian institutions ‘engaged part- or full-
time in EDPs’, funding for which was being provided by government agencies as well as a 
‘myriad’ of non-governmental and private organizations.105 As this new field of 
entrepreneurship development became entrenched across in India, it held one key principle at 
its core: that the key to developing entrepreneurship lay, first and foremost, in ‘developing 
entrepreneurs’.106 Meanwhile, psychologized entrepreneurship training also found enthusiasts 
within other parts of India’s industrial landscape. Beginning in the late 1960s, a number of 
large Indian corporations, including Tata Chemicals, Larsen & Toubro, Air India and the 
State Bank of India initiated their own internal courses of achievement motivation training.107 
At the new Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) in Ahmedabad and Calcutta, ‘laboratories 
on Motivation Development’ also became a staple feature of the methods used to prepare 
Indian graduates and executives for corporate careers.108  
In various spaces, then, McClelland’s ideas began to inform Indians’ own conceptions about 
what development meant, and what it entailed. But it was not only the case that McClelland 
shaped India: India shaped McClelland too. By ‘proving’ certain connections between 
psychological change and economic outcomes, the Kakinada Experiment would inspire 
 
103 SIET Institute, Entrepreneurial Motivation Development Programmes: Action Plan (Hyderabad: SIET 
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Development’, in Rao and Pareek (eds.), Developing Entrepreneurship: A Handbook (New Delhi: Learning 
Systems, 1978), pp. 126-147.  
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McClelland to go on promoting achievement motivation training in other contexts. Back in 
the United States, the historian Kira Lussier has shown, McClelland would promote the 
Kakinada model of achievement training as a cutting-edge technique of corporate 
management education through his own consultancy firm, McBer & Co. Beginning in the late 
1960s, McBer would run achievement motivation training for business schools (Harvard and 
Stanford) as well as several large corporations (including IBM, General Electric and Mattel), 
thereby mirroring Indians’ own attempts to apply motivational concepts to the corporate 
realm.109 McClelland would also advocate achievement motivation training in other arenas. 
In 1967, for example, McBer received funding from the United States Economic 
Development Administration to run a ‘Business Leadership Training Project’ for deprived 
African-Americans in inner-city Washington D.C. The prescribed motivational courses, again 
following the blueprint of the Kakinada Experiment, sought to motivate black entrepreneurs 
to break the ‘cycle of poverty’ that had gripped them and their communities. The Washington 
project formed part of a longer series of engagements by McClelland’s group in training 
enterprises for ‘negro businessmen’.110 Here, as with their attempts to motivate Indians out of 
‘underdevelopment’, psychologists chose to understand the connection between race and 
poverty in terms of a nexus between cultural and psychological factors, thereby glossing over 
the role of other issues, including discrimination and segregation, in the impoverishment of 
black communities.111 
Thus, motivational approaches to development, first trialled in the field of Indian industrial 
development, did more than just shape the areas they targeted; they also looped back to 
inform practices and programmes at home – from community uplift among black 
neighbourhoods to corporate culture in white executive boardrooms.112 This pattern of 
backward looping was one that also shaped careers, at least in the case of Manohar Nadkarni, 
a SIET official who had worked with McClelland during the Kakinada Experiment. 
Acquiring a reputation as a skilled achievement trainer, Nadkarni would take the less-
travelled route back to the United States during the late 1960s, securing positions as a trainer 
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on a number of motivational projects. Returning to India in the 1970s, he would eventually 
become a leading advocate for entrepreneurship development in his native state of Gujarat.113 
‘Hindu culture’, personality and economic development in contemporary debate 
There was, as one contemporary put it, something natural, ‘almost inevitable’ in the fact that 
India became the focal point of claims concerning the role of psychological change in 
economic development.114 Since the nineteenth century, theorists of economic and social 
change, from Marx to Weber, had viewed Indian society and culture as the antithesis of the 
cultural complex that underpinned the ‘modern’ West. In search of reasons why the ‘spirit of 
capitalism’ had not emerged beyond Europe and North America, Weber had looked in part to 
the inhibiting features of Indian culture for answers. In The Religion of India, he contrasted 
the ‘other-worldly’ asceticism of Hinduism to the ‘this-worldly’ ascetism of Protestantism, 
arguing that the former acted to prevent the development of the ethic – and thereby the spirit 
– required for capitalism to take hold. ‘No community dominated by inner powers of this sort 
could out of its own substance arrive at the ‘spirit of capitalism’’, Weber had argued. Nor 
could it be expected to develop industrialism as an imported ‘artefact’.115 
Weber’s claims cast a long shadow. Half a century later, McClelland and likeminded thinkers 
would approach India through the same lens. India, they argued, was a society in which one 
encountered ‘cultural, social and personal obstacles’ to the development of achieving 
minds.116 In an essay entitled Some Themes in Indian Culture, McClelland explained that a 
major barrier to the proliferation of achievement motivation was the tension between the twin 
values of ‘gifting’ and ‘humility’ in Indian culture. ‘Giving as a repeated exchange’, he 
observed, was ‘at the centre of the natural and moral universe’ of ‘the Indian’, forming as it 
did a way of ‘imitating the divine creative force and ‘initiating an exchange with the gods’. 
According to McClelland, however, this preoccupation with giving produced a curious and 
 
113 For examples of Nadkarni’s later work on entrepreneurship development see Udai Pareek and Manohar 
Nadkarni, ‘Development of Entrepreneurship: A Conceptual Model’, pp. 29-41; and Udai Pareek and Manohar 
Nadkarni, ‘A Training Model for Entrepreneurial Development’, pp. 42-57 in Pareek and Rao, Developing 
Entrepreneurship: A Handbook. 
114 A. K. Singh, ‘Hindu culture and economic development in India’, Conspectus, 1, 1967, p. 10. 
115 Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism (New York: The Free Press, 
1958), p. 325. Recent historical reappraisals of Weber have sought to add nuance to his arguments on the 
relationship between capitalism and Hinduism. Weber’s concern, it is now suggested, was only ever with the 
‘first unplanned, endogenous appearance of industrial capitalism’, and not necessarily with its future potential. 
His argument that industrial society had not taken place in India (or elsewhere), it follows, did not equate to an 
argument that it could not. For these arguments see David Gellner, ‘Max Weber, Capitalism and the Religion of 
India’, Sociology, 16:4, 1982, pp. 526-543; Detlef Kantowsky, ‘Max Weber on India and Indian Interpretations 
of Max Weber’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 16:2, 1982, pp. 141-174.     
116 McClelland and Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement, p. 249.  
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contradictory effect. On the one hand, because it necessitated having something to give, 
giving permitted the existence of strong desires to accumulate wealth, power and prestige. At 
the same time, however, this accumulative instinct also ran up against the parallel cultural 
values of humility and self-sacrifice, thereby leading to contradiction and confusion:  
Indian children are…encouraged to accumulate resources…to become more knowledgeable, 
for example, so that they can give wise advice to others – but the system requires that they 
deny that they have any resources, [to] belittle themselves.117  
Constructing a hypothetical example of a farmer keen improve their yield of wheat, 
McClelland contrasted how such a task might be pursued by an individual in a ‘giving- or 
service-oriented’ culture (like India), compared to the denizen of an ‘achievement-oriented’ 
culture. In the latter case, the farmer’s ‘central value centre[d] around his relationship to the 
environment (the wheat crop) rather than to his fellowman’. In the former, however, the 
farmer’s:   
…first and foremost goal is to get himself in a position where he can provide such a service 
to other people. It becomes centrally important to him to own a piece of land where the wheat 
could be produced or at least to get into a government institute where he can provide the 
service through the resources he controls…He is told that he must not compete, that he who 
is most humble is certain to win…He is [therefore] locked into power struggles within 
himself and with others which are extremely painful and self-defeating.118 
McClelland posited links between this permanent, debilitating state of contradiction and the 
Hindu concept of ‘withdrawal’. Here, he drew a direct comparison to the then prevalent 
‘double bind’ theory of schizophrenia, according to which repeat experiences of contradiction 
in the childhood domestic environment, typically in the form of divergent parental 
instruction, created an internal state of paralysis (a double bind) within the individual, leading 
to the construction of a delusional internal world designed to escape it. ‘The double bind 
resulting from power struggles over giving which forces withdrawal as an Indian cultural 
trait’, explained McClelland, ‘may more universally force a similar kind of withdrawal in 
 
117 David C. McClelland, ‘Some Themes in the Culture of India’, in A.R. Desai (ed.), Essays on Modernization 
of Underdeveloped Societies: Vol II (Bombay: Thacker and Co., 1972), p. 272.   
118 Ibid., pp. 278-279. In exploring the significance of this cultural complex on Indian conceptions of work, 
McClelland argued that work itself was typically ‘viewed as a form of giving, as providing service to others’. 
The result, once again, was that the principle value of work was not the outcome of the job, but its function as a 
mechanism for the giving of resources: ‘A Block Development Officer, a clerk, or a Joint Secretary is in a sense 
doing a favour to people by working; that is, he is providing services, out of his own resources, for others. But 
of course he must have some resources – e.g. privileges, prestige, respect. So his major focus of interest is not 
the outcome of a job of work but whether or not he has the resources to do the work.’ Ibid., pp. 284-285. 
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individuals whose extreme cases are labelled schizophrenic’.119 As a by-product of this 
schizophrenic mindset, the typical ‘Indian worker’ was ‘not achievement-oriented’.120  
McClelland perceived other barriers to achievement motivation in Indian culture too, 
especially in the ‘other worldly’ nature of Hinduism, as he called it. ‘Hinduism’, he argued, 
stressed: 
…values that would hardly be expected to lead parents to behave in ways that would induce 
high n Achievement in their sons…Hinduism explicitly teaches that concern with earthly 
achievements is a snare and a delusion. The ultimate goal is to become “nonattached”, to act 
without a concern for the consequences of action. If all parents were devout Hindus, it is hard 
to see how they would set high standards of excellence for their son’s performance, or show 
great pleasure over his achievements or displeasure at his failures.121 
By arguing that Indian culture thwarted the proliferation of achievement motivation, 
McClelland and his colleagues sat comfortably within a broader body of contemporary 
thought concerning the barriers posed to economic development by ‘Hindu culture’. Under 
this rubric, some looked to the impact of Hindu cosmology and ‘metaphysics’ on economic 
behaviour. In a 1963 collection of essays entitled Hindu Culture, Economic Development and 
Economic Planning in India, for example, the American economist K. William Kapp 
explored how the ‘cyclical concept of time’, by connecting ‘the actual finite human situation 
with the individual’s previous incarnation’, had the effect of ‘spreading cause and effect over 
totally different lives’. The result, he argued, was that causation lost its continuity and 
assumed ‘a fatalistic tinge’.122 Seeing this and other features of Hindu culture as a barrier to 
rational economic behaviour, Kapp called for India to ‘abandon those elements of her 
pretechnological civilization which stand in the way of the necessary secularization and 
modernization’.123 
While Kapp focused on the obstructions posed by Hindu metaphysics, others, such as the 
Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, argued that India’s economic growth was thwarted by 
another feature of Hindu culture; namely, caste. Myrdal, a former UN executive and future 
Nobel winner, based his arguments on a period of several years spent in India during the 
1960s, during which he developed close relations with Nehru and the leaders of the Planning 
 
119 The ‘double bind’ theory of schizophrenia was most closely associated with the British anthropologist 
Gregory Bateston. See Gregory Bateson, Don D. Jackson, Jay Haley, John Weakland, ‘Toward a History of 
Schizophrenia’, Behavioral Science, 1:4, 1956, pp. 251-254. 
120 ‘As I See It, An Interview with David C. McClelland’, Forbes Magazine, 1969, Box 25, DCMP., p. 1.   
121 McClelland, The Achieving Society, p. 357.  
122 K. William Kapp, Hindu Culture, Economic Development and Economic Planning in India: A Collection of 
Essays (London, 1963), pp. 13-15. 
123 Kapp, Hindu Culture, p. 64. 
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Commission. In his subsequent three-volume study, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the 
Poverty of Nations, he set out to explore the role of social and institutional structures that 
underpinned Asian ‘underdevelopment’. Focusing on India, Myrdal argued that the caste 
system fixed rigidly social and economic hierarchies and impeded social and occupational 
mobility, thereby fostering an aversion to manual labour and a reluctance to acquire new 
skills and adapt oneself to new types of work.124 The caste system thus gave rise not only to 
pervasive inequality but a general lack of competitiveness in economic life. It posed ‘a major 
obstacle to economic growth’.125 
Ideas about the obstructions posed to economic development by Hindu culture also found 
implicit expression in the work of social scientists studying personality development and 
child-rearing. In 1953, for example, the British psychiatrist Morris G. Carstairs published a 
study of ‘Hindu personality’ formation that offered just such an interpretation. Carstairs, a 
member of a Columbia University research project led by the anthropologist Gitel Steed, 
studied the relationship between child-rearing and personality traits among high-caste Hindu 
males in the village of Deoli, Rajasthan. In his observations, he argued that overgenerous 
patterns of maternal affection, followed by their abrupt removal, equated to a process of 
‘traumatic weaning’ among subjects.126 As a result, many adult males suffered from 
uncertainty, anxiety and an inability to handle frustration, thereby leading to marked 
propensities for ‘aggression’, ‘mistrust’, ‘conformity’ and ‘passivity’. This had implications 
for economic development, Carstairs suggested, because it discouraged ambition, 
independence and risk-taking.127  
Similar themes formed part of the work of John T. Hitchcock and Leigh Minturn, an 
anthropologist-psychologist duo studying personality development in the village of Khalapur, 
 
124 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations – Volumes I-III (London: Allen Lane, 
1968). For the impact of caste on inequality and social immobility see pp. 1060, 1345; for aversion to manual 
labour and new types of work see pp. 745, 1067, 1237, 1382.  
125 Ibid., p. 579.  
126 The study of the effects of ‘traumatic weaning’ within ‘traditional’ cultures reflected a broader contemporary 
penchant of Western social scientists. For similar studies in East Africa see Erik Linstrum, Ruling Minds: 
Psychology in the British Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), pp. 75-78; 195-197.    
127 Morris Carstairs, The Twice Born: A Study of a Community of High-Caste Hindus (London, 1957), pp. 146 
and 158. Carstairs’ account was preceded by a 1948 study of ‘Basic Personality in Orthodox Hindu Culture’, 
authored by the educational missionary, William Stephens Taylor. Taylor argued that the Hindu cultural system 
produced: ‘a basic personality pattern in which personal initiative is replaced by the sense of conformity, in 
which responsibility is exercised without personal authority, in which security is associated with the sense of 
dependence and self-respect with a sense of helplessness, and in which opportunities for frustration and acute 
anxiety are minimized’. W.S. Taylor, ‘Basic Personality in Orthodox Hindu Culture Patterns’, Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 43:1, 1948, p. 12.  
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Maharashtra as part of the ‘Six Cultures Project’, a Harvard University project focused on the 
cross-cultural analysis of child-rearing patterns.128 Though, like Carstairs, focused on 
questions other than economic development, Hitchcock and Minturn’s work found that child-
rearing patterns in Khalapur produced personality structures marked by traits that were 
naturally conformist and risk-averse. Focused again on high-caste Hindu males, The Rajputs 
of Khalapur reported a heavy reliance on ‘punishment’ and negative instruction to control 
children’s behaviour, a pattern which seldom allowed children to solve their own problems. 
Subsequently, the children of Khalapur demonstrated signs of a lack of self-reliance, 
dependency and a disinclination to take responsibility for their own actions; traits which they 
carried with them into adult life.129 
In a loose yet clearly discernible thread, then, 1960s social scientists worked to recapitulate 
Weberian idea that Indian (and more specifically ‘Hindu’) culture was producing the wrong 
type of person for economic development. Claims about the specific hindrances posed by 
Indian culture varied, as did their level to which these hindrances were explicitly stated or 
merely implied. There were also, again, important differences between those who emphasized 
the difficulties of changing culture and those, like McClelland, who stressed its relative ease. 
The loose thread was, nevertheless, a powerful one. As McClelland forwarded his ideas about 
the obstacles posed to development by Indian culture, he did so not in isolation but in 
alignment with ideas at the very mainstream of contemporary (and especially Western) social 
scientific thinking.130 
There was, however, another perspective. In direct contrast to claims that Indian culture 
posed barriers to economic growth, a number of contemporary social scientists argued that in 
India, it was possible to see how economic development was a process that made active use 
 
128 On the background of the Six Cultures Project, see Robert A. Levine, ‘The Six Cultures Study: Prologue to a 
History of a Landmark Project’, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 41:4, 2010, pp. 513-521. 
129 John T. Hitchcock and Leigh Minturn, The Rajputs of Khalapur, India (New York: Six Cultures Series, Vol 
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(Bombay: Bombay University Press, 1957). 
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rate of economic growth since independence in terms of a ‘Hindu rate of growth’, he did so not literally but 
ironically. Like other economists of the time, Krishna would place the blame for India’s economic stagnation 
not on the stymieing effects of Hinduism but on the negative effects of Nehruvian planning on the economy. In 
this sense, somewhat paradoxically, Krishna’s coining of the ‘Hindu rate of growth’ actually pointed to the 
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On these shifts see Kunal Sen, ‘New Interpretations of India’s Economic Growth in the Twentieth Century’ in 
Anthony P. Costa (ed.), A New India? Critical Reflections in the Long Twentieth Century (London: Anthem 
Press, 2008), pp. 23-42.  
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of existing cultural norms. The most prominent exponents of this line of argument were 
anthropologists, and perhaps most notable among them was the University of Chicago 
scholar Milton Singer. An associate of the anthropologist Robert Redfield, whose own 
renowned civilizational theory had stressed the dialogic interaction between ‘great’ and 
‘little’ traditions and the danger of disruptive cultural transformation, Singer would emerge 
during the mid-1950s as a prominent advocate for the role of cultural ‘tradition’ in India’s 
economic development.131 Challenging what he called the ‘negative thesis’ of Weber and his 
followers, he argued that Hinduism was, in fact, replete with many of the spiritual sanctions 
associated with ‘this-worldly’ religions like Protestantism. ‘In the traditional Indian 
pantheon’, for example: 
…material wealth and power have an important place…Artha, wealth and power, represents 
one of the four major ends of life, and there is a science of it in arthasastra. In the classic 
work of that name, wealth and power are indeed considered as essential in the scheme of 
things as are the other three basic values – dharma (duty), mokhsa (liberation), and kama 
(pleasure). And this judgment is supported by the stories of the epics in which wealth and 
power, usually the reward of virtue, are ever present. In their everyday behavior, too, Indians 
do not show less of that propensity to trade, barter, and exchange than Adam Smith found in 
the mainsprings of the wealth of nations.132 
Addressing ‘the traditional Indian philosophy of renunciation’, meanwhile, Singer observed 
how this: 
…smooths the transfer of holdings from generation to generation within the family, and it 
may also be used to lever a redistribution of property. In neither of these functions does 
renunciation constitute an obstacle to economic development. In fact…in performing these 
functions it furnishes an incentive for hard work on the part of the younger generation which 
is going to inherit the property renounced by the elder generation and holds out-to the poor 
and landless a prospect of redistribution in their favour.133 
Thus, ‘those values and motivations usually associated with the "materialism" of the West’ 
were ‘also commonplaces in India…it is not, therefore, their absence which is the source of 
that economic “underdevelopment” to which the Nehru government is now addressing 
itself’.134 Indeed, according to Singer, India’s ‘traditional’ culture, far from an obstacle to 
 
131 On the connections between Singer’s arguments and Redfield’s project Nicole Sackley, ‘Cosmopolitanism 
and the Uses of Tradition: Robert Redfield and Alternative Visions of Modernization During the Cold War’, 
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134 Ibid., pp. 82-83.  
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economic development, was ‘perfectly capable of providing the spiritual incentives and 
disciplines of a modern industrial society’.135   
Another important example of this line of thinking can be found in the work of a close 
associate of Singer, the University of Baroda sociologist, M.N. Srinivas. While not focused 
on the question of economic development per se, Srinivas’s well-known theory of 
‘Sanskrization’, articulated most clearly in his 1952 work, Religion and Society Amongst the 
Coorgs of South India, offered an interpretation of the caste system that differed markedly 
from those, like Myrdal, who lamented its static, rigidifying nature. For Srinivas, the 
modernizing interpretation of caste as a bulwark of social and economic hierarchy missed 
important features about the way in which the system worked in practice, including its role as 
a capillary-like social network connecting villages to urban economies in ways that fostered, 
rather than prevented, economic change. Where Myrdal framed caste as a barrier to social 
mobility, Srinivas painted an entirely different picture, one in which inequalities in social and 
economic status could be set right through the efforts of lower and middle caste groups to 
adopt the ‘Sanskritic’ rituals and practices of higher castes.136  
Singer, Srinivas and Redfield formed part of a cohesive group of anti-modernization scholars 
associated with the University of Chicago during the 1950s, a group which had helped to 
define the contours of community development’s ‘low modernist’, culturally sensitive 
approach to development.137 But the claim that development did not necessarily entail 
disruptive changes to Indian culture was also espoused by other anthropologists not so 
closely tied to this group. One such figure was Cora Du Bois. A leading light in the ‘culture 
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(New York: Praeger Press, 1972); Milton B. Singer (ed.), Entrepreneurship and Modernization of Occupational 
Cultures in South Asia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1973).   
136 M.N. Srinivas, Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). On 
the development of the Sanskritization theory see Simon Charsley, ‘Sanskritization: The Career of an 
Anthropological Theory’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 32:2, 1998, pp. 528-549. Srinivas’ account of the 
dynamic nature of caste acquired a broad following among Indian anthropologists. For a critique of account of 
the ‘lop-sided’ account of caste provided within Myrdal’s Asian Drama, written by one such follower see T.N. 
Madan, ‘Caste and Development’, Economic and Political Weekly, 4:5, 1969, pp. 285-290.  
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and personality’ school of anthropology during the interwar years, best known for her 1944 
study of the inhabitants of the island of Alor, Du Bois had taken up a professorship at 
Harvard University in 1954, the emerging centre of ‘modernization theory’. Throughout the 
next decade, however, as colleagues at the Harvard Department for Social Relations 
(including McClelland) rallied around the concept of ‘modernization’, Du Bois looked 
instead for opportunities to explore alternative understandings of the relationship between 
development and socio-cultural change.  
In 1961, Du Bois initiated her own Indian research project in the city of Bhubaneshwar, the 
new capital of the state of Orissa. The aim was to examine evidence for ‘change and stability’ 
in the city’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ towns respectively. Quickly, however, the Bhubaneshwar project 
morphed into an expression of Du Bois’s personal desire to debunk universalizing theories of 
socio-cultural change. Working predominantly through graduate students, both American and 
Indian, Du Bois encouraged her researchers to study how processes of modernization 
occurring at Bhubaneshwar constituted ‘process of adaptation’ that drew on existing cultural 
frameworks and resources, not linear transitions from traditional to modern.138  
Drawing on evidence from Bhubaneshwar, Du Bois challenged the ‘centrifugal’ 
understanding of modernization that underwrote arguments about the need for cultural 
change. As countries like India experienced economic development, she argued, they would 
naturally seek to replicate the technologies, institutions, and practices of countries deemed to 
be ‘modern’. Where linear theories of modernization were mistaken, however, was in their 
assumption that this necessarily implied a broader ‘imitative’ process. As features of Western 
society were adopted in new contexts, she argued, they would inevitably be re-shaped by the 
cultural norms into which they were received. ‘The traditional hierarchy of caste’, she told 
one audience: 
…fits closely into the modern hierarchy of bureaucracy and is reinforced by the educational 
system which is in itself an echo of the traditional in the modern. Thus traditional and modern 
institutions of education and bureaucratic organizations reinforce each other with unforeseen 
neatness, at the expense of modern individualistic and egalitarian values.139  
Du Bois’s take on the ‘absorptive and reinterpretative’ process of modernization unfolding at 
Bhubaneshwar placed her firmly at odds with efforts to induce processes of cultural change 
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as a prerequisite for modernization. If modernization necessarily drew on existing cultural 
frameworks, attempts to change culture in order to create ‘modernity’ made little sense. 
Moreover, for Du Bois, existing cultural frameworks showed little sign of being ill-equipped 
for modern institutions or economic arrangements. As people moved back and forth between 
villages and the new capital, changing roles and economic functions as they went, they did so 
‘with psychological ease’, not hampered by absent motives or an inability to behave as 
rational economic actors.140 Claims regarding the necessity of cultural change for Indian 
development, Du Bois contended, were profoundly mistaken in their belief that 
modernization could not succeed in the absence of conditions associated with the Western 
experience. Weber had confused ‘an accidental adhesion in the West for a necessary 
condition’.141 As a reformulation of the Weber thesis through a psychological lens, 
McClelland’s claims regarding the ‘need-for-achievement’, reflected an ‘overly simple, 
overly specialized…culture-bound’ viewpoint.142 
Indian psychologists and collectivist motivation 
In India, then, McClelland’s claims for psychological modernization encountered sharp 
opposition from those, both Indian and American, who rejected its claims regarding the 
inimical relationship between ‘traditional’ culture and economic development. But 
achievement motivation theory would also encounter other, more subtle forms of reproach. 
For it was not long before Indian psychologists, many of whom were ardent enthusiasts of the 
motivation-based approaches to development, posed their own questions of achievement 
motivation theory. Here, unlike their anthropologist counterparts, psychologists critiqued not 
so much the claim that economic development required a particular set of cultural and 
psychological conditions, but rather the idea that a concern with ‘achievement’ was itself the 
key psychological driver of development. The need for achievement, Indian psychologists 
argued, while a powerful force for economic change, was also an ‘individualistic’ form of 
motivation, one that produced tendencies for competition, acquisition and ‘resource 
hoarding’. On its own, a concern with achievement could not produce effective development, 
especially in impoverished countries like India.    
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One clear expression of this sentiment can be found in the work of Udai Pareek. A 
psychologist trained at Calcutta and Delhi universities, Pareek had initially come to 
motivational theory during a period of employment at SIET in the early 1960s, during which 
he had worked alongside McClelland on the Kakinada achievement motivation training. 
Emerging, in subsequent years, as a leading figure within the entrepreneurship development 
movement in India, this self-proclaimed ‘behavioral scientist’ would put his own spin on 
what he called the ‘motivational paradigm of development’. While agreeing that 
‘achievement motivation had ‘been shown to be responsible for entrepreneurial activity in a 
society’, Pareek contended that: 
…development (economic and other) is not a function of achievement motivation alone. 
Concern for other people or the society also seems to be important…I call it [an] “extension 
motive” – a need to extend the self or the ego and to relate to a larger group and its goals. A 
superordinate goal probably arouses this motive. Such goals may therefore be important not 
only in developing harmony but also in sustaining continued motivation of people in 
development.143 
According to Pareek, the importance of ‘extension motivation’ as a catalyst of development 
could be evidenced in a number of ways, some of which directly inverted McClelland’s 
claims about achievement. For instance, while McClelland had argued that communism 
provided a good example of achievement motivation in action, Pareek suggested that what 
communist countries were in fact demonstrating was the importance of ‘extension 
motivation’. China’s economic growth, he argued, was a product of its leaders’ ability to 
create ‘an extension motivation “mystique”’ (and not an achievement one) through an 
‘emphasis on work for society’.144 Meanwhile, looking back at history, there seemed to be 
‘enough evidence’ to suggest ‘that many social changes, including economic development, 
were in the past designed and executed by people who showed great concern for others’.145 
Pareek’s was a view quite different from those who stressed the role of ‘tradition’ in India’s 
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economic development. While ‘religions’ had in the past satisfied the extension motive by 
‘helping an individual extend his self or ego and relate to larger entities’, he argued, the 
‘modern world’, in which religions had ‘outlived their utility’, called for new ‘rational 
systems of developing [extension] motivation’.146 According to Pareek, one approach to 
developing such extension motivation was an adapted form of motivational training focused 
on ‘superordinate goals’.147  
Pareek’s call for extension motivation was part of a broader tendency of Indian psychologists 
to reorient the motivational paradigm towards ‘social’ goals. For J.B.P Sinha, a psychologist 
based at the Patna Institute of Social Studies, a key limitation of McClelland’s achievement 
motivation theory was its failure to account for how limits on the availability of resources 
affected behavioural, and thereby economic, outcomes. ‘When resources are limited’, he 
argued, ‘endeavours to maximise achievement necessitate resource-hoarding behaviour’:  
…a situation is thus created in which competition with a standard shows itself in contriently 
independent behaviour, whereby attempts to extend control over resources results in 
disproportionate resource allocation.148  
Sceptical that the promulgation of achievement motivation in a ‘low resource environment’ 
(like India) would do anything more than result in ‘destructive and injurious’ competition, 
Sinha suggested that a more appropriate model of motivation for such environments would 
emphasize the need for what he called ‘n Co-operation’.149 
Sinha’s argument drew on an experiment conducted at Ranchi University in Bihar during the 
mid-1960s – the experiment with which this thesis began. Assigning small groups of students 
a simple ‘cube construction task’, Sinha had varied the conditions under which groups 
completed the activity. To some, he provided an abundance of cubes, thereby reflecting an 
‘unlimited resource’ condition. To others, he provided the minimal amount for completion of 
the task. Borrowing techniques from McClelland’s earlier work, Sinha then ‘verbally 
aroused’ motives of either ‘achievement’ or ‘co-operation’ within the groups.150 In scenarios 
where resources were ‘limited’, he argued, it was groups aroused to co-operation that 
performed the task most successfully. Indeed, under limited resource conditions, groups 
 
146 Ibid., p. 119.  
147 Pareek, ‘Motivational Patterns and Planned Social Change’, pp. 469-473.  
148 J.B.P. Sinha, ‘The n-Ach/n-Cooperation under Limited/Unlimited Resource Conditions’, Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 1968, p. 234. 
149 Ibid., p. 235.  
150 In the former case, groups were encouraged to complete the task at any cost; in the latter they were 
encouraged to work together. For a full description of the experiment see Ibid., pp. 236-238.  
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induced towards achievement demonstrated not only a poorer performance, but also a greater 
discrepancy in individual scores and a greater tendency towards conflict between members. 
According to Sinha, the results demonstrated the increased likelihood of both economic 
inequality and social tension that would come with efforts to raise n Achievement in low 
resource environments.151 
The argument that development required more than simply a desire for personal achievement 
would find yet further expression in the concept, developed later by the educational 
psychologist Prayag Mehta, of ‘social achievement motivation’. According to Mehta, 
however, it was not just that development would work better when people were motivated 
towards collective goals. What was also true was that people in low-income environments 
like India were actually more likely to be driven by ‘social’ forms of motivation. 
Interestingly, Mehta turned not to cultural frameworks of caste or kinship to make this 
argument, but instead to the psychological concept of ‘fraternal deprivation’, according to 
which socially and economically-deprived persons were more inclined towards ‘group 
thinking’. Drawing on this theory, Mehta argued that deprived persons were more 
predisposed towards ‘group action’ – that is, they were more likely to strive not just for 
personal and work-related achievements, but for improvements to their broader social 
environment too. ‘Stimulated by an increasing awareness and an increasing sense of 
deprivation’, the deprived individual learned ’to think in terms of group or social 
achievement goals and acquire such a need’.152 Mehta’s theory led to another significant 
conclusion, alongside the claim that ‘socially and economically deprived persons tended to 
think in terms of group goals rather than/or in addition to personal goals’; it implied that 
people in poverty – contrary to the assumptions of McClelland and others – were not devoid 
of motivation at all. Indeed, in what looked increasingly like an inversion of McClelland’s 
theory, Mehta’s emphasis on ‘social achievement motivation’ led him to argue that it was 
actually those from ‘socially-disadvantaged and underprivileged groups that [tended] to show 
a higher need for achievement’.153 
Pareek, Sinha and Mehta’s shared interest in collectivist, rather than individualist, motivation 
was by no means coincidental. The calls for ‘extension motivation’, ‘n Co-operation’ and 
‘social achievement motivation’ were, in fact, each responses bearing the distinct imprint of 
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the Nehruvian moment. According to Pareek, the system of government best suited to the 
cultivation of ‘extension motivation’ was a ‘socialist’ one because, though not compromising 
individual freedom, ‘socialist countries…explicitly [linked] individual goals with higher 
social goals’.154 This argument, of course, could easily be read the other way. Extension 
motivation was an important motive in development precisely because it reflected – more 
than achievement motivation did – the aims and objectives of contemporary Nehruvian 
socialism. Like n Co-operation and social achievement, extension motivation thus reflected a 
desire to cultivate forms of behaviour deemed conducive to contemporary political ideals. As 
well as an insistence on the importance of collective goals, all three concepts were united by 
a shared suspicion of competitive, acquisitive forms of behaviour. 
There were clear resonances here with the broader Nehruvian ideas about the social 
foundations for a ‘socialistic’ society. As Nehru himself explained, the pursuit of 
‘democratically planned collectivism’ required more than a broad programme of economic 
reorganization, delivered through ‘careful and continuous planning’. It also necessitated 
certain quotidian habits conducive to ‘more equitable sharing’ and ‘a progressive tendency 
towards equalization’. Such a change, he explained:  
…would mean upsetting of the present-day acquisitive society based primarily on the profit 
motive. The profit motive may still continue to some extent but it will not be the dominating 
urge, nor will it have the same scope as it has today…Collectivism [also] involves communal 
undertakings and cooperative effort.155 
For Nehru, there were clear synergies between the called for behaviours and existing Indian 
culture: 
It would be absurd to say that the profit motive does not appeal to the average Indian, but it is 
nevertheless true that there is no such admiration for it in India as there is in the West. The 
possessor of money may be envied but he is not particularly respected or admired. Respect 
and admiration still go to the man or woman who is considered good and wise, and especially 
to those who sacrifice themselves or what they possess for the public good. The Indian 
outlook, even of the masses, has never approved of the spirit of acquisitiveness.  
The spirit of co-operation was, moreover, ‘fully in harmony with old Indian social 
conceptions, which were all based on the idea of the group’.156 Psychologists, as we have 
seen, were either more sceptical of the claim that India already possessed all the necessary 
motivations for socialistic development, or, in Mehta’s case, chose to articulate this argument 
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156 Ibid., p. 522.  
147 
 
in different ways. Nevertheless, by stressing the need for drives that prized collective over 
individual good, they forwarded a distinctly Nehruvian understanding of the behaviours 
deemed necessary for effective development, one that re-worked McClelland’s ideas in light 
of their own convictions and prevailing concerns.  
Aid over achievement: the United States, India and the triumph of economistic 
development 
 
McClelland’s psychological enterprise was to encounter a third form of rivalry in India, one 
that would ultimately prove more consequential than the critiques of either relativist 
anthropologists or collectivist psychologists. This was a rivalry that centred not on questions 
of modernization versus cultural tradition, nor on individual versus collectivist motivation, 
but rather on the matter of where the real trigger of economic development actually lay. 
McClelland’s efforts to cultivate economic development through psychological change, we 
have seen, had been formed as a direct challenge to prevailing ideas about the potential 
impacts of ‘material’ economic aid. As McClelland found in India a site to pursue this 
psychologistic vision of development, however, the country was simultaneously becoming 
the principal test case for the very model of development he sought to disprove.  
The rise of American economic aid to India was borne out of the same processes that had 
underpinned the more general increase in American development assistance; namely, the rise 
of Rostovian economic theory. As Rostow and Millikan developed their arguments about the 
stages of economic growth during the 1950s, they soon homed-in on India as a key exemplar 
for how a programme of aid-backed investment might propel the process of economic 
growth. At the midpoint of the twentieth century, they argued, India stood as one of the few 
countries on the cusp of ‘take-off’ – the vital stage of development at which an economy 
made the transition into self-sustaining growth. With increases in grain production between 
1951 and 1954 having seemingly resolved the food supply issues facing India at the time of 
independence, India appeared to be ideally positioned for a concerted push of investment 
designed to build ‘industrial momentum’. ‘They can use some additional capital right now’ 
Rostow had explained, ‘in the course of five years they could absorb a helluva lot more’.157  
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Merrell, Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India’s Economic Development, 1947-1963 (Chapel Hill, 
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Rostow and Millikan’s emphasis on the Indian case reflected more than just economic 
considerations. It spoke of the MIT economists’ concerns about the impact of prevailing US 
policies in South Asia too. Alongside a broad aversion to aid spending overseas, President 
Eisenhower had come to power with a deep scepticism of Nehruvian India’s ‘non-aligned’ 
foreign policy. Interpreting this, together with India’s support for Chinese membership of the 
United Nations and its fierce critiques of US action in Korea, as a refusal to denounce 
communism in favour of the ‘free world’, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, had quickly set about forging a new set of diplomatic relationships in South Asia, 
culminating, in 1954, in the signing of an extensive military pact with India’s northern 
adversary Pakistan.158 To Rostow and Millikan, as well as other American liberals, this pro-
Pakistan tilt of Eisenhower’s foreign policy had only one logical outcome; the strengthening 
of ties between India and the Soviet Union. As the death of Stalin, in 1953, paved the way for 
a rapprochement between Moscow and New Delhi, including new announcements of Soviet 
economic assistance to India, a new approach to India was, according to Rostow and 
Millikan, necessary to prevent the wholesale ‘loss’ of India to the communist bloc.159 
In addition to economic considerations and Cold War concerns, Rostow and Millikan’s 
emphasis on aid to India bore the imprint of another factor. In 1954, the Government of India 
had begun formulating the details of its own Second Five Year Plan for economic 
development. Following on from the first iteration, in 1951, and in light of the rosier 
conditions now facing Indian planners, the Second Plan presented an opportunity for 
increased levels of investment in the Indian economy: in short, precisely the sort of 
intervention that the MIT economists held necessary for economic growth. Downplaying the 
potential contradictions between the Plan’s commitment to a ‘socialistic pattern of society’ 
and their own economic vision, Rostow and Millikan would suggest that India’s 
underdeveloped status, together with its mixed economy, provided good reason for Indian 
policymakers to focus initially on large-scale public-sector activity and infrastructure.160 
Moreover, by lending support to such undertakings, they argued, the United States would 
help ensure domestic Indian savings were channelled into private investment. The Second 
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Plan would not only convince Rostovians of the imminent possibility of Indian economic 
take-off. It would also give a specific locus to the argument for the importance of Indian 
aid.161 
Claims about the importance of economic assistance to India would suffuse the arguments of 
Rostow and his colleagues regarding the need for a new approach to US foreign policy during 
the 1950s.162 By 1956, the Eisenhower administration had begun to show clear signs of 
accepting this approach. Faced with rising levels of Soviet assistance, and continued signs of 
accord between Moscow and New Delhi, encapsulated in President Khrushchev’s tour of 
India in December 1955, Eisenhower’s White House would soon instigate nothing less than a 
wholesale reorientation of its positions towards India. Drawing explicitly from the MIT 
economists’ arguments, in 1957 Eisenhower’s National Security Council would pass a new 
statement on US foreign policy in South Asia. The statement, known as NSC 5701, called for 
‘economic and technical assistance to India, placing emphasis on projects and programs 
having the maximum potential support of the goals and aspirations of India’s second five-
year plan’.163 Meanwhile, from 1956, Einsenhower would also sign-off on a series of high-
profile aid agreements to New Delhi. Beginning with a $75 million development assistance 
grant in that year, American aid contributions to India would grow from $89.8 million in 
1958, to $137 million in 1959, to $194 million in 1960.164 In 1957, meanwhile, the US 
Government also approved a $225 million loan consisting of Export-Import credits and 
Development Lending Facility funds.165 Thus, as Eisenhower’s administration relinquished 
its earlier stance in favour of a new Rostovian-inspired aid strategy, it was to India that the 
bulk of its new aid funding would flow. 
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It was with the inauguration of the Kennedy administration in 1961, however, that US 
economic aid to India would reach its apogee. Framing Indian economic development in 
terms of both Cold War geopolitics and personal political ambition, Kennedy would keenly 
embrace arguments about the importance of Indian economic aid.166 In 1958, prior to his 
election as President, he had already tabled a resolution to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee calling for US support for multilateral aid to India to the tune of $1.2 billion.167 
Upon election, Kennedy would quickly take measures to increase the levels of American 
support to India beyond those already initiated by Eisenhower. A special preinaugural task 
force on Indian economic growth convened by Kennedy, chaired by Max Millikan, would 
recommend a recurring annual figure of $500 million in economic aid to India.168 
Accordingly, in 1961, the Kennedy administration allocated $500 million of its total $900 
million developmental budget for 1962 to India, with similarly high levels in subsequent 
years.169 Designated as ‘non-project’ aid, the bulk of these funds would go towards 
investments in infrastructure and capital goods, including hydroelectric power, irrigation and 
large purchase of steel and machinery parts, designed to spur industrial development under 
both the Second and Third Five Year Plans.   
Peaking at precisely the moment of McClelland’s arrival in India, increases in American aid 
ran in direct contravention to psychologists’ attempts to spur economic development through 
motivational change. But, then again, so too did the model of economic development 
endorsed by the Indian state itself. Indeed, while American economists, politicians and aid 
officials sought to kick-start Indian economic development through infusions of capital, the 
Government of India was itself practising an approach to economic development that, in its 
own way, put structural economic considerations above individual psychological ones. 
Developed by its own cast of expert economists, most notably Nehru’s chief statistical 
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adviser, the Bengali economist P.C. Mahalanobis, the Second Five Year Plan had also 
prioritized large-scale investment, especially in heavy industries, as the key driver of national 
economic progress. Increased investment in the heavy industries, according to Mahalanobis, 
when combined with the development of smaller-scale industries would help to tackle head-
on the intertwined problems of unemployment, low personal consumption, and low income 
growth that underpinned India’s economic underdevelopment. In the process, it would 
generate significant further investment potential, which could then be used to fund the growth 
of other sectors of the economy. 170 Compared to the First Plan, the Second stipulated a 
fivefold increase in investments in industry, to be paid for by deficit spending together with 
foreign grants and loans. Planned industrialization, as we have seen, would create sites and 
spaces in which McClelland’s psychological enterprise would flourish. Its overarching 
emphasis, however, ran in the opposite direction.  
There were, as already noted, important distinctions between the vision of development put 
forward by the Second Five Year Plan and that championed by advocates of Rostovian aid. 
For Nehruvian planners, the endpoint of economic development culminating was not the 
arrival of an ‘age of high mass consumption’, but the creation of a ‘socialistic pattern of 
society’. Drawing from the Soviet example, the ‘Mahalanobis model’ therefore emphasized 
‘state ownership of the strategic means of production’. In this version of economic 
modernization, the driving force of industrialization would be played by state-backed public 
enterprises focused, in the first instance, on the production of capital goods. Kennedy, 
Rostow and other liberally-minded economists, we have seen, would downplay these 
differences, framing the strong statist element of Indian planning as a necessary measure 
given the country’s prevailing economic circumstances.171 Occasionally, however, the 
differences between these two visions of economic development would also fall into sharp 
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relief. One such instance occurred, for example, when researchers at a CENIS research 
centre, established in New Delhi in 1958, clashed fiercely with Indian planners over details 
concerning the level of public ownership envisioned by India’s Third Five Year Plan.172 
American and Indian elites’ shared conviction that structural economic change formed the 
lynchpin of development thus ran in parallel to, at times, divergent opinions on the ultimate 
goal of development (a process that mirrored psychologists’ own debates about the merits of 
individual versus collectivist motivation).  
The entanglements between American aid and Indian economic development spoke of a 
broad willingness on the part of American policymakers and economists to push aside these 
latent tensions – to ‘reject the conservative rhetorical conflation of the “free world” and the 
“free market”’ and claim Indian development ‘as the free world’s own’. 173 They also spoke 
of the way in which Nehruvian elites, as targets of Cold War economic largesse, drew 
flexibly on external support while pursuing their own particular vision of development.174 To 
McClelland and likeminded thinkers, however, the connections between Rostovian economic 
aid and Nehruvian economic development were ultimately the symptom of a deeper problem. 
As American dollars were ploughed into Indian hydroelectric dams and steel plants, they 
articulated the way in which policymakers in both Washington and New Delhi had come to 
see development through one lens in particular: the lens not of psychology, but of economics. 
In this process, it seemed, protagonists on both sides had mistakenly placed an emphasis on 
economistic modes of thinking over what really mattered in development: the modernization 
of the mind. 
Conclusion 
In India, then, McClelland’s psychologistic vision of economic development had come to 
shape thinking within the spheres, including entrepreneurship development, rural 
development and education. In diverse sites and spaces during the 1960s, Indians had come to 
see economic development, first and foremost, as a matter of heightened motivation. What is 
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more, achievement motivation theory had arrived in India not so much as an imposition of 
McClelland and his American associates, but as a result of the active efforts of Indian actors 
and institutions to appropriate these ideas. As we have seen, however, the motivational 
approach had also encountered numerous forms of opposition in India, not least in the form 
of prevailing approaches to economic development adopted by American and Indian 
policymakers. While McClelland’s motivational paradigm sat in broad alignment with a new, 
hegemonic set of claims about the need to ‘modernize’ ‘underdeveloped’ societies, its 
psychologistic leaning was one that ultimately fell foul of more dominant economistic models 
of change.  
McClelland’s motivational enterprise would by no means be the last attempt to apply 
psychological expertise to Indian development, however. As the Indian state pushed ahead 
with its agenda of planned industrialization, that same agenda – notwithstanding its basic 
economistic overtures – would create further spaces in which contemporaries would, once 
again, seek opportunities to mobilize psychological forms of knowledge. In the next chapter, 
I turn to explore how the broader rise of discourses on ‘management’, forged in direct 
response to the Nehruvian industrialization drive, brought with it a turn towards other forms 































Managing development: industrial development, management, and 
psychologized corporate leadership 
In 1964, amidst the clanging of steel and the blasting of concrete that characterized 
Nehruvian India’s planned industrialization drive, in the city of Hyderabad, a group of 
businessmen sat down together and talked about their feelings. Seated on chairs arranged in a 
small, intimate circle, the men took it in turns to share their perceptions of themselves, their 
fellow participants, and the group as a whole. They discussed relationships, and what made 
them effective. They discussed leadership, and each member’s capacity for it. They talked 
frankly, confronted each other openly, and sat through long periods of silence. As they did so, 
a psychologist, seated among them, took notes on their interactions and the overall ‘group 
climate’.1 
Strange though it may seem, the experience of these Hyderabadi businessmen was not 
uncommon in India during the 1960s. On the contrary, it represented one of hundreds of 
similar ‘training group’ exercises conducted across the country during the heyday of 
Nehruvian industrial development. As plans for rapid industrialization gathered pace, this 
curious brand of business workshop-cum-behavioural therapy session became a central 
feature of the training provided to prepare corporate leaders for the task. Proponents of ‘T-
group training’, as it was commonly known, argued that the placement of individuals in an 
intimate, unstructured group environment would help them to learn the value of certain forms 
of leadership over others. More specifically, T-group training would help to cultivate 
‘democratic’ leadership based on sensitivity, trust and consensual decision making deemed 
necessary for effective organizational management. The rise of T-group training pointed to 
the centrality of the human dimension within contemporary efforts to realize industrial 
progress. It also pointed to a new site in which the allure of psychologized development had 
taken hold.  
This chapter traces the way in which new discourses on the need for ‘management’, 
articulated in response to India’s planned industrial development drive, created new spaces 
for the proliferation of American psychological knowledge. Discourses on ‘management for 
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development’, I argue, emerged as a matter of broad consensus in India during the 1950s, 
linking industrialists, scientists and government officials in a belief that rapid industrial 
development required the propagation of new, ‘professionalized’ approaches to 
organizational leadership. The call for management fed off concerns about the perceived 
inadequacies of ‘colonial’ institutional structures for modernizing development. In 
extrapolating this discourse, the section focuses on the ideas of its most important exponent: 
the scientist, industrialist and institution-builder, Vikram Sarabhai. For Sarabhai, the need for 
management emerged not just as a broad set of ideas on the need to professionalize 
managerial functions, but as a precise vision about the structures and forms of leadership that 
effective organizations required. At the centre of this vision sat the concept of ‘horizontal 
control’. 
From the late 1950s, Sarabhai would become a key figure in the development of 
‘management education’ in India, ultimately becoming the prime mover behind the creation 
of the Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIMA) in 1962. In the second part of this 
chapter, I use the creation of the IIMA as a lens to explore the birth of management education 
in India. Together with its sister institute, the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, the 
IIMA was a distinctly Nehruvian creation – part of a broader trend in which India’s post-
colonial elites sought to catalyse development through the growth of applied, technocratic 
forms of advanced education. At the same time, I argue, the IIMs also formed part of a more 
global spread of the management education concept, a process in which contemporaries 
looked to the United States as a key source of ‘management knowledge’. I explore this 
process through the IIMA’s collaboration with the Harvard Business School. Here, I also 
examine the ways in which Sarabhai sought to construct the IIMA as a model of horizontal 
control.  
In the third section, I explore how the creation of new management education institutions like 
the IIMA created space for psychologized forms of leadership training like the T-group. 
Tracing the T-group’s lineage from Lewinian ‘group dynamics’ research to American 
corporate culture, I show how this therapeutic approach to learning, centred around the 
cultivation of ‘democratic’ leadership styles, came to occupy a central place within the 
programmes designed to train Indian corporate leaders. For its proponents, I argue, the T-
group offered a behavioural technology capable of producing precisely the forms of 
leadership that horizontal control required.  
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Management, development and ‘horizontal control’ 
‘That a developing economy needs management even more than resources is now becoming 
abundantly clear to all students of growth’ explained Prakash Tandon, the Punjabi 
industrialist and Chairman of Hindustan Lever in 1968.2 Published in the foreword to a series 
of essays entitled Managerialism for Economic Development, the statement encapsulated a 
cause to which its author, together with many other Indian leaders, had associated himself 
during the course of the preceding two decades. From the early 1950s, Tandon and like-
minded thinkers had emerged at the forefront of a new wave of thinking on development. 
Posed against more economistic approaches, this was a movement that framed national 
economic progress as a process tied intrinsically to the rise of ‘modern management’.  
The discourse on modern management reflected shifts in India’s development agenda, 
specifically the emergence of industrialization as the core priority of Nehruvian development 
planning. In 1956, India’s Second Five Year Plan set out a roadmap for the expansion of key 
industrial sectors, focusing in particular on capital goods such as iron, steel and the 
manufacture of heavy machinery. Arising at this juncture, discourses on the need for 
management reflected a series of anxieties about the suitability of India’s existing 
organizational and managerial landscape for the planned industrialization drive. The first set 
of anxieties, in this regard, related to the perceived ineptitudes of the prevailing structure of 
commercial organization in India; the so-called ‘managing agency system’. A product of 
desire of nineteenth century British businessmen to maintain overseas investments without a 
physical presence, the managing agency system had been formed to enable companies 
formed and registered in Britain to subcontract operational and management responsibilities 
to ‘agents’ – in most cases British expatriate firms – resident in India. During the course of 
the nineteenth century, driven by factors such as shortages of capital and poor access to 
banking facilities, many Indian companies had themselves begun to use managing agencies. 
Others, meanwhile, had established their own managing agencies to cater to domestic 
demand. By the early twentieth century, the agency system had evolved to become the 
dominant form of industrial organization in India.3 
 
2 Prakash Tandon, ‘Foreword’, in S. Benjamin Prasad and Anant R. Neghandi, Managerialism for Economic 
Development: Essays on India (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 1. 
3 On the managing agency system see Geoffrey Tyson, Managing Agency: A System of Business Organisation 
(Calcutta: Houghty Printing, 1960). See also Maria Misra, Business, Race and Politics in British India, c. 1850-
1960 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp.17-67. 
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Post-colonial elites saw two major problems arising from the managing agency system, the 
first of which was its reduction of the scope of managerial decision making. Under the 
agency system, contracts agreed between companies and agents subsumed much of the 
former’s decision making power. As such, the growth of the agency system had the effect of 
condensing industrial management responsibilities into the hands of a small group of 
managing agency firms. This was problematic, according to many observers, because it 
removed decision making from business operations themselves. The second problem related 
to the character of the agencies themselves. As they grew, Indian managing agencies had 
developed an organizational structure ‘coterminous with the familial organisation’. Headed, 
in most cases by the patriarchal head of the family, agency firms reserved their senior 
management positions for male relatives. They had fostered a pattern of industrial leadership 
based, as one contemporary put it, on ‘familial connections’ rather than ‘managerial skills’.4  
A second set of anxieties concerned the capacity of India’s administrative system to lead a 
process of industrialization. Drawing from Keynesian as well as Soviet economic models, we 
have seen, the Second Five Year Plan had set out a key role for the public sector in India’s 
planned industrial transformation. The Plan, therefore, placed emphasis on the expansion of 
new public enterprises that would ‘function alongside private enterprises in a mixed 
economy, acting as a counterweight to the cyclical swings and fashions of private 
investment’.5 These new public enterprises were to be managed by government ministries, 
with new executive bodies such as the Ministry for Iron and Steel created for this explicit 
purpose. While arrangements varied between cases, a general pattern here was that executive 
roles within new public enterprises were assumed by high-ranking officials drawn from the 
Indian Administrative Service (IAS). The placement of IAS officials at the heart of public 
enterprise management provoked concern not only about the lack of commercial experience 
held by these administrators, but also about the capacity of a colonial bureaucracy, built along 
lines of command and control, to lead a dynamic process of planned industrial 
transformation.6 
 
4 Kamla Chowdhry and Ram S. Tarneja, ‘India’, File: Chowdhry, Dr Kamla, 1964-5, Box 2, Indian Institute of 
Management, Ahmedabad Records (hereafter IIMAR), Special Collections, Baker Library, Harvard Business 
School, p. 100.  
5 Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London: Penguin, 1997), p. 77.  
6 The Second Year Plan itself acknowledged this concern, noting that ‘questions bearing on the methods of 
management and personnel policies in public enterprises’, were ‘under constant review’. Second Five Year Plan 
(New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, 1956), p. 54. 
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Amidst concerns about the inability of ‘colonial’ institutions to lead a process of industrial 
development’, the call for ‘management’ advocated the rise of a new, Weberian model of 
enterprise management ‘in which major policy-making decisions and nearly all other 
positions in the hierarchy are held by persons on the bases of alleged or demonstrated 
technical competence rather than on relationships to a family or a political regime’.7 ‘Modern 
productive activity’, two leading exponents of this argument proclaimed: 
…whether it takes place in an advanced or an advancing country, requires a complex 
blending of the skills and talents of people into a mosaic of tasks and functions in an effective 
manner…this we refer to as “managerialism”’.8 
According to its proponents, there were two overarching ways in which a shift towards 
‘managerialism’ might be brought into being. The first was legal and institutional; namely, 
the prohibition of the managing agency system. The second was education. New forms of 
management training, it was argued, would help to produce a new type of ‘professionalized 
manager’ equipped with a ‘high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge’. 
Professional managers, it was argued, unlike their nepotistic forbears, would manage 
organizations not in ways established by custom and tradition, but in the most efficient and 
productive way possible. Alongside legalistic approaches to reforming archaic management 
structures, then, education would yield individuals capable of reforming and rationalizing 
organizations from within.  
The need for new management found adherents in leading industrialists like Tandon. But it 
also found footing among India’s governmental elite. According to Douglas Ensminger, the 
Ford Foundation Representative in New Delhi, the need for professional management had 
three key proponents within the Government of India during the 1950s: the Deputy Chairman 
of the Planning Commission, Sir. V.T. Krishnamachari; the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry, T.T. Krishnamachari; and the Finance Minister, C.D. Deshmukh.9 Each of these 
figures, it will be seen, would go on to play a key role in the establishment of management 
 
7 Prasad and Neghandi, Managerialism for Economic Development, p. 22. Here, Indians like Prasad and 
Neghandi drew on a definition of professional management put forward by American economists Frederick 
Harbison and Charles A. Myers in Harbison and Myers, Management in the Industrial World: An International 
Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 76-77.  
8 Ibid., (preface).  
9 ‘The Ford Foundation and Management Education in India’, Folder B.7, Box 9, Series II, Douglas Ensminger 
Papers (hereafter (DEP), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University, p. 5. As the next section will elucidate, 
Ensminger and Ford would go on to play a prominent role in the development of India’s first management 
education institutions during the 1960s.  
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education institutions in India. It was in the figure of Vikram Sarabhai, however, that the 
cause of modernizing management would find its most indefatigable exponent.  
At first sight, Sarabhai seems an unlikely figure to have led a campaign for a management-
centred approach to development. The scion of a wealthy Ahmedabad millowning family 
with close connections to India’s nationalist elite, Sarabhai typically enters the narrative of 
post-colonial Indian history for other reasons. A talented cosmic-ray physicist, and the 
recipient of a PhD from the University of Cambridge in 1947, Sarabhai would go on to 
profoundly shape the fields of atomic science and space research in India during the post-
colonial decades. In 1962, he founded the Indian National Committee for Space Research 
(INCOSAR), what would later become the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). 
Between 1966 and his untimely death in 1971, he also became Chair of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), the body responsible for overseeing India’s programme of nuclear 
research. Narrating these aspects of his career, historians have rightly positioned Sarabhai as a 
key figure in the development of India’s modern scientific establishment.10  
The emphasis on Sarabhai the scientist has, however, also worked to obscure other 
dimensions of his career. As a prolific institution-builder and industrialist, Sarabhai would 
spend the 1950s and 60s acting as a tireless advocate for the idea that development hinged, 
ultimately, on the way in which institutions were managed. Like others, Sarabhai would 
champion the need to rationalize and professionalize managerial functions. At the same time, 
however, he would also frame ‘modern management’ in uniquely specific terms. Modern 
management, he argued, required more than mere professionalization. It also required a 
particular approach to the structure and functioning of organizations: it required ‘horizontal 
control’. 
The concept of horizontal control had its origins in Sarabhai’s observations concerning the 
organization of scientific research.11 As a young scientist, he later recalled, he had been 
 
10 On Sarabhai’s role in space research see various contributions to Padmanabh K. Joshi (ed.), Vikram Sarabhai: 
The Man and the Vision (Ahmedabad: Mapin Publishing, 1992); P.V. Manoranjan Rao (ed.), From Fishing 
Hamlet to Red Planet: India’s Space Journey (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2015). On atomic research see Robert 
S. Anderson, Nucleus and Nation: Scientists, International Networks, and Power in India (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2010), ch. 15; Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and 
the Postcolonial State (London: Zed Books, 1998), ch. 4.   
11 It is also conceivable that the concept of ‘horizontal control’ drew upon Sarabhai’s own experiences, 
including those of his childhood. At the request of his parents, Ambalal and Sarladevi Sarabhai, the young 
Vikram had been educated in a home-school setting styled on the ‘Montessorian’ principles. This education, one 
associate has noted, ‘placed the teacher ‘not so much in the imparting of knowledge as in stimulating the pupil 
in its [own] love and pursuit’. J.S. Badami, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai: My Student, Employer and Friend’ and C.J. 
Bhatt, ‘Boyhood Days of Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, in Electronics Today, 1972, pp. 42-45 
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greatly impressed by the organizational ethos of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission 
under its first Director, Homi Bhabha. Rather than build the AEC around a formal 
hierarchical structure extrapolated through an ‘organisational chart’, Sarabhai explained, 
Bhabha had established a loose system of oversight in which control was ‘largely inherent 
and contained in professional commitments’. The AEC’s decision making was therefore 
conducted, in the main, ‘through discussion and the judgement of peers, with administration 
performing largely the role of service’. According to Sarabhai, this emphasis on flexibility 
and autonomy had proved conducive not only to the performance of the organization as a 
whole but to the self-development of individual AEC researchers too.12  
From this example, Sarabhai developed a firm conviction that effective scientific research 
required the creation of organizational structures that allowed practitioners freedom to 
innovate and self-direct, rather than ones that controlled them from above. Research, he 
argued, worked better when the individuals or groups conducting it were given space and 
autonomy to pursue their own interests and needs; when management systems fostered ‘direct 
interaction’ between individuals ‘at the same level’, rather than elaborate hierarchical 
procedures for ‘reporting and feedback’. What scientific organizations needed were 
‘horizontal’ – not ‘vertical’ – systems of management and control.13 
The concept of horizontal control was fluid and multifaceted. At its core, however, was an 
eschewal of all semblances of top-down, hierarchical authority. On the one hand. this meant a 
commitment to organizational structures that allowed for delegation, freedom and ‘trust’, and 
to decision making based on deliberation, discussion and consensus. At the same time, it also 
called for certain types of organizational leadership. ‘In horizontal control systems’, 
explained Sarabhai: 
…a leader, if one chooses to identify one, has to be a cultivator rather than a manufacturer. 
He has to provide the soil and the overall climate and environment in which the seed can 
 
12 Vikram Sarabhai, ‘Science and National Goals’ in Vikram Sarabhai, Science Policy and National 
Development, edited by Kamla Chowdhry (New Delhi: Macmillan and Co., 1974), p. 5. See also Vikram 
Sarabhai, ‘Organisation for Developmental Tasks: Atomic Energy Commission of India’ in Vikram Sarabhai, 
Management for Development: A Collection of Papers, edited by Kamla Chowdhry (Vikas Publishing, Delhi, 
1975), pp. 1-31. Bhabha, for his part, had modelled the AEC’s institution-around-man’ approach from the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Society (later renamed the Max Plank Institute), a scientific research institute in Berlin, citing 
that organization’s motto that ‘the Kaiser Wilhelm Society shall not first built an institute for research and then 
seek out a suitable man, but shall first pick up an outstanding man and then build an institute for him’. He styled 
the AEC’s management style as a contrast to the planning-centred approach of the Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CISR), established by the Government of India in 1942. Homi Jehangir Bhabha: Collected 
Scientific Papers, edited by B.V. Sreekantan, V.  Singh, and B.M. Udgaonkar (Bombay: Tata Institute of 
Fundamental Research, 1985), p. 57.  
13 Sarabhai, ‘Science and National Goals’, p. 5. 
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grow. One wants permissive individuals who do not have a compelling need to reassure 
themselves that they are leaders through issuing instructions to others rather they set an 
example through their own creativity, love of nature and identification to what one may call 
the ‘scientific method’.14 
For Sarabhai, horizontal approaches offered more than just greater efficiency over 
hierarchical ones; they also offered a model of management more suited to democracy as 
well. ‘[I]f we are to base the growth of this country on the application of science and 
technology within the democratic framework’, he argued, ‘we shall have to increasingly rely 
on horizontal controls’.15  
Upon his return to India from Cambridge, in 1948, Sarabhai would soon find himself 
presented with a number of institution-building opportunities of his own. In each case, he 
would use these opportunities to create institutions which, in their own way, embraced the 
concept of horizontal control. The first of these, the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL), 
was an institution born directly out of Sarabhai’s interests as a physicist. Established in 
Ahmedabad, in 1947, with funding from the Bombay Provincial Government, the Centre for 
Scientific and Industrial Research and the Ahmedabad Educational Society (a fund support 
by benefactors from the textile industry), the PRL would conduct research in cosmic ray and 
astrophysics, building on the foundations of Sarabhai’s own doctoral research. In establishing 
the PRL, notes Robert S. Anderson, Sarabhai was building ‘the home of his professional life 
as a physicist’.16  
At the PRL, Sarabhai took great pains to create an organizational structure that modelled 
horizontal control. Like their AEC counterparts, PRL scientists were given considerable 
autonomy over their own areas of research. At the centre of the Laboratory’s organizational 
structure, meanwhile, stood a ‘committee system’ through which all significant decisions 
relating to scientific research and administration were taken. Each committee comprised 
employees from different levels of the organization, with a chairmanship shared between 
committee members by rotation. This system ensured that control over institutional decision 
making remained diffused amongst members, not concentrated within any one individual. To 
keep senior management informed of the functioning of the committees, every individual 
 
14 Cited in Parikh, K., ‘The “Permissive” Leader’ in Joshi, P.K. (ed.), Vikram Sarabhai: The Man and the Vision 
Ahmedabad: Mapin Publishing, 1992, pp. 109.    
15 Vikram Sarabhai, ‘Development through Pace Setting: Horizontal and Vertical Control Systems’ in Science 
Policy and National Development., p. 41.  
16 Anderson, Nucleus and Nation, p. 283.  
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scientist also met regularly with the PRL Director. At the root of the PRL’s committee 
system, writes Padmanabh Joshi, ‘was an attempt to avoid a hierarchical control system’.17 
Sarabhai’s second major scientific institution building pursuit of the 1950s, the Ahmedabad 
Textile Industry’s Research Association (ATIRA), reflected more explicitly his connections 
to the Ahmedabad industrial community. The concept of a textile industry research institute 
had emerged during the mid-1940s, the product of millowners’ dual interest in sponsoring 
pioneering scientific industrial research, on the one hand, and finding ways to reduce the tax 
burden incurred from substantial wartime profits on the other.18 Following an agreement with 
the Government of India whereby funds set aside for scientific research would be treated as 
tax-exempt, in 1947 the Ahmedabad Millowners’ Association (AMA) had formally registered 
ATIRA with the goal of conducting ‘operational, applied and fundamental research to 
improve understanding of men, materials and processes in industry’. The government, keen 
to promote the development of industrial research, agreed to provide its own financial 
backing.19  
Appointed as ATIRA’s first Director in 1950, Sarabhai set about structuring the 
Association’s eight divisions into a format that avoided top-down lines of authority.20 Instead, 
he built an organizational structure focused around three interlinking ‘clusters of control’. 
The first of these comprised the top-level policy-making body, consisting of board members 
including Sarabhai himself. The second consisted of ATIRA’s researchers. The third cluster 
consisted of the city’s textile mills – the targets and ultimately the beneficiaries of ATIRA’s 
 
17 Padmanabh K. Joshi, ‘Dr. Vikram Sarabhai: A Study of Innovative Leadership and Institution Building’, 
unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Gujarat, 1985, p. 136.  
18 Both the first and second world wars proved enormously profitable to Ahmedabad’s textile mills, the principal 
reason being that reduced shipping services served to protect domestic textile production from foreign 
competition. The ‘swadeshi’ movement, meanwhile, also ensured a thriving domestic market for Indian-
produced clothing and garments. Howard Spodeck, ‘The “Manchesterisation” of Ahmedabad’, The Economic 
Weekly, 17, 1965, pp. 483-490. For more on this, and for the ways in which Ahmedabad millowners saw these 
profits as a means to transform the institutional and cultural life of the city, including through institutions like 
ATIRA and the IIMA see Howard Spodeck, Ahmedabad: Shock City of Twentieth Century India (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press), pp. 117-118, 128-130.  
19 ‘ATIRA – The Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research Association, pamphlet issued on the occasion of the 
foundation stone laying ceremony of the ATIRA laboratories by the hon’ble Sardar Vallbhbhai Patel, 1 
November 1950’, File Number 4(8).46. Vol IV, Records of the Ministry of Education, Government of India, 
National Archives of India (hereafter NAI). For the agreement between the millowners and the Government of 
India see: Letter from the Secretary, Ahmedabad Millowners’ Research Association the Secretary to the 
Government of India, Department of Industries and Supplies, 30 August 1947’, File Number 4(8).46. Vol IV: 
Ahmedabad Millowners’ Proposal for the Establishment of a Textile Research Institute, Records of the Ministry 
of Education, Government of India, NAI. 
20 The eight units were Physics, Chemistry, Statistics, Psychology, Liaison, Technology, Library and 
Documentation and Administration. See Vikram A. Sarabhai, ‘Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research 
Association’, Nature, 174, 1954, pp. 578-580. 
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scientific research. Decision making concerning research priorities and processes was taken 
across these three clusters with Sarabhai helping to ensure the meaningful contribution of all 
three layers. As with the PRL, decision making across the clusters was also participative and 
discussion based. ATIRA’s researchers enjoyed ‘freedom of work and trust’, and license to 
plan, budget and implement tasks with autonomy.21 Sarabhai, recalled one ATIRA employee, 
viewed his role, in relation to researchers as being to ‘nourish their developing capacities, to 
permit them to move in directions that made sense to each’.22  
Among the polymer chemists and textile engineers recruited to ATIRA during the early 
1950s was an individual who would come to exert an important influence on Sarabhai in the 
years to come. Her name was Kamla Chowdhry. Chowdhry, the daughter of an aspiring civil 
service family and a former student of Rabindranath Tagore’s Shantiniketan school, had been 
awarded a PhD in social psychology from the University of Michigan in 1949, there working 
alongside a leading figure in the burgeoning field of industrial psychology, Rensis Likert. 
During a chance encounter following her return to India, Chowdhry had made an instant 
impression on Sarabhai, who soon invited her to establish a programme of psychological 
research at ATIRA. Chowdhry’s Psychological Research Division would conduct studies of 
attitudes, labour-management relations, incentives and the effects of physical working 
conditions on the health and efficiency of workers. Its first major project, beginning in 1951, 
was a series of enquiries into labour-management ‘tensions’ conducted as part of the Ministry 
of Education’s tensions research.23  
At ATIRA, Sarabhai and Chowdhry would develop an intimate working relationship, with 
important consequences for both.24 Chowdhry, for her part, would quickly come to embrace 
Sarabhai’s thinking on horizontal control systems.25 In doing so, she would also seek to 
 
21 Joshi, ‘Dr. Vikram Sarabhai: A Study of Innovative Leadership and Institution Building’, p. 116 At ATIRA, 
recalls Joshi, ‘an organic structure emerged out of common experiences of team work in which administration 
played the role of support and services’, pp. 114.  
22 Kamla Chowdhry, ‘Institution Building and Social Change: The Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research 
Association’, Indian Journal of Public Administration, 14:4, 1968, p. 956. 
23 For the write-up of this research see Gardner Murphy, In the Minds of Men: The Study of Human Behaviour 
and Social Tensions in India (New York: Basic Books, 1953), ch. 9.  
24 The memoirs Kamla Chowdhry’s nephew, Sudhir Kakar (himself a renowned personality psychologist) bring 
to light the intimate personal, as well as the professional, relationship between Sarabhai and Chowdhry during 
this period. See Sudhir Kakar, A Book of Memory: Confessions and Reflections (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001), ch. 
6. See also Prakash Tandon, Return to Punjab: 1961-1975 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 
pp. 115-119.  
25 For examples of Chowdhry’s thinking on horizontal control systems see Kamla Chowdhry, ‘Institution 
Building: Two Approaches in Contrast’ in Ravi Matthai, Udai Pareek, T.V. Rao eds., Institution-building in 
Education and Research (New Delhi: All India Management Association, 1977), pp. 12-18; Kamla Chowdhry, 
‘Organization and Administration of Scientific Institutions: A Case Study of Atira’, Management International 
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connect these ideas to the latest ‘human relations’ insights of the day. As will be seen, the 
most important aspect of this would be the promotion of new psychologized techniques for 
promoting leadership norms deemed conducive to horizontal control, at the centre of which 













According to Sarabhai, the concept of horizontal control was of particular relevance to 
scientific organizations like the PRL and ATIRA. This was because scientists, together with 
other ‘professional groups’, possessed a set of values uniquely suited to work under 
horizontal controls.26 During the course of the 1950s, however, Sarabhai would begin to 
widen the scope of this argument by claiming that vertical control systems were inimical to 
all organizations wherein ‘innovation’, rather than ‘preservation’ formed the central operation 
or task. 27 Soon, he would demonstrate this conviction through attempts to promote horizontal 
 
Review, 9:6, 1969, pp. 97-104; Kamla Chowdhry, ‘Organizational Innovation in Universities: Relevance of 
Industrial Experience’, Economic and Political Weekly, 4:35, 1969, pp. 97-100. 
26 Rather than ‘money, hierarchical status and power’, Sarabhai argued, it was the need for ‘autonomy of 
working conditions and opportunities’, ‘discussion’ and ‘peer-judgement’ that came first in the mind of most 
scientists. Vikram Sarabhai, ‘Approaches to the Administration of Scientific Organisations’, in Science Policy 
and National Development, p. 23.  
27 Vikram Sarabhai, ‘Preservation and Innovation: The Tasks of Government’, in Science Policy and National 
Development, pp. 32-38. 
The horizontal leader 
 
Figure 10. Vikram Sarabhai participating in a seminar on radio protection in Trombay 
 
(Source: Nuclear India, 10:5, 1972) 
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approaches across a broader spectrum of institutions. Here, he would make use of his 
privileged position within the Ahmedabad corporate sphere.  
On his return to India, alongside institution building opportunities afforded by the PRL and 
ATIRA, Sarabhai had also assumed senior management positions within a number of 
enterprises within the Sarabhai family group, some of which he himself had also helped to 
establish. These companies included Swastik Oil Mills (in Bombay), Standard 
Pharmaceuticals Limited (in Calcutta), Sarabhai Chemicals, Sarabhai Glass and Sarabhai 
Engineering Group (all in Baroda). Across each of these enterprises, Sarabhai would work to 
promote norms of corporate management that eschewed vertical forms of control.28 
‘Vikram’s approach’, recalled one Swastik Oil Mills employee:  
…was democratic. He believed in the delegation of powers and group discussions to arrive at 
sound management decisions. The working of the company was discussed in detail at 
monthly meetings. Each person whatever his position was encouraged to express his thought 
freely and to criticise constructively without any inhibition. This gave the staff a feeling of 
involvement in the decisions and a rare opportunity for training and for building up their 
morale…He believed in the delegation of duties. At staff meetings, even when he was 
present, he would insist that the Chief Executive should take the chair and he would sit as an 
ordinary member even though he was the Chairman of the Company.29 
According to Sarabhai, the world was full of examples of the benefits of horizontal control 
systems; from the way in which individuals interacted within their own communities, to the 
manner in which prices were kept down through the self-regulation of the market. The 
‘prevention of armed conflict between the USA and the USSR during the last 20 years’, he 
even suggested, spoke of the merits of ‘horizontal interaction without anyone from the top 
ordaining that there should be no war’.30 From quotidian circumstances to the relations 
between nations, he argued, things just worked better through the natural checks and balances 
of horizontal control. To Sarabhai, the merits of horizontal over vertical systems had 
important implications for the way in which India went about its pursuit of planned industrial 
development. A programme of public enterprise-led industrialization, he argued, could not be 
successful if it relied on top-down models of management. Here, he questioned the efficacy 
 
28 N.R. Nadkarni, ‘Dr. Sarabhai – the Industrialist’ in Electronics Today, 1972, pp. 95- 98. 
29 J.S. Badami, ‘Dr. Vikram Sarabhai: My Student, Employer and Friend, pp. 47-49 Electronics Today, 1972, 
pp. 48.  
30 ‘Most people’, explained Sarabhai, ‘would agree that it is not the existence of the UN or the superior power of 
an organisation at a higher level which has preserved peace. It has been through the operation of mutual 
deterrents or what is known as the balance of terror. Each side is aware that to resort to arms for the settlement 
of a dispute would entail its own population being subjected to unacceptable damage. In consequence peace is 
preserved by horizontal interaction without anyone from the top ordaining that there should be no war’. Ibid., p. 
40.  Emphasis mine. 
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of the prevailing model of public enterprise organization, in which top-down ‘committees of 
management’, consisting of ministers and senior civil servants, held responsibility for 
decision making without any direct involvement in day-to-day company affairs:  
Can the vertical controls of a Board of monolithic corporations or of the Bureau of Public 
Enterprises, or of the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises, or the Auditor General 
provide adequate substitutes for what can be gained through accountability for task 
performance in a situation of survival and growth in a competitive economy?…Top bodies 
involved in such control can rarely function in anything but roles of strategic decision-
making. When they involve themselves in the decision-making process of day-to-day 
administration, the system indeed gets fouled up. I would suggest that since [these] vertical 
controls inhibit innovation and remove the decision-making process from the operating level, 
they are unsuitable as a system for the developmental tasks of government.31 
What was needed, according to Sarabhai, was a new approach to public enterprise 
management, one that embraced the concept of horizontal control and modelled it as an 
example for others to follow: 
In our country where we ideologically promote the public sector, the Government has a 
wonderful opportunity of priming the process of development by setting up pace setting 
industries and organisations which through exercising horizontal controls stimulate the 
overall level of economic development.32 
Sarabhai stopped short of a wholesale critique of planned industrial development. ‘We are not 
suggesting here the abdication of supreme authority at the topmost echelon of government’, 
he explained. ‘One is talking of a self-restraint and exercise of power based on an 
understanding of the control systems appropriate to developmental functions’.33 As a critic of 
the tendency of planning to propagate vertical controls, then, Sarabhai remained, in the words 
of one colleague, ‘a socialist – strictu sensu’ with deep ties to the Congress and its vision of 
planned development.34 Here, Sarabhai’s call for modern management resonated with a 
broader inclination of the discourse on management as it emerged in the Indian context; 
namely, a tendency to see management as a means of realizing the Nehruvian vision of state-
led development. Significantly, this was a view that contrasted to later discourses, wherein 
 
31 Sarabhai, ‘Science and National Goals’., p. 6.   
32 Sarabhai, ‘Development through Pace Setting: Horizontal and Vertical Control Systems’, p. 40.  
33 Ibid., p. 40. This was a message that Sarabhai would promote repeatedly during public speeches from the 
1950s onwards, as well as in ‘Observations on Planning’ submitted to the Planning Commission. See Vikram 
Sarabhai, ‘Some Observations on Planning’, File. S.N. 65, Subject Files, Planning Commission, Asok Mitra 
Papers (hereafter AMP), Nehru Museum and Memorial Library. 
34 B.S. Rao (Guest Editor), ‘Between Ourselves’, Electronics Today, 1972, p. 33. 
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the call for ‘management’ would become a tool with which to challenge the basic 
assumptions of the Nehruvian project.35 
Instituting management at Ahmedabad 
Discourses on management produced more than just claims about the sort of individuals 
needed for effective industrial development; they also gave rise to concerted attempts to 
create those persons in the flesh. In the context his own institution-building pursuits, Vikram 
Sarabhai had been busy trying to cultivate what he saw as the norms of ‘modern 
management’ throughout the 1950s. It was, however, in the watershed years of the early 
1960s that the first concerted moves to build new national institutions for the production of 
modern managers would emerge. During the early 1960s, an eclectic network of stakeholders 
– public and private, Indian and international – would come together to pioneer a new form 
of education hitherto unknown to the Indian landscape: ‘management education’. Drawing 
from an American model, management education would comprise instruction in a range of 
technical fields deemed conducive to the leadership of modern organizations. In India, this 
new form of education would be spearheaded by new state-backed Indian Institutes of 
Management (IIMs). 
As chronicled by institutional historians, the story of IIMs begins in the year 1955, with the 
creation of a Committee, under the purview of the Ministry for Scientific Research and 
Cultural Affairs, to explore the prospects and possibilities for the growth of management 
education in India.36 Placed under the chairmanship of T.T. Krishnamachari, the Committee 
reflected the strength of emerging ideas about the role of professional management in 
industrial development. Under its auspices, Krishnamachari had sent a group of researchers to 
explore the approaches to management education then in use within the United States. 
 
35 In the hands of the anti-Congress liberal politician Minoo Masani, for example, the discourse of management 
would be used in precisely this way. As a founder member and MP for the Swatantra Party, Masani would 
repeatedly make the claim that public enterprise-led development exemplified ‘bad management’. See for 
example Minoo Masani, ‘Public Accountability’, S.N. 37, File 7, Minoo Masani Papers, Nehru Memorial 
Museum and Library, New Delhi.  
36 The first account of the establishment of the IIMs was provided by Thomas M. Hill, Warren W. Haynes, 
Howard J. Baumgartel, Institution Building in India: A Study of International Collaboration in Management 
Education (Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1973). The study was 
based on an internal Ford Foundation report entitled ‘Management Education in India: A Study of International 
Collaboration in Institution Building’, Report No. 001973, Catalogued Reports 1-3254 (FA739A), FFA. More 
recent institutional histories include Prafull Anubhai, The IIMA Story: The DNA of an Institution (New Delhi: 
Random House, 2011); T.T. Ram Mohan, Brick by Red Brick: Ravi Matthai and the Making of IIM Ahmedabad 
(Kolkata: Rupa and Co., 2011). For recollections of the early IIMC see Citizens and Revolutionaries: An Oral 
History of IIM Calcutta (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2012).  
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Though of little immediate consequence, the Krishnamachari Committee would set in motion 
a series of developments that would culminate ultimately in the creation of the IIMs.37 
In 1956, sensing an opportunity, the Ford Foundation’s Representative in India, Douglas 
Ensminger, had arranged for two Harvard Business School professors, Richard Merriam and 
Harold Thurlby, to prepare their own Ford Foundation report on the prospects for 
management education in India. The report, published in 1957, contained the first proposal 
for a new Indian institute of management.38 In 1959, the Indian Planning Commission 
commissioned a second study, this time undertaken by George W. Robbins, the Associate 
Dean of the Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of California Los 
Angeles (UCLA). Again facilitated by Ford, the Robbins report reiterated the need for an 
‘All-India Institute of Management’.39 On 28 December 1959, a meeting of the Indian 
Planning Commission endorsed the recommendations of the Robbins report, thereby 
confirming that the Government of India would establish a new management education 
institute. Accepting the recommendation of both Merriam-Thurlby and Robbins, the Planning 
Commission recommended that any such institute should also be independent of university 
control.40  
The decision to establish a management education institute was a characteristically 
Nehruvian move. Though part of a broader international embrace of American approaches to 
management education, it also formed part of a more specific trend in which Indian post-
colonial elites sought to catalyse India’s development through the creation of elite, 
technocratic forms of professional education delivered through institutions situated outside 
the traditional academic system. Preceding the advent of the IIM, Nehruvian policymakers 
had already pioneered the creation of new Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) dedicated to 
the provision of higher education in engineering and related fields of science. Following the 
recommendation of a commission headed by the economist N.R. Sarkar, IITs would be 
established in the cities of Kharagpur, Bombay, Madras, Kanpur and Delhi between 1951 and 
 
37 For more on the 1955 Committee see Anubhai, The IIMA Story, p. 3.  
38 Ibid., p. 4.  
39 Ibid., p. 4. For a copy of the Robbins report see ‘Appendix 3A: Recommendations for an All-India Institute of 
Management: A Report by George W. Robbins, Associate Dean, Graduate School of Business Administration, 
University of California, Los Angeles, and Consultant to the Ford Foundation, New Delhi’, in ‘Management 
Education in India: A Study of International Collaboration in Institution Building’, pp. 1-34. 
40 A summary of this meeting can be found as ‘Appendix 3B: Summary of an informal meeting held on 
December 28, 1959 in Room 63, Udyog Bhavan, to consider a draft report by Dean Robbins, Consultant to the 
Ford Foundation, regarding an All-India Institute of Management’, in ‘Management Education in India: A Study 
of International Collaboration in Institution Building’, pp. 1-2.  
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1963.41 The proposal for an IIM thus formed one expression of a broader Nehruvian tendency 
to view education as a means of producing ‘trained manpower’. As Bhikhu Parekh has 
argued, this tendency was also one that, by implication, relegated investment in primary and 
secondary education to marginal concerns in the onward march to progress.42 
The city of Bombay appeared the most likely location for an IIM. Owing to its diverse range 
of industries and large cosmopolitan population, both the Merriam-Thurlby and Robbins 
reports had hinted at Bombay as a desirable location for such an enterprise. Indeed, during 
the course of their research, Merriam and Thurlby had even met with representatives of the 
University of Bombay to discuss how such an institute might work.43 The idea of a Bombay 
institute, however, would soon become untenable. The key issue here was the proposal that 
the Institute should be independent. This emphasis on autonomy sparked opposition from 
local university leaders, including the economist and former tension researcher C.N. Vakil, 
who insisted that any management education institution would work better within the existing 
institutional structures. Meanwhile, influenced by the university’s concerns, the Government 
of Maharashtra also adopted a ‘lukewarm’ stance towards the proposal.44 
As Bombay prevaricated, an opportunity emerged for other sites to come forward. 
Ahmedabad, a comparatively small, single-industry city, of regional rather national 
significance, had not initially appealed to government planners. Soon, however, a proactive 
group of figures in the city moved to put it in the frame. At the forefront of this process sat 
Vikram Sarabhai.45 Sarabhai mobilized his extensive network of political contacts, including 
Jivraj Mehta, Chief Minister of Gujarat, M.S. Thacker, Secretary at the Ministry of Scientific 
Research and Cultural Affairs and V.T. Krishnamachari, Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission, in support of an Ahmedabad institute. 46  He also called upon the services of his 
long-time friend and patron, Kasturbhai Lalbhai. Lalbhai, a prominent Ahmedabad 
millowner, brought not just his own substantial political influence but also the backing of the 
 
41 On the establishment of the IITs see Ross Bassett, ‘Aligning India in the Cold War Era: Indian Technical 
Elites, the Indian Institute of Technology at Kanpur, and Computing in India and the United States’, Technology 
and Culture, 50:4, 2009, pp. 783-810; Sabil Francis, ‘The IITs in India: Symbols of an Emerging Nation’, South 
Asia Chronicle, 1, 2011, pp. 293-326; Shahi Tharoor, The Elephant, The Tiger and the Cellphone: Reflections 
on India in the Twenty-first Century (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007), pp. 20-22. For an anthropological study of the 
IIT in contemporary India see Ajantha Subramanian, ‘Making Merit: The Indian Institutes of Technology and 
the Social Life of Caste’, Comparative Studies in History and Society, 57:2, 2015, pp. 291-322.  
42 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Nehru and the National Philosophy of India’, Economic and Political Weekly, 26:1/2, p. 36.  
43 Anubhai, The IIMA Story, p. 4.  
44 TT Ram Mohan, Brick by Red Brick, p. 9.  
45 For a first-hand account of Sarabhai’s role see Tandon, Return to Punjab, pp. 115-133.  
46 Anubhai, The IIMA Story, pp. 8-9. 
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Ahmedabad industrial community. Before long, the Ahmedabad Millowners’ Association, the 
Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and the Ahmedabad Management Association had all 
publicly declared their endorsement for the proposed institute. The Ahmedabad Education 
Society, a charitable fund backed by millowner contributions (and chaired by Lalbhai) 
promised generous financial support.47 For Ahmedabad’s millowners, the decision to support 
the management institute represented the latest in a series of cooperative investments in 
pioneering research and educational institutions in the city (including Sarabhai’s earlier 
ventures at the PRL and ATIRA). In this sense, it spoke of a longer trend in which the city’s 
wealthy industrial families pooled resources to develop progressive institutions that, while 
serving the national cause, also protected their own corporate interests.48 
The efforts of the Ahmedabad lobby paid dividends. On 11 December 1961, following 
Government of India approval, a new ‘Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad Society’ 
was formed. Tasked with overseeing plans for an Ahmedabad Institute, the IIMA Society was 
a multi-stakeholder body comprising representatives from central government departments, 
the provincial Government of Gujarat, the industrial community and, following an agreement 
to provide assistance to the project, the Ford Foundation. The IIMA resembled something 
like the Public-Private-Partnership of more recent times, with funding and planning 
responsibilities shared across various parties. The Government of Gujarat and the Bank of 
India each provided loans to facilitate the purchase of land in the Vastapur district of the city. 
The Ahmedabad Education Society, meanwhile, funded the construction of Institute’s new 
campus buildings. Ford, for its part, agreed to fund the provision of technical assistance from 
American institutions (a topic discussed further below).49  
By the time of the IIMA Society’s creation, meanwhile, developments elsewhere had also 
conspired to turn the government’s plan for an ‘institute’ of management into plans for 
‘institutes’. The change coincided with the appointment, in 1959, of Humayun Kabir 
(formerly of the Ministry of Education) as the new Minister for Scientific Research and 
 
47 Industrial backing was considered important for two reasons. Firstly, because industry represented a potential 
source of funds. Secondly, because any new management institute would need to be seen as legitimate by the 
industrial interests it was ultimately intended to serve. Ibid., p. 8.  
48 On this trend see Spodeck, ‘The “Manchesterisation” of Ahmedabad’, pp. 483-490; Spodeck, Ahmedabad: 
Shock City of Twentieth Century India, ch. 2. On the broader history of the Gujarati millowning community 
Dwijendra Tripathi and M.J. Mehta, ‘Class Character of the Gujarati Business Community’, in Dwijendra 
Tripathi (ed.), Business Communities of India: A Historical Perspective (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 
1984), pp. 151-171; Markand Mehta, ‘Gandhi and Ahmedabad, 1915-1920’, Economic and Political Weekly, 
40:4, 2005, pp. 22-28.  
49 Anubhai, The IIMA Story, pp. 9-11.  
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Cultural Affairs. A Bengali with close personal ties to the Chief Minister of West Bengal, 
B.C. Roy, Kabir had used his new position to push for Calcutta, India’s second major 
industrial city, as a site deserving its own management institute. Securing Ford’s support for 
this proposal, Kabir also appropriated the necessary Ministry and local government funds.50 
On 14 November 1961, therefore, the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta (IIMC) was 
also established. In its early years, the IIMC would occupy a site on the Emerald Tower 
complex on Calcutta’s Barrackpore Trunk Road. 
--- 
The IIMs were not the only institutions created to satisfy the demand for modern 
management. In 1957, for example, a Planning Committee established under the Government 
of India’s Council for Technical Education, chaired by T.T. Krishnamachari, had established 
the Administrative Staff College in Hyderabad. Created to provide training for middle-level 
managers within both public and private sector enterprises, the Hyderabad Staff College drew 
its institutional blueprint directly from the model of the Henley Staff College in England. 
Henley was a product of wartime demand for the training of senior army officers, later 
converted into a more general management training facility for both civilian and military 
personnel. Its hallmark – the ‘syndicate approach’ – was an educational technique in which 
delegates worked through training courses as small groups (syndicates) with responsibilities 
for management rotated between participants.51 As a response to the prevailing demand for 
professionalized management, the Hyderabad Staff College spoke of the enduring lure of a 
British model of administrative ‘excellence’. At the IIMs, however, leaders would embrace 
an alternative educational model, one based not on British examples but on the model of the 
American business school. 
The American business school was an institution with its roots in the late nineteenth century. 
Forged in response to changes in the structure of the US economy during that period – more 
specifically the transition from an economy based on ‘perfect’ market competition between 
‘traditional enterprises’ to one based on large, integrated corporations – the business school 
reflected the attempts of American corporate leaders to professionalize the range of new 
 
50 Kabir’s role in negotiating the creation of the IIMC is described in ‘The Ford Foundation and Management 
Education in India’, Folder B.7, Box 9, Series II, Douglas Ensminger Papers (hereafter (DEP), Manuscripts and 
Archives, Yale University, pp. 10-11.  
51 See Marshall E. Dinnock, ‘The Administrative Staff College: Executive Development in Government and 
Industry’, The American Political Science Review, 50:1, 1956, pp. 166-176; J.W.L. Adams, ‘Henley and 
Hyderabad’, Indian Journal of Public Administration, 4:1, 1958, pp. 66-78. 
173 
 
managerial tasks and functions that this transition entailed.52 The foundation of business 
schools reflected more than simply a response to changing organizational demands, however. 
As Rakesh Khurana has argued, it also reflected a ‘search for legitimacy’ on the part of 
America’s new executive classes, one that drew upon prevailing trends, such as growing 
organizational support for science, the increasing professionalization of other areas (for 
example law, medicine and the clergy), and the rise of the American research university, in 
its bid to legitimate managerial occupations.53 Following the founding of the first university-
based business schools – the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business 
(1881); the Dartmouth University Tuck School of Administration and Finance (1900); and 
the Harvard Business School (1908) – the number of business schools had grown steadily 
during the first half of the twentieth century. By 1955, at least 587 institutions were 
conferring business degrees in the United States.54 
Influenced by progressivist understandings of what constituted a ‘profession’, the founders of 
America’s first business schools sought to ‘infuse the new occupation of management with 
values beyond the technical requirements of the job’.55 At the core of this, Khurana has 
argued, sat an emphasis on a ‘social compact’ between the manager and society at large. At 
the Wharton School and elsewhere, early business educators framed their mission as one of 
creating managers that possessed, first and foremost, strong ‘professional ideals’ centred 
around ethical standards and social responsibility. During the course of its early twentieth 
century expansion, however, as private foundations such as the Carnegie, Rockefeller and 
Ford came to play a key role in the funding of business education, the character of the 
American business school had undergone subtle yet significant changes. In an effort to raise 
the standards of business schools and adapt them to increasing popular demand, foundations 
had promoted an increasingly ‘standardized’ approach to management education. Contrasted 
to the earlier emphasis on promoting professional ideals, this new standardized model 
focused instead on the provision of management skills, competences and knowledge. Taught 
through functional, interdisciplinary courses comprising areas such finance, accounting, 
marketing, statistics and ‘human relations’, the management education offered by post-war 
 
52 On the rise of professional management (and the business school) as a response to this economic transition 
see Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).  
53 Rakesh Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business 
Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2007), p. 6.  
54 Ibid., p. 196.  
55 Ibid., p. 16.   
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business schools was increasingly geared towards the production of ‘rational managers’ 
capable of running large, complex organizations in an efficient manner. By the middle of the 
twentieth century, then, the American business school had morphed from a values-based 
enterprise into one focused, first and foremost, on the dissemination of professional 
management ‘science’.56 
The decision to develop the IIMs on the model of the American business school reflected the 
prominent role of the Ford Foundation in the establishment of the two institutes. In agreeing 
to provide support to both the IIMA and the IIMCA, Ford earmarked its funding to cover 
direct collaborations between the new Indian institutes and partner business schools in the 
United States. At the same time, the move to import the American business school model also 
reflected a broader set of assumptions held by Indian elites regarding the cutting-edge nature 
of American management knowledge. ‘If we look at the world from the point of view of 
efficiency with which business enterprises are managed’, noted one contemporary:  
…we immediately notice that a management gap separates the rich from the poor countries. 
We use the term Management Gap (MG) to refer to the difference between the effectiveness 
of the management of resources by business enterprises in the United States of America and 
in under-managed countries…[the] USA is a country which has the most efficiently managed 
enterprises in the world.57 
This notion that American institutions provided a model of effective management drew 
strength from the United States’ position as the world’s dominant economic power.58 It was 
also a notion based on two basic assumptions about the nature of management knowledge: 
first, that such knowledge represented a ‘universal’ science, ‘akin to the physical sciences’, 
discovered through a ‘process a deduction and variously tested through positivistic methods’; 
second, that American institutions had been fortunate enough to discover this science first.59 
At the IIMA, to which this section now turns its focus, Indian leaders did more than just 
embrace an American model of management education; they also discriminated over who 
their US collaborators were. From the time it had begun to push for a management education 
institute in India, the Ford Foundation had viewed the UCLA Business School as the most 
 
56 Ibid., pp. 201-210.  
57 A.N. Agrawala, ‘The Problem of Management GAP in Under-Developed Countries’, S.N. 457: Second 
Management Development Conference, Subject Files, Seminars/Conferences/Symposia, AMP, pp. 40-43. 
58 For this argument see J. Zeitlin, and G. Herrigel, (eds.) Americanization and Its Limits. Reworking US 
Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 1-
49.  
59 Nidhi Srinivas, ‘Mimicry and Revival: The Transfer and Transformation of Management Knowledge to India, 
1959-1990’, International Studies of Management and Organization, 38:4, 2008/2009, pp. 47-49.  
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likely US collaborator. This leaning reflected Ford’s existing connection with the School, in 
particular the relationship between Douglas Ensminger and its Associate Dean, George 
Robbins. As Ahmedabad replaced Bombay as the site for the first IIM, Ford officials had 
operated on the assumption that UCLA would become the institutional partner for the project. 
The IIMA’s leaders, however, had other ideas.  
Though not opposed to an arrangement with UCLA, Sarabhai and other IIMA leaders 
preferred a collaboration with Harvard Business School (HBS). During the course of the 
1950s, Sarabhai had already come into contact with leading figures at HBS, including its 
Associate Dean, Fritz J. Roethlisberger, of ‘Hawthorne Experiment’ fame.60 In 1959, 
Roethlisberger had visited Ahmedabad personally, holding discussions with Sarabhai, his 
brother Gautam, and Kamla Chowdhry on the future of management education in India.61  
HBS also held a personal connection for other IIMA leaders, like Prakash Tandon, now a 
Member of the Institute’s Board, who had attended a management course there in 1958.62 
‘The strange thing’, Sarabhai wrote to M.S. Thacker, ‘is that the Business School was never 
explicitly asked by the Ford Foundation…Most people would not dream of passing over an 
institution like Harvard’.63 Thus, while IIMA leaders entered into discussions with Robbins 
and the UCLA Business School, by early 1961 they had also opened up parallel negotiations 
with HBS officials.64 Believing that Ford might prove resistant, Sarabhai even entertained the 
idea of asking the then US Ambassador to India J.K. Galbraith, himself ‘a Harvard man’, to 
explore alternative sources of funding for an IIMA-HBS collaboration.65  
Sarabhai’s leaning towards HBS angered Ford officials, not least because it jeopardized 
earlier informal commitments made between the Foundation and UCLA.66 Naturally, 
 
60 On Roethlisberger and the ‘Hawthorne Experiment’ see Richard Gillsepie, Manufacturing Knowledge: A 
History of the Hawthorne Experiments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
61 A year prior to this trip, Sarabhai had also visited Roethlisberger at Harvard, attending several lectures at the 
HBS during his visit. During Roethlisberger’s time in Ahmedabad, he gave a lecture on ‘New Directions in 
Human Relations’ to over 200 members of the Ahmedabad industrial community. ‘John B. Fox to Vikram 
Sarabhai, 14 November 1958’, Folder 12, Carton 3; ‘Kamla Chowdhry to Roethlisberger, 1 August 1959’, 
Folder 12, Carton 3; and ‘A Note on Management Training’, Folder 4, Carton 1 in Fritz J. Roethlisberger Papers 
(hereafter FRP), Special Collections, Baker Library, Harvard Business School.   
62 Tandon, Return to Punjab, p. 119-122.   
63 Vikram Sarabhai to M.S. Thacker, 19 May 1961, File 1: Institution Building, Vikram Sarabhai Papers 
(hereafter VSP), Archival Collections, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad.  
64 Anubhai, The IIMA Story, p. 34.  
65 Vikram Sarabhai to Kasturbhai Lalbhai, 4 April 1961, File 1, VSP.  
66 One particular exchange between Sarabhai and the Ford Foundation official John Coleman illuminated this 
tension clearly. ‘While it would obviously have been desirable to consult the potential ‘users’ of the school’s 
product, as you have urged’, explained Coleman, ‘[t]he Foundation felt a need long before this to begin the 
search for an American counterpart group. There was no intention of thrusting anything down anyone’s throat; 
there was only a desire to line up the resources needed to get the job done. Where you and I have failed most 
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however, it piqued the interest of the leaders at Harvard. In early 1961, the IIMC had 
unveiled its own plans for a collaboration with HBS’s Cambridge rival, the MIT Sloane 
School of Management. Wary of the reputational damage that ‘MIT’s move’ could cause for 
HBS’s own standing, HBS leaders, including Harry L. Hansen, a senior marketing professor, 
stressed the need to move ‘with some alacrity’ in response to the developments in 
Ahmedabad.67 In November 1961, sensing the changing mood, the UCLA Business School 
advised the Ford Foundation of its decision to withdraw from the IIMA negotiations, thereby 
opening the door for formal talks with HBS.68 Quickly adapting, Ford would help to arrange 
a visit of HBS faculty, led by Hansen, to Ahmedabad in January 1962. By May, the proposal 
for a five-year partnership between the two institutions had been approved by both the IIMA 
Board and the HBS’s parent body, the Harvard Corporation.69 
The HBS-IIMA collaboration took one form in particular: exchange of personnel. Between 
1962 and 1967, 17 HBS faculty and research associates, together with a small number of 
graduate students, swapped the banks of the Charles for the Sabarmati, with a similar number 
of IIMA faculty sent in the other direction. At Harvard, IIMA staff observed and received 
instruction on HBS’s model of management education. In Ahmedabad, HBS staff provided 
assistance with respect to both curriculum development and teaching.70 Moulded by these 
exchanges, the IIMA’s early academic programme came to reflect several key features of the 
HBS’s own approach. Its curriculum, comprising instruction in administrative practices; 
business policy; cost and financial administration; marketing and sales; production 
management; and organizational behaviour, mirrored directly that of HBS’s own 
interdisciplinary focus. The IIMA’s first two course offerings, meanwhile – a two-year post-
graduate diploma and a three-tier industry-focused Program for Management Development – 
drew directly on Harvard’s own Masters in Business Administration and Advanced 
Management Program respectively.71  
 
significantly to see eye-to-eye is on the role which this American counterpart is to play in the Indian 
Institute…The key factor for India regarding any such school should not be its distinctive way of doing things, 
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67 Harry Hansen to Stanley F Teele, April 11, 1961, File: Correspondence, 1960-1965 (1/2), Box 3, IIMAR. 
68Anubhai, The IIMA Story, pp. 36-37. 
69 Ibid., p. 40. 
70 Ibid., p. 45.  
71 Kamla Chowdhry, as Director of IIMA Programmes, spent much of the period between 1964 and 1965 in 
Harvard trying to acquaint herself with the Harvard AMP programme. Kamla Chowdhry to John B Fox, March 
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Another telling example of Harvard’s imprint on the IIMA was the Institute’s adoption of the 
‘case method’ of teaching. Developed initially by the Harvard Law School, the case method 
prioritized the analysis of actual business cases over a ‘traditional’ lecture-based format, 
presenting this as a form of learning that stressed ‘the possibilities of alternatives in deciding 
on a profitable course of action’, thereby forcing individuals ‘to perceive economic and social 
relationships’ and improving ‘the decision-making ability of the student’.72 By the post-war 
decades, the case method had become a defining feature of HBS’s educational platform.73 As 
the IIMA’s academic programme took shape, the method became a core feature of the 

















72 ‘Case Method in Management Education’, File: Miscellaneous File (Melvyn R. Copen), 1964-1969, Box 7, 
IIMAR. 
73 Anthony Chase, ‘Origins of Modern Professional Education: The Harvard Case Method Conceived as Clinical 
Instruction in Law’, Nova Law Review, 5:3, 1981, pp. 323-363.  
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Planning the IIMA 
 
Figure 11. Scene from an early IIMA Board Meeting (those pictured include Kasturbhai 
Lalbhai (third from left), Prakash Tandon (fourth from right) Vikram Sarabhai (third from 
right) and Kamla Chowdhry (second from right). 
 
(Source: IIMA: India’s Management Athenaeum (1961-2011), (Ahmedabad: Indian Institute 
of Management Ahmedabad, 2010) 
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If the IIMA’s educational programme took its cues from the HBS model, the Institute’s 
broader organizational culture bore the indelible imprint of Vikram Sarabhai. Much like 
Sarabhai’s earlier pursuits, the IIMA was an institution built with the explicit intention to 
model the concept of ‘horizontal control’. This began at the top, in the relationship between 
the IIMA and the government. The IIMA had been founded as a ‘semi-autonomous’ Institute 
under the auspices of a triumvirate comprising the Government of India, the Government of 
Gujarat and Ahmedabad industrialists. Unlike other similar institutions, however, which in 
practice found themselves subject to a significant degree of governmental interference, 
Sarabhai insisted firmly on the preservation of the IIMA’s genuine autonomy and self-
determination. Together with Kasturbhai Lalbhai, Sarabhai successfully convinced the 
participating government departments to limit their representation (both quantitatively and 
qualitatively) on the IIMA Board. This, they argued, would give the Institute’s leaders more 
freedom over policymaking, avoiding interference from above.75   
An aversion to vertical authority was also instilled in the day-to-day organizational structure 
of the Institute. When it came to teaching and research undertaken by the IIMA, ‘tasks and 
activities were accomplished through “management by committees”’: 
The committees consisted of not those who held academic positions or had senior rank but of 
faculty members who were responsible for performing a group of activities to fulfil a need. 
These committees implemented policy decisions with the advice and approval of the total 
faculty and the Director. In such a system of management, the initiative and responsibility for 
accomplishing tasks was spread widely among the faculty and other task groups. Thus the 
need for a hierarchical structure for academic decision making was avoided.76 
Within the committees, decision making worked on the basis of ‘persuasion and mutual 
discussion’.77 ‘Right from the beginning’, recalled one account, Sarabhai and the Institute’s 
leaders ‘encouraged self-driven responsibility rather than authority-driven responsibility’.78  
As an educational philosophy, the case method merged neatly with this desire to avoid 
vertical control. The reason for this, as one internal memorandum explained, was that 
 
75 Samuel Paul, ‘Building on a Solid Foundation’, in Ravi J Matthai et al., Institution Building: The IIMA 
Experience – Vol. I: The Early Years (Ahmedabad: Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1993), p. 93. 
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76 Ishwar Dayal, ‘Early Years at IIMA’, in Matthai et al., Institution Building: The IIMA Experience, p. 58.  
77 Ibid., p. 58. 
78 Dwijendra Tripathi, cited in IIMA: India’s Management Athenaeum (1961-2011), (Ahmedabad: Indian 
Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 2010), p. 24. 
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notwithstanding its acclaimed educative merits, the case-based approach also had the capacity 
to democratize the learning experience:  
Under [the] case system teacher and students are in possession of the same basic materials in 
the light of which analysis are made and decisions arrived at. Each, therefore, has an identical 
opportunity to make a contribution to the body of principles governing business policy and 
practice. There is a significant aspect of democracy in the classroom in the sense that it 
provides a new axis for personal relationships...It is a question of dealing with a rather large 
number of equals and contemporaries whose approaches, attitudes, values and criticisms must 
be faced, comprehended and used. Every one is on par and everyone is in competition.79 
The case method didn’t just make people better decision makers. According to IIMA leaders, 
it also modelled a form of learning based around horizontal controls.  
The philosophy of horizontal control pervaded Sarabhai’s choice for IIMA leadership too. 
Owing to his various other commitments, Sarabhai assumed a temporary position of 
‘honorary director’ of the IIMA, until such time as a permanent appointment could be made. 
In seeking out a full-time leader, he would take great care to identify an individual that 
possessed the unique characteristics required for effective horizontal leadership. ‘Sarabhai’, 
recalls one institutional history, ‘judged that it was better to have somebody with the qualities 
of a good manager and a value system that fitted in with IIMA’s own, than somebody with 
great credentials’.80 Bypassing a number of senior figures, including the then Indian 
Ambassador to the United States, B.K. Nehru, the man he chose for the job was the largely 
unknown figure of Ravi J. Matthai. An English literature graduate with only ten years’ 
corporate experience (plus one year teaching at the IIMC), Matthai was not only relatively 
underqualified; at 38, he was also extremely young to assume such an esteemed position. For 
Sarabhai, however, what mattered was Matthai’s commitment to leadership based on 
‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘trust’ and his faith in non-hierarchical institutional structures.81 
Following his appointment in 1965, Matthai would go on to:  
…strengthen the foundations laid by Sarabhai…Not only did he give freedom to the faculty, 
he also gave it autonomy…Ravi ensured that the academic management was insulated against 
ingress and interference from the [Board]…He encouraged experimentation and innovation 
as long as it was all oriented towards the goal.82 
Even the IIMA’s physical architecture was intended to provide, among other things, an 
expression of the virtues of non-hierarchical control. Designed by the American architect, 
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Louis Kahn, with close input from Sarabhai and Lalbhai, the IIMA campus buildings 
prioritized the creation of spaces that facilitated the ‘open and easy interaction between 
teachers and learners, between teachers and teachers, and between learners and learners’.83 
Open arches, rather than restrictive doorways, demarcated the space between students and 
faculty, thereby encouraging individuals to move freely between spaces. Classrooms, 
meanwhile, took the form of ‘amphitheatres with large wells and wide aisles’ in which the 
professor could roam and ruminate, thus reinforcing the idea that their job was to integrate 
with students and be at one among them, not to direct and dispense wisdom from the ‘safety 
of the lectern’.84 Physically as well as administratively, the IIMA was built to model a form 
of human relations that was, at its core, horizontal.  
According to IIMA leaders, building the IIMA around the concept of horizontal control 
served dual purposes. On the one hand, it meant the Institute was structured around what 
Sarabhai and others believed to be the most effective forms of organizational management. 
At the same time, it also reified those forms of conduct to those attending IIMA courses. ‘If it 
was [to be] accepted that the Institute’s work would result in changes outside’, explained 
Ravi J. Matthai: 
…then the Institute itself must have a culture of innovation and change…It was felt, 
therefore, that norms should evolve in a self-regulating community rather than having large 
volumes of rules and regulations which would constrain individual behaviour.85 
The attempt to build the Ahmedabad institute around the concept of non-hierarchical control 
was not, however, entirely without problems. Belying Sarabhai’s own claims about the merits 
of self-regulation, autonomy and trust, IIMA employees frequently complained of the 
challenges of making effective decisions under the Institute’s systems. When it came to the 
faculty committees, for example, there was a ‘general feeling among the task and the sentient 
group heads…that they had the responsibility for results but no authority to deal with errant 
members’.86 ‘Meetings’, explained one member of staff: 
…were long and frequent and decision making…extremely difficult. Discussions in these 
meetings were frustrating and many senior members of the faculty remained absent from a 
large number of task related meetings.87  
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Reverence for horizontal control, it seemed, was not without its drawbacks; namely, a 
foregoing of what some considered to be an equally essential component of modern 
management – operational efficiency.  
Moreover, as Sarabhai and others endeavoured to build the IIMA as a monument to 
horizontal logic, some complained that the relations between themselves and their Indian 
counterparts amounted to anything but. The key issue here concerned the restrictions, 
imposed by IIMA leaders, on HBS participation in the Institute’s high-level decision making. 
As one Ford Foundation report put it: ‘some of the faculty, and particularly the Americans, 
believed that the “new culture” should include greater faculty involvement in the top level 
creative process’.88 Privately, one HBS faculty member complained that by freezing out 
Harvard personnel from the decision making process, the IIMA system had squandered ‘free 
and open discussion’ in favour of ‘Vikram’s dictatorship’.89 At one level, the desire of IIMA 
leaders to keep institutional decision making under their own purview, rather than opening it 
up to their HBS colleagues, seemed an entirely reasonable one, especially in view of the 
temporary nature of Harvard’s engagement. At the same time, however, HBS’s protestations 
also underscored a subtle irony at the heart of the bid to build the IIMA’s new culture. Like 
all attempts to inculcate values within a system, the decision to orientate IIMA around the 
concept of horizontal control required, in the first instance, a top-down decision to pursue 
such a path. As an ardent advocate of horizontality, Sarabhai showed few signs of 
recognizing that the power to create such systems rested on his own (vertical) authority.  
--- 
In the eyes of its founders, the IIMA held a sense of mission tied intimately to ‘national’ 
goals. The recollections of Sudhir Kakar, an early IIMA staffer (and later a renowned 
personality psychologist), bring this out clearly:  
My memory of the atmosphere at [the] IIM is of the enthusiasm and idealism of its 
pioneering days. The faculty and the first batch of 40-odd students who were admitted to the 
2-year postgraduate programme in 1963 saw themselves as the vanguard of a revolution that 
would change the functioning of Indian institutions…all those involved in the project of 
setting up a management education institute believed that they were in the forefront of nation-
building efforts…Even when most of the first graduates of the institute found jobs industry 
and commerce, they still viewed their work as part of nation building, of bringing new skills 
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into running the vital sectors of the Indian economy. The future of management education, 
where the end goal of students was a well-paying job in multinational corporations, banks 
and international consultancy firms, was still a couple of decades away.90  
The ‘revolution’ envisioned by IIMA leaders targeted public as well as private institutions. 
Attendees to the Institute’s management development programmes therefore hailed not just 
from industrial corporations, but from public enterprises, government departments and 
development programmes as well. 
The sense of management development as a project linked to ‘national’ development would 
also spur the creation, in time, of new branches of management training and research geared 
towards acutely Indian problems. In 1970, the IIMA would pioneer a new Programme for 
Management in Agriculture focused specifically on the application of management principles 
and science to questions of agricultural development.91 Ultimately, the drive to apply 
management to areas of national importance would also give rise to new institutions created 
specifically for this purpose. The Institute of Rural Management Anand (IRMA), established 
in 1979 in rural Gujarat, was one such example. Founded by the social entrepreneur, 
Verghese Kurien, the IRMA aimed to provide management training, research and 
consultancy to support rural co-operatives and development organizations. IRMA would later 
go on to play a pivotal role in a widely acclaimed transformation of dairy production in India 
– the so-called ‘white revolution’.92 As an institution, IRMA neatly encapsulated the 
distinctly national ambitions attached to Indian management education during its early 
decades. At the same time, it also encapsulated just how intimately connected that field was. 
Kurien, as founder-leader of the IRMA, was a cousin of the IIMA’s first Director, Ravi 
Matthai. Both Matthai and Kamla Chowdhry, meanwhile, as key figures in the early history 
of the IIMA, would go on to play a major role in the founding of the IRMA.93  
At the centre of all of this was the indubitable logic of horizontal control. Indeed, while 
Sarabhai and other IIMA leaders worked to promote an organizational ethos centred around 
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the rejection of hierarchical authority, the management education that their new institute (and 
others) now promoted was also opening the door to new forms of knowledge and practice 
which, in their own way, promoted a non-hierarchical logic. Focused on leadership 
behaviours, these forms of knowledge would espouse the virtues of horizontal forms of 
management not merely in terms of principle or conviction, but in the language of social 
psychological ‘science’. It is to this expanding sphere of behavioural expertise that the final 
section of this chapter will now turn.  
Creating horizontal leaders: psychologized management and the enterprise of T-group 
training 
The forms of professionalized management that new management institutions sought to 
cultivate were, in large part, technical and operational. For this reason, management 
education comprised instruction in a range of functional skills, from administrative practices, 
to business policy, to marketing. At the same time, however, the education provided by new 
institutions like the IIMA also framed management as an inherently behavioural enterprise. 
Effective organizational leadership, it suggested, comprised not just the ability to perform 
certain operational tasks, but also the capacity to conduct oneself in certain ways. Forwarded 
under the rubric of ‘Organisational Behaviour’ (OB), this mode of instruction taught 
managers that the key to effective management was, at root, social and psychological. ‘While 
managers may be specialists in accounting, economics, manufacturing, finance, marketing or 
personnel work’, one IIMA publication explained, ‘they must also manage’.94 
The most important element of this field was an ostensibly bland sounding set of practices 
referred to as ‘T-group training’. Perceived as a technology for instilling new leadership 
behaviours, the T-group employed ‘laboratory-based’ group interactions to help individuals 
explore the effects of different forms of leadership conduct on themselves and others. In the 
experimental environment of the T-group, proponents argued, participants would learn 
through experience the merits of ‘participative’, ‘sensitive’ and ‘democratic’ leadership 
styles. T-group training would thus lay the foundations for a new type of manager, one 
characterized by these particular behavioural traits. During the 1960s, this psychologized 
brand of training would emerge as the central feature of the ‘OB’ courses provided by India’s 
new management institutes. Here, once again, Indian leaders would approach development 
through the lens of American psychological science.   
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The T-group traced its origins in a series of experiments conducted by social psychologists at 
the University of Iowa during the late 1930s. Conducted by the German Jewish émigré Kurt 
Lewin together with his colleagues Ronald Lippitt and Ralph White, the 
‘Autocracy/Democracy’ studies set out to compare the effectiveness of different forms of 
leadership on groups of young children. Organizing the participants into randomized groups, 
Lewin, Lippitt and White observed the respective behaviours of the children under three 
types of adult leader: ‘autocratic’, ‘laissez-faire’ and ‘democratic’. Autocratic leaders dictated 
to members and took all decisions for themselves. In laissez-faire groups, the social climate 
was essentially leaderless, leaving children more or less to their own devices. In democratic 
groups, meanwhile, leaders participated as ‘a regular group member in spirit’. They 
encouraged group members to make decisions based on group action and discussion, and 
endeavoured to be ‘objective’ and ‘fact-minded’ in their criticism and praise.95  
Concealed from view, the psychologists observed the impact of contrasting leadership styles 
on the children’s behaviour. The results, they argued, were clear and consistent. Under 
contrasting leadership styles, the children quickly began to demonstrate starkly different 
forms of behaviour. In autocratic groups, children were often productive in the presence of 
their leader but became rapidly disorganized and despondent in their absence. They also 
tended to exhibit extreme variations towards either aggressiveness or apathy and little in the 
way of cohesive group identity. In laissez-faire groups, children were chaotic and 
unproductive. Groups under democratic leadership, however, were marked by an altogether 
different set of behavioural outcomes. Here, children cooperated constructively towards the 
group goal, and demonstrated a capacity to ‘give and take…objective criticism without 
personal involvement’. Compared to autocratic groups, children in democratic groups 
experienced only mild levels of aggression, a greater amount of ‘we-centeredness’, and ‘more 
occurrences of praise and expressions of friendliness’. They were also more consistently 
productive when it came to completing tasks.96 
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In a period of ongoing debate about the merits of ‘progressive’ education, the 
Autocracy/Democracy experiments had been intended, first and foremost, to provide 
evidence of the impact of participative leadership styles on the capacity of children to learn.97 
For the psychologists, however, they soon came to underpin a broader conviction. Lewin in 
particular began to argue that the participative, consensual forms of interaction and decision 
making modelled by Iowa’s democratic groups held the keys not just to effective educative 
practice, but to effective organization in all manner of political, social and economic 
environments. In fact, Lewin would come to argue that meaningful democracy itself hinged 
on the proliferation of the democratic leader-group relations witnessed at Iowa. In the years 
that followed, he would work tirelessly to turn these ideas into practice.98 
Following a period of wartime work as an adviser to the US Office for Strategic Services, 
Lewin had spent the period between 1944 and his death in 1947 promoting the merits of 
‘democratic group relations’ through research spanning a number of fields.99 During this 
period, he also established a new Research Center for Group Dynamics, based at MIT, 
dedicated to furthering social scientific knowledge on the functioning of democratic groups. 
It was in the context of a 1946 project commissioned by the Connecticut State Interracial 
Commission, however, that Lewin would hit upon a breakthrough in his understanding of 
democratic group formation, a breakthrough that would eventually lead to the concept of the 
‘T-group’. 
Lewin, together with Lippitt and two other psychologists, Kenneth Benne and Leland 
Bradford, had been appointed by the Connecticut Commission to conduct ‘action research’ 
on measures to improve local community relations, in response to which they had established 
an experiment to study the impact of group discussions between community representatives. 
One evening, when several of the community representatives asked if they too could be 
included in the psychologists’ nightly review meetings, the researchers struck upon a 
realization: giving group participants themselves an opportunity to provide insight on the 
workings of the group actively helped to facilitate the creation of a harmonious group 
environment. ‘Feedback’, it seemed, formed a vital mechanism in the process of democratic 
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group formation.100 Based on this experience, Lewin, Lippitt, Benne and Bradford turned the 
feedback-based approach into a new methodology for creating democratic group-leader 
interactions: they called it the ‘Basic Skills Training Group’. In 1947, in the town of Bethel, 
Maine, the psychologists established a new institution, the National Training Laboratories for 
Group Development – soon shortened to the National Training Laboratories (NTL) – 
dedicated to its promulgation.101 
Lewin died suddenly in 1947. Lippitt, Benne and Bradford, however, carried forward the 
endeavour. Before long, the psychologists had turned the Basic Skills Training Group 
(quickly shortened to ‘Training Group’, or ‘T-group’) into a well-rehearsed technique for the 
cultivation of effective (democratic) group-leader dynamics. In the NTL’s T-groups, non-
directive ‘trainers’, most of whom were psychologists, led small groups through a series of 
intimate, experiential and unstructured workshops in group development, placing 
considerable emphasis on the role of open and honest feedback. The practice hinged on a 
notion that open group dialogue facilitated heightened awareness of oneself and of others, 
which in turn helped people establish effective group relations. The idea was that 
participants, many of whom were themselves leaders of some sort in their own local settings, 
would carry the experience home with them, thereby helping to extend both self and group 
awareness more broadly.  
In its early days, the NTL marketed T-group training toward a wide range of community 
actors including leaders of labour unions, churches, social service, welfare agencies, and 
educational associations. Soon, however, the T-group began to find footing in one place more 
than any other: the corporate sphere. As Jenna Alden has argued, this shift reflected changes 
in the NTL’s own orientation, specifically the decision of NTL trainers to provide T-groups 
for members of the same organization. The move towards internal T-groups represented a 
departure from Lewin’s original aims, but it opened up new opportunities for the NTL. 
‘Rather than working with diverse delegates toward abstract aims of democratic participation 
and awareness of group dynamics’, Alden argues, ‘the NTL could [now] help corporations, 
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non-profits, and government agencies work toward the solution of distinct, organization-
based problems’.102 During the 1950s, it was industrial corporations that would become the 
most active consumers of the NTL’s T-group training.  Here, the T-group would morph 
gradually from a mechanism for promoting democratic citizenship into a targeted technique 
for training corporate leaders in democratic, group-based leadership styles. Corporate 
engagement in the T-group method reflected a broader wave of interest in the merits of 
‘participative’ management for workforce productivity. By the mid-1950s, corporate T-group 
training – often referred also as ‘laboratory training’ or ‘sensitivity training’ – had become 
one of the core features of the management training offered by American business schools.103  
--- 
In India, the T-group first arrived not via the IIMA, but through a curious and lesser-known 
figure by the name of Rolf P. Lynton. Lynton, a German émigré like Lewin, had fled Nazi 
Germany for Britain, studying at the British Institute of Management in London during the 
1930s. During a subsequent teaching fellowship at HBS, Lynton, had become engrossed in 
the application of social science to industrial processes, avidly consuming lectures on the 
‘human relations’ approach to management given by his Harvard professors. It was, however, 
the ideas emerging from Bethel that most captured Lynton’s imagination.104 Studying 
personal feelings ‘in the “here and now” and the group as we developed it’, he later recalled:  
…was quite new to me…That I had never done, and it actually went quite against the grain of 
all that I had grown up with in Germany and then in England…[In] the T-Group, personal 
openness was not merely encouraged; developing the group depended on it.105 
In 1954, Lynton reached an agreement with the World Assembly of Youth to head a new 
international development organization that made the T-group the core of its praxis. ‘Aloka’, 
as it became known, was a training institute for young community leaders in developing 
countries. From a small office in rural Ceylon, Lynton ran T-group training as a means of 
nurturing youth leaders into ‘flexible instruments of change’.106 In doing so, he developed a 
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reputation for insisting that the details of every single group interaction be meticulously 
recorded.107  
In 1957, Lynton moved to India, taking Aloka with him. Here, he continued the practice of 
using the ‘laboratory method’ as a form international leadership training, now from a larger 
office on the fringes of the city of Mysore.108 The move to India would open up new 
opportunities. By 1963, Lynton had secured a new position as a consultant at the Small 
Industries Extension Training (SIET) Institute in Hyderabad. The SIET, as we have seen, had 
been established in 1961 to promote the development of small-scale industries in Indian 
towns. Funded jointly by the Government of India and the Ford Foundation, the Institute 
sought to promote innovative approaches to the growth of small industries using the latest 
insights from economics and other forms of social science. During the 1960s, the SIET would 
become the principal test-bed for the entrepreneurial development courses pioneered by 
David McClelland and his Harvard colleagues. In 1963, Lynton arrived at the Institute as an 
‘extension consultant’, tasked with studying the effects of T-group training on small 
businessmen engaged in the SIET’s ‘area development programmes’.109 
At the SIET, Lynton would encounter the same group of social scientists with whom 
McClelland was then working, and it was with Udai Pareek that he would forge a particularly 
close attachment. To his own intellectual ‘playfulness’, Lynton recalled, Pareek brought a 
‘discipline’, a ‘breadth’ of knowledge, and a ‘rigor of method’.110 Working together as 
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‘virtual twin brothers’, Lynton and Pareek would take joint ownership over the development 
of T-group training at the Institute. Through laboratory training, they argued, the entrepreneur 
and businessmen would learn ‘how to be a skilful leader as well as a skilful member of the 
group’.111 
Following the example of the NTL, Lynton and Pareek’s T-groups forced participants:  
…to interact in an unstructured situation; the group is not defined, the leadership is not 
offered by the trainer, behaviour is not prescribed…the group evolves through a natural 
process. The laboratory offers a climate conducive to open discussion and learning of trusting 
behaviour…when an individual feels comfortable to behave as he likes, he can find out that 
part of his behaviour which is not effective with other persons.112 
In the course of this ‘natural process’, Lynton and Pareek argued, managers would come to 
‘increase their sensitivity or perceptibility to what and how they do (behave), how others see 
them behaving, and how other people behave, effectively and ineffectively, in different 
situations’.113 What is more, the T-group would not only demonstrate the virtues of certain 
types of leader behaviour, it would also provide ‘intensive personal opportunities’ for 
actually ‘practicing’ leadership of this type.114 Out of the laboratory experience, claimed 
Lynton, would emerge ‘new patterns of relationship’ that could be ‘projected into the 
workday world’.115 
The arrival of the IIMs opened-up new horizons for the practice of T-group training. By 
1964, for example, ‘sensitivity training’ had become a core feature of the IIMA’s graduate 
and executive management courses, with Lynton and Pareek providing technical support.116 
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At the IIMA, T-groups would be presented as a behavioural technique geared towards 
cultivation of precisely the forms of horizontal leadership that Sarabhai and other Institute 
leaders espoused. In the experimental environment of the T-group, it was argued, prospective 
managers would undergo a series of ‘learning experiences’ in both interpersonal relations, the 
result of which would be new forms of leadership behaviour based on ‘participative’, 
‘sensitive’, and ‘democratic’ principles. This ‘systematic’ form of training, explained Lynton, 
would assist the ‘development of those horizontal relationships that are necessary for modern 
technology and administration’.117   
At the IIMA, the key driver of T-group training was Kamla Chowdhry. Chowdhry, a social 
psychologist by training, was well-acquainted with Lewinian theories of democratic group 
dynamics. Indeed, her time studying at Michigan had coincided with the university’s 
assumption of administrative control over Lewin’s Centre for Group Dynamics, originally 
established at MIT.118 In 1957, in her capacity as an ATIRA researcher, Chowdhry had led a 
series of T-group laboratories for the managers of Ahmedabad’s textile mills. Here, she 
collaborated not just with Rolf Lynton, but also with social scientists of the London-based 
Tavistock Institute for Human Relations, a UK counterpart to the American NTL.119  
Appointed as ‘Director of IIMA Programmes’ in 1962, Chowdhry quickly moved to put T-
groups at the forefront of the Institute’s new educational agenda. The ‘use of sensitivity 
training as a method of teaching human relations’, she reported to HBS, made her and other 
IIMA colleagues ‘very excited about the possibilities’.120 
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For Vikram Sarabhai, the T-group concept pushed the limits of what was practical when it 
came to methods for promoting horizontal control. At first, he explained, ‘the significance of 
the training through group living…was lost on me’: 
I suspect it was puzzling and frustrating to the participants that the [training] often concerned 
itself with feelings and group interactions in seemingly pedestrian situations rather than teach 
some of the new techniques of management and organization.121  
Before long, however, Sarabhai too would come to see T-groups as an essential form of 
management training. When it came to the ‘training of leaders who could contribute to the 
process of change’ in ‘under-developed areas’, he explained, the laboratory-based training 
provided by the NTL, the Tavistock Institute and Rolf Lynton’s Aloka experiment stood out 
as programmes that ‘bring to bear on the problem the new insights which have come from the 
study of the behavioural sciences’.122 All such programmes were ‘of great significance to 
 
121 Vikram Sarabhai, ‘Foreword’, in Lynton, Tide of Learning, p. ix.  
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Pioneers of horizontal control 
Figure 12. Vikram Sarabhai and Kamla Chowdhry 
(Source: D. Merriam, K. Marshall, and L. Chen, (eds.), In Service to 
Humanity: Kamla Chowdhry: A Loving Tribute to Her Life and Spirit (New 
York: Ruder Finn, 2008) 
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those who are interested in the problem of change – in industry, in agriculture, in public 
administration, in education, in the community’.123 
But it was not only at the IIMA that the T-group concept was taking root. In Calcutta, the 
IIMC was also becoming a site of T-group training. The key here, it seems, was the IIMC’s 
connection with the MIT Sloane School of Management. Between 1964 and 1966, visitors to 
the IIMC included Warren Bennis, a young MIT psychologist rapidly making a name for 
himself as an expert T-group trainer; Douglas McGregor, the exponent of a new theory of 
participative industrial management encapsulated in his 1960 work, The Human Side of 
Enterprise; and Howard Baumgartel, a psychologist at the University of Kansas acquainted 
with ‘applied group dynamics’ through a stint at the NTL.124 At the IIMC, recalled one 
faculty member, leaders saw ‘tremendous possibilities in the T-group approach to planned 
organisational change’.125 Responding to this demand, Bennis, McGregor and Baumgartel 
would help to turn the T-group training into a core element of the new management 
programmes offered by the IIMC. This included an ‘Executive Development Programme on 
Managerial Leadership and Conflict Resolution’, and a ‘Leadership Lab’, offered as part of 
the IIMCs’ Advanced Management Programme. To run T-groups, the Institute would recruit 
social scientists from a range backgrounds, including Dharni Sinha, an anthropologist trained 
at the University of Lucknow and the University of Southern Illinois.126 
As well as carrying T-groups forward within the Institute’s own curriculum, the IIMC’s OB 
specialists would develop an exportable model of T-group training geared towards 
organizations. Entitled ‘Leadership and Organisational Development’, the training course 
followed the NTL’s own assumption that T-groups run for organizations – ‘peer labs’ – could 
be a more effective tool for organizational change than those run for diverse individuals – 
‘stranger labs’. From 1967 onwards, the IIMC’s Behavioural Sciences Group ran peer lab 
training for a wide range of Indian corporations, including the State Bank of India, the 
Kamani Group, Tata Iron and Steel Company, the Allahabad Bank, and Larsen and Toubro. 
IIMC also experimented with T-group training in other areas, including union 
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representatives, student leaders, and hospital staff.127 The range of organizations involved in 
IIMC T-group training was significant. In 1965, Warren Bennis and Rolf Lynton had teamed-
up to host an ‘inter-institutional’ workshop on T-group training in the town of Dalhousie, 
Punjab. The workshop, proceeding ‘along the general lines of the work pioneered by the 
National Training Laboratories’, had been attended by a similarly eclectic audience, with 
representatives attending from the Indian Aluminium Company, the National Institute of 
Health Administration and Education, the Central Family Planning Institute and the State 
Bank of India. 128 In 1969, an American psychologist named Ross Pollock ran ‘sensitivity 
training’ courses for the Indian Institute of Public Administration.129 As the T-group entered 
the Indian arena, then, its unique laboratory methods sparked the interest not just of 
management educators per se, but also of leaders across a wider network of institutions. By 
the same token, T-group trainers pushed the merits of this training beyond the limits of the 
corporate realm.  
As the T-group paradigm took hold in India, a process of transnational exchange soon 
developed. American T-group specialists continued to advise Indian institutions throughout 
the 1960s. At the same time, however, Indians also travelled in the opposite direction. During 
the mid-1960s, at least 15 Indian social scientists underwent training in ‘applied behavioural 
science’ at the NTL.130 There, Indians rubbed shoulders with the founders of the T-group 
movement, including Leland Bradford, Kenneth Benne and Ronald Lippitt.131 The training 
provided at Bethel was practice-based, with all ‘interns’ gaining first-hand, intensive 
experience of the laboratory group method. As Dharni Sinha, put it: 
Bethel was a great experience in self-discovery…The first two weeks of the lab focused 
intensively on the self – its awareness, understanding and exploration…It was self-disclosure 
at different levels of depth, and exploration by participants that sometimes appeared as 
interrogation with facilitators making almost no intervention, but encouraging dialogue 
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among the interns. We all sat in a pit, a triangle in the centre of the room; everyone squatted 
or lay down on the floor that was littered with small cushions. The facilitators occupied the 
three corners, as if by design…It was an egalitarian setting, informal and open.132  
All such training was paid for by American money, either through Ford Foundation or 
USAID grants. According to one Ford Foundation official in India, the NTL’s ‘human 
relations insights’ represented ‘one of the most exportable commodities which the United 
States has developed’.133 
Returning to India, Indian social scientists not only drew on their experiences at the NTL; 
they also developed their own version of it. The Indian Society for Applied Behavioural 
Science (ISABS), established in 1971, was the creation of a group of ‘social scientists drawn 
from sociology, psychology, anthropology, education and industrial relations’, all of whom 
had ‘gone through T-Group experience in the United States or in India’.134 Its aims, its 
founding Resolution explained, included to ‘share and develop professional skills’ with 
respect to the laboratory method, ‘advance conceptual knowledge’ and to promote the T-
group ‘to as yet unserved areas of public interest’.135 The Model’, explained Dharni Sinha, 
‘was the NTL’.136 ISABS would dedicate itself to the provision of training opportunities in 
the T-group method. Its ‘internship programme’, run from its small offices in the south of 
Delhi, trained T-group experts across fields ranging from management education, to public 
health, to community development.137 
According to its exponents, the behavioural norms learnt and practised in the T-group setting 
would help to catalyse a new pattern of organizational leadership in India, one based not on 
‘leadership of authority’ but on ‘leadership of shared goals and norms’, ‘autonomy’, and 
‘functional collectivity’.138 Moreover, as managers came to understand the value of 
democratic approaches to leadership, they would, in turn, apply these same principles to the 
‘systems and procedures’ they created within organizations. Reflecting the lessons of the T-
group, it was argued, organizations would increasingly be designed to account for the ‘the 
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autonomy needs of the subordinates’, as much as the manager’s own ‘control needs’.139 In 
this sense, the manager would not only manage in a particular way, they would also act more 
broadly as a ‘change enzyme in an organisation system’.140 Proponents of horizontal control 
argued that effective organizations required both horizontal structures and horizontal leaders. 
T-group trainers, while sharing in this dual idea, framed the growth of horizontal systems as a 
process that began, in the first instance, with the making of horizontal men. Theirs, then, was 
a psychologistic view of organizational change, one that framed changes to institutions (and 
by extension economies) as a process rooted in pre-emptive individual adjustment. There 
were clear resonances here with the vision of development espoused by David McClelland 
and his associates. While McClelland framed economic development as a process hinging on 
entrepreneurial ‘motivation’, however, for T-groupers, it was the deferential, horizontal 
characteristics of leaders that mattered.  
For many, the T-group was a behavioural technology uniquely relevant to the Indian 
situation. The reason, they argued, was the ‘traditional reliance on hierarchical relationships’ 
that characterized Indian culture.141 Both within organizations and more generally, T-
groupers argued, Indians suffered from a leaning towards management systems of 
‘centralized authority’. Many Indian organizations represented little more than ‘a descendent 
of the feudal system’. Indian families, meanwhile, remained ‘full of sons who find it difficult 
or “impossible” to move their fathers’.142 ‘Laboratory training’, explained Lynton, ‘seems 
better than anything else we know for getting significantly at the dimensions of personal and 
organisational development in India today’.143 In a T-Group, he argued, participants went 
through a staged transition in which ‘traditional’ conceptions of authority would be replaced 
by a new, ‘modern’ understanding of what it meant to be a leader. Initially, he explained, 
when realizing the unstructured nature of the group situation, participants instinctively sought 
out opportunities for ‘submission to the control of a strong man’, a process which reflected 
‘the tendency in developing societies to political dictatorship’. Gradually, however, as 
trainers encouraged ‘frankness and openness’ between group members, and challenges to 
authoritarian leadership, ‘a new pattern emerged’. The ‘series of stages through which 
managers and officers in a training group pass’, Lynton argued, provided ‘an example in 
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miniature not only of the strains of leadership in a developing society, but also of the 
sequence in which the strains may be overcome and a new society born’.144 The description 
highlighted another important feature of the T-group enterprise: its conviction, again shared 
with McClelland, that urban-industrial modernization necessarily required the emergence of 
new personality types.  
The T-group would extirpate prevailing tendencies towards hierarchy. But it would also 
cultivate forms of leadership necessary for industrialization in a segmented social structure 
like India’s. As the growth of industries produced increasing opportunities for physical and 
social contact between caste and other social groups, the democratic leadership behaviours 
cultivated within T-groups would help to smooth over tensions between groups, thereby 
alleviating the potential for conflict during a period of rapid social change.145 The democratic 
leader would, then, become a catalyst for social integration, both within corporations and 
within society more broadly. ‘National integration’ hinged on the right approach to ‘business 
organisation’.146 Here, the industrial organization was a synecdoche for the nation.  
What is perhaps most striking about the T-group paradigm, however, is that it forwarded a 
vision of effective industrial leadership remarkably similar to that which contemporaries were 
busy espousing in other areas. In the context of India’s rural ‘Community Development’ 
programme, sociologists-turned-community developers had, influenced by the same 
Lewinian discourses as their T-group counterparts, promoted precisely the same norms of 
behaviour – group-centred, consensual and ‘democratic’ – as the keys to effective leadership 
in the village. As Matthew Hull has argued, the call for this form of leadership also found 
footing in the context of India’s urban development projects, wherein city planners and urban 
sociologists worked together to promote community representatives whose ‘democratic 
leadership’ would engage and foster forms of Lewinian-inspired ‘democratic group life’.147 
The T-group thus formed part of a broader movement to apply distinctly American ideas 
about the social psychological basis of effective leadership to problems of Indian 
development. Rooted in Lewin’s ‘scientific’ experiments, this movement forwarded a 
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decontextualized, universalist understanding of what made for effective leadership, 
applicable, in equal measure, to the village, the urban slum, and the corporate boardroom. 
Conclusion 
To the founders of Indian management education, the success of post-colonial development 
hinged ultimately on the rise of ‘modern management’. ‘There is a totality about the process 
of development’, Sarabhai would argue: 
which involves not only advanced technology and hardware but imaginative planning of 
supply and consumption centres, of social organisation and management, to leapfrog from a 
state of backwardness and poverty’.148 
 
Training a new generation of managers would do more than prepare individuals for 
prosperous careers; it would nurture a cadre of organizational leaders that would transform 
the fortunes of the nation as a whole. In tracing this discourse on ‘management for 
development’, this chapter has argued that for Sarabhai and others, it revolved around one 
particular set of ideas; namely, those concerning the concept of ‘horizontal control’. 
Horizontal control was by no means the only way in which contemporaries understood 
modern management. In the eyes of many, however, it formed a key organizing principle for 
effective organizations. Framed as a mode of organizational functioning suited to ‘democratic 
conditions’, the concept of horizontal control would give rise to new institutions built to reify 
its principles. As Indian agendas merged with concepts of post-war American management 
science, it found its ultimate expression in the psychologistic enterprise of T-group training. 
The pursuit of horizontal control formed a powerful strain of contemporary development 
thought. But it also sat in tension with key features of Nehruvian planning. As Sarabhai and 
others called for the replacement of vertical structures with new horizontalist norms, the 
Nehruvian state, for its part, was busy embracing an approach to industrial development that 
eschewed functional autonomy in favour of top-down management plans. In Nehruvian 
public enterprises, commercial and operational decision making would be characterized not 
so much by deferral and delegation, but by intense scrutiny from central management 
committees. Horizontalists pushed for the upheaval of ‘colonial’ institutions. Nehruvian 
planning, by contrast, would be marked by an embrace of them. Most significantly, perhaps, 
Nehruvian industrial planning would place great faith in the capacity of the Indian 
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Administrative Service – the inherited bureaucratic machinery of the British colonial state – 
to organize and spearhead the process of state-led industrial transformation. The call for 
‘management’ had sought to address potential problems associated with a civil service-led 
industrialization drive. In public enterprises across the nation, however, managerial 
responsibilities would be assigned not to ‘horizontal leaders’, but to senior administrators 
drawn from the upper echelons of the IAS hierarchy.149 
To Nehruvian planners, such measures were necessary in order to ensure industrial 
enterprises served the national interest. To those who advocated horizontal control, though, 
the refusal of officials to disavow top-down approaches was a source of deep regret. 
Presented with a unique opportunity to ‘set the pace’ for organizational change, Sarabhai 
would lament, successive administrations had continued to rely on outdated, restrictive, 
verticalist modes of operation. For Sarabhai and likeminded thinkers, the pursuit of horizontal 
control was thus an enterprise tinged by a keen sense of failure. As an organizing principle at 
institutions like the IIMA, the idea of horizontal management had also, it seemed, failed to 
make inroads into a political system, as well as a broader national culture, still wedded to 
hierarchical notions of control.150  
If the concept of horizontal management encountered limits to its influence, however, the fate 
of management education itself was an altogether different story. From its humble beginnings 
at the IIMC and the IIMA, management education would become an engrained feature of the 
Indian landscape. By 1980, there were 118 recognized management education institutions in 
India. By the year 2000, there were 744, including six IIMs.151 The IIMA and IIMC, for their 
part, would remain among the leading centres of management education in India. Today, both 
feature regularly among lists of the top-ranked business schools in the world.152 Discourses 
on horizontal management would remain part of Indian management education as it 
expanded, including behavioural technologies like T-group training. At the same time, the 
expansion of management institutions would also coincide with a shift towards new forms of 
management thinking, some of which ran in direct contravention of what had gone before. 
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One example of this was a turn towards new concepts of effective organizational leadership 
based on so-called ‘Indian’ cultural norms. Founded on a belief that Western management 
concepts had proved unsuited to India’s ‘hierarchical’ culture, the search for an ‘Indian 
management style’ would seek to make use of ‘Indian’ ‘concepts and processes for 
managerial effectiveness and quality of work-life’.153 Here, the quest for models of 
management would depart from intellectual assumptions that had accompanied the enterprise 
of T-group training. Rejecting the use of universalist ideas concerning the social 
psychological basis of effective leadership, it suggested instead that there existed a distinctly 
Indian set of psychosocial norms and characteristics that could be used in order to achieve 
organizational goals.154 
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Communication and population: ‘communication studies’ and population control 
during the long 1960s 
Psychologized thinking had permeated diverse spaces by the 1960s: from social tension, to 
rural development, to entrepreneurship, to industrial management. There was, however, at 
least one more theatre of development in which it would come to exert its alluring hold. That 
theatre was population control. Underpinned by arguments about the negative implications of 
a growing population for national economic development, the drive to control population 
growth would become an explicit goal of Indian post-colonial development planning; the 
subject of targeted policies and programmes to prevent unwanted births. Like other 
development pursuits, population control would generate demand for new forms of 
knowledge production and technical expertise. Here, it would once again open the door to 
American social science.  
In India, population control has been a subject typically associated with one period: the 
Emergency of 1975-1977. During the Emergency, historians have shown, the government of 
Indira Gandhi embarked on an authoritarian approach to economic development and poverty 
eradication, at the centre of which sat an increasingly coercive programme of population 
control. At its height, the Emergency would witness government officials addressing national 
overpopulation through forcible sterilization campaigns targeted at society’s poorest. Such 
practices became so prominent that in some parts of India, one scholar has shown, the period 
between 1975 and 1977 is referred to not as ‘the Emergency’, but as nasbandi ka vakt (the 
time of sterilization).1 The conflation between population control and the Emergency has not 
been without reason. In recent years, however, historians have also been at pains to stress the 
pre-Emergency history of population control in India. Emergency period ‘excesses’ in this 
sphere, it is now clear, must be understood against the backdrop of a longer-term effort to 
limit population growth. Indeed, not only did population programmes predate the Emergency, 
so too did the deployment of coercion in the pursuit of national population goals.2  
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Tracing a longer history of population intervention has done more than place Emergency 
period population control measures in wider context; it has also drawn attention to the deeply 
transnational facets of India’s population control movement. Throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, it is now clear, controlling population growth emerged as a global 
project shared in by both Western and non-Western elite reformers. The population control 
movement in India, therefore, cannot be understood without reference to a dense international 
network of actors and organizations that aided and abetted Indians’ own population concerns. 
During the post-colonial period, historians such as Matthew Connelly have explored the deep 
entanglements between Indian population control efforts and an American ‘population 
establishment’ comprised of government officials, private bodies, academics and activists.3  
One key focus here has been the role of American demographers, most notably those 
associated with the Princeton University Office for Population Research, in forging new 
understandings of the relationship between overpopulation and economic development. 
Another has been the role of American non-governmental organizations, in particular the 
Ford Foundation and the Population Council, in funding India’s population control 
programmes.4  
Drawing on these turns towards pre-Emergency and transnational histories of Indian 
population control, this chapter brings to the fore a new set of connections that shaped 
population thinking and practice in India during the long 1960s. Focusing on the field of post-
war ‘communication studies’, the chapter explores how forms of knowledge produced by 
American communications experts came to exert increasing influence over the thinking of 
Indian population control enthusiasts. Forged at the intersection of wartime propaganda 
analysis, marketing research and media theory, communication studies emerged as a new 
interdisciplinary formation within 1950s American social science, uniting practitioners from 
fields such as psychology, sociology and political science. During the post-war years, 
protagonists within this field were engaged in the advancement of a new ‘scientific’ 
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understanding of the way in which communication processes shaped human behaviour, an 
understanding that centred on the dynamic, dialogic relationship between ‘mass’ and 
‘interpersonal’ forms of communication. 
Communication studies took shape independently of population concerns. From the late 
1950s, however, influenced by growing concerns about global overpopulation, many 
communications scholars had begun to consider the application of communications science to 
population problems. Effective communication strategies, they suggested, backed by the 
latest forms of social scientific knowledge, could make a decisive contribution to fertility 
reduction programmes. Mimicking contemporary advertisers’ use of communication to sell 
consumer products, communications scientists would advocate the use of ‘scientific 
communication’ to sell new reproductive choices instead. This communication-based 
approach to family planning, I argue, would come to exert a profound influence over 
population control efforts in India. Beginning in 1959, with the establishment of new 
institutions for ‘family planning communications action research’, Indian officials and social 
scientists, together with American communications experts, would explore the ways in which 
strategic communication techniques – centred on a combination of mass and interpersonal 
channels – could produce rapid changes in fertility behaviours. In due course, the idea that 
effective ‘communication’ could promote family planning would become a central feature of 
India’s population programme. In what follows, I explore how this manifested both in 
ordinary programme practice and in the extraordinary setting of the ‘vasectomy camp’. 
Amidst escalating concerns about the economic consequences of population growth, India’s 
family planning programme would take on an increasingly urgent tenor during the late 1960s.   
Here, strategies such as ‘incentives’ for sterilization would become a key part of efforts to 
control population, therein laying the foundations for the Emergency period. Targeted at 
poorer areas, incentive-based strategies deployed a logic that looked less like persuasion and 
more like direct coercion. It is the final argument of this chapter that this coercive agenda and 
communication science would become deeply intertwined.  
Situating population control in post-colonial India: development, demography and the 
‘clinic approach’ 
The emergence of population control as a feature of India’s post-colonial development 
discourse was rooted in a longer history. As early as the nineteenth century, drawing on ideas 
set out in Thomas Malthus’ famous 1978 Essay on the Principle of Population, British 
colonial administrators had explained Indian famines (and in turn justified indentured labour 
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migration policies) in terms of a Malthusian logic of imbalance between population and food 
supply.5 It was during the inter-war decades of twentieth century, however, that the seeds of 
India’s post-colonial overpopulation discourse would begin to be sown. During this period, 
historians have demonstrated, for various reasons, ideas about the need to control population 
growth gained new precedence in India. On the one hand, driven by concerns about rising 
maternal and infant mortality during the 1920s and 30s, colonial public health officials began 
to frame these problems increasingly as the result of overpopulation.6 Colonial census reports 
of the period, meanwhile, also began to make increasing reference to a ‘population problem’.7 
The interwar years also witnessed the emergence of a growing ‘civil’ engagement in matters 
relating to overpopulation and birth control, with diverse motivations. Middle-class women’s 
reform groups, such as the All India Women’s Conference, promoted birth control primarily 
as a means of improving maternal and infant health. Eugenicists and ‘neo-Malthusian’ 
groups, meanwhile, emphasized the need for birth control not only to avoid population 
growth, but also to improve the ‘quality’ of populations.8 
Proponents of intervention in birth control faced opposition on several fronts. Mohandas 
Gandhi, India’s most prominent nationalist leader, vehemently opposed contraception on the 
grounds that it encouraged licentious sexual conduct, rather than the discipline and control 
that, as he saw it, true ‘self-rule’ required.9 The colonial state for its part, fearing a backlash 
of Indian opinion, refused to adopt official policies regarding population control. For this 
reason, the principal focus of late colonial population control advocates was the promotion of 
clinical birth control facilities.10 
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During the 1940s, a series of developments would lead to increasing concern about 
overpopulation among India’s nationalist leadership. The first was the emergence of new 
arguments concerning the relationship between population and economic development. 
Departing from prevailing economic ideas about the role of colonial exploitation in India’s 
impoverishment, economists Gyan Chand and Radhakamal Mukherjee contested that it was 
gaps between ‘production’ and ‘demand’ (population) that posed the foremost threat to an 
economically viable independent nation.11 The 1944 Bengal Famine Inquiry Commission 
provided another important turning point. Established to examine the causes of the preceding 
year’s famine, the Commission’s findings would stress population increase, alongside natural 
causes, as a possible factor in the crisis.12 In 1946, a Health Survey and Development 
Committee, chaired by the civil servant Joseph W. Bhore, called for a new national 
programme of population control citing the damaging effects of population growth on key 
areas of public health like child and maternal mortality.13 
Meanwhile, in the United States, demographers associated with the Princeton Office for 
Population Research were themselves beginning to pose new arguments about the role of 
overpopulation as an impediment to economic development through a reformulation of 
‘classical’ theories of demographic transition. According to ‘classical’ theory, the prevailing 
birth rate of a society reflected its broader state of ‘modernization’, with decreases in fertility 
only taking place once broader processes of urban-industrial development (together with 
attendant social and cultural change) had occurred. Population, in other words, represented a 
dependent variable.14 By 1945, Princeton demographers Frank Notestein and Kingsley Davis 
had begun to challenge this classic formulation. High fertility, they argued, was not just a 
symptom of underdevelopment, it could also serve as an impediment to modernization by 
subsuming gains in productivity, thereby preventing industrialization from getting off the 
ground. This re-reading, Simon Szreter has argued, was one tied deeply to Cold War 
geopolitics. Forged in the shadow of China’s 1949 communist turn, the inversion of classic 
demographic transition theory spoke of the Princeton demographers’ deep concerns about the 
potential of overpopulation to breed economic and political instability (and by extension 
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communism) in underdeveloped nations. In response, Notestein and Davis turned population 
into an independent variable, control of which could help to remove instability and improve 
development’s chances of success.15 Here, Notestein and Davis also introduced a particular 
form of modernization thinking, one that focused not on the sources of modernization per se 
rather on the impediments to it.16 
With these new developments, India’s nationalist leaders soon also began to stress the 
importance of population matters, notwithstanding Gandhi’s own reticence. Already in 1940, 
a subcommittee on population established by the Indian National Congress’s National 
Planning Committee (NPC), chaired by the economist Radhakamal Mukherjee, had remarked 
on the need for future economic development programmes to be accompanied by efforts to 
limit ‘excessive population pressure’.17 A decade later, in 1951, a new subcommittee on 
population (now under the auspices of the Planning Commission) provided further 
endorsement of the need for national measures to address overpopulation.18  
On 7 December 1952, the Government of India formally announced its adoption of the 
world’s first official policy of population control. Embracing the assumptions of revised 
theories of demographic transition, the policy, set out within the government’s First Five 
Year Plan, explained that:  
The recent increase in the population of India and the pressure exercised on the limited 
resources of the country have brought to the forefront the urgency of the problem of family 
planning and population control… While a lowering of the birth rate may occur as a result of 
improvements in the standards of living, such improvements are not likely to materialise if 
there is a concurrent increase of population. It is, therefore, apparent that population control 
can be achieved only by the reduction of the birth-rate to the extent necessary to stabilize the 
population at a level consistent with the requirements of national economy.19  
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The ‘main appeal’ of population control, however, according to the Plan, was to be found in 
its implications for ‘the health and welfare of the family’; in securing ‘health for the mother 
and better care and upbringing of children’.20 For this reason, the Plan assigned control over 
the family planning programme to the Ministry of Health.  
In adopting population limitation as a goal of state policy, India took a step beyond what 
most other governments were willing to countenance. In communist China, for example, a 
nation with similar levels of population growth, arguments about the negative impacts of 
overpopulation, though mooted by many policymakers (including Mao himself), would find 
no such articulation in state-backed programmes of population control during the 1950s. 
Indeed, restrictions on sterilization and abortion were lifted. Instead, China’s political 
leadership would seek to tackle the country’s population problems through a comprehensive 
agenda of development – ‘a great leap forward’ – that would establish the economic and 
social conditions for low fertility. The cornerstone of this agenda, a programme of forced 
agricultural collectivization and small industry development, would ultimately lead to 
famines resulting in the death of approximately twenty million people.21  
In adopting the world’s first official programme of population control, however, Indian 
planners nevertheless proceeded cautiously. Constrained in part by Jawaharlal Nehru’s belief 
that rural and industrial progress should occupy the principal focus of development planning, 
the initial budget assigned to the family planning programme was only 6.5 million rupees, a 
fraction of the First Five Year Plan’s overall outlay.22 At the same time, the programme also 
faced considerable pushback from Gandhians concerned about the use of contraception to 
deliver reductions in the birth rate. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, India’s first Minister for Health, 
was one such sceptic. A committed disciple of Gandhi, Kaur believed that the most effective 
way to address population growth was through improvements in education and the promotion 
of living standards. At the Ministry, Kaur would wage ‘rearguard action’ intended to steer the 
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family planning programme away from contraceptives and towards the promotion of the so-
called ‘rhythm method’.23 For these reasons, the scope of the programme remained limited 
during the early 1950s. Working in close collaboration with the Family Planning Association 
of India, a voluntary association founded in 1949, the Ministry of Health focused most of the 
population efforts on strengthening the existing network of clinical birth control facilities.24 
By the end of the First Plan period, Ministry funds had helped to set up 147 clinics across 
India, the majority of them located in urban areas.25  
With the adoption of its Second Five Year Plan, in 1956, the Government of India took steps 
to raise the profile of the family planning programme. Outlining a fivefold increase in 
funding for population control, the Second Plan also introduced a series of changes to 
programme administration. Though remaining formally under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Health, oversight of the family planning programme now passed to a Central Family Planning 
Board comprised of representatives from various government departments (by 1959, State 
Family-Planning Committees had also been established in all Indian states).26 Day-to-day 
management of the family planning programme, meanwhile, passed to a new permanent 
Director of Family Planning in the form of Lieutenant Colonel B. L. Raina, a former Indian 
army medical officer with a longstanding interest in birth control.27 The Plan introduced 
additional changes. At the Indian Council of Medical Research, the All-India Institute of 
Hygiene and Public Health in Calcutta and the Central Drugs Research Institute in Lucknow, 
the Ministry now began to sponsor programmes of contraceptive research for the first time. In 
Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Trivandrum, meanwhile, new demographic research centres 
were also established.28  
Such changes reflected the increasing concern about the consequences of population growth 
for economic development. ‘The conclusion is inescapable’, the Second Plan explained: 
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…that an effective curb on population growth is an important condition for rapid 
improvements in incomes and in levels of living. This is particularly so, if one bears in mind 
that the effects of improvements in public health and in the control of diseases and epidemics 
is to bring about an almost immediate increase in survival rates...population pressure is likely 
to become more acute in the coming years. This highlights the need for a large and active 
programme aimed at restraining population growth, even as it reinforces the case for a 
massive developmental effort.29 
Nevertheless, despite these changes, the basic operational strategy of the family planning 
programme remained much the same as during the early First Plan period. Though embracing 
certain new elements, such as greater efforts to distribute contraceptives through health 
outlets, training in family planning methods for doctors and nurses, and limited sterilization 
programmes in some areas, the overarching focus of India’s family planning programme 
continued to be the expansion of clinical birth control facilities.30 As several commentators 
have noted, this clinic-based approach to family planning reflected more than just the legacy 
of earlier birth control efforts, it also reflected certain prevailing ideas about the nature of 
popular demand for family planning; namely, an assumption that there existed already 
considerable ‘unmet demand’ for family planning.31 Such ideas had received support from 
the new demographic transition theories of Notestein and Davis, who, in challenging the 
‘classical’ notion that fertility reduction followed large-scale economic and social change, 
implied that a desire to lower fertility might already exist within underdeveloped societies. 
Notestein and Davis had thus framed population control as, fundamentally, a problem of 
contraceptive provision. Following a similar logic, India’s early family planning programme 
would embrace the idea that, provided with the opportunity, many would naturally avail of 
the contraceptive services provided by new birth control facilities.32 
‘Communication studies’, media theory, and ‘family planning communication’ 
As India’s population programme took shape during the 1950s, the same period witnessed the 
birth of a new, at first sight unrelated, field of social scientific enquiry in the United States. 
Pioneered by interdisciplinary research institutions such as the Columbia University Bureau 
of Applied Social Research (BASR), the Stanford University Institute for Communications 
Research and the University of Chicago National Opinion Research Centre, ‘communications 
studies’ was a field born directly out of the mobilization of American social scientists during 
the Second World War. Fusing wartime propaganda studies with insights from public opinion 
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polling and commercial marketing research, the new post-war field of communication studies 
turned the question of ‘how communication processes worked’ into the central object of its 
enquiry. Forged against the backdrop of new forms of mass mediation within mid-twentieth 
century American society, the growth of communication studies reflected the desire of post-
war American elites to turn these media from a potential threat into a knowable (and usable) 
set of tools.33 
During the 1950s, American communication scientists – an eclectic body of experts 
comprising psychologists, sociologists and political scientists – were engaged in the 
promulgation of a new ‘scientific’ understanding of the communication process, at the centre 
of which sat the unifying theory of ‘limited effects’. Disregarding popular concerns about the 
all-powerful nature of mass communication, the theory of ‘limited effects’ argued that the 
direct, transformative impact of mass media on popular opinion was neither straightforward 
nor necessarily significant. Rather, the effects of mass media hinged on a more complex, 
dialogic interaction between ‘mass’ forms of communication, on the one hand, and the social 
psychological dynamics of communication in the ‘interpersonal’ domain.34  
Two theories formed the central pivot around which this ‘weak’ conceptualization of media 
influence revolved. The first was the theory of ‘two-step flow’. Coined by the Columbia 
University sociologist and radio researcher Paul F. Lazarsfeld, the two-step flow had its 
origins in a study of the 1940 US presidential election, published under the title The People’s 
Choice: How a Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign.35 Co-authored by 
Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, two colleagues at the Columbia BASR, The People’s 
Choice argued that, during the election campaign, the majority of people had received party 
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political messages not directly as such, but via a stepped process in which local ‘opinion 
leaders’ received, interpreted and passed-on information to others.36 Opinion leaders tended 
to be those more interested in the subject matter (in this case politics) and more exposed to 
external forms of media. Widely distributed throughout society, they played a vital role in 
transmitting mass messages via informal, word-of-mouth interactions within their local 
settings. It was the influence of these opinion leaders, Lazarsfeld argued, more than the mass 
media itself, that had been the most significant factor in influencing voter decision making.37  
According to Lazarsfeld and his colleagues, this ‘two-step flow’ was not merely a 
consequence of the limited reach of the media. Rather, it reflected a more fundamental truth 
about the way in which the communication process worked. The intermediary role of opinion 
leaders observed during the voting study highlighted that people responded to media not as 
‘disconnected individuals’, but through the lens of the interpersonal and group influences that 
suffused their daily lives.38 ‘Personal influence’, Lazarsfeld argued, was a key factor in 
shaping the way in which individuals reacted to external ideas, even in cases where exposure 
to the media was widespread.39 Here, Lazarsfeld tied the two-step flow to a broader 
sociological argument. The discovery of interpersonal influence in the communication 
process, he suggested, provided ample proof that the technological advances of modernity, 
including the growth of mass forms of communication, had not turned societies into a mass of 
independent isolates. Rather, it pointed to a social fabric in which patterns of 
interconnectedness, including the bonds of the ‘primary group’, remained firmly intact.40 
The two-step flow theory did not disregard the role of the mass media. Mass forms of 
communication, Lazarsfeldians argued, with their capacity to ‘daily address tremendous 
cross-sections of the population with a single voice’, played a key role in the dissemination of 
ideas and information within a society.41 At the same time, however, Lazarfeldian media 
theory placed the influence of the mass media within a broader communication continuum, 
one in which messages broadcast via mass media intersected with a dense ‘nexus of 
mediating factors and influences’.42 Effective mass communication, it followed, hinged on 
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the ability of communicators to understand and account for these mediating influences. It 
required, according to one theorist, a ‘phenomenistic’ approach.43 
A second key theory within post-war communication studies was that concerning the 
‘diffusion of innovations’. Emerging from the field of US rural sociology, this theory traced 
its origins to a study of technology adoption conducted at Iowa State University during the 
1940s. There, two sociologists, Bruce Ryan and Neal C. Gross, had examined the adoption 
patterns of Iowa farmers in relation to a new strain of hybrid seed corn made available in 
1928. Sensing that sociological, rather than just economic, factors played a role in the 
farmers’ adoption decisions, Ryan and Gross had interviewed members of two sample 
communities to discern what factors had affected their decision to either use or reject the new 
seed. The results, they argued, pointed to significant patterns in the way in which the seed 
corn had been adopted. 44  
The first pattern concerned the rate of adoption. According to Ryan and Gross, this rate ran in 
the form of an ‘s-shape’ curve over time, from an initial period of low take-up, through a later 
period of accelerated adoption, and ultimately to a plateau as the number of farmers left to 
adopt became smaller. The second significant finding concerned the role of different forms of 
information during the diffusion process. During the early stages of adoption, Neal and Gross 
argued, formal sources of information had played a crucial role in creating awareness of the 
new seeds among farmers. When it came to actual adoption decisions, however, most farmers 
had depended not so much on these outside sources than on the informal, word-of mouth 
accounts of friends, neighbours and peers. While some early adopters had not necessarily 
awaited these forms of reassurance, Ryan and Gross argued, for many the crux of the 
adoption process had been a process of ‘informal’ information-exchange in which farmers 
shared their own personal experiences regarding the new seed.45 
The Iowa seed corn study would give rise to ‘diffusion studies’ as a new research specialism 
within rural sociology. In the hands of one sociologist, however, another Iowa researcher 
named Everett Rogers, the concept of diffusion would be taken to new heights. Reviewing 
the results of the many diffusion studies conducted by the mid-1950s, Rogers argued that 
they pointed to a set of common patterns that underpinned the diffusion of all innovations. 
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The ‘s-shaped’ adoption curve, the ‘cosmopolite’ characteristics of ‘early adopters’, and the 
role of informal exchanges in the later stages of the adoption process – all were features of a 
more pervasive model of innovation diffusion that formed ‘a kind of universal micro-process 
of social change’.46 
Much like Lazarsfeld’s two-step flow model, Rogers’ universalist understanding of diffusion 
stressed the dual role of mass and interpersonal communication dynamics in the way in which 
new ideas were received and acted upon. According to Rogers, individual adoption 
comprised five key stages: ‘knowledge’, ‘persuasion’, ‘decision’, ‘implementation’ and 
‘confirmation’. At the knowledge stage, ‘impersonal’ information sources, including 
information gleaned via the mass media, played an important role. At later stages, however, 
the individual sought:  
…information in order to reduce uncertainty about an innovation's expected consequences. 
Here an individual wants to know the innovation's advantages and disadvantages in his or her 
own situation. Interpersonal networks with near-peers are particularly able to carry such 
evaluative information about an innovation. Such subjective evaluations of a new idea are 
especially likely to influence an individual at the decision stage, and perhaps at the 
confirmation stage.47 
In the process of diffusion, then, the decision to accept innovations invariably required active 
validation from ‘localite’ sources ‘homophilious’ to the individual.  
Together, the theories of ‘two-step flow’ and the ‘diffusion of innovations’ provided the core 
canon of post-war communication studies.48 By stressing the ways in which the dissemination 
of new ideas and practices worked through interpersonal, as well as mass, forms of 
communication, both theories offered an understanding of the communication process that 
departed from ‘direct’ theories of media influence – what Lazarsfeld referred to as the 
‘hypodermic needle’ theory of media effects.49 In turn, both theories forwarded a particular 
set of claims about the way in which ‘communication’ could be used to bring about social 
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change, one in which the manipulation of the interpersonal took centre-stage. Virtually all of 
the research on which these ideas were based had taken place in an American context. To 
communications theorists, however, emerging theories of communication had universal 
resonance: they could be applied everywhere. 
In post-war America, the concepts forwarded by communications theorists found application 
in a number of different sites, from market research to Cold War psychological warfare.50 
Initially, though, population control was not one of them.51 During the course of the 1950s, 
new intellectual and institutional alignments within American society would begin to change 
this. Building upon decades of prior American involvement in debates on population control 
– from the work of the Princeton demographers to the interwar campaigning of the nurse, 
educator and birth control activist Margaret Sanger – the 1950s would witness the rise of new 
levels of concern with the problem of global overpopulation among American elites, 
perpetuated, in many cases, by a tendency to view population questions through a Cold War 
lens. Aided by the work of Notestein and Davis, this Cold War perspective held that 
population growth, by inhibiting the development of already ‘underdeveloped’ regions of the 
world, posed not just a humanitarian problem, but an existential threat to the stability and 
security of the prevailing world order. This rising catastrophic consciousness would find 
expression in new institutional formations like the Population Council, a New York-based 
non-profit organization established in 1952, dedicated to the promotion of research on 
population control. Funded by Rockefeller and Ford Foundation dollars, the Council sat at the 
heart of a growing network of American academics, donors, foundation officials and activists 
– what Matthew Connelly has called a ‘population establishment’ – dedicated to the task of 
arresting global population growth.52  
As the profile of global population problems rose within American intellectual circles, 
communications scientists soon began to tether themselves to this movement. A number of 
key figures led the way, one of whom was Donald J. Bogue. Bogue, a classical demographer 
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by training, had taken up a position in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1954, 
thereby becoming affiliated with the National Opinion Research Centre, an emerging hub of 
communication studies under the leadership of Harold Laswell.53 Influenced by the Centre’s 
work, by the late 1950s Bogue would begin to advocate the application of strategic 
communications techniques to the family planning movement. Visiting several countries 
(including India) during this time, he argued that decisions to limit fertility required the 
existence of a number of preconditions, among which included ‘awareness of the possibility 
of family planning and its benefits’, ‘knowledge of how to prevent conception’, ‘public 
discussion’, legitimation, and ‘interpersonal support’.54 Each of these conditions could be 
brought about by improved strategies for the communication and dissemination of family 
planning ideas. As such, he argued, effective population control called for ‘ambitious’ 
programmes of ‘family planning communication’ employing ‘the best principles and most 
effective techniques for stimulating attitude change’.55 
Bogue was not alone. By the late 1950s, a broader coterie of American communications 
scholars had begun to reorient their expertise away from domestic concerns and towards the 
problem of global population growth.56 Samuel Stouffer, a Harvard University sociologist 
and lead author of The American Soldier, a renowned study of attitude formation in the 
military, was another who made this move.57 In 1959, Stouffer received funding from the 
Population Council for a new social science research project on family planning. Together 
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with the BASR sociologist, J. Mayone Stycos, Stouffer examined how an understanding of 
different ‘channels of communication’ could assist a Family Planning Association of Puerto 
Rico campaign to promote new contraceptive methods.58 The population movement would 
land another leading communications theorist in the form of Bernard Berelson, a colleague of 
Paul Lazarsfeld and co-author of The People’s Choice. In 1961, Berelson would be appointed 
director of a new family planning communications research programme at the Population 
Council, soon penning a number of papers on the implications of communications research 
for global fertility reduction efforts.59 In doing so, Berelson was laying the foundations for a 
deep and lasting involvement in population issues, culminating in his eventual appointment 
as President of the Population Council in 1968. 
Significantly, what Bogue, Berelson and others were doing here went beyond just the 
application of communications knowledge to a novel area. By claiming family planning to be 
a norm producible through ‘communication’, they were also engaged in a conceptual 
reframing of reproduction itself. In this formulation, decisions to limit fertility were being 
presented as a behavioural choice, one which – much like the decision to vote or purchase a 
consumer product – could be influenced by communication strategies targeted at audiences. 
Fertility, then, was something open to manipulation by short-term variables, such as the 
dissemination of family planning ideas and information. Here, communications scientists, 
together with other sociologically-inclined demographers, diverged significantly from 
classical demographic theories about the deterministic role of long-term variables, such as 
urban-industrial modernization, in shaping fertility norms within a society.60 At the same 
time, their behaviourist understanding of reproductive decision making also departed from 
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the idea – implied by Notestein and Davis’ revised transition theory – that the conditions for 
low fertility already existed, merely awaiting increases of contraceptive supply. 
Like others before them, communication scientists would soon find that it was India that 
presented the best opportunities for turning psychologistic theory into development praxis. 
Indeed, during the 1960s, the idea that the key to population control lay in effective 
communication would move to the very centre of India’s population control efforts. This 
deepening entanglement between communications research and Indian population control had 
its origins in the establishment, in 1959, of new government centres for ‘family planning 
communications action research’.  
‘Family planning communications action research’ and the ‘Gandhigram Experiment’ 
It was against the backdrop of increasing scepticism towards the prevailing ‘clinic’ approach 
that the enterprise of ‘family planning communications action research’ took shape. By the 
late 1950s, this scepticism derived from numerous sources, one of which was the increasing 
sense of urgency attached to population control. In 1958, two more Princeton Office of 
Population Research academics, Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, published Population 
Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries: A Case Study of India’s 
Prospects.61 Funded by the World Bank, the study used India, increasingly seen by American 
observers as the key crucible for global population control efforts, as a case study for the 
argument that population growth posed an obstacle to economic development. Coale and 
Hoover projected the impact of different population growth scenarios on economic indicators. 
The results provided evidence that reductions in fertility would lead to a greater proportion of 
national income being made available for investment in growth, with positive impacts for 
both per capita income and overall output. High population growth, on the other hand, by 
diverting incomes away from savings, would reduce the amount of capital available for 
investment, with negative consequences for incomes and output.62 With the help of the 
Population Council, Coale and Hoover’s analysis quickly secured a wide readership among 
Indian policymakers; its projections soon appearing in several government reports. According 
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to one account, India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was among those who began to cite 
the study as evidence of the pressing economic need for population control.63   
As arguments about the economic dividends of population control gained influence, concerns 
about the capacity of the ‘clinic approach’ to address national population problems became 
more widespread. In most cases, contemporaries now asserted, the opening of a new family 
planning clinic meant little more than the appointment of one additional worker at an already 
overburdened primary health centre. Responsible for a population of approximately sixty-five 
thousand, by 1959, most of these ‘clinics’ were supplying an average of just eighteen 
condoms a day. Low levels of attendance at birth control facilities, meanwhile, raised deeper 
questions concerning the merits of a ‘passive’ clinic approach.64  
It was in this context that B.L. Raina, Director of India’s family planning programme would 
take steps to establish family planning communications research. In May 1959, Douglas 
Ensminger, the sociologist turned Ford Foundation representative in India, had written to 
Raina proposing a new strand of ‘Ford Foundation assistance for strengthening the 
communication aspects of the Family Planning Program’. Suggesting a ‘five year Family 
Planning Action-Research-Training Program in Communication’, Ensminger recommended 
that the overarching aim of this programme would be: 
…scientifically to determine the role of all available methods of communicating information 
about family planning, for attracting interest, for gaining acceptances and for motivating 
continuous use of family planning practices.65 
There were a number of ways, Ensminger explained, in which Ford might be able to assist 
this endeavour. In addition to funds, the Foundation could provide expert consultation to the 
Ministry, organize visiting fellowships abroad, and help to develop a central Family Planning 
Communication Research Committee.66 In July, Raina informed Ensminger of the Ministry 
of Health’s acceptance of the proposal. Articulating the desire of Indian population officials 
for ‘a strong national educational programme to further the idea of family planning’, Raina 
explained how the proposed ‘action research effort’ would provide ‘a firm foundation for this 
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educational effort…testing, systematically, the most effective methods to communicate this 
message to people’.67  
By late 1959, a grant of $330,000 for Family Planning Communications Action Research 
(FPCAR) had been agreed between Ford and the Ministry, soon followed by a second 
endowment of $603,000.68 Coordinated by a central FPCAR Committee, comprising figures 
such as D. P. Karmarkar, the new Minister for Health. S. N. Ranade, the Principal of the 
Delhi School of Social Work, and P.C. Mahalanobis, the esteemed Statistical Adviser to the 
Planning Commission, FPCAR would proceed via the creation of a network of six new 
family planning communications research centres throughout the country.69 Established 
between 1959 and 1963, the six centres were as follows: The Central Health Education 
Bureau, New Delhi (later transferred to the Central Family Planning Institute); the 
Demographic Training and Research Centre, Bombay; The Indian Statistical Institute, 
Calcutta; The Department of Statistics, University of Kerala; The Planning Research and 
Action Institute, Lucknow; and The Institute of Rural Health, Gandhigram.70 
The Ford Foundation assigned a number of American consultants to support the budding 
FPCAR programme. Herbert Lionberger, a rural sociologist grounded in the diffusion 
tradition, was one. Already in India as a consultant on Community Development at the time 
of Ford’s FPCAR grant, Lionberger was quickly assigned to produce a report containing 
‘Observations Concerning the Nature and Scope of Action-Research in Family Planning’.71 
The report, essentially a review of literature deemed relevant to the FPCAR programme, 
referenced all the major publications of American communications theory and diffusion 
studies published during the post-war years, including Paul Lazarsfeld’s various works.72 The 
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second key figure was Moye Freymann. A physician with a doctorate in public health from 
Harvard University, Freymann’s encounter with India also predated FPCAR. In 1957, he had 
taken a position as a Ford consultant on health and sanitation, soon building a reputation for 
his application of social science to latrine-use programmes.73 Appointed as Ford’s lead 
consultant on FPCAR, Freymann would join Lionberger in promoting the latest insights of 
American communication studies as the basis for Indian family planning communications 
research.74  
The most important early experiment in FPCAR took place at the Gandhigram Institute of 
Rural Health, in Tamil Nadu, between 1960 and 1964. Founded in 1947 by disciples of 
Mohandas Gandhi, Gandhigram seemed a highly unlikely site for an experimental 
programme of family planning communications research. Under the direction of its two 
leaders G. Ramachandran and T.S. Soundram, however, Gandhigram had soon made a name 
for itself as a Gandhian institute with a difference. Ramachandran, a social worker, and 
Soundram, a medical doctor, embraced an adaptive approach to rural uplift work, one that 
sought to propagate basic Gandhian principles while retaining ‘an open mind’ to the 
‘innumerable new situations and developments in India since the passing of Mahatma 
Gandhi’.75 In 1952, to the censure of many orthodox Gandhians, the Institute had been among 
the first non-governmental organizations to embrace the Government of India’s programme 
of rural Community Development.76 Later, in 1959, with support from the Government of 
India, the Government of Madras, the Indian Council of Medical Research and the Ford 
Foundation, the Institute had also initiated a new ‘Pilot Health Project’ aimed at using ‘action 
research’ to evolve a new ‘model pattern of Rural Health Services’.77 Owing to its existing 
work in the field of action research, as well as its connections with Ford, Gandhigram had 
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appeared as a natural location for a new centre of FPCAR. Accordingly, in August 1962, it 
began receiving a new funding stream for research on family planning communication.78  
At Gandhigram, the enterprise of family planning communications action research would 
hinge on the central Lazarsfeldian question: to what extent could local forms of opinion 
leadership be used to communicate and propagate family planning ideas? According to the 
Institute’s researchers, in order to engage with a new practice like family planning, couples 
required ‘accurate information from a person or organisation they trust’ as well as the 
‘approval’ of ‘their particular social group’.79 Working with local opinion leaders, they 
argued, had the potential to ‘lessen the social distance’ between officials and the villagers. It 
would ‘identify and use indigenous channels of communication’.80 
In 1962, in villages of Athoor Block, the site of the Institute’s ongoing pilot health project, 
Gandhigram’s social scientists initiated a process of identifying, selecting and training 
‘village leaders’ to educate their neighbours about family planning. The method was 
‘systematic’. First, within each village, male and female spouses were selected randomly 
from every tenth household and asked to provide names of persons that they would endorse 
as ‘family planning leaders’. These leaders, the researchers advised, were to be individuals in 
whom the interviewees had among other things ‘faith, confidence and respect’. Second, a list 
of named leaders was compiled and interviews undertaken to determine the interest of the 
‘candidates’ in becoming family planning leaders. If the list was short, those who accepted 
the offer of leadership were duly selected. If not, candidates were themselves asked to 
express their own preferred leaders. The number of family planning leaders was to be 
sufficient to provide at least one male and one female leader for every hundred households in 
a community. It was necessary, explained the researchers, that selected leaders covered ‘all 
major kinship or sub-groups’.81  
This systematic approach contained both similarities and differences to the selection of 
village leaders in the case of rural Community Development. Like Community 
Development’s ‘village leaders’, the ‘family planning leaders’ targeted by Gandhigram 
researchers were viewed as conduits for the engagement of rural people in government 
programmes. Their most important characteristic, therefore, was their established position 
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within existing social structures and groups (and not their own psychological traits or 
‘motivations’). Now, however, the emphasis on the social embeddedness of rural leaders was 
combined with new elements, such as those leaders’ interest in and basic understanding of 
family planning ideas. More significantly, perhaps, by emphasizing the need for leaders to be 
drawn from various ‘kinship and sub-groups’, the concept of family planning leadership 
approached leaders as opinion leaders within discrete sub-units of the village, not, as 
Community Development had done, as mobilizers of ‘village communities’ as wholes.  
Family planning leaders received briefings on the ‘population problem in their own village’, 
‘explanations of the reproductive processes and contraceptive methods’, and guidance on 
educational methods (such as group discussions and visual-aids) that could be used to 
generate interest in family planning among their peers.82 At the same time, family planning 
leaders were themselves appointed as contraceptive ‘depot-holders’ to whom couples could 
go for contraceptive supplies. In some villages, leaders formed family planning committees 
and conducted total village programmes of education and contraceptive distribution. In 
others, leaders acted individually within their own sub-groups. All such variations were 
encouraged, in keeping with the belief that ‘leaders are able to mobilize group support for the 
acceptance of family planning practices in a way not possible for officials working 
directly’.83  
In soliciting the support of local leaders, Gandhigram’s researchers also attempted to frame 
family planning concepts in terms that villagers would understand. ‘Staff members’, 
explained one report:  
…made careful observational studies of [villagers] life styles to identify their ways of doing 
things and specific tools and examples they use in everyday living. They analysed this 
information for items which might serve as a frame of reference or familiar concept through 
which complex, new ideas could be communicated meaningfully to the people. They 
developed analogies, tested them and if they found them effective, they taught them to village 
leaders.84 
 
In one example, researchers described the attempts of a family planning leader to explain to 
villagers the function of a condom using the analogy of an unlit match:   
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He took out a match and struck it on the box. ‘Result – fire! Now a second match, but this 
time I cover the head of it with this piece of cloth and then strike it against the box. Result – 
no fire!’ ‘Now here is the condom’, he continued, as he passed it to [the villagers] for a closer 
look. ‘When a man's seed is released, it may strike and enter the egg. In a woman's womb 
and, like the fire of the match, a baby is started. But the condom, like the cloth over the 
match, prevents the seed from striking the egg and just as we had no fire – no baby’.85 
 
Intended for use during hookah smoking sessions – an important feature of day-to-day rural 
social life – the matchbox analogy formed part of a broader set of elucidatory techniques 
employed to communicate ‘complex’ family planning concepts to people on their own 
terms.86 
Within two years of the project’s initiation, Gandhigram’s researchers had already begun to 
discern a significant impact on the villages of Athoor. ‘In the 39 villages where the leadership 
programme is in vogue’, explained one report:  
…1,000 couples are using contraceptives regularly. The contraceptive intake for ‘63 and ‘64 
were 44.8 and 144.2 gross of condoms and 734 and 1487 tubes of foam tablets. The number 
of vasectomy operations conducted in Athoor Panchayat Union area with the help of the 
above leaders during the year 1963 and 1964 were 62 and 957 respectively.87 
Data obtained through fertility surveys provided further evidence of changing reproductive 
behaviours. Between 1959 and 1964, it suggested, the number of live births per one thousand 
of the population fell from 43.1 to 35.4.88 By 1968, researchers would record a vasectomy 
rate of 8.5 per one thousand men, at that time the highest recorded anywhere in India.89 
Later analysis would attribute these changes to other social variables, including a decrease in 
the number of married women of reproductive age.90 From the perspective of the early 1960s, 
however, reports emanating from Gandhigram were taken as compelling evidence of the 
potential of strategic communication techniques to change reproductive behaviour. ‘The 
utilisation of influential and interested leaders’, explained one Institute report, had proved 
‘very effective as judged from the uptake of contraceptives as well as from the number of 
sterilisation operations carried out’.91 ‘Implementing the family planning program through 
village leaders’, espoused another, ‘is an effective way to reach the ultimate goal of reducing 
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fertility within a reasonably short period of time’.92 Given its connections to the Institute, the 
Ford Foundation was particularly keen to underscore the significance of the ‘Gandhigram 
Experiment’. When it came to the development of ‘improved and effective methods of 
operations’, Douglas Ensminger wrote to Ford’s New York headquarters, the work done at 
Gandhigram had been ‘outstanding’.93  
Meanwhile, at a meeting of the Population Association of America in San Francisco, Donald 
Bogue, the recently appointed as President, implored his associates to recognize the 
‘demographic breakthrough’ hailed by Gandhigram and other similar experiments. ‘The years 
1963-1964’, he declared: 
…will go down in demographic history as one of the great landmarks of social-science 
research progress. In twelve months from June 1963 to June 1964 researchers in fertility 
control began to get a string of successes that left no doubt that by planned intervention they 
had induced a downward change in the birth rate in high-fertility populations…the 
Gandhigram experiment in South India, the experiments of the University of California 
School of Public Health at Dacca, East Pakistan, the experiments of The Johns Hopkins 
School of Public Health at Lahore, West Pakistan, and the research of the Population Council 
in Korea are among these ‘successes’…This discovery, and the refinements that will be made 
in the next five to ten years, may well lead to social-engineering work that will have as great 
an impact on the course of human history as any of the major inventions or discoveries in the 
physical sciences.94 
For Bogue, the Gandhigram experience served to strengthen a conviction that improved 
communication strategies could be applied to produce changes in reproductive behaviour. But 
the Gandhigram Experiment would do more than just excite American foundation officials 
and social scientists. Soon, it would capture the imagination of Indian policymakers too. 
Indeed, taken in combination with other developments, the studies undertaken at Gandhigram 
would soon pave the way for a fundamental shift in the structure of the Indian family 
planning programme. Here, the promotion of family planning through strategic 
communication would become more than just a subject of experimental research; it would 
become a key element of programme practice too. 
‘Extending’ family planning, expanding family planning communication 
In October 1963, the Government of India declared an end to the clinic approach to family 
planning. Through a series of communiques issued to state governments at that time, the 
Ministry of Health called instead for a new ‘integrative effort aimed at establishing the 
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conditions conducive to adoption of family planning’ – what it called an ‘extension 
approach’.95 
The shift to an extension approach was driven by the same factors that had underpinned the 
turn to communications research; namely, an increasing belief in the urgency of population 
control and a growing belief in the inadequacy of the clinic method. By 1963, this dual 
conviction had grown stronger still. In 1960, the Third Five Year Plan had declared that ‘the 
objective of stabilising the growth of the population over a reasonable period must be at the 
very centre of planned development’.96 Accordingly, the Plan had outlined a ten-fold increase 
in funds allocated to family planning.97 The results of the 1961 census, meanwhile, which 
highlighted an annual rate of population increase approaching 2 percent (thereby exceeding 
expectations of a rate closer to 1.5), had lent further weight to the idea that a more proactive 
approach was required. In 1962 the Government of India had adopted a new target for 
reduction of the birth rate to 25 births per 1000 population by 1973.98   
Against this backdrop, the new extension approach called for substantial changes in 
programme organization. Alongside clinical facilities, the Ministry now introduced a new 
national framework of family planning service and outreach. Beginning with multipurpose 
Family Planning Welfare Centres (Parivar Kalyan Niyojan Kendra) in local areas, the new 
framework also included family planning bureaus at the Block, District and State level. One 
aim of these ‘units’, explained the Ministry, was to ‘increase the number of distributing 
centres’ such that there would be ‘no part of the country where people cannot readily get 
[contraceptive] supplies’.99 The new units of family planning extension were also given other 
responsibilities, however. Emphasizing the need to ‘accelerate the adoption of family 
planning’, the Ministry called upon the new network of centres and bureaus to promote 
‘community level educational techniques aimed at helping people themselves to organise 
educational activities within their own groups for promoting family planning’. 100 
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The extension model drew directly on the findings of family planning communications 
research. In memoranda circulated to Family Planning Welfare Centres, the Ministry called 
upon local officials to use methods identical to those employed at research centres like 
Gandhigram. The goal of fieldworkers, instructed the Ministry, should be to ‘establish useful 
working relations’ with ‘family planning leaders’ (Parivar Kalyan Sahayaks/Sahayikas). 
These leaders, it explained, would be those who held the:  
…confidence, affection, and the respect of a group of people. They should be the type of 
village elder, panchayat member, school teacher, post master [or] social worker…whose 
advice and guidance is often sought for by the people when some new decision has to be 
taken…Parivar Kalyan Sahayak/Sahayika will therefore be drawn from amongst school 
teachers, panchayat members, village health committee members, representative of rural 
welfare organizations, married social workers, local leaders and dasis. There should be at 
least one male and one female worker in each village.101 
According to the Ministry, local family planning leaders would serve a number of purposes. 
First, they would act as conduits for the ‘easy availability of supplies and services’. Second, 
they would ensure the transmission of ‘personal knowledge about family planning methods’. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, they would facilitate ‘group acceptance of the small family 
size norm’. Family planning leaders, according to the Ministry, were ‘not government 
functionaries’; they were ‘honorary workers devoted to the cause of their own choice’.102  
With the launch of an extension approach, then, techniques of opinion leadership and 
interpersonal communication moved to the centre of population policy. The core of the 
‘extension’ approach, explained B.L. Raina, was a process of ‘mobilising the forces of group 
pressure’, involving: 
…methods for identifying influential leaders among different sub-groups of the population, 
methods for encouraging them to gain knowledge and take interest in developing the small 
family norm among their group, methods of imparting to them and others basic information 
regarding family planning, and methods of helping them actively to promote family practices 
among their group.103 
According to Raina, this approach would ‘allow a single worker to reach much greater 
numbers of people than through primarily individual approaches’. It would, subsequently, be 
‘more effective in bringing change’.104 
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The embrace of opinion leadership as a key strategy of population control had important 
implications for India’s family planning programme, the first of which was that it embraced 
communication scientists’ particular understanding of fertility change. Downplaying 
arguments about the widespread existence of unmet need, and the entrenched relationship 
between fertility levels and socioeconomic contexts, the opinion leader approach opted 
instead for a view of reproduction as a choice alterable through narrow social psychological 
variables, such as the communication channels that existed between people. Another effect of 
the turn to family planning opinion leaders, Savina Balasubramanian has argued, was that it 
gave the population programme a distinctly gendered slant. Ministry guidance had suggested 
that fieldworkers seek out both male and female family planning leaders. In the context of a 
patriarchal social structure, however, wherein males were more likely to occupy positions of 
status and prestige deemed conducive to family planning leadership, the emphasis on leaders 
soon paved the way for a programme geared increasingly towards men. The tendency of men 
to dominate positions of family planning leadership reflected extant social conditions. 
According to Balasubramanian, however, it spoke of prevailing cultural assumptions as well. 
Both population planners and communication scientists, she argues, deemed men not only to 
be more accessible recruits, but also more suitable candidates for the role of family planning 
leader. The key here, she suggests, was a prevailing ‘culture of masculinity’, in which men 
were deemed more capable of the ‘calculative reasoning’ that fertility reduction decisions 
required.105 As will be seen, the entanglement between a communication-based approach to 
population control and an emphasis on male targets would manifest in other ways during the 
1960s, one of which would be the rise of communication campaigns focused explicitly on 
men.  
--- 
The extension approach to family planning comprised more than just interpersonal, opinion 
leader-based strategies. It also embraced mass communication techniques. The drive to 
mobilize mass forms of communication for population control began, to some extent, in 1963 
with the issuance of Ministry instructions to state governments to promote family planning 
through newspapers and other forms of media. It gained added momentum, however, with the 
appointment of Indira Gandhi as India’s new Prime Minister in 1966. Gandhi, a long-term 
advocate of the need for birth control, would quickly set about raising the profile of the 
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population programme within national policymaking circles, establishing, among other 
things, a new and reformed Ministry of Health and Family Planning. Meanwhile, as former 
Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Gandhi would also stress the need for a new 
concerted national campaign to promote family planning through the use of mass media.106 
Here, she would be joined by other powerful voices within her administration, most notably 
Sripati Chandrasekhar, an esteemed demographer and first Minister for Health and Family 
Planning, and Asok Mitra, a senior civil servant and member of the Planning Commission.107   
Developed jointly by the Ministry of Health and Family Planning, the Planning Commission, 
the Ministry Information and Broadcasting and the Ministry of Finance, the government’s 
mass communication campaign sought to mobilize ‘all available mass media' to ‘accelerate 
the pace’ of family planning nationwide.108 By 1968, the programme had grown to 
encompass a dizzying array of media forms. Alongside the supply of 50,000 transistor radio 
sets to rural family planning welfare units, the campaign also included: specialized family 
planning ‘programming cells’ within 22 regional all-India radio stations; the development of 
short family planning films to be shown on the commercial theatre circuit; scripts for song 
and drama performances on family planning themes; advertisements in local newspapers, 
periodicals, billboards, posters and signs; leaflets and pamphlets in 13 languages (6 million 
copies of each); themed postage stamps; and telephone directory advertisements.109 Some of 
these activities were administered centrally. Others, meanwhile, were implemented by states 
using funds allocated by the centre. In some cases, funds allocated for family planning 
communication activities were larger than the state’s total information budget to date.110 
At the head of the mass communication campaign sat Dharmendra K. Tyagi, an Assistant 
Commissioner within the Department for Family Planning and Frank Wilder, a Ford 
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Foundation consultant on mass communication. Tyagi, a civil servant by profession, had 
worked in the field of information and communications development since the early 1950s. 
Wilder, meanwhile, a former journalist and newspaper editor, had served as a 
communications consultant in Cambodia and the Philippines. Together, Tyagi and Wilder 
pioneered what they called an ‘Indian formula for mass communication’. Rejecting 
arguments for a ‘phased approach’ to media messaging, wherein the focus of family planning 
slogans, designs and appeals would change over time, they opted instead for: 
…a message that would be a direct exhortation to have a specific number of children; to 
present this message in the same form in all media; to keep it simple and understandable; and 
to stay with it until everyone knew, through this message, that family planning is legitimate 
and what it means.111 
In the context of widespread rural illiteracy, Tyagi and Wilder argued, ‘simplicity and 
repetition’ would be more effective than an evolving set of messages and symbols. Repetition 
would also provide ‘an illusion of saturation’, and thereby a sense of ‘legitimation’, that 
would help stimulate increased ‘public discussion’ of birth control.112 
The chosen ‘message’ was a basic design known as the ‘four faces’. Comprising ‘the stylized 
front-view faces of a smiling mother and father, a son and a daughter’ accompanied by the 
text ‘do ya teen bachche, bas’ (‘have only two or three children…that's plenty’), the design 
retained simplicity while going beyond a vague appeal to ‘practice family planning’ to 
specify ‘the limits of a “small” family’ as well.113 At the same time, Tyagi and Wilder also 
emphasized the need for a symbol that would ‘communicate, identify and represent’ the 
movement. Here, they struck upon an idea that would become one of the most distinctive 
features of the family planning programme: the ‘Red Triangle’. A simple, unadorned 
vermillion triangle with its apex pointed down, the ‘Red Triangle’ was selected as an original, 
culturally-neutral symbol with no intrinsic meaning or attachment, therefore allowing it to be 
‘identified in people's minds only with family planning and with family planning services and 
products’. It was ‘clearly identifiable’, explained Tyagi and Wilder, and ‘easy to reproduce 
anywhere’.114  
Invariably positioned alongside each other, the ‘four faces’ and the ‘Red Triangle’ would 
become pervasive features of India’s rural and urban landscapes during the late 1960s, 
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appearing in everything from motion pictures, newspaper headers, billboards, posters, cinema 
slides, corporate letterheads, postage stamps and the sides of buses and buildings.115 Tyagi, 
according to one account, displayed a unique level of personal commitment to the symbols of 
the communication campaign, even organizing his own private campaign in which an 
elephant, named ‘Lal Tikon’ (red triangle), marched between villages distributing pamphlets 
and contraceptives to residents. When Tyagi died suddenly in 1970, funeral attendees 
honoured his final wish by showering paper red triangles over his body. As the funeral march 
proceeded, Tyagi’s favourite family planning song played in the background.116 
According to population officials and communication scientists, the promotion of family 
planning through mass media channels would work in tandem with other aspects of the 
extension framework. While helping to convert some ‘early adopters’, it was argued, the 
changes produced by mass messages alone were always likely to be limited in nature. ‘By 
themselves’, explained Indira Gandhi, ‘neither the posters nor the films’ would truly ‘reach 
the hearts of the people’.117 The goal of mass media, rather, was to generate ‘wide public 
awareness of family planning’.118 In doing so, it would ‘feed’ informal channels of 
communication, thereby readying populations for conversion in the interpersonal domain.119 
--- 
The extension approach, then, produced concerted attempts to use communication – both 
interpersonal and mass – to generate acceptance of family planning. But it also gave fresh 
impetus to the enterprise of family planning communications research. During the 1960s, the 
number of institutions conducting FPCAR grew to 13, with new centres established in 
Bhubaneshwar, Hyderabad, Kanpur, Lucknow and Udaipur.120 Here, government-sponsored 
research would continue to probe the relationship between communication processes and 
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reproductive behaviours. Here, India would further cement its status as a laboratory for the 
study of ‘family planning communication’.  
This research proceeded along a number of fronts, one of which was the study of ‘direct 
mailing’ campaigns. Focused on local leaders (in most cases members of a rural panchayat), 
direct mailing campaigns targeted these leaders with a barrage of family planning literature in 
the hope of stimulating the ‘transfer [of] information to others in the village through word-of-
mouth’. ‘The general expectation’, as one social scientist commented: 
…was that this kind of printed mass media [combined] with personal informal channels in a 
community would result in effective diffusion of family planning information, irrespective of 
class and literacy barriers.121  
According to FPCAR researchers, direct mailing campaigns had an ‘unusual potentiality’ in 
the Indian countryside, wherein ‘mail-getting’ still had a particular ‘prestige’ and a notable 
‘psychological effect’. ‘When a villager gets mail delivered at his home by name from an 
agency such as the Department of Family Planning’, explained one: 
…it is likely that he will feel honored, and consider himself associated with the people or 
agency behind the mail. This sensation is likely to make him a part of the family planning 
diffusion system in that village or among his friends and relatives.122  
Targeting areas for direct mailing campaigns, communications scientists then descended 
upon villages to assess residents’ awareness of the information contained in mailed materials. 
What mattered was not whether the inhabitants had read the material themselves – most 
villagers (though not village elites) were assumed to be illiterate anyway – but rather whether 
or not they had gleaned the information through others.  
In areas targeted by direct mailing, researchers argued, villagers showed a marked increase in 
awareness and knowledge about family planning. Moreover, mailing campaigns also helped 
to provoke more ‘public discussion’ about birth control between residents.123 What this meant 
for the actual adoption of family planning in practice was, of course, far from clear. To 
communication researchers, however, evidence that direct mailing had encouraged 
dissemination of information through ‘word-of-mouth’ had inherent significance. By 
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demonstrating that interpersonal communication channels had been activated, it highlighted 













A second strand of family planning communications research concerned the role of ‘acceptor 
communication’. Here, scientists explored the proposition that those who had already 
accepted contraceptive ideas and methods could also act as leading advocates for the 
promotion of family planning more broadly. At FPCAR centres across the country, 
researchers tested this hypothesis by monitoring the behaviour of contraceptive acceptors 
within their local communities. In doing so, they found evidence that the majority of 
acceptors, both male and female, had spoken about their experience with others. Studies at 
the Demographic Training and Research Centre in Bombay, for example, showed that on 
average each female Intra-Urine Contraceptive Device (IUD) acceptor had spoken to five 
other women about their decision.125 
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Mobilizing ‘interpersonal channels’ 
Figure 13. Excerpt from a family planning booklet distributed by direct mailing 
(Source: A Study in Family Planning Communication – Direct Mailing (New Delhi: 




In some cases, research showed that acceptor communication had a directly negative effect. 
Where users had experienced post-acceptance problems such as pain or ill-health, for 
example, this could easily lead to the circulation of damaging rumours about a particular 
contraceptive method.126 Where experiences were positive, however, the tendency of 
acceptors to communicate with others helped to generate both increased awareness and 
increased public discussion. ‘To the extent they are satisfied, adequately informed, and 
[understand] the implications of their acceptance’, explained one study, ‘acceptors’ could be 
‘relied upon as the most effective and widely diffused family planning communication task 
force’.127 Here again, the nature of the connection between awareness and adoption was 
assumed rather than verified. What mattered was that interpersonal channels had been 
mobilized. 
Studies of ‘direct mailing’ and ‘acceptor communication’ sought to understand processes of 
information dissemination within communities. A third strand of FPCAR, however, probed 
the domain of ‘inter-spousal communication’. Here, research revolved around 
communication scientists’ conviction that a key factor in the decision to adopt family 
planning was open interaction between husbands and wives. ‘One element in the 
crystallization of a desired family size’, explained Thomas Poffenberger, a psychologist and 
Ford Foundation consultant on FPCAR: 
…may be verbal communication with others most concerned with the problem, usually the 
spouse. Some idea of how many children one wants may develop but it is unlikely that this 
number becomes a firm attitude until the person has tested this attitude against the opinions 
of other people he regards as important…If there is little communication between husband 
and wife, it is likely that little family planning is taking place.128 
Studying reproductive decision making in a village near Baroda, Poffenberger argued that the 
forms of inter-spousal communication necessary for family planning were, in many cases, 
‘blocked’ by existing social norms. Within the joint family system, he argued, reproductive 
decisions were typically arrived at by the male, acting in consort with both other male 
members and the paternal mother-in-law, with little scope for meaningful dialogue between 
husbands and wives. Unlike reproductive decisions arrived at through husband-wife 
communication, wherein discussion and planning played an important role, reproduction 
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under the joint family setup was, according to Poffenberger, often unplanned.129 For 
Poffenberger, the promotion of effective husband-wife communication thus called for a 
‘gradual weakening of the joint family resulting in closer husband-wife relationships and 
improved communication’.130 Here, the promotion of husband-wife communication doubled-
up as an endorsement of the Euro-American nuclear family as a key factor in proliferating a 
low fertility norm.131  
By connecting family planning decisions to deeper changes in the structure of familial social 
relations, Poffenberger veered away from a narrow social psychological approach to 
population control. In general, however, it was a commitment to asocial thinking that formed 
the backbone of family planning communications research. What linked studies of ‘direct 
mailing’, ‘acceptor communication’ and many other avenues of FPCAR, in other words, was 
a sustained conviction that new reproductive choices could be cultivated not by changing the 
social structure itself, but rather by manipulating social psychological dynamics within the 
existing social fabric. At the forefront of this line of thinking during the 1960s was Dinesh 
Chandra Dubey, a sociologist and researcher at the Central Family Planning Institute (CFPI) 
in New Delhi. When it came to the application of social scientific expertise to family 
planning, Dubey argued, social scientists had the choice of two different approaches. One 
was the ‘development approach’. Those who followed this strategy placed ‘emphasis on the 
role of the socio-economic structure of the society and its institutional framework in 
prescribing norms of human reproduction and fertility’. The second option, by contrast, was 
the ‘direct approach’. This approach concerned itself with the role of ‘intermediate variables’ 
– such as ‘communication’, ‘reference groups’, ‘leadership’ and ‘socially valued goals’ – in 
shaping reproductive choices. Its aim was ‘to study the behaviour in its total context, within 
which individual couples decide to accept or not to accept family planning information and 
services made available to them’. According to Dubey, while both approaches held merit, it 
was the direct approach that ultimately held more promise when it came to the urgent 
challenge of arresting population growth.132 
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Alongside Dubey, the FPCAR programme would play host to a broader coterie of social 
scientists who advocated the direct approach. Significantly, those that studied FPCAR in 
India during the 1960s included not just Indian social scientists, but American 
communication researchers too. Bogue in particular would play a key role in the development 
of FPCAR in India, including studies of direct mailing and studies of acceptor 
communication.133 Everett Rogers, meanwhile, himself now a convert to the mission of 
‘defusing the population bomb’, would use India as a base to test the applicability of his own 
‘diffusion of innovations’ theory to the process of contraceptive diffusion. Claiming that the 
same universalistic pattern of diffusion did apply, Rogers would explore the ways in which 
both mass and ‘informal’ information exchange contributed to the spread and the adoption of 
family planning ideas.134  
As India became a key site for experimentation with direct approaches to population control, 
it also sought to promote these approaches more broadly. In 1975, for example, the National 
Institute of Family Planning, a Ministry of Health and Family Welfare organization, ran a 
series of international training courses on ‘Research in Family Planning Communication’ 
from its base in south Delhi. Supported by Unesco, the courses brought together researchers 
and officials from across South and Southeast Asia in order to ‘exchange, review and learn 
from the experiences of each participating country about the problems and research studies in 
family planning communication’.135 ‘In the field of family planning’ one course document 
explained:  
…especially in the developing countries…an army of researchers disciplined in accepted 
traditional ways, has to be created to tackle the problem of assessing the basic tenets which 
govern the behaviour of a community and steps which will divert its acceptance towards the 
more desirable social norm of a limited family. The factors of diagnostic, communication and 
action research plans must be ingrained as discipline into these workers.136 
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The courses drew attendees from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Republic of 
Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Their basic objective was to 















Communication and coercion in the vasectomy camp 
By the late 1960s, communication science had become an embedded feature of the Indian 
population programme. There was one setting, however, in which the idea that scientific 
communication strategies could instigate new reproductive choices would find its most overt 
expression: the vasectomy camp.  
Vasectomy camps had become an important feature of the Indian family planning programme 
by the early 1970s. Vasectomy operations, for their part, had been a feature of Indian family 
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Promoting ‘family planning communications research’ 
Figure 14. Scenes from an international course on Research in Family Planning Communication hosted 
by the Government of India, 1972 
(Source: Course Report – Vol I: Course on Research in Family Planning Communication, 6 May – 6 June 
1975 (New Delhi: National Institute of Health and Family Welfare, 1975) 
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planning since the programme’s initial ‘clinic’ phase, forming part of the package of 
contraceptive solutions offered by clinics in several states.138 There had also been a notable 
spike in vasectomies performed in clinics and rural health centres following the launch of the 
‘extension’ approach in 1963.139 Beginning in the late 1960s, however, the vasectomy camp 
sought to generate widespread acceptance of vasectomy through the provision of substantial 
surgical facilities in a targeted area over a specific period of time. The decision to focus 
camps on male rather than female sterilization reflected the relative ease and rapidity with 
which such operations could be performed. Unlike time-consuming female alternatives such 
as tubectomy, most vasectomy operations could be performed in under fifteen minutes with 
local anaesthetic.140 Another important factor here was a growing concern regarding the 
health risks associated with the female IUD contraceptive, thereby prompting policymakers 
to place more emphasis on male-centred interventions.141 According to Savina 
Balasubraminan, the rise of the vasectomy camp also reflected prevailing assumptions, noted 
earlier in this chapter, that males represented more likely acceptors of birth control.142  
One of the most important early examples of a vasectomy camp was that held in the district 
of Ernakulum, in Kerala, in December 1970. Coordinated by the District Family Planning 
Bureau together with other branches of local government, the Ernakulam camp took place 
within the grounds of the Cochin amphitheatre and town hall. Here, organizers established an 
extensive field hospital geared towards the conduct of vasectomy operations on a mass-scale. 
Unlike other early vasectomy camps, which sought to take vasectomy to the people in their 
local surrounds, Ernakulam officials opted instead for an approach that took people to the 
vasectomy camp.143 Over the course of a month-long campaign, staff ferried busloads of 
‘patients’ from surrounding towns and villages to the surgical facilities. By the end of the 
campaign, camp surgeons had performed over 15,000 vasectomies, marking what 
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Ernakulam’s District Collector, S. Krishnakumar, would call a ‘tremendous breakthrough in 
India's family planning effort’.144 
Following the success of the first camp, Krishnakumar quickly organized a second, larger 
version in 1972, this time securing the sterilization of more than 63,000 individuals.145 In 
November 1971, meanwhile, a state-wide vasectomy campaign was launched in Gujarat. 
Running for two months, the campaign would see more than 1,000 Ernakulam-style camps 
established, within which a reported 221,933 vasectomies were performed.146 By the middle 
of 1973, with the encouragement of the Department of Health and Family Planning, many 
other Indian states were running camps based on the Ernakulam model.147  
In vasectomy camps, the attempted use of strategic communication to induce family planning 
played out in its most explicit form. In most cases, communication efforts began well in 
advance of the camp itself, with extended periods of publicity and awareness-raising 
throughout the local area. Employing various forms of media, including statements on local 
All-India Radio stations, loudspeaker announcements, wall posters, banners, cinema slides 
and roving cultural performances, these publicity drives drew on the energies of various cells 
of local government, from state information agencies, to health education units, to district 
family planning bureaus. Meanwhile, using data on marriages, ages of husbands and wives, 
and the number of children per household, lists of couples ‘eligible for sterilization’ (those in 
reproductive age with two or more living children) were also prepared. Eligible couples were 
then targeted by ‘squad work’ – house-to-house visits by teams comprising local family 
planning fieldworkers to encourage acceptance of sterilization. The intensity of these pre-
camp ‘publicity and fieldwork’ activities, explained one report, ‘reached a crescendo two 
days before the opening of the camp…reminiscent of a high powered election campaign’.148 
During the camps themselves, publicity efforts were intensified. 24 hours prior to the 
scheduled ‘operation window’ for a given panchayat or municipality unit, officials and 
voluntary workers descended upon the area in droves. Here: 
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…the entire propaganda machinery in the district was concentrated in the particular localized 
area so that no eligible couple could miss the message of family planning. The house-to-
house campaign and squad work were raised to maximum intensity. In addition large public 
meetings were arranged on this pre-operation day in each panchayat, pre-sided over by local 
leaders and, wherever possible, by the members of the legislative assembly from the area. 
Persons who had already undergone vasectomies were [also] encouraged to speak.149 
At Ernakulam, some of these public meetings were attended by as many as 3,000 people.150 
Camp publicity drives placed clear emphasis on the role of interpersonal persuasion in 
motivating individual acceptance of vasectomy. In addition to officials and fieldworkers, 
‘squads’ established for canvassing work in local areas drew on the support of local ‘family 
planning leaders’ and prior contraceptive acceptors, thereby reflecting a belief that the most 
effective form of persuasion lay in individuals known to the community. The emphasis on 
interpersonal communication extended to other aspects of programme organization too. Most 
notable in this regard was the practice of sending would-be acceptors to vasectomy camps in 
groups. By making provisions for individuals from the same community to travel to surgical 
facilities together, it was argued, camp organizers:  
…provided a psychological sense of security and support to each individual, allayed his fears, 
and reinforced his convictions. It took the focus off what, to the individual if he were alone, 
would loom large as a serious surgical interference with his reproductive physiology. The 
presence of friends and acquaintances reinforced the individual's sense that what he was 
doing was socially acceptable.151 
‘Individual motivation’, explained one account, ‘received group support’.152  
For social scientists like D.C. Dubey, the vasectomy camp provided a model of effective 
family planning communication in action. Drawing on interviews conducted at camps in 
Kerala, Haryana, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, Dubey argued that each of the camps had 
succeeded in creating a unique ‘psychological atmosphere’ conducive to the ‘mass-scale 
acceptance of change’. One of the most notable features of the camps, he argued, had been 
their success in stimulating ‘the maximum amount of interpersonal communication’. The 
responses of many interviewees indicated that ‘people had never talked about [vasectomy] so 
freely and frequently’. In particular, the data suggested especially high levels of ‘interspouse 
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communication’, with 79 percent of acceptors reporting that they had discussed the operation 
with their wives.153  
According to Dubey, the effective activation of informal communication had played a key 
role in generating widespread acceptance of vasectomy. 49 percent of those undergoing 
sterilization, he observed, reported ‘operated cases and local non-officials’ as the persons 
who had convinced them most about accepting treatment.154 Meanwhile, interviews with 
acceptors indicated that ‘bringing people in groups to the camp and taking them back in 
groups after the operation’ had indeed provided:  
…opportunity for mutual group reassurance in favor of change. This acceptance in groups 
and the camp approach which created an impression of collective acceptance can be credited 
with making possible the phenomenon of large-scale social change.155 
--- 
The vasectomy camp, then, marked the apogee of the communication-based approach to 
family planning. At the same time, however, it also captured another emerging feature of the 
Indian population programme; namely, its increasingly coercive nature. In the context of the 
vasectomy camp, efforts to generate acceptance through scientific communication ran in 
parallel with methods that looked ever less like communicative persuasion and ever more like 
deliberately planned compulsion. The most important dimensions of this was the use of 
financial incentives.  
‘Incentives’ were a central feature of vasectomy camps. In Gujarat, for example, acceptors 
received not only a basic payment for undergoing treatment (ranging between 65 and 75 
rupees), but also a series of additional ‘payments in kind’ including a free dhoti (male 
garment), a plastic bucket, and a gift bag.156 In its own right, the adoption of raw financial 
incentives signalled a departure from a purely communication-based approach. The camps’ 
incentivization tactics veered still further from persuasion, however, by attempting to steer 
these forms of inducement specifically towards the poor. At Ernakulam, for instance, camp 
planners selected ‘special pockets’ of ‘economic backwardness’ in which they amplified the 
 
153 D.C. Dubey and A. Bardhan, ‘Mass Acceptance of Vasectomy: The Role of Social Interaction and Incentives 
in Social Change’, in Moni Nag (ed.), Population and Social Organization: Proceedings of the 9th International 
Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), p. 302.  
154 Ibid., p. 302.  
155 Ibid., p. 300. On this point see also Dubey, S.C. and A. Bardhan, ‘A Case Study of Faridkot Mass Tubectomy 
Camp’ (New Delhi: National Institute of Family Planning, 1974); and A Bardhan, ‘Some Socio-Cultural 
Processes and Concepts of Importance to Communication’, S.N. 541, Subject Files, AMP, pp. 8-9.  
156 Thakor and Patel, ‘The Gujarat State Massive Vasectomy Campaign’, p. 188.  
241 
 
intensity of their campaigns.157 Guided by an assumption that poor people would be most 
likely to avail of financial reward, these methods consciously pushed sterilization towards 
those for whom acceptance was less a matter of free choice than one of economic necessity. 
Vasectomy camps harboured coercion in other ways. As part of their incentivization 
strategies, most camps offered financial rewards not just to those who underwent sterilization, 
but also to local ‘motivators’ who successfully persuaded others to accept treatment. To camp 
organizers, the incentivization of these individuals promised to harness the power of 
interpersonal factors in mobilizing acceptance. In reality, however, the policy of rewarding 
motivators wedded the incentive system to the deeply unequal power structures at work 
within Indian society. In rural areas, local motivators often turned out to be ‘men of 
influence’; local magnates, such as money lenders or landlords, with the requisite political, 
economic and social power to force people to participate in sterilization drives. In some areas, 
for instance, it was not uncommon for farmers to be refused credit or fertilizer supplies until 
they submitted to motivators’ demands to accept sterilization.158  
These coercive dynamics reflected a broader trend in the Indian family planning programme. 
Indeed, by the early 1970s, coercion had become a deeply engrained feature of Indian 
population control.159 In 1966, the administration of Indira Gandhi had adopted a new policy 
on financial incentives for birth control, thereby increasing their significance within the 
repertoire of techniques used to promote family planning. Backed by a long list of 
international donors, including the Population Council, the Ford Foundation, the World Bank 
and the International Planned Parenthood Federation, the new policy saw central funds 
allocated to states for every tubectomy, vasectomy and IUD insertions performed (40, 30, and 
11 rupees respectively).160 
In the wake of this policy, the late 1960s witnessed a spike in the number of sterilizations and 
IUD insertions. Here, however, the extent to which the incentive-based approach 
compromised the supposedly voluntary nature of family planning decisions was again open to 
question. As many contemporaries were aware, states in which the most dramatic increases in 
sterilization took place, including Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orrisa and Uttar Pradesh, were 
also those in which extreme economic hardship was being countenanced. Bihar, where the 
 
157 Krishnakumar, ‘Kerala’s Pioneering Experiment in Massive Vasectomy Camps’, p. 178.  
158 Cassen, India: Population, Economy, Society, p. 164.  
159 Connelly, ‘Population Control in India’, p. 657.  
160 States were given control over who received these funds – whether patients, ‘motivators’ or programme staff. 
They could also – and some did – supplement them with their own financial contributions. Ibid., p. 656. 
242 
 
year 1966-67 coincided with a third year of drought, leading to famine conditions in many 
parts of the state, was perhaps the most telling example. In that year, nearly 100,000 people 
had come forward to avail of incentive payments, rising to 185,000 in 1968. Contrasted to the 
2,355 operations performed in 1965, before the incentives were introduced, there could be 
little doubt that many were accepting sterilization simply in the hope of avoiding 
starvation.161 As Marika Vicziany has shown, this poverty-adoption nexus was strengthened 
by efforts to keep adopters ignorant about less drastic methods of birth control, while the 
social pressure of local leaders and state officials (as it did in the vasectomy camp) turned 
many adoption decisions into anything but a ‘free’ choice.162 Before and beyond the 
vasectomy camps, then, policies on incentives had thus already helped to forge a programme 
that waged population war not only through ‘communication’, but through knowing forms of 
coercion as well. By the late 1960s, in Vicziany’s words, ‘the myth of voluntarism’ 
surrounding the Indian family planning programme had become increasingly ‘hollow’.163  
Communications scientists could hardly ignore the increasing role of incentives within the 
family planning programme. But the nature of their response was striking. As incentives, both 
within and beyond the vasectomy camp, established a coercive poverty-adoption nexus that 
made poor, illiterate and low caste groups the most likely ‘consenters’ to birth control, one 
might have expected communication experts to critique these practices sharply. In practice, 
however, many did precisely the opposite. Seeing the rise of incentives, many 
communication scientists opted to see these not as an intervention that undermined the 
voluntarism of family planning, but rather as a valuable addition to the communication 
process. 
According to Dubey, the significance of incentives lay in their capacity to affect a process of 
‘cognitive dissonance’ within the individual, one that ultimately made adoption decisions 
more likely. When most Indians had first learned of sterilization, he argued, the idea had 
sparked within them an initial process of dissonance – a contradiction between the idea that 
sterilization was a desirable path and an anxiety concerning its potential impact on their lives. 
In the absence of sufficient information to the contrary, most had achieved ‘consonance’ by 
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‘freezing the issue and relegating it to the back of their minds’. The introduction of 
incentives, however, had provoked reconsideration of the issue, thereby ‘recreating the stage 
of cognitive dissonance’. Here, incentives created a new opportunity for intervention to 
ensure that consonance was achieved not by dismissal, but by adoption instead. Combined 
with the intensive promotional and social persuasion tactics, as seen in settings like the 
vasectomy camp, Dubey argued, many individuals had resolved the dissonance created by 
incentives by ‘taking a positive decision to accept vasectomy this time’.164 Thus: 
…the incentive actually created situations favorable for more intense and fruitful extension 
education…the contention that incentive undercuts or is opposed to the extension-education 
approach does not seem to be true. If anything, the high incentives and mass camps together 
can be credited with having made the theoretical concept of extension education practical and 
a reality… The family planning program functioned in a most democratic way, respecting 
fully the freedom of the individual and faith in his ability.165 
Another who chose to see incentives in this light was Everett Rogers. Like Dubey, Rogers 
was fully aware of arguments regarding the coercive implications of incentives. He too, 
however, opted to emphasize their benevolent communicative role. As he explained in his 
Communication Strategies for Family Planning, incentives provided ‘inducements to change 
behaviour’ and acted as ‘trigger-mechanism’ for those already well-disposed towards family 
planning. More significantly, according to Rogers, incentives also had the capacity to 
‘reverse’ certain aspects of the diffusion process. While the ‘classic’ theory of innovation 
diffusion had emphasized the elite, ‘cosmopolite’ nature of the early adopter, incentives 
altered this pattern by catalysing early adoption among those of lower ‘socio-economic’ 
groups.166 While acknowledging the tendency of incentives to appeal to the poor, however, 
Rogers refrained from describing this as a relationship coercion. Incentives, rather, 
encouraged adoption of family planning ‘by different individuals than would otherwise 
adopt’.167 They provided an ‘important communication-motivation input in family planning 
programs’.168 
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Rogers framed the payment of incentives to motivators in a similar way. On the one hand, he 
recognized the potential for coercive dynamics in the relationship between patients and what 
he called ‘canvassers’. Those influenced by these individuals, he observed, were more likely:  
…(1) to have undergone sterilization without their wife's consent, (2) to be motivated 
primarily by the adoption incentive, rather than to limit family size, and (3) to hold an 
unfavorable attitude toward vasectomy even after adoption. These points suggest a high 
degree of coercion by the canvassers. On all three counts, sterilizations motivated by 
canvassers were of lower “quality”.169  
This had important implications, Rogers argued, because ‘a dissatisfied customer who 
adopted because of pressure from a canvasser is the worst kind of interpersonal advertisement 
for an innovation’. Notwithstanding these concerns, however, to Rogers, canvasser incentives 
also had an important role to play because they encouraged ‘interpersonal communication 
about the innovation with peers’. The ‘motivational’ work undertaken by individuals ‘similar 
to the potential adopter in socioeconomic status, life-style, and attitudes’, he argued, was ‘the 
greatest motivating force for adoption of family planning ideas’. The canvasser was therefore 
‘able to motivate more clients, and different clients, than could the professional field 
worker’.170 Notwithstanding the potential opportunities for coercion, then, canvasser 
incentives also had the potential to ‘accelerate’ the diffusion process by stimulating 
interpersonal, homophilious communications which, according to diffusionist theory, 
produced adoption decisions.  
What Rogers was doing here, argues Vicziany, was applying the classical ‘diffusion of 
innovations’ model to a situation which, in many ways, ‘negated its basic assumptions’. 
According to Rogers, the adoption of sterilization could be understood as one iteration of a 
more general process of innovation diffusion. While this played down the coercive elements 
at work in the incentive-driven acceptance of sterilization, it also overlooked the manifest 
differences between sterilization and the forms of innovation on which the diffusion model’s 
core assumptions had been based. Unlike adopters of hybrid seed corn, acceptors of 
sterilization did not have the opportunity to experiment with the innovation in advance, nor to 
accept it in a piecemeal fashion. Sterilization was instead ‘a single and irreversible 
operation’. When it came to the adoption of sterilization, the ‘cumulative momentum’ 
associated with the diffusion of innovations was also notable by its absence. Rather than 
adhering to Rogers’ gradual ‘s-shaped’ curve, the number of sterilizations ‘fluctuated wildly’ 
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in accordance with both the provision of large financial incentives and circumstances of 
economic distress. By squeezing sterilization adoption into the classical model of diffusion, 
Vicziany contends, Rogers’ approach ignored these fundamental differences. In doing so, it 
deliberately downplayed ‘a more down-to-earth explanation of the effectiveness of incentives 
in a culture of poverty’.171 
Conclusion 
Coercive approaches to population control reached their apotheosis during the Emergency 
period. During this time, the practice of coerced sterilization would seep into almost every 
facet of Indian life. The impetus here came from the top. Identifying population control as 
central to its plans for tackling poverty, in April 1976, the Emergency regime of Indira 
Gandhi adopted a series of new measures that strengthened the coercive tendencies of the 
programme. Now, financial assistance to states was made partly dependent on their family 
planning performance, along with new increases in the incentives paid to sterilization 
acceptors. New permissions allowing states to enact laws to promote sterilization were also 
adopted. The new measures, in turn, set the tone for an increase in the coercive measures 
adopted by states. Some began to offer incentives to civil servants agreeing to undergo 
sterilization; others penalized employees with more than two children. In states across the 
nation, meanwhile, basic services such as access to medical facilities, maternity care, or the 
distribution of ration cards were tied, among other things, to the presentation of a sterilization 
certificate.172 
The Emergency witnessed more than just new coercive policies. In 1976, the Ministry of 
Health and Family Planning set an ambitious national target of 4.3 million sterilizations for 
the forthcoming year. The target, divided between states, set in motion a process of 
downward pressure that produced a dramatic upsurge in the forms of coercion practiced on 
the ground. As state leaders piled pressure on district-level subordinates to meet their targets, 
in many areas, the entire machinery of government became a lever through which acceptance 
of sterilization would be compelled. Here, the sterilization agenda dovetailed with another 
key feature of Emergency-era policy: urban beautification. As slum-dwellers found 
themselves forced out of their erstwhile homes, sterilization would be the price paid by many 
for resettlement. As states competed to set higher and higher targets, the number of 
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sterilizations rose to astonishing levels. In 1976-77 alone, more than 8 million sterilizations 
would be recorded.173 
In later years, the widespread practice of forced sterilization would come to be seen as a 
symbol of the political repression of the Emergency, with the result that coercive population 
control measures would come to be equated with years 1975-1977 alone. Drawing on recent 
histories, this chapter has shown that coercive forms of population control predated the 
Emergency period. In doing so, it has also explored the ways in which these forcible 
approaches received legitimation from prevailing forms of social scientific knowledge.  
Communication science, I have argued, had come to fundamentally reshape the terrain of 
population control in India. Beginning in 1959, as a marginal field of study, family planning 
communications research had soon provided insights that had helped to transform the focus 
of the national population programme. Communications research brought with it a particular 
set of ideas about the way in which a reduction in the birth rate might be achieved. Diverging 
from ‘classic’ demographic transition theory’s claim that changed fertility patterns hinged on 
long-term social and economic variables related to urban-industrial modernization, it also 
took issue with a ‘revised’ transition theory’s suggestion that there existed a widespread 
‘unmet need’ for family planning within ‘underdeveloped’ societies. Instead, communication 
scientists framed low fertility as a norm requiring active cultivation in populations, a process 
possible through the manipulation of more short-term factors – Dubey’s ‘intermediate 
variables’ – foremost among which were the flows of communication between people.   
Population planners’ embrace of communications theory formed part of a broader trend. 
Across the decolonizing world, Arvind Rajagopal has argued, post-colonial elites would turn 
to American concepts of ‘communication’ (as well as communication technologies) ‘as a 
technocratic means for building a modern nation’.174 One result of this, according to 
Rajagopal, was that in nations like India, ‘communication’ became a ‘state subject, liable to 
monopoly control by government’.175 In charting the embrace of communications concepts in 
the context of population control, this chapter has shown how its deep connectedness to state 
aims and objectives produced curious and contradictory effects. As the paradigm of family 
planning communication gained influence, I have argued, it also became deeply entangled 
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with coercive approaches to population control. The rise of coercion took place 
independently of the rise of family planning communication. In contexts such as the 
vasectomy camp, however, these seemingly distinct agendas would soon become inexorably 
intertwined. Framing incentives as just another means of mobilizing interpersonal channels, 
communications scientists would serve to legitimize practices that forcibly imposed 
sterilization upon the poor. Here, the idea of voluntarism, one of the most basic assumptions 





























During the two decades that followed Indian independence, a broad transnational network of 
actors – comprising social scientists, government officials, foundation officers and 
industrialists – undertook to psychologize Indian development. Loosely aligned, and at times 
internally divided, this network of actors was nevertheless united by a shared conviction that 
social and economic progress could be accelerated through applied forms of social 
psychological expertise. From the late 1940s, psychological frames of thinking would come 
to occupy a prominent place within development thought and practice. In doing so, they 
would be applied to a wide range of contemporary concerns.   
Why did a process of psychologized development unfold in post-1947 India? In tracing the 
history of five distinct psychologizing projects, this thesis has suggested a number of reasons. 
Firstly, and most fundamentally, the enterprise of psychologized development must be seen 
as an extension of a more foundational set of convictions embraced by India’s post-colonial 
leaders; namely, those surrounding the concept of ‘development’ itself. The belief that 
society could and indeed should ‘develop’ was, of course, by no means a natural or given 
one. Rather, it was an assumption bearing the deep imprint of Western post-Enlightenment 
thought. During the course of the twentieth century, ideas about development had come to 
occupy a central place within Indian nationalist discourse, in part as a basis through which to 
critique colonial rule. As these ideas carried over the post-1947 watershed, they brought with 
them not just a continued longing for development, but also a belief that development was 
something post-colonial leaders were duty-bound to deliver. As a central feature of post-
colonial discourse, the belief in the imperative of ‘progress’ formed the key intellectual 
justification for each of the programmes and initiatives studied within this thesis. In this 
sense, it provided the essential backdrop against which psychologized development would 
occur.  
Secondly, psychologized development must also be linked to a Nehruvian proclivity for 
scientific expertise. Indian post-colonial leaders did more than just embrace development; 
they also embraced a particular understanding of the ways in which this process might be 
achieved. Society, according to this understanding, was an entity amenable to adjustment 
through scientific intervention ‘from above’. The route to development, by extension, ran 
through technocratic expertise. A Nehruvian affinity for the scientific would manifest most 
clearly in the enterprise of development ‘planning’, wedded as it was to the empiricist models 
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of statisticians and economists. The inclination of contemporaries to adopt psychological 
frames of thinking thus held links to a broader prevailing tendency to approach complex 
social problems through scientific knowledge. That development became a question for 
psychological experts was, then, an outcome deeply in tune with the intellectual assumptions 
of the age.  
Both a desire for development and a faith in the scientific formed key enablers of 
psychologized development. It has been a central argument of this thesis, however, that this 
process had other causes too. Across the spheres of social tension, community development, 
entrepreneurship, management and population control, I have demonstrated, the move to turn 
a psychological lens on society was one shaped significantly by American social science. 
American social science was not, of course, the sole source of psychological forms of 
knowledge. Nevertheless, by the middle decades of the twentieth century, American social 
scientists had emerged as leading exponents for the application of psychologized approaches 
to real-world problems, a move that encompassed not just psychology, but also a broader 
range of American social science disciplines, from sociology, to anthropology, to economics 
and communications science. The rise of psychologized thinking reflected developments 
within mid-century American society, including the widespread mobilization of psychology 
during the Second World War. With the onset of new post-war concerns about the state of 
‘underdeveloped’ regions, many would seek to sell these forms of knowledge as a novel 
brand of development expertise. India, a nation of key symbolic importance in the context of 
the global Cold War, would become a key site in which these processes would unfold.  
There was at least one more reason why development would be psychologized in post-
independence India; namely, the presence of an existing system of psychological training and 
research. At the time of independence, India was a nation with an established network of 
university social science departments, including a number of centres for psychological 
teaching and research. An established base of social science education, rare among 
decolonizing nations, reflected distinct features of India’s colonial experience. What it 
provided, from the perspective of the post-1947 period, was an existing body of Indian 
intellectuals capable of formulating and applying psychological ideas. Indian social scientists, 
we have seen, would play a key role in promulgating ideas and practices of psychologized 
development. In doing so, some would forward their own distinct take on what the goals of 
that process should be.  
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A history of psychologized development has offered new perspectives on the history of 
development in post-independence India. Moving beyond well-worn narratives about the rise 
of economic planning and ‘concrete modernities’, this thesis has traced the trials and travails 
of a network of actors who approached development through a lens different to that typically 
associated with the Nehruvian era. At the same time, a history of psychologized development 
has suggested new ways to think about the transnational connections and influences that 
impacted upon India during this period. Underpinned by tensions between a US search for 
allies against communism and Nehruvian India’s dual commitment to socialism and non-
alignment, it has often been assumed, the decades following Indian independence witnessed 
not so much a period of collaboration between Indian and American actors, but rather a 
gradual process of ‘estrangement’ on both sides. The flows of knowledge and expertise traced 
in this thesis have borne witness to a different story. Notwithstanding frictions and tensions 
pervading the diplomatic arena, forms of scientific and intellectual exchange between Indian 
and American actors represented an important feature of the 1950s and 60s. Here, a history of 
psychologized development has spoken to a broader emerging literature on the entanglements 
between Indians and Americans during the early post-independence decades, one that forces 
us, in turn, to re-think the position of India within the political and intellectual climate of the 
early Cold War. 
--- 
Psychologizing social scientists, both Indian and American, believed firmly that their forms 
of knowledge provided tools for transforming society. In many cases, they also received 
backing from institutions and programmes that shared this view. In spite of these convictions 
and these privileged positions, this thesis has shown, psychologizing projects routinely failed 
to meet expectations. In some cases, their consequences were disastrous. The cases explored 
here have offered few straightforward reasons as to why psychologized development ‘failed’. 
Across each of the five cases, both the nature of this failure and the causes underlying it 
varied considerably. Nonetheless, the thesis has drawn attention to at least some recurrent 
problems running through attempts to pursue development through psychological expertise, 
upon which it is worth reflecting. Firstly, psychologizing approaches suffered from a 
consistent tendency to reduce human behaviour down to narrow social psychological 
variables, thereby ignoring alternative understandings of what led people to act in certain 
ways. In framing social tension as a product of the ‘irrational’ displacement of ‘frustration’ 
onto others, we have seen, tensions researchers gave short shrift to the role of actual lived 
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experiences in the formation of tensed attitudes. By framing fertility as a variable 
manipulable through the social psychological dynamics of ‘communication’, meanwhile, 
communication scientists downplayed the role of broader socio-economic and cultural factors 
in shaping reproductive choices.  
A second challenge facing psychologized development concerned the unintended 
consequences of group-based approaches to social change. For many psychologizing social 
scientists, local group-leader dynamics represented a key vector for development. The crux of 
this, I have demonstrated, was a belief in the power of existing social relations to accelerate 
processes of behavioural change. Group-leader logic would seep into various fields of 
development praxis, from Community Development to population control. But there was also 
a problem here. By emphasizing the potential of groups, leaders, and ‘interpersonal channels’ 
to catalyse change, social scientists oversimplified the actual composition of social relations 
within the units they targeted. In many parts of India, especially rural areas, those approached 
as leaders of cohesive social groups were, in fact, often members of deeply divided, 
hierarchical social structures. Here, working with leaders – whether in the form of ‘natural 
village leaders’ or ‘family planning leaders’ – did little to catalyse bottom-up patterns of 
social change. Ultimately, it made for programmes that worked directly against the interests 
of the lower social orders.  
A third challenge facing psychologized development, I have suggested, was its inability to 
compete with alternative forms of development expertise. In chapter three especially, we saw 
how psychologizing approaches, while finding their own pockets of influence, soon found 
themselves eclipsed by the preference, held by both Nehruvian and Rostovian policymakers, 
for more crudely economistic understandings of development. From one perspective, 
psychologizers depended on economic approaches as intellectual foil for their own 
behaviourist claims. At the same time, the trumping of psychologistic by economistic 
development, demonstrated so clearly in the case of McClelland’s motivational enterprise, 
marked out clear limits to the power of the psychological approach. 
Such were the problems faced by psychologized development. In psychologism’s failure, 
however, there may also be broader lessons. The consistent failure of psychologizing projects 
to deliver on expectations may well have something to say about the wider challenges faced 
by attempts to produce development through technical expertise. Certainly, the notion that 
failure may be a more pervasive feature of expert-led approaches has found expression within 
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a broader body of literature on development, a literature that spans both colonial and post-
colonial approaches.1 Though not delivering on their own terms, this literature has suggested, 
scientific development projects have also served an implicit purpose: by enabling 
governments to map, survey, and intervene in populations, development initiatives have 
provided wide-ranging opportunities for the consolidation and extension of state power. It is 
in part for this reason that the lure of development, despite its perpetual shortcomings, has 
proved so enduring.  
Though providing few clear-cut cases of such expansion, the cases explored in this thesis 
have nevertheless provided some telling examples of the ways in which expert-led regimes 
have served to bolster state power. In the context of Community Development, group-based 
theories helped ultimately to justify programmes that turned local leaders into channels for 
the top-down imposition of state-backed development initiatives. Under population control, 
communication theory provided intellectual justification for government programmes that 
forced sterilization on the people. Significantly, this thesis has also revealed the ways in 
which psychologizing enterprises served as a vector for more insidious forms of power. By 
framing social problems in terms of individual and collective psychology, psychologizing 
provided reason for states, together with other social actors, to reach out and infiltrate 
peoples’ innermost worlds. Techniques such as projective testing and laboratory training, 
meanwhile, provided a serviceable set of tools through which this infiltration could occur. In 
this sense, psychologized development had done more than assist the expansion of 
bureaucratic machineries, it had also helped to foster new forms of elite intervention in 
society, at the centre of which sat attempts to penetrate the individual mind. 
--- 
This thesis has studied the enterprise of psychologized development across the first two 
decades of Indian independence, linking it, in turn, to new forms of cross-border connection 
fostered by the early Cold War. But what was to become of psychologized development? 
There are, it seems, a number of ways in which to answer this question. On the one hand, the 
period from the early 1970s onwards witnessed a gradual decline of this enterprise, at least in 
the form it had taken during the 1950s and 1960s. As a result of numerous controversies, 
including those surrounding the role of American consultants in the population programme; 
 
1 The most influential account being James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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tensions in Indo-US relations surrounding the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War; and the aftermath of a 
1967 CIA-related scandal, the privileged position once enjoyed by American institutions in 
India would wane considerably during the course of the 1970s. In the case of the Ford 
Foundation, damaged relations with the Government of India would lead to significant 
changes in the nature of the Foundation’s activities. While remaining active in India, Ford 
now began to conduct itself with a decidedly lower profile. Its focus, remarked one observer, 
shifted from a concern with ‘American know-how’ to ‘a new emphasis on Indian institutions 
and indigenous research’.2 Ford, we have seen, had been a key player in the drive to apply 
American social scientific knowledge in India. With these changes, that practice would 
gradually subside.  
The enterprise of psychologized development did not disappear altogether. The application of 
psychological knowledge to development had, after all, never been wholly dependent on the 
presence of Americans. As American influences waned, Indian social scientists would 
continue to promote the application of psychological approaches to contemporary social 
problems, from economic development, to education, to political and civil unrest. Here, 
moreover, psychologizing enterprises would also be able to draw upon the resources of a 
burgeoning Indian academic establishment, now grown considerably in size and scope 
compared to that of the immediate post-independence decades. 
As psychologized development continued, it would also become the site of a deeper process 
of change. Freed from the pattern of drawing on American models, Indian social scientists 
would now begin to question the extent to which the theories and forms of knowledge 
promoted by American social science really did have merit in the Indian context. For post-
independence psychologizers, the belief that there existed a common set of rules 
underpinning all human nature had merged easily with the idea that those same rules could be 
comprehended through one, universal body of psychological science. Now, as Indian social 
scientists questioned these universalist assumptions, the corollary was a call for new forms of 
psychological knowledge more suited to Indian social, cultural and psychological realities. 
Beginning in the 1980s, the move to develop an ‘Indian’ psychological agenda was one 
advocated by a broad network of figures involved in psychological teaching and research. 
 
2 Kathleen D. McCarthy, ‘From Government to Grass-Roots Reform: The Ford Foundation’s Population 
Programmes in South Asia, 1959-1981’, Voluntas, 6:3, 1995, p. 301. 
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Significantly, however, some of its leading thinkers were those who had been at the forefront 
of psychologized development during earlier decades. 
Durganand Sinha, the former advocate of motivational approaches to development, was one 
such figure. A process of ‘indigenization’, Sinha would now argue, was necessary in order to 
free Indian psychology from its historic reliance on Western concepts. Such a process, he 
suggested, could take one of two routes. The first was ‘exogenous’, involving the gradual 
adaptation of ‘alien’ frameworks to account for Indian cultural nuances and psychosocial 
realities. The second was ‘endogenous’ involving the turn to ‘Indian’ concepts and traditions, 
including ancient religious texts such as the Vedas and Upanishads, for novel insights into 
human behaviour. Another key proponent of this ‘Indian’ agenda was Jai B. P. Sinha, the 
architect of the Ranchi ‘cube construction’ experiment with which this thesis began. 
In time, then, Indian social scientists would break from the intellectual frameworks that had 
accompanied psychologized development during the post-independence decades. While 
remaining committed to the application of psychology to social problems, they would now 
make the claim that a meaningful contribution of psychological knowledge hinged, 
ultimately, on the production of distinctly ‘Indian’ forms of knowledge. The move to create 
an Indian form of psychological knowledge was nativist in its assumptions. In challenging the 
applicability of Western models of social science, it suggested that there existed a distinctly 
‘Indian’ culture that could be accessed and scrutinized for scientific purposes. The move 
signalled a departure from the approaches of the post-independence years. In both its 
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